UNITED STATES v. McNINCH, DOING BUSINESS AS HOME COMFORT CO., ET AL.
No. 146
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued April 1, 1958.—Decided May 26, 1958.
356 U.S. 595
A. C. Epps and Edwin P. Gardner argued the cause for respondents. On the briefs were Mr. Epps and Charles W. Laughlin for Cato Bros., Inc., et al., and Mr. Gardner and Edward W. Mullins for McNinch et al., respondents.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was argued with Rainwater v. United States, ante, p. 590, also decided today. It involves three separate actions by the Government to recover damages and
In Cato and Toepleman the District Court found the defendants had submitted false claims for crop support loans to the Commodity Credit Corporation, and entered judgment in favor of the Government for the forfeitures provided by the False Claims Act. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that a false claim against Commodity was not a claim “against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof” within the meaning of that Act. The sole question before us, so far as these two actions are concerned, is whether the Court of Appeals erred in so deciding. For the reasons set forth in Rainwater we hold that it did.
McNinch raises different questions concerning alleged false claims against the Federal Housing Administration. By statute the FHA is authorized to insure qualified banks and other private lending institutions against a substantial portion of any losses sustained by them in
The Government‘s complaint in McNinch charged the defendants with causing a qualified bank to present a number of false applications for credit insurance to the FHA.4 The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that it failed to state a cause of action. The District Court granted the motion, holding that an application for credit insurance was not a “claim” within the meaning of the False Claims Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed on that same basis as well as on the alternative ground that a false claim against the FHA was not a claim “against the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof.”
2. Although the problem is not easy, we believe the courts below were correct in holding that a lending institution‘s application for credit insurance under the FHA program is not a “claim” as that term is used in the False Claims Act. We acknowledge the force in the Government‘s argument that literally such an application could be regarded as a claim, in the sense that the applicant asserts a right or privilege to draw upon the Government‘s credit. But it must be kept in mind, as we explained in Rainwater, that in determining the meaning of the words “claim against the Government” we are actually construing the provisions of a criminal statute.5 Such provisions must be carefully restricted, not only to their literal terms but to the evident purpose of Congress in using those terms, particularly where they are broad and susceptible to numerous definitions. See United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537, 542; United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96.
In normal usage or understanding an application for credit insurance would hardly be thought of as a “claim
The False Claims Act was originally adopted following a series of sensational congressional investigations into the sale of provisions and munitions to the War Department. Testimony before the Congress painted a sordid picture of how the United States had been billed for nonexistent or worthless goods, charged exorbitant prices for goods delivered, and generally robbed in purchasing the necessities of war.7 Congress wanted to stop this plundering of the public treasury.8
At the same time it is equally clear that the False Claims Act was not designed to reach every kind of fraud practiced on the Government. From the language of that Act, read as a whole in the light of normal usage, and the available legislative history we are led to the conclusion that an application for credit insurance does not fairly come within the scope that Congress intended the Act to have.9 This question has
now been considered by the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits, as well as by District Courts in those circuits, and all have reached the same conclusion.10
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in McNinch and reversed in Cato and Toepleman and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
I agree with the Court as respects the false claims made against the Commodity Credit Corporation. I disagree as to the claims against the Federal Housing Administration. The allegations are that McNinch and others, having contracted to make alterations and improvements in various homes, presented to a South Carolina bank several fraudulent loan applications. The applications were accompanied by fictitious credit reports and misrepresented the financial eligibility of the homeowners. These loan applications were made with the intent that they be accepted by the Federal Housing Administration for insurance.1 These are the allegations, which for present purposes we must assume are correct.
The statute,
This cheating of the United States is as real, as substantial, and as damaging as those specific abuses against which the managers of this legislation railed when it was before the Congress.2 We do not have to stretch the law to include this type of “claim,” as this form of insurance is a well-recognized property interest. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Arenz, 290 U. S. 66. The obtaining of
