Case Information
*1 Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Krysia Carmel Nelson, NELSON & TUCKER, PLC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Julia C. Dudley, United States Attorney, Jean B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. *2
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Richard Tyrone McMillan of possession of a stolen firearm and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(j) (2006), and possession of a firearm after having previously been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). McMillan was sentenced to ten years of imprisonment for possession of a stolen firearm and fifteen years of imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm, to run concurrently, and now appeals. Finding no error, we affirm.
McMillan first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. This court reviews a district court’s decision to deny a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209, 216-17 (4th Cir. 2006). A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden. United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). The verdict of a jury must be sustained “if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the verdict is supported by ‘substantial evidence.’” Smith , 451 F.3d at 216 (citations omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). *3 Furthermore, “[t]he jury, not the reviewing court, weighs the credibility of the evidence and resolves any conflicts in the evidence presented.” Beidler, 110 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
McMillan argues that the Government failed to
demonstrate that the firearm charged in the indictment was a
firearm within the meaning of the statute because the Government
did not prove that the firearm was not an antique firearm. In
order to prove McMillan possessed a stolen firearm in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), the Government had to demonstrate that
(1) McMillan possessed the stolen firearm; (2) the firearm had
moved in interstate commerce; and (3) McMillan knew or had
reason to know that the firearm was stolen. See United
States v. Moye,
Moreover, the antique firearms exception is an affirmative defense that must be raised by the defendant and supported by evidence before the Government must disprove its application. See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 349 F.3d
109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 2003). As McMillan failed to raise the antique firearms exception in the district court or provide any evidence of its application, the Government was not required to demonstrate that the firearm was not an antique firearm.
McMillan also argues that the Government failed to demonstrate that he knew the firearm was a firearm within the meaning of the statute. However, the Government was not obliged to prove that McMillan knew that the firearm met the statutory definition for a firearm. See United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 561 (4th Cir. 2000) (Government need not prove that defendant knew possession of particular type of firearm was prohibited). In addition, the Government provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that McMillan knew the weapon was a firearm, as that term is commonly used. See id.
*5 McMillan next argues that the Government failed to demonstrate that he knew the firearm was stolen. We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that McMillan knew, or had reason to know, that the firearm was stolen.
Finally, McMillan argues that the district court erred
in instructing the jury by omitting essential elements of the
crimes charged. As McMillan did not object to the jury
instructions in the district court, we review this issue for
plain error. See Neder v. United States,
McMillan argues that the district court failed to instruct the jury on the definition of an antique firearm. However, as noted above, McMillan did not raise the antique firearm exception as an affirmative defense. Accordingly, the *6 Government was not required to prove that the firearm McMillan possessed was not an antique firearm.
McMillan also argues that the district court failed to
instruct the jury that the Government had to prove that he knew
the weapon was a firearm within the meaning of the statute.
However, in order to convict a defendant of a violation of
§ 922, the Government does not need to prove that the defendant
knew that possession of a particular type of firearm was
prohibited. See Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 561; see also United
States v. Jones,
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED