26 F. Cas. 1069 | S.D.N.Y. | 1876
This matter seems to me very plain. The information in this case is based upon a sale and delivery—a removal out of the stoek or possession of the party of a package of spirits, containing not less than five wine gallons. It does not involve a question of receiving, and I see no difference whatever between the law' as it was in 1SG8, and the section ip the Revised Statutes; because in 1868 the provisions in regard to wholesale liquor dealers were precisely the same as they are in the Revised Statutes—that is, that a
Now, it is said that this penalty is imposed only for a neglect or refusal to make entries therein specified; and that, that means that the refusal to make each and every of the above specified entries is necessary, to impose the penalty; and that the penalty cannot be imposed if a man is able, for instance, to make four entries and only makes three of them, that the penalty cannot be imposed for a failure to make four. I do not think the statute is capable of any such construction. I think that is one of those cases where the construction of the statutes is well settled and laid down; that it means a failure to make any of the above entries which he can make. Well, of course, he is not obliged to make entries which it is impossible to make. If he is required to put down in the book the serial number of the package, and it has no serial number on it, why, of course, he cannot put that on it; because there is no neglect or refusal to do what it is impossible to do. There can be no neglect or refusal to do what does not exist. But the meaning of the statute is that he shall do what he can do; that is, he shall enter the day when, the name and place of business of the person or firm to whom, the spirits are to be sent. That he can do. And he can also enter the quantity of spirits. Next is the number of gallons and the proof. If it is utterly impossible, then he is not obliged to do it, but, if he can. he must do it. Then if it is a branch of the statute which is applicable only to domestic spirits, that is incumbent on those
Mr. Sherman.—Do I understand that your honor concurs with the commissioner V
THE COURT—No. I have not said that. I have said that, for the purposes of this case, that decision covers this case. Because this is a case where, as I understand from the proof, Mr. McCullough says that he sold and delivered these spirits from the bonded warehouse. “But the party who receives them into his own private premises,” that is into his store, “or takes them out of the government custody, must enter them in the prescribed book, whether he be the importer or a purchaser from the importer, or from a subsequent owner; and it will be sufficient identification of ‘the place where received’ to designate the particular bonded warehouse.”
Referring to that letter, the commissioner says, in the following March: “So long as your imported spirits remain in the government warehouse, you are not required to enter the same in the wholesale liquor dealer’s book. But when such spirits are re
Mr. Cotterill—If the goods remain in bond, and are not removed by the party who sold them for consumption, is he obliged to enter them in the book?
THE COURT—I think so.
Mr. Cotterill.—He must even then make the entry?
THE COURT—I think so.
Mr. Cotterill.—Then he would be obliged to make the entry in all cases of any importations, if he received the goods?
THE COURT.—I think so under the law, and under the laws of the warehouse act, which I have had occasion recently to examine in other cases, and which gives to the importer the privilege of designating the warehouse, I think the place where, after he imports those goods into this country, he puts those goods for safe-keeping, for his own convenience, are his premises, for the purposes of this suit; and that he receives those goods within the meaning of this statute, whether he puts them in his own store, or whether he puts them in a bonded warehouse, for the purpose of having the privilege of not paying the cash down for the duty, for the purpose of waiting to see whether he can satisfactorily sell them to somebody who will pay the duties, and thus relieve him from the necessity of paying them, or, if you please, getting a drawback for export, he substantially receives them. Because somebody must receive them. They are imported into this eountry, so they are received by some one; they are received by the importer; they are received by the consignee; they are received by the owner. This statute, however, is limited to a person who is a wholesale liquor dealer, and does not apply to anybody else. This statute applies to a person who “sells or offers for sale foreign or domestic spirits,” according to this definition, “in quantities not less than five wine gallons at the same time.” 1 see no greater hardship imposed upon these gentlemen who deal only in foreign stuff, than there is imposed upon those gentlemen who deal solely in domestic; not a particle. Practically, there is no greater duty imposed upon the one than on the other. There is nothing that this dealer in foreign spirits is required to do over and above what the domestic man is required to do. I should think it was just the other way. The domestic man is required to do more because he can do more. What I mean to < say, is, there is no inequality in the law that requires the foreign man to do something in addition to anything, that the domestic man can do. Therefore, there is no inequality in the law, none whatever. And when you find it as a branch of the law, which always, from the commencement, has required that' the person who sells, or offers for sale, these foreign spirits, in terms, shall pay this one hundred dollars, the same as the man who offers for sale domestic spirits, it is perfectly clear that to keep up a uniform system, these provisions ought to be applicable to both classes, as congress has made them.
Mr. Cotterill.—I understand the court to state, that the entry should be made at the time the goods were received. May it not be a very serious question as to whether the goods are received?
THE COURT.—I cannot Imagine now all possible cases. I believe the law declares that as soon as the goods arrive within the district, they are subject to duty.
Mr. Cotterill.—Of course, but they are in the custody of the collector. May not the term “receive” apply to that particular time when the importer withdraws the goods for consumption? Is not that the time that he receives his goods?
THE COURT.—No, sir; I think not. I think there would be confusion. He should be considered as receiving them when he puts them into the bonded warehouse. But that is a matter of latitude. The designation of a bonded warehouse is an act of potential control over the goods, and it seems to me that you may fairly assume that he receives the goods when, instead of putting them on a car and carrying them- to his own shop or store, he says. “Put them in the bonded warehouse,” that then he receives them by putting them into that bonded warehouse. That is a privilege which has always attached under the warehouse act. The importer has the privilege of designating the warehouse, as all these warehouse acts are matters of privilege. But for that the government would require, and for years did before we had the warehouse system, that the duty should be paid immediately
Mr. Cotterili:—Having received them at at that particular time, suppose the importer afterwards sells them in bond; they might be successively sold in bond, and the entries would bear just this evidence of those transfers.
THE COUBT.—Exactly, and, I think, in that same connection, that is a fair and reasonable interpretation of the statute, when it says, “at the time of sending out -of his stock or possession any spirits, and before the same are removed from his premises.” I think it is a fair and reasonable interpretation, that when he sells them in bond, and they stay in bond, that is, sends them out of his stock, they are no longer in his stock; and, notwithstanding, the mere fact that the other man does not choose to remove them from that bonded warehouse, and take them to another bonded warehouse, but chooses to leave them in that bonded warehouse, still that bonded warehouse ceases, by that act of the transfer of the goods, to be the premises of the vendor; they become the premises of the vendee. And that is a symmetrical system, it seems to me, and a system that can take care of itself.
Another fact that occurs to me as having great force is, that while it is, of course, an additional trouble to these gentlemen to make the entry, and while this law is subject, as all other revenue laws are, to this suggestion, that revenue officers may abuse it, yet so long as this system of a tax on domestic spirits exists, so long as we have so many of these spurious imitations of foreign spirits, it seems to me that this system is one which is quite as much for the benefit and protection of these gentlemen, who deal solely in genuine foreign spirits, as1 for the protection of anybody else; because it enables them to have a record of the spirits they have dealt in, and that if at any time the allegation is made that they have been dealing in domestic spirits which are fraudulent, and have not paid the tax, why, they have a record kept for themselves to which they can refer from time to time, to show precisely what spirits they have been dealing in, and have been sending out; and, therefore, it seems to me that, properly looked at, is a law which is for their benefit and protection decidedly, and ought to be looked at in that view.
I ought to add another thing, that my views on this subject are strengthened by this fact: that while this special tax on wholesale liquor dealers applies to anyone who sells or offers for sale foreign or domestic spirits or wines, that the provision in this section in regard to this case, applies only to spirits, and does not apply to wines.
With the views I have suggested, it seems to me that the government intended to have a record of both foreign and domestic spirits, for the purpose of indicating the facts in regard to them.