*1 UNITED STATES v. MAZE Argued No. 72-1168. 13-14, November January 8, Decided J., opinion delivered Rehnquist, Court, which Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, JJ., joined. and Powell, Burger, J.,C. filed dissenting opinion, J., post, a joined, in which White, p. J., dissenting 405. filed White, opinion, J., in which Burger, C. JJ., post, joined, p. Blackmun, BreNNAN 408. cause for the argued
Jewel S. Lafontant Bork, General As- were Solicitor On the brief States. *2 Petersen, Jerome M. Feit. Attorney General and sistant Warner, appointment Court, post, by William T. respondent. filed a brief for the cause and p. 997, argued Rehnquist opinion of the delivered Justice Mr. Court. Thomas E. Maze moved February respondent
In apartment and there shared an Louisville, Kentucky, to year In of that spring L. Meredith. with Charles thoughts of the turned to respondent’s fancy lightly (cid:127) Meredith’s sunny thereupon and he took Southland, and headed for and his 1968 automobile BankAmericard presenting the BankAmericard By California. Southern respondent obtained food signing name, Meredith’s and California, Florida, and at motels located lodging and to establishments transmitted Louisiana. Each of these Co. in Louis- Fidelity Bank & Trust the Citizens Meredith, the BankAmericard ville, which had issued and services furnished representing goods the invoices re- day after meanwhile, on the respondent. Meredith, Louisville, notified the Louis- spondent’s departure from had been stolen. ville bank that his indicted to Louisville he was Upon respondent’s return mail fraud on four counts of violation of the federal S. C. and one count of violation statute, § U. Dyer 2312. The Act, of the S. C. mail fraud charged respondent counts of the indictment that had devised a scheme to defraud the Louisville bank, Charles L. Meredith, and several merchants different States by unlawfully possession of the obtaining BankAmericard issued bank by Louisville Meredith, using the card goods to obtain and services. The indictment charged respondent had goods obtained and services specified four Meredith's Bank- by presenting motels payment
Americard for to be representing himself Meredith, and that respondent knew that each merchant would slips purchases cause the sales to be de- livered mail to the Louisville bank which would in turn mail them to Meredith for payment. The indict- ment also charged delay in this mailing would respondent enable the to continue purchasing goods and appreciable services for an period of time.
Respondent
jury
tried
in the United
was
States
District Court for
Kentucky.
the Western District of
trial, representatives
At
four
identified the
motels
sales invoices from the transactions on
Bank-
Meredith’s
Americard which were forwarded to the Louisville bank
*3
by
An
their motels.
official of the Louisville bank testi-
fied
that all
the sales invoices for those transactions
by
were received
the bank
due course through the
mail, and that
customary
this was the
method
which
invoices representing
purchases
BankAmerieard
were
transmitted to the
bank.
jury
Louisville
The
found
respondent guilty as
on all
charged
counts, and he
appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. That court reversed
the judgment as to the mail fraud
but affirmed
statute,
it as to the Dyer Act.
fraudulent petition granted we the Government’s statute,2 fraud (1973). 411 963 For the reasons stated certiorari. U. S. Appeals. affirm the Court of judgment we below, provide mail parts of the fraud statute applicable The as follows:3
“Whoever, having
intending
devised or
to devise
obtaining
defraud,
scheme or artifice to
or for
any
2
Appeals
Tenth
decision of the Court of
for the
Circuit
Lynn,
(1972), appears
with
United States
v.
461
2d 759
consistent
F.
in the instant case. Five other
decision of the Sixth Circuit
g.,
E.
United
contrary
apparently
appeals
take a
view.
courts of
Kellerman,
(CA2),
denied, 400
States
v.
In Pereira v. 1, 347 U. (1954), 8-9 Court held that one “causes” the mails to be used where he “does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended . . . .” We assume, as did the Court of Appeals, that the evidence support would a finding that jury Maze “caused” the mailings of the invoices signed he from the out-of-state motels to the Louisville bank. But the more question difficult is whether mailings these were sufficiently closely related respondent’s to bring scheme his conduct within the statute.4 such matter or thing, shall be fined $1,000 not more than impris-
oned not more years, than five or both.” 18 U. S. C. 1341. § 4 The Government indicates in 1969 it was estimated that more than 300 million consumer credit cards were in circulation, with charges annual $40 between billion $60 billion. It also was estimated that, 1969, 1.5 million cards were stolen, lost or losses due to fraud $20 had risen from million $100 in 1966 to million in 1969. Brief for United 2, States 14 n. citing 115 Cong. (1969). Rec. 38987 statute, mail fraud first enacted 1872, c. 335, 301, 17 Stat. obviously while not directed at credit card such, frauds as is sufficiently general in language its include them requirements if the of the statute are otherwise met. *5 statute, mailing
Under the
the
pur-
must be “for the
pose
executing
the scheme,
requires,”
as the statute
States,
Kann v. United
323 U. S.
but
(1944),
“[i]t
necessary
is not
contemplate
the scheme
use of
the mails
element,”
as an essential
Pereira v. United
States,
Pereira,
at
supra,
8. The Government relies on
supra, and United States v. Sampson,
(1962),
“The fruition. scheme each case had reached persons had money intended to receive the received it irrevocably. them, It was immaterial any or to consummation of the how the scheme, paid bank which credited check would collect from the drawee bank. It cannot be said mailings question purpose were for the of execut- ing the scheme, as the statute requires.” S., 323 U. at 94. Parr,
In supra, charged, the defendants were inter .alia, having with obtained gasoline products and other and services for their own purposes the unauthor- ized use of a gasoline credit card issued to the school district which employed them. The oil company which furnished products and services to the defendants would *6 mail invoices to the school district for payment, and the school district's payment was made check sent in the mail. Relying on Kann, the again Court found that there was not a sufficient connection between the and mailing the execution of the defendants’ scheme, because it was immaterial to the defendants how the oil company went about collecting its payment.
The defendant in Pereira, supra, was charged with having defrauded a wealthy widow of her property after marrying her. The Court describes the of conduct de- fendant in these words:
“Pereira asked his then
if
wife
she would join him
in the hotel venture and advance $35,000 toward
the purchase price of $78,000. She agreed.
It was
then agreed, between her and Pereira, that she would
sell some securities that
possessed
she
in Los An-
geles, and bank the money in a bank of his choosing
in El Paso. On June 15, she received the check for
$35,000 on the Citizens National Bank of Los An-
geles from her brokers in Los Angeles, and gave it
to Pereira, who endorsed it for collection to the
State National Bank of El Paso. The check cleared,
and on June 18, a cashier’s check for $35,000 was
drawn in favor of Pereira.”
We do not believe that Sampson sustains the Govern- ment’s position. The subsequent mailings there were designed to lull the victims into a false sense security, postpone their ultimate complaint to the authorities, and therefore make the apprehension of the defendants less likely than if no mailings had taken place. But the successful completion of the mailings from the motel owners here to the Louisville bank increased the proba- bility that respondent would be detected and appre- hended. There was undoubtedly delay in transmitting invoices to the Louisville bank, as there is in physical transmission of any business correspondence between *8 cities separated by large distances. Mail service as a means of transmitting such correspondence from one city to another is designed to overcome the effect of the distance which separates the places. But it is the distance, and not the mail service,7 which causes the time lag in the physical transmission of such correspondence.8 7Since we are admonished that may we not judges as ignore what we know men, as we do not wish to be understood as suggesting that delays in mail service are solely attributable to the distance involved. If the Postal appears Service on occasion to be something less than a 20th century version of the wing-footed Mercury, the fact remains that the invoices were mailed to and were ultimately by received the Louisville bank. 8Distance is not the only cause of delay. The Court of Appeals
noted that BankAmericard had a billing system in which billing was to an amendment passed recently only has Congress the criminal makes which Act9 Lending in the Truth “trans- in a credit card obtained fraudulently aof use period a one-month receipts over collecting by aceomplished reason- might It 2d, 535. 468 F. the card holder. billing then interstate of used facilities himself respondent that argued ably be large dis- the scheme, executing since his purpose of the for travel from one another from defrauded motels the separating tances appre- difficult it did make more probably bank Louisville .the in enterprises Louis- local simply defrauded if he had him than hend of the facilities of cast, not terms of use is statute the ville. But the mails. of use of travel, terms but in interstate provides: C. 1127, 15 U. S. § 84 Stat. Volume commerce, foreign affecting interstate or “Whoever, in transaction a stolen, lost, or altered, forged, fictitious, counterfeit, any uses services, or goods or card to obtain fraudulently obtained more, $5,000 be shall aggregating retail value both, having a. years, than imprisoned not more five $10,000 or than not more fined or both.” Congress the Appeals enactment of felt that the of
The Court legis- a Lending Act manifested Truth to the above amendment be excluded card fraud schemes-were judgment that credit lative the offender mail statute “unless fraud application of from the accomplish his scheme.” the mails to purposeful of makes a use 2d, F. at 536. indicates passage of the amendment that the
Respondent contends fraud was not in 1970 credit card Congress believed that Respondent 1341 or under 18 U. S. C. otherwise. federal crime history of the amend- passage legislative also notes that Senate, original bill, as ment enacted indicates jurisdictional limitation. Senate-House no amount The contained request Justice, conferees, Department later added at the purchases jurisdiction of federal under section the limitation $5,000. Respondent 16-21. exceeding Brief Appeals erred in the Court contends that Government *9 amendment, urging that is significance to the 1970 there attaching provisions Congress to be sole no indication intended its frauds. prosecution of credit Brief vehicle for federal action affecting interstate or foreign commerce.” 84 Stat. 1127, 15 U. S. C. § 1644. Congress could have drafted the mail fraud statute so as to require only the mails be in fact used as a result of the fraudulent scheme.10 But it did not do this; instead, it required that the use of the mails be “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice ...” Since the mailings in this case were not for that purpose, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Mr. Justice White joins, dissenting.
I join in the dissent of Mr. Justice White which follows but add a few observations on an aspect of the Court’s holding which seems of some importance. Sec- tion 1341 of Title 18 U. S. C. has traditionally been used against fraudulent activity as a first line of defense. When a “new” fraud develops constantly —as happens— the mail fraud statute becomes a stopgap device to deal United States 33-37, citing United v. States Beacon Co., Brass 45 (1952).
We deem it unnecessary to determine the significance of passage of the amendment, since we conclude without resort to that fact that the mail fraud statute does not cover the respondent’s conduct in this ease. 10We are admonished The Chibe Justice in dissent that the “mail fraud statute must remain strong to be able to cope with the new varieties of fraud” which threaten “the financial security of our citizenry” and which “the Federal Government must be ever alert to combat.” We believe that under our decision the mail fraud statute remains a strong and useful weapon to combat those evils which are within the broad reach of its language. If the Federal Government is to engage in against combat fraudulent schemes not covered statute, it must do so at the initiative of Congress and not of this Court.
406 until phenomenon, new the with basis temporary
on a passed and developed be can legislation particularized of passage the to “Prior evil. the with directly deal to prosecutions criminal most Act, 1933 [Securities] the under brought were transactions securities fraudulent Criminal Mathews, Fraud Statute.” Mail Federal the and Laws Securities Federal the Under Prosecutions of SEC Development and The Nature Statutes: Related (1971). 901, L. Rev. Wash. 39 Geo. Cases, Criminal of 18 by means justice to brought were Loan sharks Under Prosecuting Loan Sharks 1341, Lynch, §C. U. S. (1945), L. Rev. 14 Ford. Statute, Mail Fraud the interstate the recognized 1968, Congress, before federal provide need to the loansharking and character activity, and crime organized this against protection outlawing extortionate seq.¡ et §C. 891 18 U. S. enacted protect inadequate Although of credit. extensions mail fraud fully, the public investing buying with frauds connected against breach in the stood statute until undeveloped real estate, sale burgeoning land sales problems examine could Congress Land Interstate Sales into law industry pass seq. 1701 et Act, U. C. 82 Stat. Full Disclosure Full Sales: of Land Regulation Welch, & Federal Coffey Res. L. W. Earth, 21 Case Comes Down Disclosure fraud statute was the mail Similarly, (1969). Rev. Congress moved fraud, before stop used to 15 U. S. C. passing particular protection provide § 1644. impor- an to remain mail statute continues fraud in those areas where frauds prosecuting
tant tool directly addressing more passed has been legislation pages fraud fill secu- conduct. counts fraudulent Mail today. supra, 39 Mathews, fraud indictments even rities pervasive Rev., Despite L. Gov- Wash. 911. Geo. ernment regulation of the drug industry, postal fraud statutes still play important an role in controlling the solicitation of mail-order purchases by drug distributors upon based fraudulent misrepresentations. Hart, The *11 Postal Fraud Statutes: Their Use and Abuse, 11 Food Drug Cosm. L. J. 245, 247, 261 (1956). Maze’s inter- state escapade which there are numberless —of counter- parts that —demonstrates federal mail fraud statute should place have a in dealing with fraudulent credit card use even with 15 U. S. §C. 1644 on the books.
The criminal mail fraud statute must remain strong to be able to cope with the new varieties of fraud that the ever-inventive American “con artist” is sure to develop. Abuses in franchising and the growing scandals from pyramid sales schemes are but some of the threats to the financial security of our citizenry that the Federal must Government be ever alert to combat. Comment, Pyramid Multi-Level or Systems: Sales Fraud or Free Enterprise, 18 S. D. L. Rev. 358 (1973).
The decision of the Court in this case should be viewed
as limited to the narrow facts of Maze’s criminal adven-
on
tures
which the Court places so heavy a reliance, and
to the Court’s seeming desire not
to flood the federal
courts with a multitude of prosecutions for relatively
minor acts of credit card misrepresentation considered
as more appropriately the
of
business
the States. The
Court of Appeals, whose judgment
today
is
affirmed, was
careful to state that
do
“[w]e
not hold that the fraudu-
lent use of a credit card can never constitute a violation
of the mail fraud statute.”
Until invoices separate sales four causing knowingly case— issued had the bank by merchants be mailed a scheme furtherance of stolen BankAmericard card without using the bank to defraud have credit—-would securing falsely authorization *12 fraud under as mail punishable offense criminal been a misreading this By no more. But C. 1341.1 18 S.U. fed- unambiguous an giving prior decisions and Court's majority reading, the unrealistic an criminal statute eral a fraudulent the statute the reach beyond places until after consummated by law is not that scheme cen- as a the mails utilizes used, that have been mails 1 1972), Kelly, (CA7 262 F. 2d g., States v. 467 United See, e. Madison, 2d 458 F. v. (1973); United States denied, 933 411 S. cert. Chason, States v. United (1972); denied, 859 409 U. S. (CA2), cert. 974 (1972); United denied, 1016 1971), 405 U. S. (CA2 cert. 2d 301 451 F. denied, 400 U. (CA2), Kellerman, cert. 2d 319 431 F. States v. (CA5 1970); Thomas, 2d States v. 429 407 United (1970); F. denied, 1969), (CA9 cert. Kelem, F. 2d 346 States v. United (CA5 2d 137 v. 312 F. Adams (1970); 397 U. S. 1963). least five prior majority recognizes to this decision that by contrary reached that appeals a view had taken courts Appeals in this Ante, Court of 2. The at 398 n. below.
the court 1972), (CA10 Lynn, F. 2d 759 United States upon v. case relied plan allege de- case did not but the indictment issuer. card the credit holder or authorized frauded tral, necessary instrumentality in its perpetration, and that demands federal investigatory prosecutorial and re- sources if it is to be effectively checked. I Because can- not subscribe to the majority’s or the reasoning result it I reaches, dissent. “part
As of his scheme and artifice to defraud,” respond- ent was charged with “obtain[ing] property and services on credit through the use of” an unlawfully possessed “by BankAmericard and means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations promises and . . . .” App. 5, 6. The property and services were obtained from Citizens Fidelity Bank and Company Trust of Louisville, Kentucky, BankAmericard licensee, Charles Meredith, the authorized card holder and user, and various per- sons and business concerns “which had previously en- tered agreements into with BankAmericard to furnish property services on credit to the holders of Bank- Amerieards . . Id., . .” at 6. The indictment also charged that the mails played an indispensable role respondent’s fraudulent activities:
“It was a further part of his scheme and artifice to defraud that the defendant would and did ob- tain property services on credit through the use of BankAmericard [the] ... charging pur- chases on credit, well knowing at the time that bank copies of the sales invoices recording these purchases be, would and were, delivered mail to *13 Citizens Fidelity Bank and Trust Company, Louis- ville, Kentucky, according to the directions thereon for posting the BankAmericard account of Charles L. Meredith, that copies of these sales invoices, to- gether with bill for the accumulated charges, would subsequently be mailed- in the normal course of business to Charles L. Meredith; and that the delay inherent in this posting and mailing would enable 410 with purchases to make to continue
the defendant scheme and . . . before his BankAmericard [the] Id., at 6-7. could be detected.” to defraud artifice I pur- the “for of the mails use proscribes Section court The trial fraudulent scheme. executing” a pose of on convict it could jury had instructed alia, that inter found, if it only fraud counts mail four out the scheme carry were in fact used “the mails reasonably foreseeable. of the mails was the use and that a fraudulent not disclose on its face matter need The mail intended only need be purpose, but representation App. to defraud.” carrying in out the scheme to assist added). trans- Viewing each fraudulent (emphasis respondent time received as consummated at the action sales exchange signing in the BankAmericard goods did Appeals respondent held that drafts, the Court subsequent mailings purpose “for the not cause the executing 529, his fraudulent scheme.” 468 F. 2d acknowledged (emphasis original). The court below issuer and against that “the fraud was directed the card holder,” the card but it nevertheless concluded that respondent’s. “As far as perspective relevant was [re- complete spondent] was his transaction was concerned, motel; subsequent billing when he checked out of each ‘incidental and collateral to the scheme and merely was ” Id., Kann v. United part 534, quoting not a of it.’ (1944). U. S. this unneces- majority uncritically has embraced sarily approach construing restrictive statute. upon seized Appeals, selectively Like the Court of has it language prior pursuit in our of its notion decisions respondent duped fraudulent scheme ended when
the motels into giving him goods and services on credit.
We
told,
are
for example,
in Kann,
as
supra, where
were
mails
used to deliver checks drawn from a
dummy corporation
part
as
of a scheme by corporate
officers to defraud their own corporation, that the scheme
here “had reached fruition,” that
the person “intended
[goods
receive the
had received it
services]
ir-
revocably,”
it
was “immaterial
...
con-
any
summation
the scheme” how the sales invoices were
forwarded
the motels to the issuing bank for payment
and billing to
holder, and
so-called billing
process was, as previously noted, “incidental and col
lateral
to the scheme and
a part
not
of it.” 323
S.,U.
95. “Therefore,
if
only
the mailings were 'a part of
the execution of the
or, as we said in
v.
Pereira
fraud/
States,
United
What the majority overlooks is the salient fact that fraud this case—and most others involving un- authorized use of credit cards—was practiced on the card issuer and not on the individual merchants who furnished lodgings and meals to respondent. As the of Appeals Court itself recognized, “[t]he merchants who honored the BankAmericard were likely insulated from under loss their agreements with BankAmericard. See Brandel & Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 1033, 1040 (1971).” 468 F. 2d, at 534 n. 3.2 Here, then, the fraud was ulti- 2Almost all of the bant systems credit card presently in operation country rely this upon three-way a transaction between the card issuer, the cardholder, and subscribing retailer. tripartite This arrangement credit card basically separate entails three contractual *15 upon mately perpetrated not issuer and credit card the “part ex of the the The mails thus became merchant.3 v. United the fraud . . . Kann ecution of agreements: issuing card the (1) the credit and between bank the system (2) in the cardholder; one of the banks between individual (3) merchant and the card- merchant; and between the and a local Card Trans- generally Comment, Tripartite The Credit See holder. (1960). Legal Infant, A action: 48 Calif. L. Rev. 459 many parties system is important to such a “The most of the charge public. The issuer- cards the bank which issues to person to bank an account on behalf of the whom establishes agreement governs issued, an which card is and the enter into two under agreement relationship. establishes a line of credit their This by obligations a cash may the issuer incur which the cardholder through goods one of the purchase or from a of services advance merchant-members. requiring agreement the banks an with also have “These merchants member-bank, and charge a cards issued all them to honor evidencing slips sales to cardholders enabling deposit them he has reached which ordinary checking bank with account at the an to that account. credit agreement a discounted an in return for interchange through an slips forwarded These are then cleared originally the card issued which system the member-bank card- periodically. billed will be cardholder from which a full within payment in make whether to then decide holder must payment and charges, defer or to specified free of finance period, billed.” the amount percentage of charged ultimately an extra be Problems, Ford Contemporary Comment, Bank Credit Cards — omitted). (1972) (footnote 373, 374 ham L. Rev. dictated parties is relationship legal between the Because the governs the agreements, contract respective their the terms the merchant between frauds for credit of risk distribution exceptions for systems, certain with Under most and. the issuer. expired an he honors if merchant part of the negligence on a if he makes “stop list” or appearing current on the card or one line, the the cardholder’s in excess for amount sale an Legal-Empirical A Murray, frauds. risks all issuer assumes Cards, L. 21 U. Miami Credit Use Study Unauthorized Distributing Fraud Note, Cards: Credit (1967); 811, 813 Rev. supra, at 95. Indeed, they were "an essential element” and not merely “incident to an essential part of the scheme . . . Pereira v. United States, 347 1, (1954).
Nor had respondent’s plan reached fruition. For his part, he may very well not have schemed beyond ob- taining the goods and services under pretenses false with a stolen credit card. But from legal standpoint of criminal fraud, this was only the first and certainly “not the last step in the fraudulent scheme. It
was a continuing venture.
. . . The use of the
Loss, 77 Yale L.
1418,
J.
1420 (1968); Comment,
Tripartite
Credit Card Transaction,
mails ... chopping up justified, are not project. lent We part isolating one segments into scheme if the be warranted That would from the others. But [only to defraud merchants]. scheme were had a wider reach plain plans these it is not they the mails would but for the use of Kann v. United finally been consummated.” have States, supra, J., dissenting). (Douglas, actually that was card-issuing it was the bank Since purpose “for the defrauded, employed the mails were . .” executing scheme . . [the] II realization of The mails further contributed to the creating delay respondent's fraudulent scheme detecting results from the necessarily fraud that time-consuming invoices processing of credit card Chason, mail. See States v. 2d 303- 451 F. 304 (CA2), denied, (1971). During cert. U. S. two-week, his $2,000 spending transcontinental spree, respondent took full advantage of this *17 delay inevitable to continue his unlawful activities. If the motel owners had employed an instantaneous identification or verification system, respondent's scheme fraudulent likely would most have been nipped in the bud. But the simple truth of the matter is that they did not. As a direct consequence of the prevailing business practice of mailing invoices to the issuer for subsequent billing to the card holder and system’s attendant time delays, respondent was able to buy valuable time to postpone detection and thereby execute his scheme.
The majority mysteriously ignores prior decisions that 18 U. S. C. 1341 reaches “cases where the use of the mails is a means of concealment so that further frauds
which
part
are
of the scheme may be perpetrated.”
Kann v.
United
supra, at 94 — 95. See United
States v. Hendrickson, 394 F. 2d
(CA6
1968),
cert. denied,
“We are unable to find anything either the Kann or the Parr case which suggests that the Court was laying down an automatic rule deliberate, planned use of the mails after the victims’ money had been obtained can never be ‘for the purpose of executing’ the defendants’ scheme. Rather Court found only that under the facts those cases the schemes had been fully executed before the mails were used. And Court of Appeals decisions ren- dered both before and after Kann have followed the view that subsequent mailings can in some provide circumstances the basis for an indictment under the mail fraud Id., statutes.” (footnote omitted).
As previously indicated, the indictment here charged respondent knew that the delay inherent in the posting and mailing of the credit card invoices would enable him to continue making purchases with the pur- loined card before his criminal conduct could be detected. Respondent engaged in a criminal enterprise that is *18 very its nature short-lived. Every time delay in the 416 slips allows card forged credit of the receipt holder’s
card part, my For longer. much to continue the scheme 1341, C. § 18 U. S. crime under a charged the indictment beyond guilt respondent’s established Government and the doubt. reasonable a
Ill beyond far has ramifications decision majority’s In this conviction. criminal of a lone the mere reversal increasingly Americans are society, “cashless” era day-to-day. their of credit cards resorting to the use million credit well over Today purchases. consumer $60 exceed charges and annual circulation, are in cards lost cards were 1.5 million credit alone, In 1969 billion. mil- exceeding $100 in fraud losses stolen, resulting esti- (1969). Current Rec. 38987 Cong. lion. as put are fraud losses annual credit card mates of Cards: Cleveland, Bank Credit $200 million. high as Banking L. J. Merchants, Users, Issuers, majority, only by result reached (1973). Under the by covered exceeding $5,000 frauds those federal criminal subject 1644 will be C. jurisdiction. burgeoning activity, criminal as evidenced
Yet this very recognize artificial case, facts of this does not In credit card future, boundaries. nationwide state in each indi- prosecuted fraud schemes will have to be transpired. vidual in which State a fraudulent transaction Here, respondent charged now be example, must result, California, Louisiana, tried in and Florida. This may widespread never intended Congress, precipitate inability apprehend who would prosecute those and/or hijack system. the credit card
I dissent.