UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. MAURICE A. TAYLOR
No. 23-5064
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
Decided and Filed: October 25, 2023
2023a0233p.06
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
Before: BATCHELDER, GRIFFIN, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Steven D. Jaeger, THE JAEGER FIRM, PLLC, Erlanger, Kentucky on the merits brief, HEMMER WESSELS MCMURTRY, PLLC, Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky on the reply brief, for Appellant. Lauren Tanner Bradley, Charles P. Wisdom, Jr., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee.
OPINION
GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Maurice Taylor pleaded guilty to two drug-trafficking crimes, and the district court sentenced him to 385 months’ imprisonment. In this appeal, Taylor contends that the district court erroneously found applicable three sentencing enhancements: maintaining a drug premises; being a leader/organizer; and using force, friendship, or affection to involve another in a conspiracy. We affirm.
I.
Kentucky law enforcement officials learned that Taylor was part of a drug-distribution network. They began surveilling houses associated with him, and ultimately seized several kilograms of cocaine and fentanyl. A grand jury charged Taylor, along with many other individuals, with
The presentence investigation report recommended the district court apply three sentencing enhancements: (1) maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance under
II.
Whether a district court properly applied a sentencing enhancement is a matter of procedural reasonableness. United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 2015). When evaluating a sentence‘s procedural reasonableness, we review the district court‘s interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Grant, 15 F.4th 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2021). “Under clear-error review, we affirm a district court‘s finding of fact so long as the finding is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). We have, however, not spoken with a uniform voice when reviewing mixed questions of law and fact concerning sentencing enhancements. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 766 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir. 2014). That debate does not matter here, for under any review standard, Taylor‘s appeal is without merit.
A.
Section 2D1.1(b)(12) of the Guidelines enhances a defendant‘s base offense level for drug crimes if a defendant “maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” We set forth briefly the facts supporting the district court‘s application of this enhancement.
As part of his plea agreement, Taylor stipulated to several facts concerning his connection to two of his co-conspirators’ residences that provided some of the foundation for the district court‘s application of this enhancement. Taylor agreed that he used Tannare Brown‘s and Rae‘Shawna Campbell‘s respective residences to facilitate his distribution of fentanyl and cocaine. For purposes of resolving Taylor‘s appeal, we will focus on Campbell‘s residence.1
Taylor‘s plea agreement established that, in 2021, he “brought over the controlled
Campbell testified at Taylor‘s sentencing hearing, filling in more detail about Taylor‘s use of her residence as a “drug house.” She stated that the two dated in 2019, and during that year, she discovered that he stored at her home, without her consent, $600,000 worth of heroin, which he ultimately removed at her insistence. They resumed their relationship in 2021, and he again used her house to store distribution-quantity levels of drugs. More specifically, she testified that he insisted he have access to her house, telling her that “he needed [her] to hold something there.” When Campbell initially refused, Taylor pushed back: “[T]hat‘s when he said I didn‘t know what he had in the house. He said he could have shit buried in the ground.” In Campbell‘s mind, his response meant that she was left with no “choice” but to let him use her house to stash his drugs: “I loved him and I believed him when he said he loves me, and also because I was scared. . . . I knew that he had people that were watching and I also knew that there were [others] . . . watching as well.” That is, she did not object further because she “knew that [she was] in danger.”
Although Taylor did not have a key to her house at that time, he would tell her when he needed access to the house and she would leave it unlocked. He did so ten to fifteen times. Sometimes Taylor would come over, and other times, other co-conspirators would visit her house or use her garage.
Based on this testimony and other evidence, the district court concluded the drug-premises enhancement applied. It “completely credit[ed]” Campbell‘s testimony, finding “she was essentially blackmailed beginning in early 2021 by Mr. Taylor, that if she didn‘t allow him to use that premises there, that he had drugs stored there and bad things would happen to her” and that “she had to leave her house open” for him to use. And Taylor, concluded the district court, “took advantage of that, used her premises, either picked up or delivered or had delivered drugs to that location ten to [fifteen] times from January through . . . August” 2021.
The “drug-house enhancement applies to anyone who (1) knowingly (2) opens or maintains any place (3) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” United States v. Johnson, 737 F.3d 444, 447 (6th Cir. 2013). Taylor does not contest the first element, and the third is not debatable—his storage of kilograms of cocaine and fentanyl at Campbell‘s residence was one of his “primary or principal uses for the premises.”
Taylor‘s primary argument is that he did not “maintain” that premises given that he did not live at or have a possessory interest in Campbell‘s residence. That much is true: he did not reside there and no documents—such as a mortgage, lease, or utility agreement—tied him to that property. But “the maintaining-a-premises enhancement does not come with a Statute of Frauds defense.” United States v. Hernandez, 721 F. App‘x 479, 485 (6th Cir. 2018). “To hold otherwise,” we have commented, “would mean that a defendant could run a drug operation in a[] house without triggering the enhancement so long as he was not the house‘s lawful owner.” United States v. Hill, 2023 WL 152474, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 11, 2023). Rather, even without a “legal interest in the premises, the enhancement may still apply if the government makes a sufficient showing of de facto control.” Hernandez, 721 F. App‘x at 484; see also United States v. Broadnax, 777 F. App‘x 137, 141 (6th Cir. 2019);
Based on this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Taylor exerted sufficient control over Campbell‘s residence: he threatened Campbell, leaving her no choice but to give him and his other associates on-demand use of her residence for nearly a year to store kilograms of cocaine and fentanyl. That amount of exerted authority demonstrates Taylor was “more than just a casual visitor.” Hernandez, 721 F. App‘x at 484 (citation omitted). Perhaps Taylor, as he insists, was just “ask[ing] for access to the premises, which could have been denied.” The district court concluded to the contrary, deeming Campbell‘s testimony to be “100 percent” credible. Giving due deference to the district court‘s credibility determination, see United States v. Abdalla, 972 F.3d 838, 851 (6th Cir. 2020), we find no error in the application of the drug-house enhancement.
B.
Defendant next claims the district court erroneously applied the aggravating-role enhancement under
the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.
The district court applied this enhancement by concluding Taylor “was involved in all levels overseeing the drug trafficking organization, as well as the recruitment of accomplices.” Specifically, the court credited
Given the various testimony linking Taylor‘s role in sitting atop his distribution network, we discern no error in the district court‘s application of the leadership enhancement. True, Taylor may not have been—to use his words—the conspiracy‘s overall “architect,” but even if that is so, Taylor still qualifies for the enhancement. See
C.
Taylor disputes one final enhancement: another special-offense characteristic under
- “the defendant used fear, impulse, friendship, affection, or some combination thereof to involve another individual in the illegal purchase, sale, transport, or storage of controlled substances,”
- “the individual received little or no compensation from the illegal purchase, sale, transport, or storage of controlled substances,” and
- “the individual had minimal knowledge of the scope and structure of the enterprise.”
Defendant first concedes that Campbell assisted him because she “believed him when he said he loves me,” but he contends that this testimony was insufficient because Campbell did not identify a specific “overt force or threat[]” demonstrating her fear of him. But Campbell testified that she knew that Taylor “had people that were watching” her. And the district court found credible Campbell‘s testimony to the effect that Taylor had “essentially blackmailed” her, leaving her so “scared” that she felt she had no choice in whether he used her home to store drugs. Taylor‘s
Taylor also insists that the third element is not satisfied because Campbell had more than “minimal knowledge” of the enterprise.
III.
We affirm the district court‘s judgment.