MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This case comes before this Court on remand from our Court of Appeals for reconsideration of defendant Darlene Mathis-Gardner’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3564(c) [Dkt. #21] (“Def.’s Mot.”). Upon consideration of our Circuit’s decision, the parties’ briefs, the relevant law, and the entire record herein, Ms. Mathis-Gardner’s motion for early termination of her supervisеd release is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On April 8, 2011, the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, filed a two-count Information charging defendant with one count of Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and onе count of Making False Claims Upon the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 287. See Information [Dkt. # 1], On April 18, 2011, defendant pleaded guilty to both counts pursuant to a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procеdure 11(c)(1)(B), admitting that her actions and involvement in the charged offenses were “fairly and accurately describe[d]” in the Statement of Offenses accompanying the plea agreement. Plea Agreement $ 4 [Dkt. # 6]. That Statement outlines the details of defendant’s conduct. See generally Statement of Offenses [Dkt. #5]. In particular, between March 2007 and January 2009 defendant conspired to defraud the United States by providing false and fraudulent information, documents, and' representations to the United States General Services Administration (“GSA”) in order to obtain a $1.3 million contract as part of the renovation оf the headquarters for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). Id. at ¶¶ 1-7. Once defendant obtained the contract, she “knowingly gave false information to subordinates for them to use in preparing invoices thаt materially overstated the number of hours of work performed” by her company’s personnel and directed these invoices-to be submitted to GSA for payment. Id. at ¶ 8. Moreover, even after defendant learned of a criminal investigation involving the contract, she “continued submitting forged documents to GSA.” Gov’t’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing 10 [Dkt. # 15] (“Gov’t’s Sentencing Mem.”). Based on these actions, defendant agrees that the government could establish by a preponderance of the evidence that ICE suffered an actual loss of $389,738. Plea Agreement ¶ 10.
For these offenses, defendant faced a statutоry maximum term of 5 years imprisonment, a period of supervised release of -up to 3 years, a criminal fine of up to $779,476 — twice the gross loss caused to the victim, an order of restitution in the amount оf $389,738 to be paid to the victim, and a special assessment of $100 per count. Plea Agreement ¶¶ 5-7, 10. Consistent with the terms of the plea agreement, the United States recommended “a Guidelines-basеd sentence consisting of a
Defendant served the imprisonment portion of her sentence and was released on her supervised release term on December 31, 2012. United States v. Mathis-Gardner,
DISCUSSION
All post-sentencing changes to the terms of a defendant’s supervisеd release are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). Pursuant to Section 3583(e), a Court may terminate a defendant’s supervised release “at any time after the expiration of one year of supervised release” if the Court is satisfied that two requirements are met: (1) early termination must be “warranted by the conduct of the defendant released” and (2) early termination must be in “the interest of justice.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). In deciding whether a modification is warranted, the Court must consider several of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), such as deterrence, public safety, rehabilitation, and consistency in sen-téncing. See Mathis-Gardner,
Section 3583(e) does not provide any guidance on when early termination is “warranted by the conduct of the defendant released,” but courts considering this provision have found that mere complianсe with the conditions of release is not enough to merit early termination of supervised release because “[m]odel prison conduct and full compliance with the terms of supervised rеlease is what is expected of
In this case, defendant argues that her conduct on supervised release has indeed been extraordinary. Defendant explains that she has not only “complied with and successfully completed every cоndition of supervision,” but has made efforts to “get businesses in the community to hire ex-offenders,” “has arranged for other members of the community to make donations of books and magazines to Alderson for the inmates since her release,” and has “worked with [the] Probation Office to develop a White Collar Female Ex-Offender pilot program with the support of the D.C. Chamber of Commerce.” Def.’s Mot. 3. The Court commends defendant for her evident commitment to giving back to her community. The Court, however, needs not decide whether these actions are so “unusual or extraordinary” as to wаrrant early termination of supervised release under Section 3583(e)(1) because, after considering the Section 3553(a) factors, I find that terminating defendant’s supervised release is simply not in the interests of justice.
The sentence I imposed on defendant for her crimes was carefully calibrated to reflect the seriousness of her offense, provide adequate punishment, and to deter others who may be similarly inclined to defraud the government. Sentencing Tr. 46 (“But under the circumstances, I think a combination of all of these things is necessary not only to promote respect for thе law, not only is it adequate punishment, it perhaps more important than anything else is a deterrent to others who may be similarly inclined to defraud the Government. ...”). As I explained during defendant’s sentencing, hеr conduct was very serious — it was not “run-of-the mill white collar conduct;” rather, her conduct involved “substantial amounts of money.” Id. at 43. Although I did not believe defendant was likely to re-offend, I emphasized thе need to impose adequate punitive measures to deter others who may be inclined to engage in similar fraudulent conduct. Id. at 43-46. In balancing jail time with supervised release, I fashioned a sentence that, in my judgment, adequately punished defendant for her serious offense and would serve to deter others from defrauding the government.
As one element of the sentence, supervised release is necessary to meet both the goal of punishment and the goal of deterrence. Indeed, supervised release serves a multitude of purposes — it is not only designed for rehabilitatiоn and re-integration, or as defendant suggests, simply a vehicle to facilitate community service; rather, supervised release is also a form of punishment. See United States v. Ginyard,
CONCLUSION
On the day of sentencing, the combination of jail time and supervised release I imposed was a just and fair punishment for the serious crime defendant committed and was calculated to achieve maximum general deterrence. It remains so today.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release [Dkt. # 21] is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.