United States v. Mata-SotoUnited States v. Mata-Soto
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Mary Beck Briscoe, Matheson, Carson
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
Juan Mata-Soto appeals pro se1 from the dismissal of his motion for compassionate release under
I
In 2009, Mata-Soto pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. The statutory sentencing range was ten years to life in prison.
Since his sentencing, Mata-Soto has repeatedly and unsuccessfully challenged his conviction and sentence. Most recently, in the wake of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No., 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, he filed a motion for compassionate release under
Mata-Soto claimed his life sentence under
II
A. Timeliness of Notice of Appeal
Before addressing the merits, we consider the timeliness of Mata-Soto‘s notice of appeal. The district court dismissed the
However, the 14-day deadline is not jurisdictional; it is an “inflexible claim-processing rule” that we must enforce when the government properly invokes it. Id. at 1241 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although we have discretion to invoke the rule sua sponte, “this power is limited and should not be invoked when judicial resources and administration are not implicated and the delay has not been inordinate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In Randall, the defendant filed an untimely notice of appeal but stated he did not receive the order being appealed until the day his notice was due. See id. The government did not invoke Rule 4(b), and we reasoned that if the defendant truthfully stated when he received the order
This case is similar to Randall. The district court dismissed the
B. Merits
We review a district court‘s ruling on a motion under the First Step Act for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1147-48, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 2020) (reviewing disposition of a
Consistent with step one, the district court determined that Mata-Soto failed to establish extraordinary and compelling reasons for reducing his sentence. Mata-Soto contends the district court incorrectly relied on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 to reach its conclusion. As explained above, the district court did consider § 1B1.13 as the relevant policy statement, and we have held that § 1B1.13 is “applicable” only to motions filed by the BOP, not to motions brought by defendants, due to the timing of its promulgation. See McGee, 992 F.3d at 1048-50. But notwithstanding the court‘s consideration of § 1B1.13, the court also recognized it had the independent authority to determine for itself whether extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant release. See id. at 1044. Exercising that authority, the district court determined there were no such reasons here. Thus, the court‘s analysis was not constrained by § 1B1.13, and any error in considering § 1B1.13 was harmless.
Mata-Soto also cited his successful rehabilitation efforts, but the district court correctly determined that rehabilitation alone could not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting release. See
Additionally, Mata-Soto claimed he was at risk of contracting COVID-19. The district court determined, however, that at age 32, he was relatively young, he
Because Mata-Soto failed to show an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, the district court was under no obligation to further consider the motion. See McGee, 992 F.3d at 1043 (“[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when any of the three prerequisites listed in
Mata-Soto contends the district court did not account for sentencing disparities or mitigating circumstances such as his successful rehabilitation efforts, his character traits, and the non-violent nature of his offense. But he cites nothing to support his contention that the court failed to account for sentencing disparities. Cf. Piper, 839 F.3d at 1267 (“We have . . . found no basis to impose upon the district court a requirement to address every nonfrivolous, material argument raised by the defendant in a
As for mitigating circumstances, the district court accounted for Mata-Soto‘s progress made toward rehabilitation. The court also considered his character traits and the nature of the offense, but rather than view these as positive factors, the court indicated that a sentence of time-served would not reflect the gravity of the offense or the need both for deterrence and to protect the public. The district court explained that Mata-Soto committed a significant drug-trafficking offense, he was a supervisor
III
The district court‘s decision is affirmed. Mata-Soto‘s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees is granted.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge