*1 STATES, Appellee, UNITED
Christopher MARTINELLI, Specialist, P. Army, Appellant.
U.S.
No. 02-0623.
Crim.App. No. 20000311. Appeals
U.S. Court of Armed Forces. April 13,
Argued 2004 and March Sept.
Decided
ERDMANN, J., opinion delivered BAKER, Court, EFFRON and in which GIERKE, C.J., JJ., separate joined. filed dissenting opinion concurring part CRAWFORD, J., dissenting filed part. opinion. Captain A. Appellant: Charles Kuh-
For
Odegard,
H.
fahl,
(argued);
Adele
Jr.
Colonel
Teetsel,
D.
Colo-
Colonel Robert
Lieutenant
Tellitocci,
Park,
Major
nel
Sean S.
Mark
Stone,
Captain Mary
Major Jeanette K
brief).
(on
Vergoña
C.
Appellee: Captain
P. Felsman
For
Janine
(argued);
Captain
S.
Colo-
Mason Weiss
Leeker,
T.
B.
nel Lauren
Colonel Steven
Salata,
Margaret B.
Lieutenant Colonel
Baines,
A.
Theresa
Lieutenant Colonel
Gallagher, and
Colonel Mark L.
Lieutenant
(on brief).
Johnson
Judge
opinion
ERDMANN delivered the
court.
yet
presents
This
another issue aris-
case
prosecution
from the
of servicemembers
relating
violating
federal criminal statutes
wake Ashcroft
Coalition,
Speech
v. Free
(2002).
Special-
152 L.Ed.2d
are
Christopher
ist
Martinelli’s convictions
upon
Pornogra-
based
violations of
Child
(CPPA),
phy
Act
Prevention
of 1996
(2000),
the same statute that
U.S.C. 2252A
O’Connor,
we
v.
addressed
(C.A.A.F.2003),
and in United
M.J. 450
2004).
(C.A.A.F
Mason,
included offenses under clauses 1 and 2 un- tinelli, (A.Ct.Crim. Army No. 20000311 Mason, principles der the in discussed 60 2002) 7, App. (unpublished). Feb. atM.J. 18-20. petitioned
Martinelli then this court for Appeals review the Court of Criminal deci PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND time, By sion. Supreme Court had guilty pleas Martinelli entered and was upheld ruling upon the Ninth Circuit which by general April convicted court-martial challenge Martinelli had based the to his on four specifications CPPA-based un- Speech conviction. See v. Free Co Ashcroft 134, der 3 of (sending, clause Article UCMJ alition, 122 S.Ct. U.S. receiving, reproducing possessing granted L.Ed.2d 403 We review pornography) specification and one of ob- challenged Issue I in he Martinelli’s which structing justice in violation of Article his CPPA-based convictions under 3 of clause UCMJ. He was sentenced Speech in light Article 134 of Free Coalition judge discharge, to a dishonorable confine- specified addressing we issue whether years, pay ment for three forfeiture all the CPPA application.1 had extraterritorial and allowances and reduction to the lowest issues,2 Following argument on these initial grade. enlisted In accordance with the pretrial supplemental terms of the court agreement, convening briefing ordered on authority eigh- reduced the confinement two additional issues related the extrater- granted On November we review of II. WHETHER 18 U.S.C. SECTIONS 2252A(a)(l)-(a)(3) (a)(5)(A) following issues: AND APPLY TO CONDUCT ENGAGED IN OUTSIDE I. WHETHER APPELLANT’S GUILTY OF THE THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS 1, 2, PLEAS TO SPECIFICATIONS UNITED STATES WHEN CHARGED AND OF THE CHARGE WERE IM- UNDER CLAUSE 3 OF ARTICLE PROVIDENT BECAUSE THE MILITARY UCMJ. JUDGE PROVIDED AN UNCONSTITU- TIONALLY OVERBROAD DEFINITION argument 2. We first case at the heard oral this OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND DID Guard New Lon- Coast Academy, ADEQUATE NOT CONDUCT AN PROVI- "Project don, as Connecticut, of this court’s part REQUIRED INQUIRY, DENCE AS BY Outreach.” This was practice part developed CARE, UNITED STATES program of a awareness demonstrate public (1969), U.S.C.M.A. C.M.R. of a Federal Court of operation Appeals justice AND ITS PROGENY. the militaiy system. Darmstadt, Germany. At the case stallation application of the CPPA.3 The ritorial keep images he would either reargued of the two addi- barracks with inclusion the hard drive of them onto the disk load tional issues. computer. his following charged with the Martinelli was FACTUAL BACKGROUND CPPA under clause 3 violations of the ground- convictions are Martinelli’s CPPA Article 134: ed four discrete actions that he took mailing, knowingly trans- Specification 1: respect images pornography.” of “child porting shipping continuing Beginning January 1999 and (by commerce com- interstate January through Martinelli downloaded 2252A(a)(l) (specifi- puter) violation images from Inter- images cally, sending over the Internet *4 off-post using computers located at the net in from the Internet Café Network Darmstadt, in Ger- Network Internet Café Darmstadt, Germany); many. He would search Internet websites knowingly receiving child Specification 2: in order to log into Internet chat rooms mailed, shipped pornography that has been willing communicate with individuals to send foreign transported in interstate or ultimately images. him He secure would (by computer) in violation of commerce images through one two routes: distinct 2252A(a)(2)(A) (specifically, downloading § (1) he would receive materials via electronic in images from the Network the Internet (e-mail) e- mail sent other individuals to Darmstadt, Germany); Internet Café he mail accounts that maintained with either knowingly reproducing Specification 3: or Hotmail or he be direct- Yahoo! would through pornography distribution for to respective ed their web individuals mails, or in interstate or com- pages, from which Martinelli would secure (by computer) merce violation scenario, directly. images Under either 2252A(a)(3) (specifically, downloading images e- he download the from the would Internet; images copying from the them page mail attachments web contents to transmitting copied hard drive and computer hard of a at the drive Network approximately twenty files to individuals sixty-four Café. received at Martinelli least over the in the Network Internet Internet images pornography in this of child fashion. Darmstadt, Germany); Café in Specification knowingly possessing 4: receiving images, After Martinelli building and in a on land copy them would them order distribute under control of used the Unit- to other individuals in the form attach- ed in violation He States Government ments to e-mail transmissions. transmit- 2252A(a)(5)(A) possessing (specifically, images to ted some of these other individuals fifty accounts, containing approximately diskettes sending via his Yahoo! and Hotmail bufldings messages the Cam- approximately twenty such over Kaserne). brai Fritsch period. time relevant copied images also from Martinelli DISCUSSION computers hard at the Netz- drives A. Review Standard of disk, separate work a which he then Café guilty plea. to his case involves a For this took back barracks at Cambrai This Kaserne, reject Army guilty plea appellate in- States court to Fritsch 2252A(a)(l)- granted §§ 2004 we the additional IV. WHETHER 18 U.S.C. On October (a)(3) issues: specified ARE BEING APPLIED DOMES- 2252A(a)(l)- §§ III. WHETHER 18 U.S.C. TICALLY OR EXTRATERRITORIALLY (a)(3) WHO APPLY TO AN INDIVIDUAL WHEN E-MAILS CONTAINING CHILD RECEIVES, AND REPRO- SENDS, ARE SENT THROUGH PORNOGRAPHY DUCES ELECTRONIC FILES CON- PRO- E-MAIL OR INTERNET SERVICE AT TAINING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY THE VIDER SERVERS LOCATED IN CAFÉ OFF AN INTERNET LOCATED UNITED STATES. POST IN GERMANY.
review, trial Courts-Martial, the record of must show a sub- Manual United States (2002 ed.) (MCM), IV, 60.c.(4)(c)(i) (em- stantial law questioning pt. basis and fact for H added). plea. Jordan, phasis v. United States As a M.J. uniformed servicemem- Germany, ber (C.A.A.F.2002)(citing stationed Martinelli Prater, (C.M.A.1991)). unquestionably subject jurisdiction v. 32 M.J. 2(a)(1) the UCMJ. See Articles Whether intended the CPPA UCMJ, 802(a)(1), §§ 10 U.S.C. have extraterritorial is question question CPPA, There is no also that the if statutory interpretation. Interpretation charged clause 3 Article would legislative history a statute its ques- are applicable to Martinelli’s conduct had he tions of law we review de novo. United engaged in these acts in Internet cafe Falk, (C.A.A.F. 50 M.J. Killeen, Texas and then carried the disks 1999). back a barracks room on Fort Hood. Similarly, might punisha- his conduct well be
B. The Charge Nature under Arti- ble under clauses 1 of Article 134 cle 13h regardless of where it occurred. Martinelli’s charged conduct was as a vio today we address is not the lation Article UCMJ —the itself, “General of the UCMJ but rather Article.” punishable Conduct is under Arti whether the appli- CPPA has extraterritorial *5 “prejudices good cle 134 if it cation under clause 3 of 134.4 If order and disci Article we (clause CPPA, pline find that a 1), the armed forces” if “crime offense it is capital,” applicable not is not to bring “of a Martinelli’s upon nature to discredit Germany, (clause conduct we must then 2), consider armed forces” or if it is a crime whether, usage due the nature of his (clause 3). capital O’Connor, offense not Internet, his fell within the do- atM.J. 452. As was the case in both O’Con application mestic of the To CPPA. the ex- Mason, nor and Martinelli’s spe conduct was tent that find we that Martinelli’s conduct fell cifically charged offense, as a “clause 3” with CPPA, within the application domestic of the serving the CPPA as the “crime or offense we must guilty then consider his whether capital.” not pleas provident light were of O’Connor. question The specified initial that we for Finally, if pleas we find that Martinelli’s ostensibly review is straightforward —does improvident were under clause 3 of Article apply the CPPA Martinelli’s conduct reason, for either we must determine Germany? President, The in the Manual they provident whether would for be to lesser Courts-Martial, has stated that: included offenses under clauses or 2 of Article 134. person subject may A the [UCMJ] punished be under clause 3 of Article 134 an offense place a occurred C. The Application Extraterritorial in question
where the law apply. did not the CPPA For example, person may pun- not be (1) Presumption Against Extraterritorial- 13Jp ished under clause 3 Article when ity foreign the act country occurred in a
merely because that act would have been
The
application
of Federal
under the United States Code
any question
statutes does not involve
offense
as to
had the act occurred in the United States.
authority
Congress’
its
enforce
criminal
Regardless
committed,
where
such an act
beyond
laws
the territorial boundaries of the
might
punishable
be
under clauses 1 or
Congress clearly
has that au-
States —
Bowman,
thority.
of Article 134.
v.
260 U.S.
question
Congress
particular
of the extraterritorial
statute have extraterri-
nothing
application.
of federal statutes has
to do with the
torial
See
Fire Ins. Co.
Hartford
jurisdiction
764, 813,
California,
is a
federal courts.
It
509 U.S.
113 S.Ct.
law,
(Scalia,
(1993)
J.,
of substantive
which turns
dissenting).
intent
L.Ed.2d 612
(1922).
locality for the
98-103,
dent on their
Government’s
L.Ed. 149
43 S.Ct.
Rather,
jurisdiction,
is
but are enacted because
question here whether Con
authority,
itself
gress
right
in fact exercised that
of the Government
defend
has
statutory
obstruction,
a matter of
construction.
or fraud wherever
which is
Employment Opportunity
Equal
Commis
its
especially if committed
perpetrated,
(Aramco),
v. Arabian American Oil Co.
citizens,
sion
such
agents.
Some
officer
own
244, 248,
111 S.Ct.
499 U.S.
only
within the
can
be committed
offenses
(1991).
L.Ed.2d
jurisdiction of the Government
territorial
required to consti-
local acts
because of the
recognized
Supreme
has
limit
are
that to
tute them. Others
such
American law
longstanding principle
as a
“
juris-
strictly
territorial
their locus to
legislation
Congress,
a con
‘that
unless
greatly to curtail
diction would be
trary
appears,
apply
is meant to
intent
of the statute and
scope and usefulness
territorial
of the Unit
within the
immunity
large
for frauds as
open
leave
Foley
(quoting
Bros. v.
ed States.’”
easily
high
committed
citizens on the
281, 285,
Filardo,
336 U.S.
69 S.Ct.
foreign
countries as at home.
seas and
(1949)); see also Small v. United
L.Ed. 680
cases,
thought
has not
such
1752, 1755, 161
385, 125
S.Ct.
provision in
necessary
specific
to make
L.Ed.2d 651
We must assume
high
law that
locus shall include
Congress legislates against
backdrop of
countries,
but allows it to
seas and
extraterritoriality.
presumption against
inferred from the nature of
offense.
Aramco,
doWe
not believe that
gressional
the CPPA can be
applica
intent for extraterritorial
category”
viewed as a “second
offense
tion in
under
several circumstances that do not
Bowman and
exempt
Government,
thus
from
involve
against
crimes
in
presumption against
cluding
pornography-related
extraterritoriali-
child
offenses.
ty.
See,
objective
e.g.,
The ultimate
Harvey,
behind the crimi-
States
F.3d
(3d
nal proscription of
pertaining
guide
activities
Cir.1993)(sentencing
offenses);
protect
pornography
child
lines for child
is to
children from
Thom
as,
Coalition,
(production
893 F.2d at
Speech
abuse. Free
1068-69
at
U.S.
2251).
S.Ct. 1389.
few
We
While
crimes are
disagree, however,
expanded
s
morally
more serious
Baker
repugnant,
category”
view of the “second
offenses in
abuse does not involve “fraud” or “obstruc-
phrase
Bowman.
from
against
tion”
“inferred
the United States Government.
nature
Rather,
of the offense” in Bowman was clear
epitomizes
abuse
that class of
“[cjrimes
ly cast in
reference
the “class”
criminal
against private individuals [includ-
involving
statutes
fraud or obstruction
peace
good
children]”
“affect the
against the Government and is
not
free
community”
order of the
described
standing principle
statutory
construction:
category
first
of Bowman. 260
U.S.
S.Ct. 39.
But the same
of interpretation
rule
should
not
applied
to criminal statutes which
law,
We
body
are aware of the
primarily
are,
class,
logically dependent
not
Circuit,
from the Ninth
that does not read
locality
their
jurisdic-
the Government’s
category
the second
in Bowman as limited to
tion, but are enacted
right
because of the
against
See,
crimes
e.g.,
Government.
Government to defend itself
v. Vasquez-Velasco,
15 F.3d
obstruction, or
perpetrat-
fraud wherever
(9th
Cir.1994);
n. 4
United States v.
ed, especially if
committed
its own citi-
Thomas,
(9th Cir.1990).
893 F.2d
zens,
cases,
agents....
officers or
In such
roots,
all
Those cases
trace their
fash-
one
Congress has
thought
necessary
another,
ion or
back
United States v.
provision
specific
make
in the law that the
Baker,
(5th
Cir.1980),
high
locus shall include the
seas and for-
where the Fifth Circuit read Bowman as
countries,
eign
but allows it to be inferred
allowing
court,
the absence of
ex-
from the nature of the offense.
pression
intent,
congressional
to “infer”
*7
Congress’
provide
intent to
for extraterritori-
(cid:127) “in reproduction requisite special for act occurs maritime by jurisdiction or of the mail or interstate and territorial
distribution
commerce,
States,
by,
including by
any
building
on
or
owned
foreign
com-
or
land
(18
2252A(a)(3)(A));
by
puter
§
to or otherwise used
or under the
U.S.C.
leased
Government,”
control of
control
the United States Govern-
ment”;
pornogra-
does
matter whether
phy
moved in
ever
commerce.
See
(cid:127)
(as
in
country”
“the Indian
defined
(5)(A).
2252A(a)(4)(A),
§
1151).
§
statutory
aspects
There are two
country
The reference to Indian
reflects a
2252A(a)(l)-(a)(5)
language
§in
that could congressional
complex jurisdictional
on
focus
possibly
expressing congressional
be read as
unique,
that flow
issues
from the
and inher-
(1)
intention
to extraterritorial
effect —
domestic,
ently
relationship between the
foreign
references to “interstate or
com- United States Government and
In-
American
merce” and
in
language
the situs
certainly
dians.
It
does not reflect
clear
2252A(a)(4)(A), (a)(5)(A).
In terms of the
legislative
for
out-
arising
concern
matters
former,
not,
themselves,
they
in
are
and of
side the territorial boundaries of the United
expression”
any congressional
“clear
inten- States.
proscribed by
tion that the acts
the statute
“special
The term
maritime and territorial
constitute a
crime
in
federal
no matter where
jurisdiction
is,
United States”
like
Rather,
they
the world
occur.
we view them
country,”
“Indian
a term of art that carries
straightforward
aas
reference to the source
its own distinct definition. See
18 U.S.C.
authority
Congress
proscribing
these
term
That
of art has been the sub-
instance, i.e.,
acts as
in
criminal
the first
ject
interpretations
of different
as to
ex-
its
Commerce Clause of the United States Con-
reach, particularly
traterritorial
whether it
stitution:
territory
extends to lands within the
of a
Many
Congress
Acts of
are
on the
based
See,
sovereign foreign
e.g.,
nation.
authority
body
regulate
of that
com-
(9th
Corey,
among
merce
the several
and the Cir.2000)(term
property
includes
Yo-
inside
parts
setting
of these Acts
forth the basis
Japan
kota Air
private apart-
Base
jurisdiction
for legislative
obviously
will
re-
building
ment
rented
United States em-
way
fer to such
commerce
one
anoth-
Gatlin,
bassy
Philippines);
to, by special used or under “within the maritime otherwise the and territorial statutory a the text reflect requires co that 18 U.S.C. jurisdiction of the United States.” Congress’ 3261(a) (2000).7 intent that the expression clear of § Aramco, reach. have extraterritorial statute language remaining The situs refers 248, 1227. The lan- 111 S.Ct. building any land or occurring conduct “on a enough to overcome guage must be clear to, by or by, used owned leased otherwise apply it presumption that was intended Gov- under the control of the United States plau- domestically, simply itself to a not lend undoubtedly language re- That ernment.” applies that it overseas. argument sible criminally congressional flects a intent not to over- plausibility Mere sufficient proscribe physical locations where conduct presumption. the context come the enjoys some the United States Government “any we not the presumption, of do view that type of control over location. proprietary the building” language of land however, provide language, The does 2252A(a)(5)(A) 2252A(a)(4)(A) as a §§ congressional intent that clear evidence of a by Congress that it have expression” “clear apply the statute should outside the bound- application. language That aries of the United States. (b) History Legislative just only to easily apply as land and could territorial United buildings located within the the text and struc- Having concluded that parks, as federal office States such national any clear express CPPA do not ture of the buildings and domestic installations. apply by Congress intent the statute extraterritorially, the conclu- we reach same concerning language note that the We also respect legislative history. to its sion with alone, building” “land or does not stand but history legislative focus of that clear by dealing language is instead bracketed of patent on the evils “special with the maritime territorial computer technology the new dimension that jurisdiction of and “the States” Congressional See Find- adds to those evils. (as 1151).” country Indian defined section ings, following 18 *10 States”); boundaries,” Congress provided United 18 U.S.C. has that the 2251(c)(l)(“[a]ny § person employs, who occurring ... statute extends to “conduct outside uses, in, any ... engage minor to or who has of the United addition to conduct in, person engage a minor assist other occurring inside of the United States” and any sexually explicit “[tjhere of conduct outside juris- is extraterritorial Federal States”). United range diction” over the wide of offenses de- scribed in the statute. See U.S.C. Congress clearly expressed has intent its 2332(e), (2000). § (g)(1) examples These Biolog- other criminal as well: statutes express congressional intent constitute vari- Weapons ical Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 indicia, ous none present of which are with provides, “There is extraterritorial federal respect to the CPPA. jurisdiction over offense under this section by against committed a or national of the by To reach the urged conclusion the Gov- 175(a) States,” (2000); § United 18 U.S.C. ernment, Congress intended the CPPA Drug the Maritime Law Enforcement Act to criminalize conduct inside the boundaries provides, “This section is intended to reach countries,8 sovereign foreign we would manufacture, possession, acts of or distribu- disregard have to the Bowman and Aramco juris- tion committed outside the territorial presumption and the absence of these indicia. app. diction United States.” U.S.C. statutory The rules of construction laid down 1903(h) (2000). § by Supreme simply not support do § also amended 18 U.S.C. that conclusion. (2000), “special which defines the maritime jurisdiction” and territorial of the United Accordingly, we cannot view the part Uniting Strength- as overcoming CPPA as presumption ening Providing America Appropriate against dictated Required Intercept Tools and Obstruct charges Bowman and Aramco. The (USA Act), Terrorism Act PATRIOT against squarely Martinelli fall within the 107-56,115 (2001). Pub.L. No. Stat. example the President described the Man USA Act PATRIOT amendments a inserted Courts-Martial, i.e., person may ual “a that, provision respect new to “offenses punished not be under clause 3 of Article 134 committed a national of the country foreign when the act occurred States,” special extends the maritime merely because that act would have been an and territorial of the United offense United States Code had States under “premises 18 U.S.C. the act occurred in the United States.” consular, diplomatic, of ... other MCM, IV, 60.c.(4)(c)(i). result, pt. U As a States____” ... foreign missions ... there is a substantial basis law and fact for (codified §Act USA PATRIOT at 18 viewing guilty pleas Martinelli’s 7(9)(A)). expression This clear is a CPPA-based clause 3 offenses under Article congressional intent crime commit- occurring Germany for conduct special ted in “the maritime and territorial improvident. jurisdiction” may now includes in some instances have occurred inside the D. Application The Domestic foreign boundaries of a nation. CPPA Finally, Congress’ ability we note to make stipulated regard its intentions in this Martinelli that all of the e-mails clear with re- spect range to a that he broad of criminal acts rather sent received his Yahoo! or single electronically legislation proscrib- than a crime. Hotmail e-mail accounts were transcending through “[a]cts terrorism national routed servers by Congress, Delgado-Garcia, 8. Unless with a restricted statute 1344-45 (D.C.Cir.2004); congressional (Rogers, clear intent ef- id. at of extraterritorial see also 1351-62 fect, J., (Third) applies dissenting); Foreign nationals as well as Unit- Restatement interpretation §§ ed States nationals. Such an rais- Relations Law the United States 401-03 es See international law concerns. *11 traveled from place take as Moneini’s letters This connection to the United States.9 California, Italy giving the court territorial possibility that the CPPA States raises the found, jurisdiction.” in Id. trial court domestically three applied be could alternative, jurisdic- the extraterritorial specifications upon that were e-mail based proper. tion Id. would messages through received Martinel- sent or argues that li’s e-mail accounts.10 Martinelli appeal was convicted and on he Moncini charge alleges specification, in each sheet jurisdiction. again The Ninth urged a lack only near that the conduct occurred “at or decision affirmed the lower court’s Circuit Darmstadt, Germany” and therefore “[¿jurisdiction if explaining proper him on the mis- put Government notice that offense, offense, with- part of the occurred argues in Germany. He occurred (citing Rocha States.” Id. the United Germany that the offenses situs of the was (9th Cir. may material and fact that the have been 1961)). explain The court went on to through routed an Internet located server mailing pornography “Moncini’s child was does not what the United States transform offense, continuing part so that act was an into a domestic extraterritorial committed in the United States offense was act. through mail as his letters traveled to their were delivered destination.” responds was Government that there “reject[ed] argument The court Moncini’s more for than one situs Martinelli’s miscon- was the time complete that the crime prosecution proper duct and that was Italy.” deposited letter was in the mail a domestic or either Id. The Ninth Circuit did not reach the application of the CPPA. The Government extraterritoriality. contends that server because Internet was in the The obvious distinction between Moncini located United States and due is that and this case this case child continuing nature of the involved offenses pornography through flowed the Internet (sending, receiving, reproducing child statute, through rather than the mails. The part pornography) a of each offense was however, is not limited “mail” but includes committed United States. Therefore “mail, transport ship” as such includes argues ap- the Government that a domestic through It material routed the Internet. can plication is proper. of the CPPA The Gov- disputed purposes that for sending not be Moncini, ernment cites States v. communications, receiving the Internet (9th Cir.1989), in support F.2d 401 of its system rapidly becoming e-mail the 21st position. century equivalent century postal of the 20th Moncini, Italy a citizen and resident of system. The domestic as he entered arrested the United States possible CPPA is therefore under the “con- and was tried in the United District theory tinuing Specifications offense” 1-3. Court for the District Central of California specification alleges As different mis- each Italy for mailing pornography child from conduct, individually. must be each examined undercover officer California viola- Moncini, tion of 2252. F.2d 18 U.S.C. speci This Specification (sending): at 403. Prior to his trial filed a Moncini charged that “elec fication Martinelli used motion to dismiss the for lack of indictment containing tronic mail to send electronic files personal jurisdiction. The trial court denied pornography through the Internet”. mailings ground his on the that the agree motion with the Ninth that “send We Circuit “continuing continuing were ing” offenses which continued to is a of- Specification possession We those where e-mails 4 is the situs based address instances through were e- routed Martinelli’s U.S.-based charge specification allege did not move- stipulate, mail Martinelli did nor accounts. through the ment Internet. record, is there he evidence on utilized U.S.-based servers he downloaded when directly we from websites and address that therefore do not issue.
fense that as continuing continues the e-mail travels in nature and provide do not for through the Internet to its In application destination. domestic of the CPPA. this routing case travels those included a through servers located the United States. E. Guilty The Providence Martinelli’s result, application
As
a domestic
of the
Specification
Plea
1
to
CPPA
Specification
appropriate.
1 is
Having determined that the CPPA is
Moncini,
receiving the child were not Inquiry The Providence and Record of any start of conduct continued into the Trial “receiving” United States. His the e-mails in Germany only occurred and Specification Under Martinelli there can application be no domestic charged with violation of the as a CPPA CPPA to specification.11 this capital” “crime or offense under clause 3 military judge explained Article 134. The Specification (reproducing): speci- This to Martinelli that clause 3 of Article 134 charged fication “reproduced that Martinelli prohibits the commission of and of- crimes by computer means of a capital fenses not and that he had been for downloading distribution ... from charged with violation of 18 2252A. copying Internet electronic files ... said files military judge explain went on to computer sending copied diskettes and knowingly elements wrongfully and mail- files ... electronic mail.”12 Similar to the ing, transporting shipping or pornogra- “receipt” specification, in reproducing for dis- phy by using mail electronic to send electron- tribution, Martinelli commenced no conduct containing ic files pornography through that continued into the United States and Internet, acknowledged which Martinelli there can application be no domestic he judge understood. then read CPPA. Martinelli the definition several terms summary, Specifica- we find that while 2252A, were including used 18 U.S.C. tion involves conduct that into continued pornography, the definition of child which the provides the United States and therefore for military judge noted was found in U.S.C. CPPA, Speci- § domestic military judge 2256. The defined “child fications involve conduct pornography” that is not follows: 10-K, respect 11. With of whether Year Form available at (follow messages http://www.microsoft.com/msfi/sec.mspx all of e-mail in Martinelli's hyperlink) (listing "Fiscal Year Form 10-K" Yahoo! and Hotmail accounts were "resident” Dublin, European Operations Center in Ireland Internet servers located in the United noting fully that: "Our are used (which facilities operated both Yahoo! and Hotmail is operations segments...."/. current all Marti- MSN, Corp.) division Microsoft have stipulated messages nelli that his e-mail had significant operations. international See Yahoo! through been routed setvers located in the United Report, Annual at available any States. The does not include record informa- http://yhoo.client.shareholder.com/annual.cfm opened tion about the on which servers his (follow Report" hyperlink) (listing "2004 Annual unopened messages e-mail were stored. thirty-three locations in cities around office noting principal world offense, that: "Our Web server "Sending” not an element of this equipment operations are maintained "reproducing rather the offense for distribu- "sending” allegation and several other domestic and tion" and the was included California locations."); international Fiscal to meet the “distribution” element. Microsoft specifically the distinction including discussed [A]ny depiction, photo- visual film, pornography and video, computer, “virtual” child picture, or between graph, picture, pornography and concluded image or “actual” computer-generated electronic, restricting pornographic produced by rationales for whether made mechanical, involving actual do not sexually ex- children or other means materials conduct, simulations computer-generated plicit where: extend 249-56[, images. 1389]. 122 S.Ct. (A) production depiction of such visual *13 the Supreme concluded that The Court in engaging use of a minor involves the any prosecu- prohibits First Amendment conduct; sexually explicit on “virtual” under the CPPA based tion (B) is, appears to depiction or such visual pornography. be, sexually in engaging of a minor conduct; explicit Coalition, Speech knowing Prior to Free created,
(C) depiction such visual has been of receipt images of possession and appear adapted, to that an or modified actual, or pornography, virtual was suffi- engaging minor in sexu- identifiable is predi- of factual to establish one the cient ally conduct; explicit or plea guilty for a of under the CPPA. cates (D) advertised, depiction is such visual “actual” The “virtual” or character described, presented, or promoted, itself, not, a images was in and of factual in distributed such a manner that con- plea predicate guilty to a liabili- —criminal veys impression the material the ty could under either circumstance arise depiction or a of a is contains visual ____ Speech In the of Free wake Coali- sexually explicit in engaged minor con- tion, provisions of 18 the relevant U.S.C. duct. 2256(8) depiction § visual require the inquire military judge sexually The did not as to engaging minor in be of an actual Martinelli that his conduct whether believed The of explicit conduct. “actual” character prejudicial to good was either order and dis- depictions predi- a factual the visual now in cipline discrediting. As any plea service O’Con- guilty of under the CPPA. cate nor, judge’s pre-Free the use omitted). (internal at 452-53 footnote M.J. pornog- “child Speech Coalition definition of O’Connor, the to the situation in Similar properly at raphy” reflected the law the time military judge definition used the in this inquire of trial. His failure to into the “actu- portions included of the definition case those al” or “virtual” distinction or discuss the Supreme the Court in later struck down possible discrediting” “prejudicial “service military judge Speech Free Coalition. discipline” good order and characteristics aspects the not discuss those of CPPA did O’Connor, perfectly understandable. Supreme by the that were not affected at 453. M.J. i.e., ruling, pornogra- “actual” Court’s (B) 2256(8)(A), § phy under Plea The Providence the Under of images of an “computer morphed” identifi- Clause 3 2256(8)(C). O’Connor, § minor able under at 452. As we noted Mason: guilty
In this M.J. O’Connor court reviewed plea Article clause 3 134 CPPA offense O’Connor, a provi- our decision Under light Supreme the Court’s decision plea the guilty to a violation of CPPA dent Speech Free Coalition: the must reflect accused violated Coalition, Supreme portions Free the of the statute not affected Speech
In
those
portions
Supreme
ruling
Free
determined that certain
Court’s
2256(8)
§
at 454. The
Speech
definition are unconstitution-
Coalition.
M.J.
al,
any
“or
lan-
focus on or discussion con-
specifically
appears
be”
absence
2256(8)(B),
cerning
aspects
entirety
those
the statute
guage of
2256(8)(D).
256, 258[,
coupled
the use of the
present
record
1389],
former,
unconstitutionally
definition
striking
In
overbroad
during
plea colloquy
potential
Mason’s
preclude
availability
render this
does not
indistinguishable
case
from O’Connor.
a lesser included offense under these circum-
stances. As
noted
Manual
atM.J.
Courts-Martial,
may
conduct that
not consti-
Similarly,
reasons,
and for
same
tute a violation of clause 3 in a
coun-
absence of
focus
“actual” versus
try may
punishable
still be
under clauses
images,
“virtual”
nature
the use of the
60.c.(4)(c)(i).
MCM,
and 2.
pt.
See
IV. 1Í
unconstitutional
pornogra-
definition
“child
phy,” and
anything
the absence of
recognized
O’Connor we
that after Free
record that would demonstrate that Marti- Speech
possession
receipt
Coalition the
pled guilty
constitutionally
nelli
to a
defined
protected
“virtual” child
law,
violation of federal
we find Martinelli’s
speech
First Amendment:
guilty plea
Specification
improvident.
Supreme
Court has now extended
cloak of First
protection
Amendment
Possibility
F. The
Lesser
Included
*14
depictions
certain
engaging
minors
in
Offenses
sexually explicit
Accordingly,
conduct.
the
improvidence
The
of Martinelli’s
question
possession
or
whether
not the
pleas
inqui
under clause 3 does not end our
of such visual depictions can be
viewed
ry
improvident plea to a CPPA-based
—an
discrediting
service
now has a constitution-
may,
clause 3 offense
under certain circum
al dimension that was not at issue in Sapp
stances,
upheld
provident
be
as a
plea to a
Augustine.14
or
lesser included offense under
1
clauses
or 2
explained
We
and
under the less
review
strict
plea
difference in the nature of the
Augustine/Sapp
qualitative
defect
standard
dif-
ruled,
James,
providence
13. This court
in United States v.
55
"virtual” children but whether
(C.A.A.F.2001),
M.J.
CPPA was con-
inquiry
was sufficient
sustain a
conviction
images
applied
stitutional as
of "virtual” chil-
a lesser included
under
2 of
offense
clauses
or
Court, however,
Supreme
The
dren.
ruled to the
Article 134.
contrary
Speech
in Free
Coalition
we are
required
precedent.
Supreme
to follow that
(C.A.A.F.
Sapp,
14. United States v.
see.7
an act of
imagination”
requires judges
creative
GIERKE,
Judge (concurring
Chief
in part
put
place
themselves
author of
dissenting in part):
those words and
“how he
determine
would
I agree
majority
Appellant’s
with the
have dealt with the instance that has aris-
plea
specification
improvident
1 was
en.”8
O’Connor,1
agree
and I
guilty pleas
his
specifications
Putting myself
to the other
place
of the Con-
gress
based on
Pornography
adopted
the Child
Prevention
the CPPA
determin-
(CPPA)2
provi
Act of 1996
cannot be deemed
“how
would have dealt with the in-
[it]
*16
arisen,”9 disagree
dent to the lesser included offenses
has
stance that
I
with the
2
majority’s
Congress
clauses 1 and
of Article 1343 based the
conclusion that
did not
principles
prohibit
pos-
discussed in
States v.
intend to
a
United
Mas
servicemember from
majority
sessing
pornography
on.4 Because the
remands each of
a
on United States
specifications
the
military
receiving
CPPA-based
due to the
or
installation
from
re-
improvidency Appellant’s pleas,
pornography
of
I
producing
believe
that same
that was
through
the
of whether the CPPA has extra
routed
in
Internet servers located
application
Appellant
territorial
does
need to be
the United States.10 Because
case,
6,
(2d
Specifi-
15.
Cir.l959)(proceedings
special
Because of our decision in this
F.2d
28
of a
through
necessarily
Appeals
cations
4
will
have to be
session of the United
Court of
States
for
Circuit,
10, 1959).
any rehearing
prior
allege
Apr.
amended
to
to
the
lesser
Second
prejudicial
good
included offenses of conduct
to
forces,
discipline
order
in
a
the armed
or of
7.
Id.
bring
upon
nature to
discredit
the armed forces
of clauses
2 of
violation
Article 134.
and/or
8.
Id.
(C.A.A.F.2003).
1.
rial
would be
to curtail
nal statutes —those enacted so that the Gov-
scope
of
the
and usefulness
the statute
against
ernment can defend itself
obstruction
____”20 Thus,
Congress
when
ex-
does not
However,
or fraud.23
I do not read this
plicitly
plain language
partic-
state in the
of a
language
narrowly
majority.
as
as the
Nota-
ular criminal statute that it intends for that
Bowman
bly,
against
awas
case about fraud
apply extraterritorially,
statute
courts can
and, thus,
limiting
Government
lan-
such
“from
infer
intent
the nature of the
guage
majority
directly
on which the
relies
Congress’
legislative
offenses and
other
ef-
applies to the
circumstances
that case.24
type
forts to
in-
eliminate the
crime
Moreover, I believe that a narrow inter-
volved.”21
pretation of Bowman is inconsistent
interpret
the Bowman
language
I
as draw-
purpose of
exception
the criminal offense
ing
dividing
line
those criminal
between
Supreme
recognized.
Judge
Like
offenses that
are “domestic”
nature and
Sand, I think
underlying purpose
those whose nature “warrant[s] a broad
in Bowman is two-
exception
criminal offense
sweep
power.”22
example,
For
a U.S.
hand,
fold.25 On the one
the United States
neighbor
citizen’s assault on his next-door
right
protect
has the
“to
itself from harmful
“peace
good
would affect the
order
irrespective of the locus of
con-
this
conduct —
community”
neighborhood
in his
and is a
hand,
duct.”26
a presumption
On the other
domestic crime. The
nature
this offense
exists that
both
would not
“enact
sweep
power any
does not warrant a
designed
protective
statute
to serve this
provided
broader than that
police
local
function,
However,
proscribes
and —where the statute
force
arrest him.
if a U.S.
citizen commits a criminal offense
ef-
just
readily
performed
whose
as
acts
could
particular
are not
fects
confined to
si-
one
outside the United States as within it
...
example, smuggling illegal drugs
tus —for
protective
undermine this
intention
limit-
trafficking
between
por-
countries
the statute’s
to United States
then,
nography over the
na-
Internet —
territory.”27 By reading the Bowman lan-
ture
that offense warrants a broader
guage to
exception
limit the criminal offense
power.
sweep
to crimes of
fraud
obstruction
Government,
majority ignores
I believe the
in Aram-
majority
language
reads the
underlying
co and Bowman to allow an
exception
rationale of the
exception
to the
presumption only
types
against extraterritoriality.
for certain
of crimi-
presumption
See
U.S. at
S.Ct. 39.
Vasquez-Velasco,
21. United States v.
15 F.3d
Laden,
F.Supp.2d
25. See United States v. Bin
(9th Cir.1994) (quoting
(S.D.N.Y.2000)(holdingthe
Bowman ex-
Felix-Gutierrez,
(9th
F.2d
ception
presumption against
extraterritori-
Cir.1991)(internal quotation marks and citations
statutes,
ality applies to
various criminal
such
omitted));
Baker,
136;
see also
609 F.2d at
Unit
prohibiting
statutes
malicious destruction
Wright-Barker,
ed States v.
166-67
property
possessed
owned or
the United
(3d Cir.1986).
generally Christopher
See
L.
killing
the course of an attack
Blakesley
Stigall, Wings
& Dan
Talons: The
for
facility involving dangerous weapon,
a federal
Case
the Extraterritorial
Over
Jurisdiction
Sex
*18
holding
exception
but also
that
the
does not
Exploitation
through Cyberspace,
ual
Children
of
apply
penalizing
to the statute
the
murder within
that,
Wayne
(2004)(asserting
L.Rev.
"special
jurisdiction
and
of
maritime
territorial
situations,
ig
in certain
the
States
United
will
States”).
the United
general
against
ap
the
nore
rule
extraterritorial
plication,
jurisdiction
and assert
"over nationals
Id.)
Blakesley
Stigall, supra
26.
see also
&
note
ap
though
who commit crimes abroad even
the
("The
interposes
at 141-42
Constitution
no
propriate
explicitly
not
statute did
declare that
bar as such to the extraterritorial
applied extraterritorially”).
thus,
law,”
Congress proscribes
criminal
and
if
conduct,
is
“United States law
Baker,
22.
servicemembers that the U.S. sends to should As Ger- articulated many.35 Hand, important aspect Learned the most of statutory construction is to look mean- to the The actions of support other countries ing of the words the statute and discern jurisdiction States’ assertion over legislature’s intent in adopting those proscrib- U.S. citizen who violates statute “[wjherever Furthermore, possible, words.40 pornography. “Every child nation has statutes should construed in a common- children, criminalized the sexual abuse of honoring plain meaning sense ... manner majority leg- the vast of states have enacted avoiding ... and absurd or counterintuitive against pornography.”36 islation child Addi- denying results.”41 I believe that CPPA “[ijnternational tionally, conventions on the extraterritorial effect is counterintuitive rights of children favor the strict enforce- light plain meaning § of the 2252A and ment of support such laws and lend Congress’ intent forms eradicate all jurisdiction assertion of extraterritorial pornography passing CPPA.42 types Therefore, asserting these of eases.”37 jurisdiction particularly federal U.S. appro- Section can 2252A be divided into four priate light Appellant’s of the nature of (1) types of child offenses: offenses.38 (2) mailing knowingly or transporting; know- (3)
ingly receiving distributing; knowing- (4) ly reproducing; selling knowingly II. meaning Plain the CPPA possessing. proscription mailing, The presumption of whether the shipping, “foreign transporting com- extraterritorial is rebut- applies merce” to all four types of offenses.43 particular ted for a statute “is a matter of statutory Supreme “foreign construction” turns on Court has wheth- defined particular er that a intended stat- commerce” as commerce between the United application.39 ute have States and a nation.44 I believe the Therefore, statutory the tools of “foreign construction CPPA’s of the use commerce” lan- Dauterman, Agreement 12, supra 35. See (noting Between the Parties to the 38. See note at 219 Treaty Regarding North Atlantic "universally recognized Status that the consensus that VII, 1(a), 19, 1951, Their Forces art. June is an evil that be elimi- should 1792; Martinelli, U.S.T. see also M.J. at 56-57 prosecute nated enables states offenders out- (Crawford, J., dissenting); James B. & Roan borders"). side of its Buxton, Cynthia Military The American Justice Millennium, System in the New 52 A.F. L.Rev. Martinelli, 4) (n. (citing 39. M.J. at 56-57 185, (2002)(noting 191 n. 32 that the “German 764, California, Fire Co. v. U.S. Ins. Hartford government agreed general has to a waiver 113 S.Ct. 125 L.Ed.2d their due to the United States mili- J., (1993)(Scalia, dissenting)). tary's proven ability disciplinary prob- to handle through Military Code [Uniform lems tice]”). Jus- Hand, Judge supra 40. 28. Learned note at Dauterman, Carroll, (1st supra 36. at note 203. 41. 1997) (internal omitted). Cir. citations (discussing 37. Id. at 204 that the Convention on Child, Rights created the United Stigall, Blakesley supra & See note ISO- 1989, provides Nations basic international (discussing proscribing federal laws how guidelines protection for the of children from exploitation apply extraterritorially must offenses exploitation pornography); sexual via child see based on the offense international nature of the Note, Scott, also Allison M. From a State-Cen- technological due to commu- recent advances in Approach Openness: tered to Transnational nication, comprehensiveness legislative Adapting Hague Contempo- Convention with already judicially scheme been deter- that has rary Rights Human Standards Codified apply extraterritorially, mined to and American Child, Rights Convention on the J. 11 Ind. jurisprudence). Legal (noting Global Stud. 235 n.18 Rights Convention on of the Child 2252A(a)(l)-(3), (5). 43. See 18 U.S.C. countries, has been ratified the United States and Somalia have not ratified it, 1, 193, (9 Wheat.) formally signed Ogden, but the United has Gibbons v. U.S. Convention). L.Ed. 23 *20 guage scope defines the of materials Con- side of the territorial borders United gress pornog- intended to reach —those child States. raphy foreign materials that have traveled in ease, unique Because of the facts of this it or interstate is than commerce —and more particularly appropriate is the CPPA
just jurisdictional words, a hook. In other application. have extraterritorial “Given the “foreign the inclusion of the commerce” lan- cyberspace fact that has no borders and dis- guage straightforward was not “a reference irrelevant, tance is in that [sic] realm is there authority Congress to the source of why is no reason U.S. courts should not proscribing these acts as criminal the first eschew reliance on traditional notions of ter- instance, i.e., Clause,”45 the Commerce but ritoriality directly rule that such statutes rather, description a prohibit- the material application.”49 have extraterritorial ed “By proscribing under the statute. pornography distribution of child in ‘foreign “All recognize nations of the world ‘the commerce,’ Congress intended the criminal principle country that a man who outside of a apply sanctions to part even where some of willfully puts in motion a force to take effect the criminal conduct occurred outside the in it place is answerable at the where the evil ’ territorial ”50 limits of the United States.”46 is done.... Similar to a bullet shot from Therefore, just as applies the statute to an country, image another pornogra- of child individual who pornography sends child from phy can be “shot” across borders with the city state, in one state to another common- computer key. touch of a And like the indi- logic sense and would dictate “Congress standing vidual in Canada who fires bullet would equally in preventing interested States, into the United the U.S. servicemem- that same citizen from making the same dis- Germany ber in who sends or receives the city] tribution to a foreign [U.S. from a coun- subject to U.S. federal try.”47 jurisdiction. Appellant used his Hotmail and Yahoo! e- plain language of the statute reaches accounts, mail which are located on a server Appellant’s possessing, acts of sending, re- States, in the United to send and receive e- ceiving, reproducing mail messages with embedded or attached “mailed, shipped that has been transport- images. Appellant Because Germany was in ed in interstate or commerce.”51 The and outside of the base when he sent “foreign language commerce” of the statute images, received the the CPPA would Appellant’s satisfied admission that he reach his if it has extraterritorial acts send, used Hotmail and Yahoo! accounts to application. In considering the extraterrito- receive, pornographic and store the images. CPPA, rial persua- I find Moreover, States, this link to the United sive reasoning Judge Hoeveler of the sending images through storing United States District Court for the South- images in Internet servers located in the ern District of Florida. He stated that the States, United implausi- makes it even more “unquestionably States would have Congress ble that did not intend the CPPA authority prosecute person standing in Appellant’s. reach conduct like Canada who fires a bullet across the border person which strikes a standing second plain statute, Based on the meaning of the United States.”48 So applies appears U.S. law extra- explicitly wanted to territorially because the actor is out- located extend over those individuals Martinelli, 45. 62 M.J. at injury, may 60. certainly itself from be exercised beyond territory.”). the limits of its Martens, 46. United States v. 59 M.J. (A.F.Ct.Crim.App.2003). Blakesley Stigall, supra 49. & note at 147. 47. Noriega, F.Supp. (citing at 1513 Rivard v. (5th Cir.1967)). 1512-13; Noriega, F.Supp. see also Hubbart, (2 Cranch) 187, 234, Church v. (1804)("[A power 2252A(a)(l)-(3). L.Ed. 249 nation's] to secure 51. See 18 U.S.C. *21 majority agree I that neither the only with- with possess pornography
who
child
in the territorial boundaries of
United
“spe-
“foreign
language nor the
commerce”
States,
building
any
also on
land or
but
jurisdiction of
cial maritime and territorial
under the control of the United States.52
language alone evidences
the United States”
words, Congress’
of the “on
other
addition
congressional
for a statute to
a clear
intent
to,
by,
any
building owned
leased
or
land or
extraterritorially.57
But
apply
otherwise used
or under the control of the
particular
is not whether
words within
language clearly
United States Government”
statute can
defined to establish extraterri-
jurisdiction over an individual
establishes
jurisdiction,
Congress in-
torial
but whether
property
being
who admits to
on
“under
apply Appel-
to
to
tended the statute itself
pos-
control of the United
when he
States”
in further
lant’s offenses.58 As discussed
Ap-
sessed the obscene material.53 Because
below,
part
detail
the CPPA was enacted as
being
property “under
pellant admitted to
on
comprehensive congressional
of a
scheme
the control of the United States” —his bar-
eradicating
pornography.
I
Kaserne,
aimed at
child
racks at the Cambrai Fritsch
Army
language
interpreting
plain
States
installation
Darms-
that
believe
tadt, Germany
possessing
offense of
CPPA,
compre-
its structure and the
—his
mili-
on a United States
statute,
to
hensive scheme of the entire
leads
tary
proscribed
installation is
the CPPA.
clearly
Congress
conclusion that
meant
majority
language
argues
extraterritorially
this
apply
the CPPA
“just
easily
only
...
apply
would
do
key
Appellant’s
reach
acts
this case. The
military
mestic
installations.”54 We have ex
Congress
passed
question is whether the
rejected
reading
“territory
plicitly
such a
prohibit
the CPPA intended to
or allow
jurisdiction”
under the control or
of the Unit
pornography on a
possession of child
U.S.
Wilmot,55
ed States.
In United States v.
we military
answer is
base overseas. The
obvi-
language
Nar
held that this
included
ous.
cotics Control Act of 195656made the statute
Relying
two criminal cases—this
applicable
drug
committed at Yo
offenses
Japan.
opinion
v.
kota Air Force Base
Court’s 1977
United States Gla-
2252A(a)(5)(A),(B).
7(3) (2000),
§
§
Section
decide whether 18 U.S.C.
which
52. See 18 U.S.C.
2252A(a)(5)(A) proscribes knowingly possessing
jurisdic-
"special
defines
maritime and territorial
States,”
"special
in the
maritime and
tion of the United
has extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the United
or on
territorial
Compare
in this case.
to,
building
by,
Gatlin,
land or
owned
leased
or
(2d Cir.2000)(hold-
F.3d
otherwise used
or under the control of the
7(3)
apply
§
extrater-
that 18 U.S.C.
does not
Government.”
Section
United
2252A(a)(5)(B)
ritorially
appellant's
to reach
offense of sexual
knowingly possessing
proscribes
abuse of a minor on a United States
"mailed,
pornography that has been
Republic Germany),
installation in the Federal
shipped
transported
in interstate
Corey,
(holding
at
that 18
F.3d
means, including by comput-
by any
commerce
7(3) applies extraterritorially
appel-
§
er."
of a minor on an
lant’s offense of sexual abuse
Japan
pri-
in an off-base
Air Force base in
2252A(a)(5)(A).
53. See 18 U.S.C.
apartment building
Philippines).
vate
See
Blakesley
Stigall, supra note
at 147
also
&
Martinelli,
When
plies extraterritorially,
today, Congress
courts are not “limit-
of the 1977 Act
actment
1,
(C.M.A.1977).
sentencing guideline addressing
59. 4 M.J.
5
I believe our Court
the offense of
exception
causing
engage
sexually
in Gladue misread the
explicit
Bowman
to the
a minor to
presumption
extraterritoriality and de
purpose
producing
conduct for the
visual de-
narrowly.
may
fined it too
cate,
A statute
not indi
pictions
applies
of such conduct
when the of-
face,
congressional
on
a
its
intent to be
Philippines).
fense occurs in the
See also United
given
application.
extraterritorial
But such
Bredimus,
639,
in
F.Supp.2d
States v.
650
"readily implied"
tent
can
from the nature of
(N.D.Tex.2002)(deciding
§
that 18 U.S.C. 2251A
targeted by
deny
the offense
the statute and if to
applies extraterritorially
traveling
to
greatly
extraterritorial
"would be
to
pro-
commerce with the intent to use minors to
scope
curtail the
and usefulness of the statute!].”
depictions
sexually explicit
duce visual
duct);
con-
(citations
Wright-Barker,
69. 144
Rec. S12263
ed. Oct.
1998)
nography
exploitation
(statement
and sexual
of children
Leahy).
of Sen. Patrick
effectively implemented
could not be
as contem-
Harvey,
(holding
70. See
tion, possession simultaneously them, reproduced occur- ceived them or when he ring on e-mail servers located the United Appellant and that when sent or received States, prosecuted cannot be 2252A. they merely them “through” all went position unsettling, Not is that but it electronic form. constitutes a dramatic shift in this Court’s occurred, actually What at least on those jurisdiction. view of criminal Appellant occasions that sent or received im- e-mail, ages by Appellant, by typing is that Application I. Domestic of 2252A Darmstadt, keyboard computer on the of a Appellant When sat in the Netzwerk Inter- used his electronic address on a server locat- Darmstadt, Germany, net Café he didn’t ed in the United to send and receive open envelopes, photographs, copy remove messages e-mail with embedded or attached photographs, place photographs envelopes, images, to and from his on that address place envelopes drop, those in a mail Appellant server. “space” also used his physical Appellant least not sense. the Hotmail and Yahoo! servers the Unit- browser, rented a web which he used visit pornographic images ed States to store gain Internet websites and to access to his children, crystal which was made clear Hotmail or Yahoo! e-mail accounts. These 5,3 language specification testimony “web-based,” particular e-mail accounts are (SPC) Specialist Appellant’s Oviatt and ad- operated as distinct from through e-mail during providency inquiry. missions (a local client such as pro- Microsoft Outlook gram locally that can be installed and which Appellant downloading also admitted to storage facility creates local for e-mail files images directly onto the hard drive of a attachments). Because “web-based” ac- computer at the Netzwerk Internet Café and operate counts without a local server and portable Appellant onto disks that took back pools consist of discrete of information elec- *25 Appellant to the But barracks. also admit- tronically assembled and stored under day, ted that each after he had left user’s filename on a client server owned Café, many Netzwerk if all Internet host, all Appellant’s e-mails—-and their collected, images Appellant repro- had attachments —were “resident” on the Inter- duced, stored, or sent to others remained Yahoo!, net servers of Hotmail and located name, account, under his in his user on the the United States. servers of Hotmail and Yahoo! within the technology many While this is not the of us territorial borders United States. with, grew up technology pre- it is the storage images, Because much of the all today. technology appel- vails It is the sending, receiving, infrequently lants and and all of the actu- counsel not must ex- and, plain judges point, ally space more occurred the electronic con- technology Appellant stipulated to and by Appellant trolled on Hotmail and Yahoo! explained military judge during to the in the servers the crimes Care2 inquiry in this case. sending receiving were committed Further, although prod- there.4 some of the majority misconstrues the “routed Appellant’s reproduction (e.g., ucts of through” language stipulation to con- portable computer Appellant took back disks images including clude that all the those — barracks) Germany, to his were located attached to e-mail—were located outside the Appellant reproduction United States when sent or re- much the actual occurred on Care, 2. United States v. 18 C.M.A. 40 C.M.R. sessed child in violation of 18 2252A, deleting U.S.Code to wit: all files with attachments his two electronic mail from Emphasis added. accounts." "Specification Appellant wrongful- 5 states that ly impede investigation endeavor[ed] to into by asking specifications, they Morgan were his own misconduct SPC A. 4. As reflected in the destroy simultaneously Germany, propo- Oviatt to evidence that the said SPC committed in Christopher pos- P. Martinelli had received and sition discussed below. by and under located, Army used installation images U.S. those were the servers where form, in the United States. of the United States Govern- in electronic the control ment.5 record, there was facts of light of these added, specifi- § 2252A to application of a domestic Emphasis through cations 1 DISCUSSION Extraterritoriality II. context, law military modern Outside the Arti- required to 2252A and If examine support of extra- recognizes five theories setting, I would in an extraterritorial cle sovereign’s juris- of a application territorial precedents great and the
follow this Court’s
(1)
citizens;
regulating
of its
diction:
law,
considering
ease
while
bulk of federal
(2)
have a sub-
regulating activities which
forces,
deployment of our
the worldwide
(3)
effect;
regulating ex-
territorial
stantial
in Article 134.
melding of federal statutes
a connec-
conduct when there is
traterritorial
security;
act and national
tion between the
FACTS
(4) asserting jurisdiction
as to crimes
jurisdiction
asserting
humanity;
above, Appellant possessed
As detailed
sixty images
pornography on a
is a citizen of the
over
of child
the victim of the act
where
Germany.
He
U.S.
installation
jurisdiction.6
asserting
state
computer
also
in a German communi-
used
service-
In the context
ty
repeated reproduction, trans-
to effect the
members, Congress’ authority to “make
mission,
receipt
of child
Regulation of
for the Government and
Rules
Appel-
commerce.
interstate
forces,”7
the land and naval
creates addition-
were,
mini-
lant’s electronic transactions
at a
Article 134.
al sources of
mum,
through
routed
Internet servers
States:
Citizenship
1, Appellant stipu-
In Prosecution Exhibit
Notwithstanding
pre-
law
common
lated that
sumption against
e-mail sent to or received from the
[a]ll
law,8
sovereign’s
of a
there remains little
accused’s Yahoo or Hotmail e-mail ac-
power
electronically
through
counts is
routed
*26
application
extend
of U.S. criminal statutes
respective
computers
service’s
in the Unit-
undertaken be-
to the acts of U.S. citizens
result,
a
all of
ed States. As
the child
yond our territorial borders. The extraterri-
pornography that
the accused had either
statutes,
torial
at least as to
reach
federal
using
sent or
two accounts
received
these
citizens,
far
when the
arose as
back as
transported through
interstate or for-
Supreme
recognized the
United States
eign commerce.
Apollon>9
nationality principle.
In The
practice,
a matter of
the course
As
over
of no nation can
Court stated: “The laws
year,
copying
pornog-
of the
after
the child
territories,
justly
beyond
extend
its own
ex-
diskettes,
raphy
floppy
onto
the accused
regards
cept so far as
its own citizens.”
would then take the diskettes to his bar-
Again
that national-
the Court hinted
building
room in
4002 on the Cam-
racks
ity-based jurisdiction
depen-
civilian
over
Kaserne, Darmstadt,
brai Fritsch
Germa-
military personnel
pos-
overseas was
ny. The
Fritsch Kaserne is a dents
Cambrai
Const,
I,
Court,
cl. 13.
5.
this
the Government noted “the
7. U.S.
art.
Before
‘foreign
at
issue moved in
through
commerce’ because it was filtered
inter-
Filardo,
281, 285,
Foley
v.
336 U.S.
Bros.
providers operating
net service
from the
(1949).
basis for
punished
provided
be
as
in subsection
shall
ally
plain meaning
purpose of the
—the
(b).
legislation
‘While the
statute itself.
Emphasis added.
Congress,
contrary
ap-
intent
unless
pears,
apply
within the
is construed
statute,
appro-
interpreting this
it is
When
the United
territorial
plain meaning of the
priate to look at the
application,
of its
[extraterritori-
statute,24
history,
purpose
its
construction,
ally]
legislative
not of
is one
statute.25
“Congress
authority
power.”22
has the
grants
The Commerce Clause
beyond
enforce its laws
the territorial bound-
for-
power
regulate
“to
commerce with
aries of the United States. Whether Con-
Nations____”26
was an
eign
Section 2252A
authority
gress
...
has
fact exercised that
authority
by Congress of
over
exercise
its
statutory
is a
matter
construction.”23
pow-
foreign
This
interstate and
commerce.
specific
deals with a
federal stat-
This case
regulate foreign
has been
er to
commerce
ute,
2252A,
i.e.,
provides:
which
broadly
“transac-
encompass
all
construed
immediately, or at some
tions which either
(a) Any person who—
stage
progress,
be extraterrito-
their
must
(1)
mails,
knowingly
transports
rial.”27
ships
interstate or
commerce
means,
computer, any
including by
in con-
Certainly, Congress is interested
pornography;
evi-
trolling
cyberspace
commerce
statute.
statute
knowingly
or distributes— denced
This
receives
(2000)("[W]hen
language
20.
L.Ed.2d 1
the statute’s
Id. at 207.
plain,
courts —at least
the sole function
required
disposition
is not
where
the text
Agreement
Between the Parties
North
according
its
enforce
absurd —is
Treaty Regarding
Status of Their
Atlantic
terms.’’)(intemal quotation
and citations
marks
Forces,
1(a),
VII
art.
June
U.S.T.
omitted).
might
impor-
purpose
25. The
of the statute
*28
437,
States,
421,
22.
United
284 U.S.
Blackmer v.
statutory
aspect
interpretation. Geier
tant
v.
of
252,
(1932) (citations
52
76 L.Ed.
omit-
375
888,
Co.,
861,
Motor
529 U.S.
American Honda
ted).
1913,
(2000).
L.Ed.2d
120 S.Ct.
146
914
Aramco,
248,
at
23.
499 U.S.
24.
Underwriters Ins. Co.
Plant
v.
Veazie
Hartford
(1852).
Bank,
U.S.
broad, bution, comprehensive eradicate, scheme possession to and pornography, control, that, exploitation least I conclude even if applied sexual extraterritori- ally, Appellant’s plea It part by appli- children. In and conviction CPPA. ex- § statute, jurisdictionally cation of 2252Awas panding congressional Congress proper. specifically found that “elimination of child Appellant’s Military Status pornography protection and the of children A final rationale for prose- to exploitation provide compel- from sexual Appellant cute arises under the Pur- UCMJ. ling governmental interest for prohibiting authority, suant to provid- this has distribution, production, sale, possession, ed under Article 134 “all disorders depictions viewing visual of children neglects prejudice good to the order and conduct____”28 explicit engaging sexually discipline in the armed forces” or conduct join I majority’s cannot conclusion that bring upon which would “discredit the armed “protect the CPPA because was enacted to may forces” tried under the UCMJ. The abuse,” from children v. Mar United States specifically provides UCMJ for extraterrito- (C.A.A.F.2005), 62 M.J. 57-58 tinelli jurisdiction.30 light rial of Article therefore focuses on individual victims and UCMJ,31 it clear that clause 3 of Article cannot fall within category” the “second contemplates prosecution 134 of crimes such criminal statutes described Bowman. § as those enumerated 2252A. language applied Similar has been numer Congress delegated authority to the Presi- ous recognizing many federal circuits in trial, prescribe “[pjretrial, to post- dent prohibitions by Congress criminal enacted procedures, trial including proof, modes of primarily were protect intended the na for cases” triable under the UCMJ.32 In the interest, tional opposed property Courts-Martial, Manual United States persons of individuals.29 (MCM) (2002 ed.), IV, 60.c(4)(c)(i) pt. 1Í
83 community by providing extra military recognized in approach This Scholten, possess, who for “rights” In this Court servicemembers v. Scholten.33 in, jurisdictional pornography, that are four bases and even create held there traffic overseas, kidnapping on a try an occur individual even when those acts commerce, including foreign or “interstate installation. jurisdiction, special
maritime territorial Actual Children guests foreign of the aircraft of each explaining In the elements though 18 government.”34 Even specifications, the 1201(a), Scholten, four the statute at issue pornography” 3, military judge “child may defined not under clause apply does 2256(8) including reading Appellant, charged 1 and clauses where under good language “ap- order prejudicial impermissibly conduct is and disci- overbroad bring upon pline “conveys impression.” or of nature to discredit pears to be” and Thus, however, assuming Appel- fact, armed explicitly forces.35 stipulation engaged in “interstate or sixty-four lant was not in all recognizes children that the commerce,” permit those clauses would also images appended stipulation are actual prosecution Appellant focusing on a techni- children: “Rather than UCMJ. offense, listing of of an this cal the elements entire looks at the context of the rec- reasons, I respectfully For all above ord to determine whether accused majority’s holding dissent that from elements, explicitly aware of the either appli- § 2252A does not have extraterritorial inferentially.”39 impact holding cation. The of this is far-
reaching prior our it overlooks case because military judge Appellant assured the by military law36 and forecloses every- stipulation he understood federal authorities of numerous statutes thing in it After the was true. defense overseas.37 objection, military judge waived admitted document, provided, part: “[t]he which III. of the Plea Providence children, identity as well as these majority’s I also dissent from the conclu lasting damage may have occurred be- improvident Appellant’s pleas sion that were photographs, of their cause abuse these Speech light v. Free Coalit Ashcroft known”; accused never at- and “[t]he similarly my ion.38 dissent from erro tempted to the identities well- discover O’Connor, by this Court neous conclusion being of these children.” (Crawford, C.J., at 58 M.J. 456-457 dissent “identities,” they children not have Virtual do ing), pleas I emphasized O’Connor’s abused, “damage” when nor do not suffer factually provident involving were to offenses may “well-being” Appel- their be restored. actual children and therefore unaffected voluntarily stipulated knowingly lant Speech Notwithstanding Free Coalition. sixty-four images fact that the children nearly support position for this unanimous identifiable, real, potentially were female the federal circuits that have addressed that law, children, very majority prepubescent, steadfastly some of whom were Court, Appellant’s justification, and all of were abused. moves this without whom animate, threatens, understanding corporeal protects, than na- path that rather Blevens, (C.M.A.1984). 33. 17 United States v. 5 C.M.A. C.M.R. M.J. 171 (1955). (citation quotation at and internal 34. Id. See, omitted). e.g., Espionage 37. Act of 18 U.S.C. marks (2000). § 792-99 35. 173-74. U.S. 152 L.Ed.2d 38. 535 See, Collins, 7 e.g., v. M.J. 188 United States Jackson, (C.M.A.1979); v. United States Redlinski, (1968); 58 M.J. C.M.A. C.M.R. 378 States v. omitted). Wilmot, (1960); (C.A.A.F.2003) (citation 29 C.M.R. 11 C.M.A.
84 depicted sixty-four portray[ed] ture of children that images the the evidence the real children”). images upheld attached to the record of trial is clear. Courts have convictions Moreover, sixty-four images to appellate attached judges’ viewings when the own left graphically support the record this case images jury no doubt that “the shown to the Appellant’s images belief that the are of actu- depicted ... ... real” children. United al minors.40 There is no Richardson, substantial basis 1061, States v. F.3d providence law (11th Cir.2002). and fact to The Richardson court Appellant’s plea. Appellant was aware of the [that] “reached conclusion because evi- objectively support elements and the facts clearly dence established that the children plea. his depicted images pictures were actu- case,
al
children.”
at 1064-65.
that
a
that,
special agent
testified
based
his
“Specialized Society”
Revisited
training
experience,
images depicted
By departing from the bulk of federal
simply
actual
appeared
children and not what
precedent,
articulating any military
without
to be children.
distinction,
necessity or
this Court continues
addressing
Other federal courts
this issue
suggest
to
that servicemembers accused of
upheld
have
convictions
where
factfinder
offenses have First
depicted
that
the images
concluded
actual
rights paramount
and trial
Amendment
appellate
children or where the
court deemed
those extended
the federal
circuits
Padgett
that it
have
must
been so.
v. United
similarly
prose-
situated civilian defendants
F.Supp.2d
598-600
Further,
cuted
under
same statute.
(D.S.C.2004)(finding
language
provi-
balance,
without
articulating
even
the ma-
inquiry
dence
actual
established
nature
jority implicitly promotes
newly
elevated
that, by appellate
children and
court’s own
rights
pornogra-
for accused
review,
children);
photos
actual
were of
phers
military community
over those of the
Slanina,
United States v.
359 F.3d
as a whole.
(5th Cir.2004) (stating that the “Government
required
present
was not
additional
Application
Speech
A.
of Free
Coalition
expert
testimony
evidence or
...
to show
in the Federal Courts
images
depicted
downloaded ...
children,
children”);
real
and not virtual
Coalition,
Speech
Since Free
most of the
v. Farrelly,
389 F.3d
federal courts that
have considered eases
(6th Cir.2004)(affirming conviction where the
which
constitutionally
overbroad lan-
presented
Government
“sufficient
2256(8)
evidence
guage
employed
have
actual children” and the trier of fact “was
looked to the entire
record
determine the
capable
reviewing
evidence to
deter-
legal
constitutionally
impact
impermissible
mine whether the Government met its bur-
explanations.
instructions
Even in con-
cases,
images depicted
den to
show
real
tested
these courts have found suffi-
children”)
Slanina,
(quoting
359 F.3d
depicted
cient
images
evidence that
actual
357);41
Kelly,
United States v.
314 F.3d
pediatric
in cases
expert
children
where a
(7th
Cir.2003)(upholding
guilty plea
age
depicted
testified as
of the child
regulation
photographs
pornogra-
“[b]ecause
of real child
appeared
portray
“the
See,
Kelly
phy remains
...
e.g.,
real children.”
constitutional
and Mr.
(11th
Bender,
possessed
pornography”);
290 F.3d
real child
Deaton,
(8th
Cir.2002)(denying
speech
defendants’
free
States v.
noting
claim
Cir.2003)(reaffirming
that “there
[was] sufficient
the reasonableness of
See,
evidence,
58, 59,
(attached
(“You
e.g., images
may
all
consider
fact).
stipulation
images unques-
These
depiction,
including your viewing of the
in deter-
tionably depict actual
children
female
of kinder-
mining
depiction portrayed
whether
actu-
garten age
graphic
poses.
sexual
eighteen
person
age
engaging
al
conduct.”).
sexually explicit
See,
al.,
e.g.,
3 Leonard B. Sand et
Modem
Criminal,
Jury
Federal
Inst. 62-22
Instructions —
the First Amendment
balance between
“jury’s
children were
conclusion
real
*31
accused,
military
the one
rights of
on
images
trial
a
the
themselves
depicted, even where
hand,
military community’s interest
pre
the
government
and
the
were the
evidence
on
other.
good
discipline
the
subject.”);
v.
in
order and
the
United States
sented on
(8th
military
and the
443,
Cir.1999)(holding Both the servicemember
Vig,
449
167 F.3d
lawful,
in a
jury
community share an interest
“images
the
were viewed
that
the
of
Unfortu-
its own
the CPPA.
in
to draw
rational
position
which was
a
that af-
nately,
maintaining
position
a
real
while
independent conclusion as to whether
pornographers a level of
v.
depicted.”); United States
fords
children were
(9th
608,
jurisdic-
Rearden,
sanctuary unrecognized by other
612-14
349 F.3d
Cir.2003)(evidence
tions,
balancing and
prove
majority provides
trial
to
no
sufficient
the
Kimler,
children);
only one
States v.
335 serves
interest.
real
United
(10th
1132,
Cir.2003)(stating
1142
that
F.3d
above,
majority
growing
of
As noted
capable
distinguishing
are
of
“still
factfinders
overly
an
have declined
re-
federal courts
images”);
real
virtual
United
between
and
Coalition,
Speech
application of Free
strictive
(11th
Hall,
1250,
1260
States v.
approach, e.g., consid-
in
of a measured
favor
Speech
Cir.2002)(affirming a Free
Coalition
waiver,
Hay,
v.
231
eration
jury
“no reasonable
could
conviction because
(9th Cir.2000),
error,
630,
plain
F.3d
images
that
were virtual chil
have found
the
Hall,
legal
other
theo-
F.3d at
dren”).
Hilton,
v.
But see
States
United
ries,
conjunction
examination of
in
with an
(1st Cir.2004)(because
F.3d
18-19
case, including
of each
the nature
the facts
images
that
jury
required
find
images
prohibited
and characteristics
children,
if
were
actual
even
a common
Richardson,
(C.A.A.F.2003)(applying “good order and dis-
cipline”
validating
rationale in
Government’s
long recognized
We have
that the First
abrogation
speech
of First Amendment free
rights
Amendment
of civilians and mem-
Brown,
rights); United States v.
45 M.J.
bers of the armed
are not
forces
necessari-
*32
time,
(C.A.A.F.1996)(applying
danger
ly
At
“clear
coextensive.
the same
howev-
er,
mission,
loyalty, discipline,
we must
ensure that
the connection
morale” stan-
claim).
any
protected by
between
conduct
dard
the
to First Amendment
First Amendment and its effect on the
long
“This
recognized
Court has
the
military
closely
environment be
examined.
is,
military
by necessity,
specialized society.
a
(citations omitted).
58 M.J. at 454r-455
recognized
military
We have
also
the
disposition
This Court’s
of Appellant’s case
has, again by necessity, developed laws and
should,
minimum,
at a
very
treat those
same
long
traditions of its
during
history.”
own
its
by
considerations addressed
eval-
O’Connor:
Levy,
Parker v.
94 S.Ct.
uating any “discussion or focus in the record
(1974).
2547, 41
Balancing
L.Ed.2d 439
this
regarding
before us
the ‘actual’
of
character
recognition
military’s specialized
need
images,”
ensuring
the
and
“that the connec-
for
discipline
regulation,
enhanced
our
protected
tion
by
between
the
long
vigilance
Court has
in pre-
maintained
First Amendment and
in
mili-
its effect
the
serving
rights
the
of
servicemembers
tary
closely
environment [is]
examined.” Id.
process.
generally
court-martial
See
Instead,
explanation
elaboration,
without
Jacoby,
v.
C.M.A.
C.M.R.
O’Connor,
majority purports
rely
the
on
perform
balancing,
When we
this
conducting
balancing
implicitly
while
no
however, we must not fail to consider the
declining
adopt
reasoning
the
of
clear
the
“specialized society”
fabric of
the
which
majority of
III
Article
courts.
servicemembers and their
families exist.
practice,
As a matter of general
we
when
Department
military
of Defense and the
depart
choose to
from Supreme
prece-
Court
departments
emphasized
“spe-
have
that this
dent,
reasoning
or from
majority
the
society”
only
cialized
consists not
of service-
of the federal circuit courts that have fol- members, but of
families
their
as well.43
Supreme
precedent
lowed
Court
constru-
applies a
provi-
When this Court
U.S.Code
ing
applying
statutory
a
constitutional
superior
interpretation
sion and our
court’s
provision,
departure
and when
not
thereof
manner inconsistent
mandate,
required by legislative or executive
bulk
presumably
of Article III
for
military
this
should
Court
articulate the
ne-
courts —
purpose
providing
of
an elevated level of
cessity
compels
or distinction that
our rea-
protection
rights
for the trial
of a
See,
Roberts,
soning.
e.g.,
v.
United States
weigh
accused —we must
our
the reasons for
(C.A.A.F.2004) (rejecting
59 M.J.
divergent application of
that statute
Supreme
evaluating
Court standard for
dis-
the concomitant
reduction
the level
covery
applying
violation and
a more strin-
protection
pro-
that statute would
gent
otherwise
“military practice”);
standard
on
based
Unrue,
“specialized society”
vide to
we also
United States
22 C.M.A.
noted,
society
populated
serve. As
(C.M.A.1973)(recognizing
C.M.R.
“military
necessity”
evaluating reasonable-
the uniformed men and women
seizure);
Nation,
bravely
ness of search and
v. who
serve our
but
their
See,
(DoD)
e.g., Department
contributing
of Defense
Di-
to the readiness and retention of
rective,
30, 1988)
(Dec.
Family Policy,
quality personnel.
combat-ready
goal
at E3.1.1
is a
("DoD personnel
supported by
quality
and their
are the most
force
whose
life
families
families
support
high
pride
valuable
de-
Na-
resource in
the national
reflects
standards and
defend.”).
they
multiplier,
fense. DoD Families serve as
force
tion
children,
every
thousands of other service-
have
terests
spouses and
all whom
ap-
right
expect
comprise
a measured and rational
who
and their families
members
appellate
law trial
courts.
plication of
society” recognized by the Su-
“specialized
light
this
particularly,
Court’s
More
years.
preme
thirty
Court for over
individual First
historical balance between
rights
“spe-
needs
Amendment
IV. Conclusion
society
society,”
of that
cialized
the members
would,
hardly anticipate
could
that this Court
on
of extraterritorial
Both
despite
weight
federal decisions to the
implementa-
2252A and
application of
contrary,
Supreme
decision
construe
Court
Coalition,
majority
Speech
tion of Free
right
so as to elevate the
of an individual
from the main-
this
still further
moves
pornogra-
traffic
servicemember
so,
doing
practice.
stream of federal
phy
“specialized
of that
soci-
above
need
departs
precedent
our
opinion
from
own
lead
ety”
discipline.
order and
good
compet-
by failing
balancing
to conduct a
then,
being compelled
How
without
to do
rights
For these reasons
and interests.
*33
court,
by Congress,
superior
so
our
alone,
respectfully
I
dissent. Because
must
President,
does this Court elevate
stipulation
provides
of fact
no
Appellant’s
rights
First
and fair trial
Amendment
basis
law and fact to
“substantial
military’s
over the
need for
servicemembers
Prater,
of,”
providence
United States v.
discipline?
good
good order and
Are
order
(C.M.A.1991),
pleas
Appellant’s
Notes
notes
Not
weight
law in
decisional
“[tjhere
that under clause 3 of Article
the federal circuits
our
precedents,
own
types
two
congressional
are
enactments
but
on the compelling
based
similarities be-
application: specific
local
federal statutes
struggle
tween
pro-
this Nation’s
crimes),
(defining particular
general
and a
duction, importation, distribution,
pos-
statute,
federal
the Federal Assimilative
illegal
(which
drugs
session of
and the much more
adopts
Act
Crimes
certain state crimi-
creation,
laws).”
recent efforts to
combat
distri-
nal
Act,
Perez-Herrera,
Pornography
sy Guinea);
28. Child
Prevention
Pub.L. No.
United States v.
610
104-208,
A.,
I,
121(1)(13),
(5th
§
Cir.1980)(conspiracy
attempt
div.
tit.
110 Stat.
F.2d 289
importation
marijuana
high
3009.
ed
U.S.
into
from
seas);
Baker,
(5th
United States v.
