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United States v. Martin
662 F.3d 301
4th Cir.
2011
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*1 301 adopted prior may that Defendant’s convictions approach” The “common-sense Supreme under ACCA. The Court majority essentially qualify shifts the bur clearly held that Defendant must have to De has proof from the Government den of However, necessarily ge- elements of the in the face of a silent admitted fendant. reasons, foregoing For the record, that we find the neric offense. Shepard requires mandatory fifteen-year respectfully sen I dissent. and its ACCA wholly rather inapplicable, tence to be the Gov

than seek to find facts allow through rea to meet its burden

ernment in the speculation inference and

sonable Evans- of actual evidence. See

absence 899, n. 22 Taylor, v. 19 F.3d 908

Smith (“While (4th Cir.) all inferences must be America, UNITED STATES prosecution, leaps in favor of the made Plaintiff-Appellee, denied, be.”), cert. 513 logic should not 298, 919, L.Ed.2d 211 v. 130 U.S. (1994); Aguila- v. see also United States MARTIN, Paulette Mur- Paulette a/k/a (9th Oca, 655 F.3d 935-37

Montes de phy, Akuffo, Paulette Pau- a/k/a a/k/a Cir.2011) emphasizing that (repeatedly Murphy, Auntie, la Defendant- a/k/a the defendant’s con “the factual basis for Appellant. by looking at the viction” is “determined Shepard America, documents” limited universe of United States of exercise caution in Plaintiff-Appellee, and that “a court must a conviction ‘neces determining what facts v. enough on.... It is not that sarily rested’ Bynum, Bo, Derrek Lewis a/k/a merely allege a certain fact an indictment Defendant-Appellant. fact; that the admit to a or necessary convicting fact must be America, United States of defendant.”). Plaintiff-Appellee, assertion, Contrary to the v. “divorced-from-reality, is not some law- Goodie, Learley Goodwin, Reed a/k/a school-professor-type hypothetical[ ] Ross, Lonnie Defendant- a/k/a goes no resemblance to what on.” bear[s] Appellant. p. (quoting Ante United States Cir.2010), (11th Rainer, 10-5301, 10-5304, Nos. 10-5306. — denied, -, rt. U.S. ce Appeals, United States Court of (2011)). L.Ed.2d 796 This is S.Ct. Fourth Circuit. a sentence of twen the difference between of fif ty-seven prison months and one 20, 2011. Argued: Sept. years prison. impose teen To sort 30, 2011. Decided: Nov. penalty, of criminal the Government sim possibility, ply must show more than the logic, solely

based on common sense and majority’s holding knowledge— yet, map personal ture? And under deuce such as that the "Sunrise-Sunset Restaurant” in Maui today, will be the law in this Circuit. building definitively or struc- located in *2 Montemarano, PA, Elkridge, D. Michael Martin; Maryland, Appellant Anthony *3 Martin, Martin, PC, Anthony D. D. Greenbelt, Maryland, Appellant for Good- win; Mitchell, Timothy Law S. Office of Mitchell, Greenbelt, Timothy Maryland, S. Rosenstein, Bynum. Appellant for Rod J. Attorney, United States Deborah A. John- ston, Attorney, Assistant United States Bonnie Greenberg, S. Assistant United Cassella, Attorney, States Stefan D. As- Attorney, sistant United States Office of Attorney, Baltimore, States United Breuer, Maryland; Lanny A. Assistant General, Andres, Attorney Greg D. Acting General, Deputy Attorney Assistant Dan- Goodman, iel Steven United States De- Justice, D.C., partment Washington, for Appellee. MOTZ, GREGORY,

Before and DUNCAN, Judges. Circuit Affirmed published opinion. Judge opinion, DUNCAN wrote the in which joined. Judge Judge MOTZ GREGORY opinion concurring part wrote an and dissenting in part.

OPINION DUNCAN, Judge: Circuit Martin, juryA convicted Paulette Lear- Goodwin, ley Bynum, Derrek and Lavon (collectively “Appellants”) Dobie of various drug related offenses. As of their sentences, Biddle, Ap- Robert Na- the district court ordered ARGUED: Whelen Biddle, LLP, Baltimore, Mary- to forfeit assets connected to their pellants thans & land, crimes to 21 Appellants. Anthony drug pursuant for William U.S.C. 853.1 Vitarelli, Department Appellants of On seek vacature of the appeal, United States D.C., Justice, district court’s orders of forfeiture.2 For Washington, Appellee. Montemarano, follow, affirm. BRIEF: Michael D. the reasons we ON $400,000 Appellants challenges to the over in cur- made identical 1. These assets included separately filed rency by Appellants, a criminal forfeiture orders in a from accounts held Martin, appeal owned under Case No. 07-4059. Mercedes automobile appeal appeal representing drug pro- difference between this and the dollars several million 07-4059, joined Dobie in 07-4059 is ceeds. made, 90-day a claim is clock begins to I. run. expiration Before the of that period, A. government must do one of three large drug This case involves traffick- (1) things: complaint “file a [civil] for for- supplied ing operation drugs through- (2) feiture,” “obtain a criminal indictment Columbia, Maryland, out the District an containing allegation that the May Virginia.3 grand On and take forfeiture[] jury Appellants indicted numerous steps necessary preserve right its relating to their charges participation *4 custody maintain property pro- the as operation. drug trafficking the Authori- applicable vided in the criminal forfeiture Appellants ties on June 2004. arrested (3) statute,” property.” “return the to, arrests, Upon, subsequent 983(a)(3)(B) added). § (emphasis U.S.C. government various belong- seized assets If government complete fails to one of ing Appellants pursuant to to civil forfei- these three steps days before the 90 ex- ture warrants issued under 18 U.S.C. pires, it required to “promptly release § 981 civil proceed- and initiated forfeiture the property.” Id. ings. After waiting several months for the 19, 2005, January grand jury On hand- government action, to take Martin filed a superseding ed down a fourth indictment motion with the district “Prompt court for against Appellants included criminal Return of Property Pursuant to Federal against forfeiture allegations Appellants’ Rule of 41(g).”4 Criminal Procedure Mar- Thus, by January assets. the gov- tin asserted that timely she filed claim pursuing ernment was both civil and crimi- 22, 2005, February govern- and that the nal property. forfeiture of the same ment complete any failed to of the three challenged Martin the civil forfeiture of 983(a)(3)(B) § actions listed in within 90 22, 2005, her February by assets on filing days.5 Martin govern- contended that the a claim Department with the U.S. of Cus- ment’s possession continued of her proper- toms and Border Protection. The Civil ty despite its failure to act violated Act, Asset Forfeiture Reform 18 U.S.C. 983(a)(3)(B). § (“CAFRA”), § 983 creates a process by which a challenge motion, claimant can In response the civil gov- Martin’s forfeiture of assets in which she has an ernment obtained criminal seizure war- provides interest. CAFRA that when such rants6 for Martin’s assets based on the orders, appeal deadline, allegations forfeiture ture before the it had join appeal. whereas she does not so in this completed step "tak[ing] steps dispose challenges We of all to the criminal necessary preserve right its to maintain opinion. forfeiture orders in this custody provided ap- in the plicable criminal forfeiture statute.” The 3. thorough For a more treatment of the facts government had complaint also failed to file a surrounding drug operation, opin- this see the property. forfeiture or return the ion in Case No. 07-4059 and United States v. Johnson, (4th Cir.2009). 587 F.3d 625 challenges validity 6.Martin of these crim- warrants, pur- inal seizure which were issued 41(g) 4. part: Rule per- states in relevant “A 853(f). 853(f) suant to 21 U.S.C. Section aggrieved deprivation son prop- ... if, allows the issuance of such warrants inter erty may property's move for the return.” alia, prob- "the court determines that there is 41(g). Fed.R.Crim.P. protective able cause to believe ... that [a that, argued (e) 5. although govern- Martin order] under subsection of this section ment had obtained may an indictment with forfei- availability not be sufficient to assure the fourth ceed to the execution of a modified allegations su- order.” objected delay one The district court J.A. 532. No indictment. perseding motion, entering the holding forfeiture order. 41(g) denied Martin’s un- February claim was that Martin’s day, immediately following On that same and, alternatively, govern- that the timely hearing, the forfeiture the district court obtaining criminal seizure ment’s warrants Appellants. Although sentenced the dis- mooted her motion. trict court did not mention forfeiture sentence,

handing down each individual no B. objected one to the district court’s omis- sion. began trial on June Appellants’ 31, 2006, jury Ap- convicted August

On 5, 2007, January January Between charges on various related to their pellants the court entered its drug trafficking opera- participation Appellants. government as to deliv- Subsequent Appellants’ tion. convic- ered its modified order for preliminary *5 tions, post-trial proceedings took forfeiture to January the district court on place. 19, 2007, and the district court entered the 14, 2007, day. order that On June 21, 2006, Beginning on November district court issued a final order of forfei- hearings, district court held two forfeiture judgments ture but did not amend the the connection taking regarding evidence include that order. Appellants between the crimes for which property were convicted and the for which later, years 15, April Almost three sought forfeiture. After government 2010, Appellants filed a motion in the dis- hearing on December the second prior trict court to vacate the criminal the district court stated: forfeiture orders and to return all forfeited property. Appellants argued that the dis- testimony

I have considered the ... as trict court missed the deadline to finalize of counsel I arguments [and] well as the forfeiture as set forth in Federal Rule of government’s prelimi- conclude that the 32.2, Procedure Criminal therefore nary fully supported forfeiture order is jurisdiction lost to enter the forfeiture or- by the evidence at trial and ... Appel- ders. The district court denied presented prior to me at the evidence lants’ motion and amended the on forfeiture in this case. proceeding to include the final order of forfeiture. 530. The district court referred to J.A. appeal This followed. gov- proposed order submitted the parties ernment and noted that had II. agreed change to a minor that order concerning joint liability. appeal, Appellants challenge and several On government property. then told the the criminal forfeiture of their district you individually argues gov Martin lawyer, prepare will modified “[I]f [joint violation of the civil pre-trial order that addresses and several ernment’s liability], glad I will be to enter the or- forfeiture statute rendered invalid its later addition, In why pro- Appel- .... I see no reason not to criminal forfeiture.7 der property. property Martin of We have considered this of the for forfeiture.” asserts her argument reject it. finding that a that the district court erred 853(e) protective order under would not argument, of Martin claims that As availability have been sufficient to assure property possession of the unlawful collectively argue the district criminal forfeiture —that lants she seeks. The jurisdiction illegal property without to order the seizure of court was does not immu- of property property criminal forfeiture their after nize that long forfeiture as sentencings entry judg- government and the of as the can their sustain the forfei- proceed- In criminal forfeiture ture claim with independent ments. evidence. See, e.g., Pierre, review the district court’s find- ings,8 we United States v. 484 F.3d (1st Cir.2007); ings fact for clear error and the district see also v. INS Lo- interpretations 1032, 1039-40, legal pez-Mendoza, court’s de novo. 468 U.S. (1984) Morgan, (noting United States S.Ct. 82 L.Ed.2d 778 Cir.2000). (4th that, just consider each chal- We as an unlawful arrest does not lenge in turn. result in the suppression “body”

the defendant a criminal proceeding, the A. unlawful seizure property does not re- sult in the suppression property of that first consider argument We Martin’s Here, a forfeiture proceeding). Martin government’s pre-trial actions dispute does not pro- the evidence respect to her violated the duced government, independent statute, thereby civil forfeiture rendering the property, was sufficient to justify the the later criminal forfeiture of proper- reject forfeiture. We therefore ty argues invalid. Martin that the district challenge. Martin’s claim holding court erred both in that her *6 untimely holding was gov- B. attainment of criminal ernment’s seizure challenge mooted her warrants to its un- next Appellants’ We consider argument possession property. lawful of her As a that the district jurisdic- court was without remedy government’s illegal for the sei- tion to order the criminal forfeiture of zure, Martin seeks the vacature of the property their after sentencing and the subsequent criminal prop- entry forfeiture of her judgments.

erty.9 Criminal part forfeiture is of a de assuming,

Even without deciding, fendant’s sentence. Libretti v. United States, government prop 29, 38-39, seized Martin’s 516 U.S. 116 S.Ct. erty illegally, (1995). we grant cannot the reme 133 L.Ed.2d 271 procedure dy property’s vacature of the later used to effect criminal forfeiture is set —the illegal amounted an Although seizure in attempted violation of civil forfeiture of result, the Fourth Amendment. aAs in addi- property plays analysis, Martin’s a role in our forfeiture, being subject tion to not Martin government because the completed never argues, property also should have been forfeiture, civil our review is limited to the excluded evidence as from her trial. We dis- ultimate property. forfeiture of her agree. exclusionary "[T]he rule serves to de- deliberate, reckless, ter grossly negligent or 9. Martin monetary damages. does not seek A conduct, recurring or in some circumstances person property whose improperly has been systemic negligence.” Herring v. United government held generally can sue the

States, 555 U.S. 129 S.Ct. 172 government damages pursuant to the Fed- (2009). contrast, L.Ed.2d govern- In 2680(c). § eral Tort Claims Act. See 28 U.S.C. instance, any, ment’s error in this if "ar[ose] unavailable, however, remedy Such a is as to nonrecurring negligence and attenuated Martin's, property, ultimately like that is for- [and] thus far removed from the core con- 2680(c)(2). § feited. Id. at adopt cerns that led [the Court] to the [exclu- sionary] place.” rule in the first Id. First, analogous Following guid- context. government in Rule 32.2. forth ance, allegation missing in the we conclude that the dead- include a forfeiture must deprive in Rule 32.2 does not a the defendant. Fed. line set against indictment 32.2(a). conviction, jurisdiction After district court to enter orders R.Crim.P. long a be- of criminal forfeiture so as the sen- must establish nexus government seeking tencing prior it is court clear to sentenc- for which makes tween plans that it to order preponder- ing and the crime forfeiture. 32.2(b)(1)(A).10 Id. at ance of the evidence. — States, In Dolan v. United U.S. burden, satisfies its government If the -, 2533, 177 L.Ed.2d 108 order of preliminary district court enters (2010), the Court examined a statute that 32.2(b)(2). 32.2, it Id. as forfeiture. specifying set forth a deadline without Appellants’ at the time of sentenc- existed consequence, provided analytical an that, sentencing ... ings,11 provided “[a]t There, applicable construct here. becomes final as to the order of forfeiture defendant, the district ordered the part be made a the defendant and must sentence, pay his restitution to in the judg- the sentence and be included the victim of his crime. Id. at 2537. The 32.2(b)(3) (2004 Pro. ment.” Fed. R.Crim. governing provided, statute “the court added). version) (emphasis shall set a date for the final determination losses, days of the victim’s not to exceed correctly note that the dis- Appellants 3664(d)(5). sentencing.” after 18 U.S.C. trict court neither referenced forfeiture It undisputed both that the defendant nor sentencing Appellants, included final was on notice that the district court would judgments. in their In orders of forfeiture order restitution and that the district court fact, the district court failed to enter the missed the deadline to order restitution until order of forfeiture after preliminary and failed to include an order of restitution and did not enter a entered in the judgment. defendant’s until later. final order of forfeiture months *7 at 2538. S.Ct. by missing the dead- Appellants argue 32.2, in Rule the district court lost line set categories Dolan established three jurisdiction enter orders of forfeiture in which to consider statute- and rule- to include the and to amend depending deadlines on the dead based orders of forfeiture. by purpose, line’s as evidenced statute 32.2, 2004, language as it existed in or rule’s and context.12 Id. at Although Rule first, “jurisdictional court to finalize forfei- 2538-39. The a condi required a district tion,” consequence: at and include them has the strictest “The ture orders ‘jurisdictional’ pre a judgment, expiration in a final did not set forth the deadline consequences missing permitting taking that would flow from vents the court from Court, Supreme the action to which the statute attached that deadline. The how- ever, recently guidance prohibition in an deadline. The is absolute. provided has preponderance 10. The standard is set forth in decision in Dolan around the issue of restitu- law, See, Instead, e.g., United case not the statute. tion. the Court in Dolan set forth Smith, 1045, (6th States v. 1050-53 guidance broad for courts faced with these 1992). Cir. consequence to determine the circumstances of missed deadlines. See 130 S.Ct. at 2537 rule was redrafted in 2009. 11. The (broadly noting, in the first sentence of the opinion, remedy for “This case concerns the Contrary suggestion, post to the dissent’s 12. deadline”). narrowly missing statutory did not frame its a at the Court 308 it, applies Dolan, cannot waive nor can a if parties

The the deadline is missed.” equitable that deadline for at court extend 130 S.Ct. 2538. type at 2538. This reasons.” Id. dead- The Dolan court aspects focused six unlikely line is to be inferred when a stat- of the deadline created the restitution specify consequence ute or rule fails to statute in concluding that it is a “time- (find- at noncompliance. for See id. First, deadline, related directive.” ing specified consequence that the lack of a “shall,” though even it contains the word

weighs against imposing a coercive sanc- does “not specify consequence a for non- tion). jurisdictional Examples of condi- (internal compliance.” Id. at 2539 quota- filing ap- tions include the deadlines for omitted). Second, tions the substantive See, Russell, peals. e.g., Bowles v. 551 purpose of the restitution statute is to aid 205, 209-10, U.S. S.Ct. crime, victims of rather than provide some (2007). L.Ed.2d 96 protection Third, for defendants. Id. statute’s primarily deadline “is designed deadline, category second a help victims of crime prompt secure rule,” “claims-processing not limit “do[es] restitution provide rather than to defen- jurisdiction, court’s regú but rather dants with certainty as to the amount of timing latelas] the of motions or claims Fourth, their liability.” Id. “depriving the Dolan, brought before the court.” sentencing court of the power to order S.Ct. 2538. No sanction applied restitution would harm those—the victims missing type of deadline “[u]nless a of crime—who likely bear no responsibility party points out to the court that another for the being deadline’s missed and whom litigant has missed such a deadline.” Id. the statute also seeks to benefit.” Id. at An example of a claims-processing rule is Fifth, “previously Court had the deadline for filing a motion for a new interpreted similar similarly.” statutes Id. See, trial in a criminal e.g., case. Eberhart Finally, restitution, in the case of “the States, v. United 546 U.S. normally can mitigate any harm (2005) curiam). 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (per that a missed might deadline cause.” Id. at 2541. The third category deadline, directive,”

“time-related is the most forgiv Considering the facts before us ing. A time-related keeps pro directive through the lens of we conclude moving by cess creating a 32.2(b)(3), deadline “that is existed, as it then *8 legally enforceable but not deprive does a established a time-related directive.13 judge public or other First, official of the power 3664(d)(5), like the 2004 version of to take the action to which the deadline Rule 32.2(b)(3)—although used the word argues 13. The dissent that this case is distin- blank provision left to be filled awas on joint because, liability, and guishable change several a to which Dolan unlike in Do- 504, 518, 520, Appellants consented. J.A. lan, presents only missing case not of Likewise, assuming 532. the dissent is cor- deadline, statutory elapsing "but also the of rect that it was not error Rule under 35 for the timeframe may in which a court amend a the district court in Dolan to miss the statuto- Post, sentence” under Rule 35. at 311. We restitution, ry governing deadline it was simi- misreading believe this a Although of Dolan. larly not error under Rule 35 for the district the dissent is correct that all that was left for court here to make an almost identical mis- district court to do in Dolan was to fill in the take, missing governing the deadline forfei- restitution, amount of this “fill in the blank” Accordingly, ture. closely we believe Dolan is is no less an amendment of a sentence than analogous to these circumstances and thus Indeed, happened what compels in this case. here the our decision here. notes, Advisory change in consequence Committee specify not “must”—did Second, substance, the substantive the rule not one of but was noncompliance. clarify is to criminal forfeiture instead intended “to what the dis- purpose of but to provide protection required for defendants trict court to at sentenc- is do of the fruits their ...” ing. advisory criminals of 32.2 com- deprive Fed.R.Crim.P. (2009 amendment). crimes. and deter future illegal acts mittee’s This *9 added). 32.2(b)(4)(B) (emphasis sentencing As the the district court would record, 853(1) ("With respect appears 14. See 21 U.S.C. to 15. From the it the time be- section, stating unequivocally tween the district court property ordered forfeited under intended to enter—after a minor Attorney to General is authorized ... take change pre- was forfeiture order —which rights action to protect other of inno- —the government, copies sented to it persons jus- interest cent which is in the given Appellants beginning ...”). —and tice. sentencings approximately individual minutes. See J.A. 543. orders, majority enter forfeiture we refuse to va- heavily relies Dolan United — States, U.S. -, 2533, tardy cate the district court’s forfeiture (2010). L.Ed.2d 108 That case held that a orders. statutory deadline to order restitution deprive III. “does not power the court of the restitution,” order id. “where ... reasons, foregoing For the we affirm the the sentencing court made clear prior to criminal of Appellants’ forfeiture assets. the deadline’s expiration that it would or AFFIRMED (for restitution, der leaving open more days) only amount,” than 90 id. at GREGORY, Judge, concurring Circuit Dolan, however, does not stand for dissenting part: and contention that as long as Although I concur in Parts I II.A and the defendant has penalty notice that a Judge opinion rejecting appel- Duncan’s ordered, would be sentencing requested remedy suppression, lant’s I authority retains to impose penalty such compelled am to dissent from Parts II.B statutory after the relevant deadline. See and III. supra at 307 (“[Mjissing the deadline set in Rule deprive 32.2 does not a district case, Not a single published or unpub- jurisdiction court of to enter orders of lished, has today’s majority done what long forfeiture so as the sentenc does: it holds that even if a punishment of ing court prior makes clear to sentencing forfeiture is not discussed at forfeiture.”). it plans to order The judgment, ordered in a defendant can still Dolan decision is much narrower: the sen subject be to that punishment if she has tencing court authority retains to deter notice that punishment may such be or- mine the amount penalty of a after the dered. statutory relevant deadline when the sen It is undisputed the district court tencing court makes the defendant aware did not preliminary enter a order of forfei- at sentencing that the defendant will be ture before sentencing judgment. and to that penalty. majority Nor proper actions, were remedial such as takes Dolan out of its context gives and its amendment of pursuant the sentence holding narrow breadth in a qualitatively timely pursued under the Federal different area of the law. I respectfully Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the dissent. appellants’ sentences pur- became final for There are two differences between the poses of Rule 32.2 before the district court present case and Dolan that I believe war- entered the preliminary order of forfei- rant vacatur of the district court’s orders. ture, I would hold that the district court First, narrowly Dolan was conscribed to did not authority have prelimi- enter the cover restitution cases in which the nary and final orders of forfeiture penalty amount of the the fact of the —not and judgments the amended and penalty Second, itself—was left blank. therefore the district court’s orders and restitution statutory amended should be vacated. schemes have purposes different In order to reach its conclusion that the structures. I deal with each in turn. appellants must forfeit their de- I.

spite no discussion about forfeiture at their *10 sentencing hearings and no inclusion of It is incontrovertible that forfeiture was forfeiture in their written judgments, the in included neither the oral sentence nor in at Critically, squarely Rule 35 is issue on any appel- of the judgment for written facts, from Dolan although by difference it is not addressed The factual these lants. 35(a) sentence and striking. Both Dolan’s majority. See Fed.R.Crim.P. going he was state that judgment (2008) (“Within order days sentencing, after restitution; only the it was subject to to be may the court correct a sentence re- open. that was left penalty amount arithmetical, technical, from or oth- sulted knowing not between The difference error.”). That Rule 35 is so er clear Dolan, in punishment, of a as amount highlights the le- squarely presented here all, at punishment to a being not merely filling between in gal difference kind, degree. not here, is a difference issuing pun- blank” and “amount-related notes, true, majority appel- It as the Dolan district ishment. Because the that their sentences lants were on notice in an amount- judge merely filling was supra at include forfeiture. See would blank, apply: Rule 35 did not there related judg- with being But sentenced 307-08. in the sentence. was no error correct fun- you is likewise against ment entered Dolan, only 130 S.Ct. at 2544. While the being on notice damentally different rule at stake in Dolan was the 90- timing may be sentenced. Under you limit the amount of day determining that after a holding, it seems imposed restitution 18 U.S.C. sen- “has served his entire 3664(d)(5), we are faced here with the long how after? —a tence—and who knows passing require- of not 32.2’s imprison- might still order additional ment, elapsing also the of the time- but restitution, ment, an additional additional may frame in which a court amend a sen- fine, super- or an additional condition significant There are differences tence. at 2548 release.” vised Rule 32.2 and Dolan’s restitution between (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). II, statute, which I address Part infra. prece- and the parsing of Dolan Careful however, troubling, is the fact that More context reveals in the asset-forfeiture dent majority’s ruling essentially reads Rule all meant to solve decisions are that these Rules of Criminal 35 out of the Federal manage- problem of court very particular Procedure. ensuring efficient use of the court’s ment: accuracy of sacrificing not time while the consensus view that a agree I tells us punishments.

its The Dolan Court of Rule 32.2 without more does violation covers the case which that its decision necessarily an order of forfeiture void (currently lacking sufficient judge “a who See, authority. e.g., for lack of United information) open, say, to leave wishes 1, 6, 14, Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d States fine, condition of special of a or a amount (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Ben- release.” Id. at 2543. What’s supervised (3d Cir.2005). nett, Two give judges needed in such cases is remedy exist for a court avenues “essentially fill in an amount- flexibility to a defen- failure to include judgment in a that made related blank mentioned, already sentence. As dant’s applicable.” Id. that restitution was clear And Rule 36 path. is one such Rule 35 in the significant difference at 2544. “[Ajfter giving any no- provides another: just is that it wasn’t appellants’ cases may appropriate, the court tice it considers awaited, they of the forfeiture amount in a a clerical error time correct very fact of forfeiture it was the order, of the rec- or other judgment, sentencing hearing open left in the record ord, correct an error judgment. *11 312 violation,

arising oversight expira- Fed. tur. coupled omission.” That (2010). timeline, 36 tion of Rule 35’s R.Crim.P. determinative. “only Rule makes back- against 35 sense Here, amend the district court did its that trial ground change rule courts cannot judgment years four after its initial some at will.” sentences 130 at S.Ct. entry it error through when discovered its (Roberts, C.J., im- dissenting). 2548 An the appellants’ the motion to vacate orders posed subject is final sentence the forfeiture. states ex Rule 36 indeed exceptions Congress explicitly has time,” plicitly, any “at and the 2009 Addonizio, permitted. United States v. clear amendments to Rule 32.2 make 2235, 442 U.S. 99 60 S.Ct. may a district court correct its failure to (1979). L.Ed.2d 805 Before Rule 35 was the judg include forfeiture order “trial adopted, courts had no ... authori- “at any through ment time” the use of modify ty” imposed at sentences. Id. 32.2(b)(4)(B) Rule 36. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 16, 99 today’s major- 189 n. S.Ct. 2235. Yet (2010). But far in advance of amend ity read Rule say would 35 to that trial judgment, seven-day ment window authority courts have to amend sentences closed, to amend the oral had sentences any at time—the clear textual limit sev- appellants’ and the had become sentences days notwithstanding en despite By modifying final. its four Supreme Court’s clear command that Rule through 36, years sentencing after Rule “jurisdictional limit may 35’s time sweep district court attempts Rule 189, not be extended.” Id. at rug. 35 under the The fact that the court judgment years modified some four later Rule any telling via 36’s “at time” allowance can It is that the majority does not trump seven-day Rule precedent 35’s window to cite to con the forfeiture sentencing. correct “clear error” in holding. text for its In all other cases on Rule 35 necessary deadlines, would never be if we so missed Rule 32.2 even in the broadly read Rule power. 36’s corrective egregious scenarios, most factual there is To allow such backdoor routes would at cast least a discussion at Rule 35 out of the Federal Rules Crimi in which hearing the court confirms undermine nal Procedure and the finality the will subject defendant be to forfeiture. See, of criminal sentences. Grasso, See United States e.g., United States v. 376 Fed. Pease, (11th 809, Cir.2003) (3rd 816 Appx. Cir.2010); 167 n. 1 Brief of (“Rule Ereme, 36 can be used to correct Appellee ‘clerical’ at United States v. errors; used, here, (4th it Cir.2009) (No. cannot be Fed.Appx. 08- make a 5094), (defense substantive alteration to a crim WL 958911 at *19 sentence.”) inal (citing acknowledged United States v. at sentencing that de “[t]he (11th Whittington, 918 F.2d Cir. already fendant has been the of a 1990); Werber, United $367,500, States v. 51 F.3d forfeiture order for which will (2d Cir.1995)) (“Rule 342, 347 bankrupt 36 is not a indeed if per it’s mitted”). vehicle for the vindication of court’s unexpressed sentencing expectations, or Furthermore, the changes wrought for the correction of made errors the 2009 amendments to the Federal Rules itself.”) (internal quotation marks of Criminal Procedure do not support the omitted). position, contests, as it su- see 309;

It is therefore not the violation of pra support amendments 32.2’s compels command alone that vaca- present view that the beyond facts are *12 states, means that the court mention the amended Rule “The must pale. The orally include the forfeiture when when court must the sentence is an- announcing the sentence or must orally Cassella, nounced.” Stefan D. Asset For- that the defendant knows ensure otherwise feiture Law In The United States 600 sentencing.” Fed. the forfeiture at (2007). 32.2(b)(4)(B) (2010) (emphasis R.Crim.P. A in finality defendant’s interest the added). nothing is in the record There greater his sentence is in cases in which sentencing that demonstrates the no indication in there is the sentence or that the defendants knew of court ensured judgment the that the defendant is say not forfeiture. The Rule does to a certain sanction than cases like Dolan previous hearings notice from suffices. in the sentencing which court and the Furthermore, rule, the amended relied judgment both state that the defendant is court, upon by Fed.Appx. Grasso subject to a certain sanction in an amount 168, highlights important factual at to be determined later. Rule 35’s time case present difference between the limits, if they apply even don’t to the “fill- cases, Ereme. In the latter Grasso and ing in the blanks” of a restitution order at hearing, forfeiture was discussed included in the in judg- sentence and demonstrating knowledge the defendant’s ment, surely must in force apply to the going imposed. was to be that forfeiture simple Contrary fact of forfeiture. to the certainly have been written The Rule could view, Dolan dissent’s a defendant’s inter- that a so that it would be sufficient defen- finality est in the of his sentence was not penalty dant is on notice of a of forfeiture. squarely in that it presented case as however, It, was not so written. here. only factually case identical to this The reported one is a district court case II. King,

this See Circuit. United States (D.S.C.2005). F.Supp.2d 509 Despite reliance on Do- King authority court found it had no factors, policy many lan ’s of those factors preliminary enter a order of forfeiture af- actually in have little relevance the forfei- sentencing ter when forfeiture had not they in appellants ture context or favor the been raised at or entered Even if I this case. were to conclude that (The judgment. court went further to con- Dolan’s framework covered the instant clude that Rule 36 cannot be used to sub- despite the fact that isn’t a “fill in case stantively alter a sentence. defendant’s Id. case, I the blank” would hold the six 512; Part I.B. (discussing at see infra policy and statutory-purpose consider- 36).) Crucially, govern- “the Rules 35 and compel ations of Dolan vacatur of the for- regarding ment ... raised no issue forfei- judgments. feiture orders and amended sentencing.” ture at Id. 512-13. The First, heavily the Dolan Court relied it that forfeiture record below makes clear importance compensation of full of vic- sentencing, not mentioned at nor tims in restitution cases. 130 S.Ct. at 2540 sentence, nor part made of the oral includ- (“[T]he speed primarily statute seeks Indeed, judgment court. ed 32.2, help the victims of crime and second- pre-2010 under the revisions to Rule defendant.”). In arily help expressly not stated “[w]hile Rule, prejudiced would be if provision victims crime most courts hold that the 32.2(b)(3) untimely had resti- requiring the forfeiture the Court vacated tution order. The same concern for vie- order to be made of the sentence grounds in the crim- explicitly appear The second and fourth Dolan tims does by the majority purpose *13 statutes. To the extent that discussed are the inal forfeiture statutory by primary scheme. contemplated are the for- The parties third scheme, injured purpose punish of forfeiture is to and deter rights by their are feiture criminals, compensate injured third there is no the conclusion that parties, goal as is the of restitution the Rule The force behind 32.2’s deadline. majority The when right statute. is provides prelimi- rule that the forfeiture argues purpose that “the substantive of final nary oi'der of forfeiture becomes as to criminal forfeiture is ... crimi- deprive to sentencing. the at the time of defendant nals of the fruits of their acts and 32.2(b)(4)(A). illegal Fed.R.Crim.P. What Supra deter future crimes.” at 309. But party may is that thereafter a third means same, course, the of could be said challenge the forfeiture order before it punishment involving for crimes dispute, say, becomes final order to illicit It all gains. cannot mean that dead- ownership subject of property the to for- imposing lines for sentences can be waived a Insisting prompt feiture. See id. that undeniably important goal. because of preliminary protects date for the order rights It the parties- was third judicial third-party promotes interests and —-victims of defendants —that the Dolan decision efficiency. problem before Rule protect; sought promote to if it sought to 32.2(b) was parties might that “third who general punishment deterrence and the property have an interest in the forfeited wrongs, promotion ancillary. such parties are not to the criminal case. At time, a the same who has no defendant ground The third Dolan majority incentive, interest has no discusses is the fact that no “there is indi- trial, dispute government’s to forfei- purpose cation that the of the deadline set allegations.” ture Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2 provide is to Rule 32.2 with defendants (2000 note). advisory committee’s Rule certainty as to the liability.” amount of the 32.2(b) aligns the parties, incentives of the added). Supra at 309 (emphasis Of provided that the preliminary order of for- course, the issue isn’t whether Rule 32.2’s feiture becomes final as to the defendant purpose provide is to certainty re- sentencing. at a time—at specific spect to the amount of liability is not —this “fill in the blank” case like Dolan—-it is That the order of forfeiture becomes 32.2, whether Rule when read with Rule final to the sentencing defendant at inis provide certainty to is intended to the stark contrast to the restitution frame- as to whether she work, go which allows the trial court to punishment at all. forward with sentencing delaying while ground The fifth by discussed Dolan and restitution order for days. U.S.C. by majority noted is that similar stat- 3664(d)(5) (2010). puts This difference interpreted similarly. utes been have This squarely play Rule 35 in the forfeiture merely very assumes the answer to context, practically whereas it is mooted question that trying we are answer to- 3664(d)(5)’s §by 90-day to en- allowance day: are forfeiture statute and Rule 35 ter the amount of the victim’s losses. enough similar to the restitution frame- Again, solely it is not Rule 32.2’s structure work to the application warrant of Dolan? compels conclusion that orders vacated; must be it is read in ground Rule 32.2 The sixth to- Dolan cited conjunction with day’s majority appellants mandates could such an outcome. any harm prevented by objecting have III. finality as to “lack of sentences’ their put To Supra at 309. orders.” surely not want criminals Congress did de- majority expects charitably, the it less illegal their enter- profit to retain the sentencing on object at their fendants anymore they than prises certainly not — punishment particular grounds that sentence want criminals to serve shorter has not imposed be thought might they than was intended from the imposed. Apart actually been finali- Congress Yet also values the judge. *14 to ask the a defendant oddity requiring of a sentence. The Federal Rules of ty of sentence, logic for a harsher court correc- provide Procedure for the Criminal system our adversarial undermines oversights sentencing tion attorney to alert forcing a defense judgments. The district court here did See, oversights. prosecutor’s timely avail itself of these correctives. (defense has counsel Op. Tx. Eth. e.g., such, I would find that the district As by pros- made duty correct mistakes no authority prelim- to enter the court had no prior convictions in court about of forfeiture after the sentence inary ecutor order defendant). court, final, authority at each nor The district became did have I hearings, asked issue its final order of forfeiture. would appellants’ therefore vacate the amended anything if else needed government of forfeiture. and orders on, in each government and the ruled be negative. J.A. 586 replied instance

(Martin); 788-89 (Bynum); J.A. J.A. 688

(Goodwin). had an also government the court’s mistake to correct

opportunity § appeal, use of an 18 U.S.C.

through Pease, 331 F.3d at it chose not to. See

but not use Rule 36 (government could 811-12 IDEARC, In the Matter of correcting a sen- judgment to amend INCORPORATED, forfeiture when that did not mention tence Debtor. under appeal not use government did 3742). attorney To insist a defense Equity Committee, Spencer ad hoc is not as object when a sentence should Appellant, principle expected violates high as she adver- advocacy required our of zealous Idearc, Incorporated, Appellee. system. sarial No. 10-10858. whole, policy Taken as a determinative structural considerations Appeals, United States Court import in the have little Dolan either Fifth Circuit. actually support the context or forfeiture Nov. con- if I were to appellants’ case. Even a Dolan present these facts clude that alone, I Rule 32.2 respect

issue with between

would find the differences com- and restitution schemes court’s or- of the district

mand vacatur

ders. notes Cf. Ben-Hur, States United emphasizes purpose clarification that Cir.1994) (7th (“[T]he purpose behind a coercive of deadline is not create 853 not forfeiture under section sanction, that but to ensure a defendant is conduct, just but also to illegal to sanction sentence, notice aspects on as to all of his pow dealers of their economic strip drug including forfeiture. er.”). Third, that the there is no indication colleague’s comprehensive Our dis set in Rule 32.2 is purpose of the deadline notwithstanding, dispute sent there is no certainty as to provide defendants Appellants fully that were of both aware Fourth, liability. of their be the amount and, beyond the pending forfeiture itself may go from forfeiture proceeds cause Dolan, even facts of the exact amount. crime,14 preventing forfeiture victims Notably, Appellants not— themselves do on the failure to meet Rule 32.2 based they and argue indeed could those like not— would often harm who deadline were caught off-guard. The district court ly responsibility no for the deadline’s bear comprehensive hearings held multiple, the statute also being missed whom forfeiture, liability in which both the fact of Fifth, benefit. as demonstrated seeks to and the amount were See determined. Dolan, previously the Court has inter by 364-461, J.A. 480-532. court The district preted similarly. Finally, similar statutes made clear at the end the final forfei mitigated could have harm Appellants hearing prior ture mere minutes15 might the missed deadline have —a sentencing Appellants it intended to respective their objecting caused at —that enter the lack Appellants forfeiture order.’ finality to the as sentencings lack of to the surprise further the fact evidenced orders. at forfeiture See S.Ct. they challenge did not the forfeiture failed They to do so. years until three the district almost after relevant of the current language the final entered order of forfeiture. supports Rule 32.2 further our conclusion jurisdictional Accordingly, this deadline is not a because the Rule 32.2 that, deadline, existed, provides per- It now it then “[t]he condition. as is most suasively forfeiture court must include the when understood a time-related orally announcing jurisdictional directive than the sentence must rather condition, ensure because were Appellants otherwise that the knows sentencing.” indisputably at on notice the time of

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Martin
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 30, 2011
Citation: 662 F.3d 301
Docket Number: 10-5301, 10-5304, 10-5306
Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.
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