Case Information
*1 Before F LAUM , M ANION , and B ARRETT , Circuit Judges .
M ANION , Circuit Judge . Police o cers pulled Marshon Si- mon over for failing to signal su ciently ahead of turning. A drug-sni ng dog alerted on Simon’s car so o cers searched it. They did not nd drugs, but they found a gun. The govern- ment charged Simon with being a felon-in-possession. The district judge denied Simon’s motions for recusal, suppres- sion, and supplementation. Simon entered a conditional guilty plea and received a sentence of 15 years. He raises a litany of issues on appeal. He argues the judge should have recused himself because before he was a judge he supervised a prior prosecution of Simon. He argues the judge should have suppressed the gun because the o ffi cers lacked probable cause to initiate the tra ffi c stop and because they prolonged the stop to allow for the dog sni . He argues the dog’s alert was false and the dog was unreliable because he was improp- erly trained. He argues the judge should have allowed him to supplement the evidence after denial of suppression. Finally, he argues one of his prior felonies should not have counted as a predicate for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act. Concluding the judge commi ed no reversible error in deny- ing Simon’s motions, we a rm.
I. Facts
On the night of August 21, 2016, three police o cers in a “bike patrol unit” surveyed a particular section of Decatur, Il- linois. O cers Jason Danner and Jamie Hagemeyer rode bi- cycles. They sat behind a propane tank 145 yards from the in- tersection of College and Green Streets. O cer Robert Hoecker drove a squad car nearby.
The bicycle o cers saw a vehicle driven by Marshon Si- mon leave the 1100 block of North College Street ( ve blocks away) and drive toward them. As Simon approached the in- tersection of College and Green Streets, he failed to signal at least 100 feet before turning left from College onto Green. This was according to the bicyclists’ testimony at the suppression hearing, which the district judge credited. At the bicyclists’ re- quest, Hoecker pulled Simon over at 10:26 p.m.
Hoecker approached Simon’s car and made contact. Hoecker introduced himself and told Simon the basic reason for the stop. Hoecker explained bicycle o cers would arrive and provide details. Simon questioned the basis for the stop. Simon gave his driver’s license and proof of insurance to Hoecker. According to Hoecker, Simon was cooperative and polite, behaved normally, and was no more nervous than the normal level of tra c-stop nervousness. Hoecker ran Simon through the LEADS computer system and found he was val- idly licensed and insured. Hoecker fi nished this check in less than 2 minutes, before Danner and Hagemeyer arrived on scene at about 10:29 p.m.
Once Danner and Hagemeyer arrived they took over “pro- cessing the ticket,” including some double-checking. Hoecker’s role was to assist. Hoecker told Danner that Simon had insurance and a valid license. Hoecker said he “didn’t know if [Danner] wanted the dog or not.” (Appellant Br. at 8, quoting Hoecker’s dashcam video.) Danner asked if Simon had any criminal history. Hoecker then ran a criminal-history check and found Simon had prior drug and weapon charges.
Danner made contact with Simon. Danner testi fi ed Simon appeared abnormally nervous. Danner testi fi ed Simon asked about the violation and insisted he used his turn signal. Dan- ner testi ed, “I observed him to pull his hand away from his lap, and he was shaking pre y good, indicating to me that he appeared nervous.” But Danner did not note this in the police report and he did not mention this when discussing whether to call a dog.
Hagemeyer testi ed that while speaking brie fl y with Hoecker he handed her Simon’s materials. She then went to another squad car that had arrived on scene “to begin the wri en warning.” Both Danner and Hagemeyer testi ed about the various steps and processes a bike patrol unit completes as part of the mission instigated by a tra ffi c viola- tion, including monitoring and securing the scene, making contacts with the driver, running computer checks, and writ- ing out the warning or ticket.
Danner decided to call a dog. He testi ed he decided to call a dog at about 22:30:38 (10:30:38 p.m.) on the clock of Hoecker’s dashcam, about 1 minute after Danner and Hage- meyer arrived at the tra c stop. An o cer called for the ca- nine unit less than 4 minutes into the stop, when the ticket was still being processed, according to the o cers’ testimony.
Canine handler Snyder arrived with Rex at the scene at about 10:33 p.m. At that time, the tra c violation was still be- ing processed, according to the o cers’ testimony. [1] Within a few seconds of walking around Simon’s car, Rex alerted. Snyder took less than 20 seconds to prepare Rex, begin the search, and con fi rm the alert. The time period from the begin- ning of the stop to the alert was about 7 minutes. Hagemeyer testi fi ed she had no part in conducting the actual dog sni . She testi fi ed she “was writing the warning.” She con fi rmed on cross-examination that she fi lled out the tra c warning, and that Danner issued it to Simon. Defense counsel asked, “So you were the one who fi lled out the date, time, name, address, and birth date?” Hagemeyer answered, “I fi lled out the ma- jority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.”
After the alert, Simon became angry and insisted there were no drugs in his car. Danner asked Simon to step out of his car. The police searched it. They did not fi nd drugs, but they found a gun. An o cer drove Simon to the police station. Danner handed Simon a tra c citation as he was released from the station. Danner testi ed he lled out the citation.
II. Procedural posture
Since Simon was a felon, the government charged him with being a felon in possession of a rearm. The case was assigned to Judge Bruce. Simon moved Judge Bruce to recuse himself because he had served as the First Assistant United States A orney for the Central District of Illinois with super- visory authority over a prior case against Simon culminating in conviction. Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion.
Simon moved to suppress the gun, arguing there was no probable cause to stop his car, the police impermissibly ex- tended the stop to get a dog on scene, and the dog was unre- liable and improperly trained. Judge Bruce held an ( Id. at 87:24–88:7.)
evidentiary hearing over parts of three days and heard testi- mony from seven witnesses. He found the o ffi cers credible, even if at times confused. He found the o ffi cers had probable cause to think Simon commi ed a tra ffi c violation, the o ffi cers did not unreasonably prolong the stop, and Rex was a properly trained and certi ed canine whose alert can lead to probable cause. The judge denied the motion to suppress.
Simon moved to supplement the record with additional, unrelated tra c citations issued by Danner (to show the dif- ferences in the o cers’ handwriting to address the issue of which o cer wrote Simon’s citation) and a video made by a defense investigator (to contradict the o cers’ version of events leading up to the tra c stop). The judge denied this motion.
Simon pleaded guilty conditioned on preserving his right to appeal. He received an enhancement as an Armed Career Criminal. The judge sentenced him to 15 years in prison, the mandatory minimum.
Simon appeals the denials of his motions to recuse, sup- press, and supplement. He also appeals his quali cation as an Armed Career Criminal, arguing his prior conviction for at- tempted armed robbery in Illinois in 2000 did not qualify as a violent felony.
III. Analysis
A. Recusal
Simon seeks remand because he claims Judge Bruce’s han- dling of this case conveys the appearance of impropriety. Si- mon does not claim Judge Bruce actually had or acted on any unfair bias against Simon.
Simon argues Judge Bruce should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): “Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any pro- ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques- tioned.” Below, Simon also sought recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3), but he no longer presses that on appeal.
As the government agrees, we review a preserved § 455(a) claim de novo . Cf. Fowler v. Bu s , 829 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding § 455(a) can be vindicated on appeal); United States v. Dorsey , 829 F.3d 831, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (a preserved § 455(b) claim is reviewed de novo ).
To win recusal under § 455(a), a party must show a rea- sonable, well-informed observer might question the judge’s impartiality. United States v. Herrera-Valdez , 826 F.3d 912, 917 (7th Cir. 2016). In other words, the party must show an objec- tive, disinterested observer fully informed of the reasons for seeking recusal would “entertain a signi cant doubt that jus- tice would be done in the case.” Id.
Simon sought recusal early in the case on the ground that Bruce served as First Assistant United States A orney for the Central District of Illinois from 2010 through 2013. During that time, the government charged Simon with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Bruce supervised the AUSA assigned to that case. Simon pleaded guilty and was sen- tenced in 2012 and again (after a successful appeal) in March 2013. This prior criminal case involved occurrence facts sepa- rate from those in the present case. But the prior case is di- rectly relevant to this case because the conviction in the prior case enhanced Simon’s sentence in this case as an Armed Ca- reer Criminal.
Judge Bruce denied the recusal motion. He noted he could not remember any participation in past prosecutions of Si- mon. Judge Bruce observed that even if he did participate in a past prosecution, he did not participate in the current pros- ecution, “which consists of new charges, wholly unrelated to those brought against [Simon] in the past.” (Text Order, Dec. 6, 2016.)
Simon likens this case to United States v. Herrera-Valdez . There, the government prosecuted a defendant for illegal reentry after deportation. Before trial on the illegal-reentry charge, defendant moved to disqualify Judge Der-Yeghiayan because he had served as the District Counsel for the Immi- gration and Naturalization Service when defendant was de- ported. District Counsel Der-Yeghiayan’s name was listed in several places in INS’s brie ng supporting deporting. Judge Der-Yeghiayan denied the motion to disqualify and defend- ant appealed. We observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to “‘disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.’” Herrera-Valdez , 826 F.3d at 917. We reversed the denial of disquali cation, concluding “a reasonable, disinterested observer could as- sume bias from the fact that the judge presiding over the de- fendant’s prosecution for illegal reentry was the same person who ran the o ce that pursued, and succeeded in obtaining, the removal order that is the source of his current prosecu- tion.” Id. at 919. We noted this was particularly true given that the linchpin of defendant’s case against the illegal-reentry charge was a collateral a ack against the removal order. The judge need not have been actually involved in the prior case or be actually biased in the subsequent case to trigger the re- quirement to recuse under § 455(a). 9
But here, the prior case does not directly give rise to or un- derly the present case. And here, Simon a tt empts no collateral a tt ack against the prior conviction. Simon’s 2011 conviction was not, and could not have been, the linchpin to his defense in this subsequent case. A defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding may not collaterally a tt ack a prior conviction used to enhance his sentence, with an exception not relevant here. See Daniels v. United States , 532 U.S. 374, 382–83 (2001); Custis v. United States , 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994). Any collateral a tt ack against the prior conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 would have been time-barred. So there was no possibility of Judge Bruce adjudicating the merits of a collateral a tt ack against Si- mon’s 2011 conviction here. And consequently there was no reason to think Simon might have declined to launch a collat- eral a ack against the 2011 conviction because he feared Judge Bruce would not be receptive to such an a ack, or would punish him in the present case for making such an at- tack.
The prior and subsequent cases at issue in Herrera-Valdez are directly related in a way the prior and subsequent cases at issue here are not. A closer analogy to Herrera-Valdez is Si- mon’s prior conviction under the supervision of First AUSA Bruce and the proceedings for revocation of supervised re- lease involving that prior conviction and the gun possession on August 21, 2016. Simon’s prior conviction directly gives rise to and underlies the revocation proceedings. So Judge Bruce recused himself from them. [2] As this relationship is not present between Simon’s prior case and the current felon-in- possession case, there was no need for Judge Bruce to recuse himself here.
True, the prior conviction enhanced the sentence for the present conviction under the ACCA. But this is mere happen- stance. It is not the same kind of direct connection we found problematic in Herrera-Valdez . Another distinction between Herrera-Valdez and this case is that there, the future judge’s name was on the briefs against the defendant, but here the future judge’s name was not on the briefs. This is a relevant consideration because it bears on public perception. We do not consider this to be a controlling factor by itself, but it is relevant.
Judge Bruce did not err in refusing to recuse.
B. Suppression
Simon raises a series of potential errors regarding the de- nial of suppression. He argues there was no probable cause to believe a tra ffi c violation occurred, and therefore initiating the stop was unconstitutional. He argues the o cers unconstitu- tionally prolonged the tra c stop. And he argues Rex’s alert was false and Rex was improperly trained. “We employ a mixed standard of review on motions to suppress, reviewing the district court’s factual determinations for clear error and de novo its ultimate determination about whether the police had su cient grounds to stop or search the individual.” United States v. Rodriguez-Escalera , 884 F.3d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omi ed).
1. Initiating the stop
Simon argues the o cers lacked probable cause to believe he commi ed a tra c violation, so they had no probable cause to stop him. If Simon were right, then the court should have suppressed the gun as fruit of the poisonous tree. The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Whenever police stop a car, the stop must satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasona- bleness requirement. Delaware v. Prouse , 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, a court will generally exclude resulting evidence. United States v. Wilbourn , 799 F.3d 900, 910 (7th Cir. 2015).
Simon goes so far as to assert he did not commit a tra ffi c violation. He argues the government did not meet its burden of proof to establish he actually commi tt ed a tra ffi c violation. But the government had no such burden. Whether Simon commi tt ed a tra ffi c violation is irrelevant for Fourth Amend- ment purposes so long as the o ffi cers had probable cause to think he did. United States v. Lewis , 920 F.3d 483, 489 (7th Cir. 2019) (“The o ffi cer is not the judge. Whether the driver actu- ally commi ed a tra ffi c infraction is irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes so long as there was an objective basis for a reasonable belief he did.”).
Generally, the decision to stop a car is reasonable, and comports with the Fourth Amendment, “where the police have probable cause to believe that a tra ffi c violation has oc- curred.” Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). Prob- able cause exists when “the circumstances confronting a po- lice o cer support the reasonable belief that a driver has com- mi ed even a minor tra c o ense.” United States v. Cashman , 216 F.3d 582, 586 (7th Cir. 2000). Probable cause is an objective standard, based on the totality of the circumstances. Lewis , 920 F.3d at 489. If an o cer reasonably thinks he sees a driver commit a tra c infraction, that is a su cient basis to pull him over without violating the Constitution. United States v. Muriel , 418 F.3d 720, 724 (7th Cir. 2005).
Here, Simon acknowledges the probable cause determina- tion depends entirely on the credibility of the two o cers on bicycles who testi ed they saw him turn without signaling at least 100 feet ahead. Simon levies many a tt acks on their cred- ibility, urging us to reverse under the clear error standard. Si- mon admits the clear error standard is very demanding. Un- der this standard, we only reverse when, after reviewing the record as a whole, we have a “de nite and rm conviction” a mistake has been made. United States v. Whitley , 249 F.3d 614, 621 (7th Cir. 2001). The district judge, after all, listened to the testimony directly and observed the demeanor of the wit- nesses. United States v. Garre tt , 757 F.3d 560, 568 (7th Cir. 2014). The district judge is in a much be er position to evaluate cred- ibility than we are. His credibility determinations are entitled to special deference. We take Simon’s credibility a acks in turn.
i. Phantom stop sign
First, Simon argues Hagemeyer swore at the suppression hearing that there was a stop sign at the corner of College and Green, but she was demonstrably and indisputably wrong. Si- mon argues this impugns her claim she saw the tra c viola- tion.
The judge directly confronted Hagemeyer’s mistake. He noted Hagemeyer “was wrong about that detail.” (Order, DE 21 at 4.) The judge said he would take the mistake into account in assessing Hagemeyer’s credibility. But the judge concluded the mistake does not weigh heavily against her credibility be- cause the detail “is not greatly important regarding the tra c o ff ense for which Defendant was pulled over” and because “[i]t would not have factored in to [sic] determining whether or not to issue Defendant a ticket for failing to signal his turn within not less than 100 feet of the intersection.” ( Id. ) Hage- meyer’s determination at the scene that Simon failed to signal at least 100 feet before the turn was not informed by the pres- ence or absence of a stop sign at the corner. In other words, there were other reasons independent of the presence or ab- sence of a stop sign for Hagemeyer to think Simon failed to signal at least 100 feet ahead of turning. Indeed, the presence or absence of a stop sign is irrelevant to estimating distances or to the requirement to signal. The judge simply did not nd this mistake about a stop sign to be very important. So the mistake did not signi cantly undermine the reliability of Hagemeyer to perceive other facts that night. Moreover, her mistake about the stop sign has no bearing on Danner’s testi- mony that he saw Simon fail to signal su ciently ahead of turning.
And as for the possibilities Hagemeyer lied about the stop sign, and this lie undermines her credibility about everything else, Simon does not go quite so far. In his opening appellate brief, he does not directly, unequivocally accuse Hagemeyer of intentionally lying about the stop sign. And Simon o ers no explanation for why Hagemeyer would have had any rea- son to lie about it. We see no clear error here.
ii. Distances
Second, Simon argues Hagemeyer and Danner were wrong about the distance between their location and the in- tersection of College and Green. They both testi ed the dis- tance was 75 yards. But the distance was actually 145 yards. The o cers’ testimony was demonstrably and indisputably wrong by a wide margin. Simon argues the o ffi cers’ ability to judge distance was the key to their claim Simon commi ed a tra c violation. He argues their failure to estimate the dis- tance between their location and the intersection correctly makes their claims about the distance between the location of Simon’s car when he activated his turn signal and the inter- section wholly incredible.
Again, the judge directly confronted the mistaken testi- mony. The judge decided the miscalculation was “of li le im- port when it comes to credibility.” (Order, DE 21 at 3.) The judge reasoned that the fact that both o cers estimated the distance at 75 yards does not indicate collusion because if they wanted to connive it is much more likely they would have used a number closer to the actual distance. They were too wrong to be conspiring to lie.
And as for the argument that the o cers’ mistake about this distance undermines the credibility of their estimate about Simon’s signaling distance, the o cers had other, spe- ci c indicia of the signaling distance beyond a raw estimate of the distance from A to B. The time between signaling and turning, the car lengths between signaling and turning, and the lengths of the headlight beams bolstered the probable cause to think Simon signaled too late and too close. The judge concluded the mistake about the distance between the bicy- clists’ location and the intersection shows nothing more than that both bicyclists were wrong about that distance. We see no clear error here.
iii. Photographs
Third, Simon argues photographs introduced into evi- dence show the unbelievability of the o cers’ claims. Danner and Hagemeyer both testi fi ed they saw Simon’s car leave the 1100 block of North College, fi ve blocks from their position. But, Simon argues, the photographs speak for themselves, and there is no way someone could see the make, model, or color of a vehicle at that distance.
The judge simply disagreed. He examined the photo- graphs and listened to the testimony and concluded “it is pos- sible for an average person, with good vision who is used to working at night, such as Danner and Hagemeyer, to see a car, in the dark, turn onto a street with its headlights on.” (Order, DE 21 at 4.) We also examined the photographs and read the testimony, and we do not have anything close to a de fi nite and fi rm conviction the judge made a mistake in this regard. Sometimes a photograph is not worth a thousand words. iv. Ghost writer
Fourth, Simon argues the judge ignored the o cers’ mis- statements about who prepared the tra c ticket. Hagemeyer testi fi ed “I was writing the warning.” She answered “yes” to the question: “[Y]ou said that you fi lled out the tra c warn- ing in this case?” When asked if she was the one who fi lled out the date, time, name, address, and birth date, she testi fi ed she “ fi lled out the majority of” the ticket herself, but she be- lieved Danner signed it. But other evidence showed she lled out none of it. Danner lled out both the tra c citation (later voided) and the warning (Simon received hours later).
Simon accuses the judge of tying himself “into a pre tz el to avoid nding that the police o cers could possibly have lied or misrepresented facts … .” (Appellant Br. at 33.) But the judge commi ed no such contortions. Rather, he addressed the discrepancies directly. He combed through the testimony about the various steps in the process leading to handing a driver a wri en ticket or warning. He noted there appeared to be confusion and possibly contradiction between the o c- ers about who actually wrote the ticket. One source of confu- sion seemed to be the word “processing.” The judge observed Hagemeyer, Snyder, and Hoecker all testi fi ed Hagemeyer be- gan “processing” the ticket, but “processing” a ticket involves much more than just physically writing the ticket. The judge also observed Hagemeyer’s testimony on this issue was more speci fi c. She testi fi ed, “I was writing the warning.” When asked, “So you were the one who fi lled out the date, time, name, address, and birth date?” she responded, “I fi lled out the majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” [3]
The judge compared the warning Simon received—pur- portedly fi lled out by Hagemeyer and signed by Danner—to a di ff erent warning de nitely lled out and signed by Hage- meyer on a di ff erent date. The judge concluded the handwrit- ing on the two warnings is di erent and they likely were not lled in by the same o cer.
But the judge noted Simon did not show the exemplar warning to Danner or Hagemeyer during the hearing to cross- examine them on who wrote Simon’s warning. The judge also noted the testimony indicated Danner or Hagemeyer would often start writing a ticket the other would fi nish. The judge observed: “There are numerous possibilities as to why the dis- crepancy exists, and without the o ffi cers being given the chance to explain the discrepancy, the court cannot impute improper conduct on their part.” (Order, DE 21 at 11.) The judge considered the totality of the o ffi cers’ testimony, and their demeanor and appearance. He concluded any discrep- ancy on this issue was due to mere confusion on the part of the o ffi cers, and not to fabrication. And he concluded the of- fi cers were credible.
We see no clear error regarding the judge’s decisions on any of these issues, nor regarding his decision to fi nd the of- cers credible. Given the two bicycle o ffi cers testi ed they saw Simon commit a tra ffi c infraction, and given the judge be- lieved them, we see no reason to reverse the decision that probable cause justi ed starting the stop.
2. Conducting the stop
Simon argues even if the o cers did not violate the Con- stitution by initiating the stop, they violated it by impermissi- bly prolonging the stop. An o cer who reasonably starts a tra c stop might violate the Constitution if he exceeds the scope of the stop or unreasonably prolongs it. Lewis , 920 F.3d at 491. A tra c stop “‘can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mis- sion’ of issuing a warning ticket.” Rodriguez v. United States , 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015) (quoting Illinois v. Caballes , 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)).
A dog sni of a car’s exterior only for illegal drugs during a lawful stop for a tra c violation does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even absent reasonable suspicion of drugs. Ca- balles , 543 U.S. at 410. But a stop justi ed only by a tra ffi c vio- lation becomes unconstitutional if the o ffi cers prolong it be- yond the time reasonably required to complete the stop’s original mission. Rodriguez , 135 S. Ct. at 1612. “An o ffi cer may conduct certain unrelated checks—including a dog sni ff — during a lawful tra ffi c stop, but he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.” Lewis , 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omi ed). As Simon concedes, “calling a K-9 unit does not unlawfully extend a tra ffi c stop as long as the normal process for pursuing a tra c ticket is on- going.” (Appellant Br. at 36.)
Without independent reasonable suspicion to justify the sni ff , the critical question is not whether the dog sni ff ed be- fore or after the o cer issued the warning, “but whether con- ducting the sni ff prolongs— i.e. , adds time to—the stop.” Lewis , 920 F.3d at 491 (internal quotation marks omi ed). With independent reasonable suspicion, however, the o cer may constitutionally detain the suspect for the sni ff even if it adds time to the total stop. Id.
Here, the judge continued to credit the o cers’ testimony. Based on that testimony, the judge concluded the stop was not improperly prolonged to allow Rex to sni . The judge noted the time period from the beginning of the stop to the canine alert was about 7 minutes, as Simon conceded. The judge de- termined the o cers acted quickly. Hoecker made the stop, exited his car, told Simon the reason for the stop, and gathered his information. The bicyclists arrived at the stop only a cou- ple minutes after Hoecker pulled Simon over. The bicyclists “diligently began processing the ticket.” (Order, DE 21 at 15.) Crucially, the judge found no indication the o ffi cers engaged in any activity other than securing the scene and processing the warning during the time between the bicyclists’ arrival and Rex’s arrival. Speci fi cally, the o ffi cers surveyed the scene, Danner spoke with Simon, and Hagemeyer testi ed she went to the squad car to begin processing the wri en warning. The video indicated that about 2.5 minutes into the stop, Danner was speaking to Hoecker about the tra ffi c violation. About 3 minutes into the stop, Danner left the squad car to speak with Simon. Danner told Simon the reasons for the stop and gath- ered information. Hoecker returned to Simon’s car at about the 5-minute mark to speak with him about the tra ffi c infrac- tion. Less than 7 minutes into the stop, Rex arrived and very quickly alerted. At that time, the bicycle o ffi cers were still pro- cessing the ticket.
In sum, the judge concluded the o ffi cers were processing the ticket when Rex arrived and alerted, so they had not yet completed the initial mission of the stop, and the stop was not improperly prolonged to allow Rex to sni .
Simon argues the police report and testimony contain the “misrepresentation” Hagemeyer was writing the warning while the o cers waited for Rex because the o ffi cers knew calling a canine unit does not unlawfully extend a stop so long as the normal process for pursuing a tra c ticket is ongoing. Simon continues to challenge the credibility of the o cers. He argues that at no point did any o cer on the scene begin ef- fectuating the purpose of the stop by dutifully and diligently lling out a warning or ticket. He claims Danner lled out both the tra c citation and the warning Simon received hours after the stop. But again we see no reversible error in the judge’s conclusions on this point.
Simon presses that even if the judge’s credibility determi- nations here are correct, his ruling is still fl awed. First, Simon argues the judge improperly allowed a de minimis delay to be constitutional, even though any delay to allow a dog to sni ff is unconstitutional absent independent reasonable suspicion. We disagree with Simon about what the judge did. He specif- ically found there was no improper delay. (Order, DE 21 at 14 (“the stop was not purposefully prolonged to allow for the ca- nine unit’s arrival”).) True, the judge added in a footnote that even if he found the ticket-writing process had not begun when Rex arrived, still the sequence of events was so short and condensed that the stop was not prolonged in any “mean- ingful” way. But we need not review this dictum.
Second, Simon argues that instead of e ectuating the pur- pose of the tra c stop, the o ffi cers decided to run a criminal- history check. Simon argues this was unrelated to the mission of the stop and delayed processing the tra c violation. Simon cites no supporting Seventh Circuit case. We said last year that when police conduct a stop, “they are entitled to demand the driver’s identi cation, of course, and it is routine to check the driver’s record for active warrants, driving history, and crim- inal history. Those checks are done for important reasons, in- cluding o cer safety.” Swanigan v. City of Chicago , 881 F.3d 577, 586 (7th Cir. 2018); see also United States v. Sanford , 806 F.3d 954, 956 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The trooper checked the occu- pants’ criminal histories on the computer in his car—a proce- dure permissible even without reasonable suspicion … .”).
We considered all Simon’s arguments, but we see no rea- son to reverse the judge’s conclusions that the o cers were in the process of completing the tra c warning when Rex arrived, and the o cers did not improperly prolong the tra c stop to allow the sni ff to occur.
3. Bona Fido ?
Simon argues even if the o cers had probable cause to pull him over, and even if they did not prolong the tra c stop to wait for Rex, still the judge should have suppressed the gun because Rex’s alert was false, Rex was improperly trained, and the alert did not provide probable cause to justify search- ing Simon’s car.
Probable cause to conduct a search is not among the high- est standards. “A police o cer has probable cause to conduct a search when the facts available to him would warrant a per- son of reasonable caution in the belief that contraband or evi- dence of a crime is present.” Florida v. Harris , 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (internal quotation marks and brackets omi tt ed). Probable cause is less than preponderance of the evidence. Id. “All we have required is the kind of fair probability on which reasonable and prudent people, not legal technicians, act.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omi tt ed). Probable cause is a practical, common-sense standard, involving the to- tality of the circumstances. Id.
A dog’s alert on a car can give probable cause to search the entire car. Indeed, a good dog’s alert can provide a rebu able presumption of probable cause to search:
If a bona de organization has certi ed a dog after testing his reliability in a controlled se ing, a court can presume (subject to any con fl icting evidence o ered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search. The same is true, even in the absence of formal certi cation, if the dog has recently and successfully completed a train- ing program that evaluated his pro ciency in lo- cating drugs.
Id. at 1057. The ultimate question is “whether all the facts sur- rounding a dog’s alert, viewed through the lens of common sense, would make a reasonably prudent person think that a search would reveal contraband or evidence of a crime. A sni is up to snu ff when it meets that test.” Id. at 1058.
Simon concedes Rex passed certi cation tests. But Simon challenges the alert itself and the adequacy of Rex’s training.
“First and foremost,” Simon argues Rex did not alert on Simon’s car. (Appellant Br. at 42.) This perplexes. Simon cites nothing to support this claim. The record belies it. Given the context of this claim, Simon seems simply to mean the alert was false. [4] It is true that following the alert the o cers searched the car and found no evidence of drugs in it. But Si- mon does not explain why that, in itself, ma ers here. Proba- ble cause is not a retrospective, outcome-based standard. Bridewell v. Eberle , 730 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2013). If an o cer randomly breaks into a house on only a wild hunch and stum- bles into a meth lab, the discovery does not provide probable cause for the search. And if 20 reliable informants tell an of- fi cer a particular house contains a meth lab, so he stands in the street outside the house and sees through an open win- dow the apparent apparatus and accoutrements of a meth lab, so he obtains a warrant to search the house based on probable cause to think it contains a meth lab, but he fi nds only an in- nocent and intricate chemistry set, still probable cause sup- ported the warrant. So the mere absence of drugs in Simon’s car does not undermine the probable cause to search it for drugs, provided there was probable cause in the fi rst place.
Simon’s other argument is the o cers did not have prob- able cause to search his vehicle in the rst place because Rex was unreliable. This argument proceeds in two waves.
The rst wave is quickly quelled. Simon argues Rex was unreliable because he was not trained properly under Illinois law, which requires police dogs be trained according to cer- tain guidelines. Simon argues Detective Larner (the Macon County canine-training director) admi ed he did not always follow these guidelines. But we need not address what Illinois law requires or whether Rex satis es it because Illinois law does not control the Fourth Amendment. See Virginia v. Moore , 553 U.S. 164, 172 (2008) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s mean- ing [does] not change with local law enforcement practices— even practices set by rule.”); California v. Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (“We have never intimated … that whether or not a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment depends on the law of the particular State in which the search occurs.”).
The second wave holds out longer, but ultimately suc- cumbs. Simon argues, apart from Illinois law, if a dog is trained to alert when no evidence of criminal activity exists, this violates the Fourth Amendment. The problem, as Simon sees it, is Rex was trained with scented co on balls to alert to residual odors. But to search a car, there must be probable cause to think it presently contains evidence of criminal activ- ity. So if Rex is trained to alert to mere residue even when no drugs are present, then his alert is not a reliable indicator drugs are present, and therefore his alert does not provide probable cause to justify a search.
The main problem with this argument is the Supreme Court already rejected its premise. In Florida v. Harris , a dog named Aldo alerted on a truck. A subsequent search did not reveal any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, but it did discover meth ingredients. The defendant moved to suppress the ingredients on the ground that Aldo’s alert had not given probable cause to search. The defendant “principally con- tended” in the trial court that because the o cer did not nd any of the drugs Aldo was trained to detect, Aldo’s alerts must have been false. Harris , 133 S. Ct. at 1058. But the Su- preme Court pa ed Aldo on the head and called him a good boy: “A well-trained drug-detection dog should alert to [resid- ual] odors; his response to them might appear a mistake, but in fact is not.” Id. at 1059; see also Miller v. Vohne Liche Kennels, Inc. , 600 F. App’x 475, 477 (7th Cir. 2015) (Plainti ’s “only de- veloped legal theory is untenable. [His] premise—that an alert by a drug-sni ng dog trained to detect residual odors does not establish probable cause to search—was rejected in Harris … .”). If a well-trained dog, trained to alert even to residual odors, alerts, there is generally a fair probability that drugs or evidence of drugs will be found, absent contradictory factors. 25 And that is all the Fourth Amendment requires. If somehow a dog were trained to alert only to residual odors, then we might have a problem. But that is not this case.
Our review of the record and the order denying suppres- sion satis fi es us the judge conducted the proper Harris evalu- ation and commi ed no error in concluding Rex’s satisfactory certi fi cation and training provide su cient reason to trust his alert or in concluding Rex’s training on residual odors is ac- ceptable. The judge heard testimony from Simon’s expert Dr. Cablk challenging Rex’s quali fi cations and the sni ff itself, tes- timony from O cer Snyder supporting Rex’s quali cations and the sni ff itself, and testimony from Detective Larner sup- porting Rex’s quali cations and the sni ff itself. The judge also entertained arguments from both sides in the form of the mo- tion to suppress, supporting memorandum, the government’s response, and post-hearing briefs led by both sides. The judge considered the totality of the circumstances, addressed Harris ’s ultimate question, and found Rex’s sni ff up to snu ff . C. Supplementation
After the judge denied the motion to suppress, Simon moved to supplement the record and for leave to seek recon- sideration. He wanted to reopen the evidence to introduce further, unrelated citations prepared by Danner in August 2016 “which further emphasize the di erences in the o cers’ handwriting … .” (Mot. Supp., DE 23 at 4.) Simon also wanted to introduce a video he [5] took when he returned to the scene one night. The video shows a vehicle leaving the 1100 block of College Street and approaching the intersection of College and Green. The judge denied this motion. On appeal, Simon only presses the video. He does not mention the additional handwriting exemplars in his opening appellate brief. Simon acknowledges we review the denial of supplementation for abuse of discretion.
The judge did not abuse his discretion. He explained there was no reason Simon could not have taken a nigh tt ime video and presented it during the suppression hearing. The judge discussed the danger of allowing supplementation here and se tt ing a bad precedent leading to a never-ending cycle of par- ties waiting for rulings and then coming up with “new” evi- dence to challenge them. Most importantly, the judge ex- plained that even with the proposed evidence, his ruling would not change. The nigh ime video would not capture the actual visual capabilities of the o cers, who credibly testi ed about how close Simon was to the intersection when he sig- naled. The judge reasoned a video of the scene taken months later, when conditions might di ff er, would not impact their credibility. Besides, the judge noted, the probable cause standard does not need evidence to support a conviction be- yond a reasonable doubt. He did not abuse his discretion. D. ACCA
Simon argues his prior conviction under Illinois law for a empted armed robbery should not have counted as a pred- icate o ense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. He recog- nizes our decisions foreclose his argument on this point, but he wants to preserve it for the Supreme Court.
IV. Conclusion
We considered all Simon’s arguments. Finding no reversi- ble error, we AFFIRM.
[1] Here are excerpts on point from the bicycle patrol unit’s testimony: Q: And when Officer Snyder arrived, was the traffic violation still being processed? Hoecker: Yes. (Tr. Continuation of Suppression Hr’g, July 12, 2017, DE 44 at 19:1–19:3.) Q: And do you recall approximately how long into the traffic stop it would have been that [Officer Snyder, with Rex] arrived? Danner: I believe it was around six or seven minutes. Q: And were you still processing the traffic ticket at that time? A: That’s correct. ( Id. at 50:19–50:24.) Hagemeyer: From the time we arrived to the time Officer Snyder arrived was three or four minutes. Q: So a very short period of time? A: Very short period of time. Q: Were you still working on the traffic ticket at that time? A: Yes. Q: And still working on it diligently, correct? A: [Nodding head up and down.]
[2] Simon asserts Judge Bruce recused himself from the revocation pro- ceedings (2:11-cr-20002). The government does not contest this assertion. The docket for that case neither confirms nor denies the recusal. We take Simon’s word for it.
[3] In his order denying suppression, the judge characterized Hage- meyer’s testimony on this point slightly incorrectly, and in favor of Si- mon’s arguments. The judge wrote “Hagemeyer answered ‘yes’ to whether she filled in the name, date, etc., but she stated that Danner signed it.” (Order, DE 21 at 10.) Actually (according to the transcript) she did not say “yes” in response to this question. She said, “I filled out the majority of it. I believe [Danner] signed it, though.” But even giving Simon the ben- efit of this characterization, the judge still did not find a significant credi- bility problem.
[4] Defense expert Dr. Mary Cablk said in her report she could not de- termine if Rex alerted or what Rex alerted to. She confirmed this on cross- examination at the suppression hearing. During direct examination she watched videos from Hoecker’s and Snyder’s dashcams. She testified she could not see the alert, could not tell exactly where on the car the dog alerted, and did not know whether the alert was barking or something else. But in her testimony she seems to accept Rex alerted. She character- ized it as a false alert because no drugs were found, and she criticized Snyder for rewarding Rex for falsely alerting: “In this instance, there’s no drugs found; so he’s reinforcing the dog for false alerting here.” In any event, Snyder testified that Rex alerted and that Snyder confirmed the alert. And the judge throughout his order accepted Rex alerted. He found the officers’ testimony, in its totality, credible. We see no reason to upend the determination Rex alerted.
[5] The motion says Simon created the video. On appeal, Simon asserts his investigator took the video. This nuance is immaterial here.