Lead Opinion
Maria Del Rosario Alvarez appeals the district court’s sentence requiring her to obtain mental health treatment as a special condition of supervised release. Because the district court committed reversible error in imposing this special condition ^without the statutorily required factual findings, we VACATE the challenged condition and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
A border patrol agent stopped Maria Del Rosario Alvarez at a border patrol checkpoint. Alvarez’s sister, her. sister’s infant, and Agustín Hernandez-Sanchez were all passengers in the car. The agent asked if they were United States citizens, and they all answered yes. The agent then asked for identification, and everyone except Hernandez-Sanchez handed the agent United States birth certificates. The agent then asked Alvarez to park in the secondary inspection area.
In the secondary inspection area, Hernandez-Sanchez admitted he was illegally present in the United States. Then, Alvarez and Hernandez-Sanchez were arrested. During a search of the car, agents found Alejandro Martinez-Cristobal hiding in the trunk of the car. Martinez-Cristobal was also illegally present in the' United States. Alvarez never told agents that there was a person in the trunk, and when agents eventually found Martinez-Cristo-bal, it was 94 degrees in the trunk. ■
Prior to the sentencing hearing, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR) detailing Alvarez’s personal background. It reported that Alvarez had no .prior criminal, history but that she had a history of alcohol use,
Alvarez pleaded guilty to transportation of an undocumented alien, in violation of
The district court sentenced Alvarez to 18 months of imprisonment to be followed by two years of supervised release. The district court then ordered “[standard terms of supervision, along with drug and alcohol treatment, mental health, and that [Alvarez] enroll in a program—educational program designed to receive a high school diploma or its equivalency.” During the sentencing hearing, Alvarez did not object to the imposition of a mental health treatment program as a special condition of supervised release.
Regarding this special condition, the judgment stated:
The defendant is required to participate in a mental health program. Further, the defendant shall participate and shall comply with all rules and regulations of .the treatment agency until discharged by the Program Director with the approval of the probation officer'. The defendant will incur costs associated with such program, based on ability to pay as determined by the probation officer.
Alvarez timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
On appeal, Alvarez argues that the district court committed reversible error by imposing the mental health special condition. Alvarez concedes that because she failed to object to the special condition in the district court, our review is limited to plain error. To prevail, Alvarez must show:
First, there must be an error or defect—some sort of “[deviation from a legal rule”—that has not been intentionally relinquished or abandoned, i.e., affirmatively waived, by the appellant. Second, the legal error must be clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute. Third, the error must have affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means -he must demonstrate that it “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Fourth and finally, if the above three prongs are satisfied, the court of appeals has the discretion to remedy the- error—discretion which ought to be exercised only if the error “seriously a£fect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Prieto,
III.
District courts have broad discretion to impose special conditions of supervised release. United States v. Fernandez,
(1) the nature and characteristics of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, (2) the deterrence of criminal conduct, (3) the protection of*240 the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) the provision of needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment to the defendant.
United States v. Weatherton,
The sentencing court must “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.”
We conclude that Alvarez has met her burden to show reversible error. It is undisputed that the district court did not attempt to explain how the mental health special condition reasonably related to any of the statutory factors. See United States v. Garcia,
There is no evidence in this record suggesting that Alvarez needs mental health treatment. By contrast, when a defendant was experiencing anxiety and had been prescribed medication for anxiety, we determined that it was not plain error when the district court imposed, without explanation, a mental health treatment as a special condition of supervised release. See United States v. Terrell,
The government argues that the district court believed that Alvarez would benefit from mental health treatment based on the nature and circumstances of her personal history, as reported in her PSR. According to the government, the record supports this inference. The record does indicate that Alvarez has experienced trauma in her life, including the murder of the father of her first two children. The PSR also reports that Alvarez was the victim of abuse in a prior relationship. In particular, the government emphasizes Alvarez’s counsel’s statement that Alvarez “has suffered extreme abuse and trauma in her very short life.”
Many defendants, unfortunately, suffer from abuse and trauma. “But special conditions must be tailored to the individual defendant....” Caravayo,
Because the district court made no specific factual finding to establish that this special condition was reasonably related to one of the four factors under § 3553(a), and because the record does not clearly substantiate such a relationship, we conclude that Alvarez has met her burden to show error. Moreover, the district court’s error here is plain, that is, not open to reasonable debate. District courts must “set forth factual findings to justify special probation conditions.”
We further conclude that the district court’s error affected Alvarez’s substantial rights. Alvarez is required to pay for the mental health program, if she can afford it, and such a program may require a significant commitment of time. Moreover, this special condition creates a possibly unwarranted perception that Alvarez requires mental health treatment. See United States v. Gordon,
Determining that Alvarez has established the first three prongs of plain error review, we must consider whether we should exercise our discretion to remedy this error. The government contends that the imposition of this condition does not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings and urges us not to exercise our discretion in Alvarez’s case. It is true that Alvarez may seek modification of this condition during her supervised release.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the condition of Alvarez’s supervised release requiring her to participate in mental health treatment. We REMAND for the district court to reconsider whether to impose this special condition.
. Pursuant to Fifth Circuit Rule 47.5.4, unpublished opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996 generally are not precedent, although they may be cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a).
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting: .
This experienced judge gave special time and attention to the conduct and history of the defendant and decided that mental health assistance would benefit her, and 'would meet some if not all of the statutory factors stated above. I would require no more because I read the record to support this.