Bеtty Louise Marek challenges the jurisdictional basis for her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. FACTS
The facts underlying Marek’s conviction are not in dispute. In September of 1996, Marek met Ricardo Cervantes. They exchanged telephone numbers and later spoke several times by telephone. On October 30, 1997, Marek told Cervantes that Betty Hooten Wade was interfering with Marek’s romantic relationship with Arnold Blake. Marek asked Cervantes whether he knew anyone who would kill Wade at Marek’s direction for pay. Cervantes informed the local sheriff, who later referred the case to the Texas Rangers. Cervantes agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities and to have subsequent conversations with Marek recorded. During one of these recorded conversations, Cervantes told Marek that he had a friend in Harlin-gen, Texas who would be the “hit man.” Marek initially agreed to meet the hit man in Harlingen, but she called Cervantes on November 1, 1997 and told him that, to avoid detection, she would only talk to the hit man by pay telephones.
Cervantes then referred Marek to Jose Cerrano, the “hit man,” who, unbeknownst to Marek, was really an undercover FBI agent who recorded ten telephone convеrsations between himself and Marek. Ma-rek told the undercover agent that she wanted him to kill Wade because Wade had stolen her boyfriend.
Marek refused to meet Cerrano in person, but agreed to transfer him the money for killing Wade. On November 19, 1997, Marek delivered $ 500 to Western Union in Houston for transfer to the undercover agent in Harlingen. On November 21, 1997, Marek was arrested at her home in Port Lavaca, Texas.
On Dеcember 9, 1997, an indictment charged Marek, under 18 U.S.C. § 1958, with using a facility in interstate commerce in the commission of murder-for-hire. On February 3, 1998, Marek pleaded guilty to the indictment pursuant to a plea agreement. On April 23, 1998, the court sentenced Marek to eighty-seven months in prison, followed by a three-year supervised release term. Marek timely filed an appeal of the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed.
II. DISCUSSION
In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the use of Western Union in a murder-for-hire scheme satisfies the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement of the federal murder for hire statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (§ 1958), where the electronic transfer of funds by Marek via Western Union to the “hit man” originated in the State of Texas and terminated in the State of Texas. We find that the use of Western Union, historically and prеsently a “facility in interstate commerce,” satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958. We therefore affirm Ma-rek’s conviction under that statute.
We review the district court’s determination that there was jurisdiction in such a case de novo. See United States v. Razo-Leora,
The Government asserts that any use of an interstate facility such as Western Union, a “facility in interstate commerce,” is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirements of § 1958. There is no doubt that Western Union is a facility of interstate commerce. Its facilities are constantly used for, inter alia, the interstate transfer of funds. See National Association of Regulator Utility Commissioners v. Federal Communications Commission,
We find that this particular issue is one of first impression for this court. In United States v. Cisneros,
With that distinction in mind, we turn to the language of the murder-for-hire statute. There are two parts to 18 U.S.C. § 1958: part (a), the substantive portion setting out the criminal act, and part (b), the portion providing definitions for the terms used in (a). However, part (b) defines a term — “facility of interstate commerce” — which is not found in subpart (a). Subpart (a) instead uses the term “facility in interstate commerce,” which is not defined in subpart (b). The puzzle is whether the language of subsection (a) was meant to be (1) synonymous with the language, “facility of interstate commerce”, in subpart (b), or (2) narrower than the definition in subsection (b); and if so, which subsection should control.
If we were to find that subsections (a) and (b) are in conflict, we would have to address whether subsection (a), the provision that creates the criminal offense, should control over the subsection (b), which purports to provide definitions for the terms used in § 1958. See United States v. Weathers,
This interpretation is supported by the structure of the phrase “use ... any facility in interstate ... commerce,” in which the word “in” is more closely juxtaposed to “facility” than it is to “use.” We are satisfied that “in interstate commerce” modifies “facility,” not “use.” Had Congress desired to mandate that, in each instance, the use of the facility be an interstate transaction, i.e., between a sender in one state and a recipient in another, it could have easily done so with wording such as: “whoever makes interstate use of a facility in interstate commerce” or “whoever makes use, in interstate commerce, of the mail or any other facility.”
Although we derive our holding from the plain meaning of the statute, we note that the interpretation we adopt today is well supported by the legislative history of § 1958. As the Sixth Circuit has noted, a 1983 senate report discussing the statute employs the phrases “facility in interstate commerce” and “facility of interstate commerce” interchangeably and generally employs the phrаse “facility of interstate commerce” in discussing the scope of the statute. Weathers,
Given the above-cited legislative history, we cannot agree with the Cisneros court’s conclusion, even in dicta, that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report on the murder-for-hire bill “supports a narrow reading of the statute in the interest of comity.” Cisneros,
The committee is aware of the concerns of local prosecutors with respect to the creation of concurrent federal jurisdiction in an area, namely murder cases, which has heretofore been the almost exclusive responsibility of state and local authorities.... This does not mean, nor does the committee intend, that all or even most of such offenses should become matters of federal responsibility.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484.) The Cisneros court concluded
Although the point is acknowledged, it is not binding on this court since that discussion is dicta. See supra аt p. 534. Nor is the point persuasive. The ellipsis in the Cisneros court’s quote leaves out the following language from the senate report:
However, the Committee believes that the option of federal investigation and prosecution should be available when a murder is committed or planned as consideration for something of pecuniary value and the proper federal nexus, such as interstate trаvel, use of the facilities of interstate commerce, or the use of the mails is present.
S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484 (emphasis added). Thus, the legislative history is clear: The use of a facility of interstate commerce, such as Western Union, is jurisdictionally sufficient.
Moreover, we must remember that the issue here is how to interpret the language of section 1958. Thus, we find that legislative history, which actually uses the terms found in the statute’s text, provides the best guidance as to what that text means. The legislative history uses the terms “facility of’ and “facility in” interchangeably. The legislative history explicitly states that a use of a facility of interstate commerce is sufficient for jurisdiction.
Additionally, the Cisneros court’s interpretation is unpersuasive in light of the canons of statutory construction, which direct this court to avoid choosing to ignore an express statutory provision. A statute should be interpreted so as to give each provision significance. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc.,
The Cisneros court also аddressed the canons of construction and found that they were of little help. The court acknowledged that the need to read a statute to give every word significance counsels against ignoring the definition in (b). Cisneros,
Once again, we take a different approach. In addressing this dilemma, this court should strive to interpret the statute in a way that best gives effect to Congress’s intentions and purpose to as much of the statute’s language as possible. If any availаble interpretation might render some language superfluous, then the interpretation which moots the least language is best. Under the interpretation in Cisneros, an entire subsection of the statute, namely (b), is left as a superfluous definition of a term that exists nowhere else in the statute. Such an interpretation leaves no likely explanation for the presence of subsection (b), and is therefore dubious. It strains credibility to as
Finally, another guide for this court is our case law interpreting the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952. We are satisfied that our holding today is consistent with our Travel Act case law. We have previоusly held that it is appropriate to interpret § 1958 in light of § 1952 given that two sections employ similar language, and that section 1958 was intended to supplement section 1952. United States v. Edelman,
At the time of Heacock’s violation, the relevant portion of the Travel Act criminalized the use of “any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, including the mail,” with an intent to engаge in a variety of illegal conduct. Id. at 255. The Heacock court concluded that “the use of ‘the mail’ clearly embodies and includes the United States Post Office, which is a ‘facility in interstate commerce.’ ” Id. The Heacock court further held that a person who uses the mail has “clearly and unmistakably used a ‘facility in interstate commerce,’ irrespective of the intrastate destination of the item mailed.” Id. Since Western Union, like the U.S. mail, is both а “facility in interstate commerce” and a “facility of interstate commerce”, it follows that an otherwise intrastate transaction- — using an intermediary to transmit funds from one place in a state to another in the same state — when accomplished by use of Western Union, is jurisdictionally sufficient under § 1958.
The Cisneros court interprets the Heac-ock decision as limited to the special status accorded the mail as compared to other “facilities in interstate commerce.” Cisneros,
This history lesson is accurate but does not require the Cisneros court’s conclusion that the mail must be treated differently than every other facility of or in interstate commerce. The unique reference to “the mail” in the Travel Act emphasizes that the mail is a “facility in interstate commerce.” As the Cisneros court noted, the “special character” of the mail automatically made it a “facility in interstate commerce.” Id. Indeed, the Heacock opinion adopted the reasoning in U.S. v. Riccardelli,
The positioning of the phrase “including the mail” in the statute singles out the mail for special treatment and thus consistent with the historical understanding of the United States mail, equates the use of the mail with the use of other facilities of interstate commerce.
Id. (emphasis added.). The logical reading of Heacock is that once the mail was determined to be a facility in interstate commerce, even an intrastate use of the mail was sufficient. Heacock,
Moreover, as the Cisneros court correctly notes, the Travel Act does not present the same distinctions between “of’ and “in.” However, the legislative history clearly emphasizes the “of’ side of the equation. Thus, if anything, § 1958 should be interpreted more broadly than the Travel Act. As we have discussed, the best way to resolve the “of’ and “in” distinction is to acknowledge that it is one without a difference and to apply the definition in (b) to determine the scope of (a). That way both subsections are given a purpose. Therefore we conclude, after analyzing the statute’s language, consulting the legislative history, and applying the canons of statutory construction, thаt any use of a facility of interstate commerce or in interstate commerce is sufficient for jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958. We therefore hold that Marek’s use of Western Union to transfer funds is sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under § 1958, irrespective of the fact that she entrusted the funds to Western Union in Texas and Western Union, in turn, delivered the funds to her transferee in Texas.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM Marek’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1958.
For the reasons stated in our decision in United States v. Cisneros,
Notes
. The Cisneros court went on to analyze whether the broad definition of (b), "facility of interstate commerce,” should apply to “facility in interstate or foreign commerce” in (a). Cisneros,
. Under that interpretation, the portion of subsection (a) dealing with interstate and foreign travel may be redundant given the coverage of subsection (b). However, it does not strain credibility to suggest that the interstate travel language merely emphasize that such travel is jurisdictionally sufficient.
. We note that our decision is consistent with the Travel Act jurisdiction from other circuits. In United States v. Baker,