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United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Company
589 F.2d 1305
7th Cir.
1978
Check Treatment

*1 1305 оf America v. Mine Workers under United 1130, 16 715,

Gibbs, 86 S.Ct. 383 U.S. (1966).

L.Ed.2d arguments their parties have devoted exercise of propriety of that

here no doubt We have

discretion. under not abuse its discretion

court did guidelines.

Gibbs the so-called

We do note that parties other against state claims ran

dent defendant the United States 7426. Where that is in U.S.C.

specified

true, jurisdiction can pendent ancillary ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‍inquiry into found without further

not be conferring juris Congress in

the intent of Aldinger claim. See

diction of federal Howard, 96 S.Ct. v. U.S. Wood, Jr., Judge, Harlington Circuit Equipment (1976); L.Ed.2d Owen a concurring opinion. filеd 437 U.S. Kroger, v. Co. Erection par L.Ed.2d Bauer, Judge, concurring filed a argued impact Aldinger ties have not opinion. jurisdiction of question Owen this case. In the law claims in the state case,

posture we need consider impact. judgment AFFIRMED. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, COMPANY,

MARATHON PIPE LINE

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 78-1453. Appeals, States Court

Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct.

Decided Dec. *2 Ewart, P. Craig Mattoon,

John Craig, Ill., defendant-appellant.

Robert Simpkins, Atty., L. Asst. U. S. Louis, Ill., East plaintiff-appellee. St. CASTLE, Before Judgе, Senior Circuit WOOD, and BAUER and Judges. CASTLE, Judge. Senior Circuit Pipe Company Marathon Line ap peals from the district court’s enforcement $2,000 way of of a summary judgment civil assessed United States against Marathon under sec tion 1321(b)(6) of the Water Pollu Federal (FWPCA)1 tion Control Act for a discharge of oil navigable into watеrs violation of 1321(b)(3) of the Act. The issue presented 1321(b)(6) per is whether section mits the Coast Guard to more assess than a nominal penalty against the owner of a discharging facility where the owner without fault spill and the caused party.2 Affirming court, the district we hold 1321(b)(6) that section is an abso lute provision cоntemplates which substantial even in the absence of and, accordingly, fault that the Coast Guard did assessing abuse its discretion 19,992 discharge for a gallons of crude oil.

On November no- Marathon was tified by pipeline local that a owned police by ruptured had discharging and was crude oil River into thе Kaskaskia in south- ern immediately Illinois. company steps took spill reported to contain the the occurrence to the United Envi- States all, 19,- ronmental Protection Agency. gallons of crude oil were discharged 10,920 from the pipeline gallons were ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‍burned, recovered so that approximately 9,072 gallons escaped downriver. Subse- quent investigation by company re- vealed that a bulldozer had struck the four- 1321(b)(6) (1976). 1. 33 U.S.C. propriety § All references 2. Marathon does not contest of a opinion FWPCA in this are to the 1972 nominal civil in this situation. In Unit- and 1973 amended Tex-Tow, Inc., version. The 1977 amend- ed States 589 F.2d 1310 mеnts, changed wording 1978), day, of section Cir. decided this same 1321(b)(6), apply spill do not argued all, to this case as the that no nominal or sub- stantial, occurred in may imposed alleged in the absence part. of “causation” on its dependent toxicity June or on the amount and pipe July inch buried back in irrigаtion while dig spilled.4 “liquidated hired to an ditch substance This damages again The bulldozer liability” subject for the owners of the land. four damage to the operator reported had enumerated defenses. 1321(b)(2)(B) (iii). landowners, thought Finally, but as the section 1321(b)(6), latter the im- *3 use, mediate here, focus of pipeline longer was no neither our concern in makes owners reported damage to Marathon. and ever liable a penal- to civil ty of up $5,000, was a matter to pipeline The location of the of with provision no for record, having any been public easement defenses but with the amount of thе penalty recorded with local recorder’s of- duly to be determined by the Coast Guard, in fice, and the marked accord- pipeline was which is instructed to take into regulations. with all It is un- ance federal account ability to pay and “gravity split in the line disputed that the eventual violation.”5 damаge from the bulldozer and resulted way at fault in Marathon was in no Statutory and Marathon’s Abuse of

learning of either the or the dam- digging Discretion Claims age any prior spill. at time to the one provision clearly civil penalty of liability strict fault is not even a since Statutory Scheme requisite clean-up liquidated or damages liability,

The FWPCA was “to restore and every enacted and court which has con chemical, See, g., maintain the sidered has so held. physical biologi- question e. integrity Tug Prince, cal of the Nation’s waters.” 33 Ocean Inc. v. United ' 1251(a). (S.D.N.Y.1977); that end U.S.C. Toward Con- 436 F.Supp. § Unit Co., gress eliminating set the ed goal of dis- States Richfield v. Atlantic charge navigable (E.D.Pa.1977); of all into pollutants F.Supp. v. 836-37 Ward by 1251(a)(1). Coleman, (W.D.Okl. waters Section F.Supp. § dealing 1976); with oil and substance hazardous United General Motors States liability, discharge” policy (D.Conn.1975); sets Corp., a “no 403 F.Supp. Co., any prohibits Pipeline immediate effect аnd dis- United Eureka States v. charge 1321(b)(1) F.Supp. (N.D.W.Va.1975). in harmful How quantities. §§ ever, that, although opera- The section holds Marathon claims regard to penalty without discharging liability tors facilities3 liable for attaches costs, as clean-up subject only may the defenses of a amount be to act nominal God, war, act of sessed in fault on its negligence the absence Government, Motors, part. regard or omission of States or act a We do not General party. 1321(f). discharged supra, third If the which also involved zero fault and § nonremovable, causation, party authority substance is owner or as for suсh operator penalty proposition, is liable to a a variable as the court that case “discharging offense. shall 3. The term facilities” shall be No be assessed unless “vessel, used where the to on- operator charged statute refers the owner or shall have facility, facility.” shorе given offshore opportunity been notice for a hear- sepa- on charge. such Each is a violation up ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‍charged drawing 4. The EPA a with sched- Any penalty may rate offense. compromised by such civil assigning appropriate penalties per ule unit to Secretary. such In deter- 1321(b) variоus nonremovable substances. mining penalty, the amount of the or the (2)(B)(iv). agreed upon compromise, ap- amount 1321(b)(6) propriateness of such Section states: size operator Any vessel, the owner or operator business owner or on- charged, operator’s facility, facility the effect owner of shore or offshore from which business, discharged ability gravi- or a hazardous to continue in and the oil substance 1321(b)(3)] violation, ty violation of shall be as- [section shall be considered penalty by Secretary sessed a civil Secretary. . department op- in which the Coast Guard is erаting of not more for each pursuant consider, assessed the one dollar to the Coast Guard to in setting a the exercise discretion in a ability own sound penalty, the owner’s and the contrast, Here, we are de novo trial. “gravity violation.” of discretion asked to the exercise review interpreted the latter to include agency. record, an administrative prior spill, size of the the owner’s “degree culpability.”7 and the Thus de- effect, Marathon would have us gree of fault is but one of several factors read into the statute a standard of strict setting Coast Guard will consider in a liability negli for а nominal and a penalty.8 allegation There is no here that gence standard of substantial the Coast Guard did not consider absence of penalty. plain We do not believe the lan factor, mitigating fault as the evi- guage supports of the statute different did, dence indicates that it as it is the Coаst opposed standards for a substantial as to a policy Guard’s stated assess *4 nominal penalty. We must construe a stat $5,000,9 or and Mara- near the maximum of according ute ordinary meaning to its un thon has offered no evidence to show that a Congress less not clearly did intend it to spill magnitude oil would сrude of this have such meaning, as determined from penal- maximum ordinarily result in the parts other legislative of the statute or his ty. the Accordingly, we find that statute tory, Congress or unless could not have penalty allows a substantial in the circum- meaning it a because intended to have such stances of this case and that Coast would render the unconstitution statute States, al. in assess- Caminetti v. Guard did not abuse its discretion 242 U.S. 470, 485, 192, (1917); 61 L.Ed. 442 S.Ct. one.10 March U.S.App.D.C. v. United Process Claim The Due Substantive

267, 1306, (1974). 506 F.2d 1313-16 For reasons explained in the section of this purpose Marathon that asserts opinion dealing with the constitutional is spills of the civil and рenalty is to deter sue, Congress, we believe the intent of as assessing that a penalty substantial civil in manifested in section 1321 taken as a the absence of fault does not meet the due whole,6 to impose a substantial civil process requirement legislative that means alty on owners or operators even in the bear “a proper leg reasonable relation to a absence of fault and that such an intent is purpose, islative arbitrary and neither [be] well within powers the constitutional discriminatory.” York, nor Nebbia v. New Congress. 502, 537, 536, 291 U.S. 78 L.Ed. (1934). First,

Marathon directly does not address the we note that thе Su intent, issue congressional arguing preme in- an econom Court has not invalidated stead that misapplied ic regulation due on substantive own guidelines fixing grounds administrative in and since 193711 that even in the amount of the penalty. The statute directs Nebbia case Marathon the relied on legislative history spеak 6. Policy,” supra does not 9. “Coast Guard note 7. issue of a substantial in the absence of only guide. so the statute itself is our 10. Marathon attacked the culpability, on the basis of its lack of the but Policy Application Tex-Tow, “Coast Guard for the supra company argued note 311(b)(6), Civil Penalties under Section ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‍spill that it did-not “cause” the since a third FWPCA,” reprinted appendix an as to United party “caused” it. Co., Inc., Towing States v. LeBeouf Bros. F.Supp. (E.D.La.1974). Gunther, 11. G. Constitutional Law Cases and 1975). regu- Materials 591 ed. “Economic interpretation 8. We note that of a statute regulation lation” is used in contrast to of non- agency primarily concerned with its inter- personal economic interests. Id. at pretation judicial proper interpre- is relevant to clearly The civil would be an economic Proper- tation of the statute. L’Enfant Plaza regulation personal as no or in- non-economic ties, Redevelopment Agency, Inc. v. D. C. Land terest of Marathon is involved. U.S.App.D.C. 564 F.2d 515 liability, most limited which in toward a event adopted a deferential stance Court $5,000. could sustaining legislative not exceed legislature,12 state prices against milk retailer’s regulation of FWPCA and of purpose prop- оf contract assertion of freedom result of clean section 1321 is to achieve the right erty claims. causing as to conduct water as well deter serves the Act’s spills. The civil from deference we Aside goal by providing water pollution-free Congress have accord would in event funding means оf the administration Mara regulation, in the field of economic enforcement Act. Under more thon’s claim suffers from the basic 1321(k) collec proceeds 'the pur sole defect that deterrence not the fund deposited revolving tions are to be in a that matter pose penalty, of thе civil used a National is to be to finance general. liability, strict Strict containment, dis Contingency Plan though performing a residual deterrent clean-up persal, spills; and removal of function, premise based on the economic reim discharges; maritime disaster to bear enterprises ought that сertain costs incurred clean-up bursement of their social costs activities.13 who are able estab general, Congress made FWPCA defenses; lish four and the ad one of the polluters legislative determination 1321(c), (i), (d), ministration act. §§ should bear costs public rather than the (]). financing principle regula water In section pollution.14 *5 through tion or forfeiture im and civil clean-up, liquidated damages, novel, posed regulatees on is not One Lot the alty liabilities all serve to shift cost of Emerald Cut Stones v. United pollution oil and hazardous substance onto (1972), U.S. 34 L.Ed.2d economic, private the sector. The rather is basing nor or forfeiture on deterrent, underlying rationale thing, offending regard of the ownership 1321 is the fact that evidenced none of of process, less violative of due Cale the three the section is liabilities created Co., Leasing ro-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht finding on a fault. The fact conditioned L.Ed.2d 452 U.S. 94 S.Ct. Congress very that carved narrow de out on which mari (1974) (ownership yacht (not fault) including fenses absence of to Rac juana found), v. Illinois Edelberg the first two liabilities does not invalidate a 1976) Bd., (owner F.2d 279 Cir. any third not accorded defenses at horse).15 ship drugged impose Congress all. had the to power enterprise liability private full sector Conclusion compromise opted posi but instead the statute as well the first two plain language tion narrow defenses for interpretation by third as its the liabilities and no defense to the See, Calabresi, g., Thoughts G. Some on said 13. e. 12. without we have that Times number Torts, lеgislature primarily judge the is Risk Distribution and Law of 70 Yale the the enactment, every necessity that of such an L.J. 499 possible presumption is in favor of validi- ty, though may and that hold views court Coleman, supra 14. at 1357. Ward v. law, it inconsistent with the wisdom of may palpably not be annulled unless ex- reject suggestion Rich- in Atlantic 15. We lеgislative power. cess field, might supra, that a claim due zero made in some instances of fault and out control, regula- Price like form of other ignores party causation it because tion, arbitrary, is unconstitutional if dis- recognition same earlier case’s criminatory, demonstrably irrelevant to purpose also serves the non-deterrent policy legislature adopt, is free financing Compare 429 revolving fund. unnecessary hence an and unwarranted inter- F.Supp. at 840 with at 841-42. n.14 liberty. ference with individual Nebbia, 537-39, supra, (em- at 54 S.Ct. added). phasis permit enterprises of a substantial ish a pen- engagеd assessment business essen- fault. alty in the absence of Such well-being tial to our national for an unfor- to the FWPCA’s eco- rationally related tunate accident when business is fault- purpose placing nomic the financial bur- less, self-defeating seems to be a exercise of den achieving maintaining clean power. liability” concepts normally “Strict water on polluting punishment refer not compensation, facilities. without fault. enforcement of district court’s Affirmed.

WOOD, Judge, concurring.

As I Castle has Judge correctly believe law

analyzed join I applicable his

opinion, principle do but as a matter so

with some reluctance. America, UNITED STATES will have to this Plaintiff-Appellee,

fine so can no doubt do without eco- however, pain. recognize, justi- nomic I no fication for it the basic unfairness involves. TEX-TOW, INC., Defendant-Appellant. The company concededly guilty No. 78-1656. slightest in no way fault. It ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌​‌​​‌‍caused the accident, was in except business. Just Appeals, Court of United States being in of supplying critical business Seventh Circuit. energy or our society оther needs for scarcely justifies type Argued this of penalty being Oct.

imposed by government agen- in a someone Decided Dec. cy. I fail to see how it will deter or remedy *6 anything. The did not conceal the

accident, engaged but actively efforts to

contain the fine spill. This and others as

unjustified passed along will to the

consuming public. good Little can be ac-

complished in particular these circumstanc-

es by this general- which is unusual

ly contrary accepted considered to be

principles of equity. law and

BAUER, Judge, concurring.

I too Judge believe that Castle cor-

rectly decided matter before us as a opinion.

matter in his of law concur and I responsibilities

While I agree also legal this court than such a go no further

analysis facts —I am contested —without joining Judge concurring also Wood’s

remarks. to me that It seems

Guard, given such fantastic having been Congressional

amount of ac- leeway by involved,

tion closer attention to should purposes legislation for which

passed protection. pun- To —environmental

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Marathon Pipe Line Company
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Dec 22, 1978
Citation: 589 F.2d 1305
Docket Number: 78-1453
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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