UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Eduardo MARIN-CASTAÑO, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-3810.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Decided Aug. 10, 2012.
Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Sept. 18, 2012.
691 F.3d 899
Argued May 31, 2012.
Alison Marlowe Siegler, Attorney, Amanda Penabad (argued), Mandel Legal Aid Clinic, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BAUER, SYKES and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
BAUER, Circuit Judge.
The defendant-appellant, Luis Eduardo Marin-Castano, was indicted and pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry into the United States in violation of
I. BACKGROUND
Marin-Castano, a native and citizen of Colombia, illegally entered the United States in 1982. In 1985, he was convicted of drug offenses in violation of
II. DISCUSSION
Marin-Castano claims that the district court committed procedural error at sentencing by failing to address two of his principal arguments. At the heart of each of these arguments (which were at best complementary, if not duplicative) was his claim that his 1985 conviction was stale and it overstated the seriousness of his current reentry offense. He further argued that although the district court‘s Guidelines calculation was technically correct, consideration of the
The first argument cited
The second argument cited
We pause for a point of clarity and underscore that Marin-Castano essentially split one argument into “two principal
In addition to procedural error, Marin-Castano also claims the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable because it failed to give proper weight to the age of Marin-Castano‘s 1985 conviction, in accordance with the
We disagree. We find neither procedural error, nor substantive unreasonableness with regard to the district court‘s imposed sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment.
Because Marin-Castano argues that the court committed both procedural and substantive error, we employ more than one standard of review. First, we conduct a de novo review for any procedural error. United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 796 (7th Cir. 2010). If we determine that the district court committed no procedural error, we review the sentence for substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In this circuit, we do apply a presumption of reasonableness to all within-Guidelines sentences. It is not a binding presumption, but it applies in every case and it is the defendant‘s burden to overcome it. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (an appellate court may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007)); United States v. Vizcarra, 668 F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that a properly calculated Guidelines sentence is presumed to be reasonable).
When addressing a party‘s non-frivolous argument, the sentencing court commits procedural error if it “fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat[es]) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the
The district court must say enough to “satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising its own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. Furthermore, “the court must address the defendant‘s principal arguments that are not so weak as to not merit discussion” United States v. Pulley, 601 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Villegas-Miranda, 579 F.3d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 2009)), though, “[a] short explanation will suffice where the context and record make clear the reasoning underlying the district court‘s conclusion.” United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2008). Finally, as we noted in Curby, “the amount of explanation needed in any particular case depends on the circumstances and less explanation is typically needed when a district court sentences within an advisory guidelines range.” Curby, 595 F.3d at 797 (citing United States v. Harris, 567 F.3d 846, 853-54 (7th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Poetz, 582 F.3d 835, 838 (7th Cir. 2009)).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court began by summarizing the arguments advanced in Marin-Castano‘s sentencing memorandum, including the staleness of his 1985 conviction, that the Guidelines significantly overstated the seriousness of the offense, Marin-Castano‘s good behavior and lack of criminal activity since 1985, that he was now 56 years old having spent the previous 27 years work-
As noted above, context and record are crucial to rendering an accurate analysis of the district court‘s consideration of the arguments. Because it is easy to overlook context by simply extracting quotations and considering them in isolation, as Marin-Castano did on appeal, below we provide relevant portions of the 18-page sentencing transcript all together, in an effort to detail the district court‘s analysis and provide the context through which it was delivered. The district court stated:
I am directed to consider a sentence that is necessary but not greater than necessary to promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, adequate deterrence, protection to the public and any needed training or treatment. In doing that, I am directed to consider the nature and history of the offense. In this case, the nature and history of the offense is a serious one. This country has a right to protect its borders, ensure the safety of its citizens and its economy, and immigration laws are enacted to achieve those ends, among others. Violation of those laws do pose a threat to our country, sometimes direct and sometimes more indirectly. Considering the need to promote respect for the law and general deterrence, [defendant]‘s points, I suppose, are somewhat well taken, that a sentence imposed here on Mr. Marin-Castano might not do much to deter others from entering this country.... But deterrence has two components. As to specific deterrence, that is, the need to deter Mr. Marin-Castano from further conduct in this regard, it‘s clear that a sentence of incarceration would at least deter him for the period of time while he‘s confined. Considering specifically the nature and history of this offense, the defendant, after committing a serious felony in this country, received a very severe federal prison sentence for a first-time offender. He was sentenced to five years of custody and another three years of special probation. He was then deported from the United States, and a very short time after deportation he returned to the United States in direct violation of the law and the conditions of his release. That‘s a serious offense and requires a sentence within the Guideline range. On the other hand, the [points made by the defendant] are well taken[.] The age of the predicate sentence, the sentence that was imposed for the 1984 offense, is something that must be considered, and the 18 or 19 years that Mr. Marin-Castano has lived here free of entanglement with the law is something that also has to be considered.... [T]he fact that he has no ties to the United States and while in custody will have no real connection with any relatives ... is something that must be considered, and the fact that apparently while he was gainfully employed he was sending money back to Colombia.... The fact that his mother [who lives in Colombia] is ill is certainly very regrettable. And again, considering that with his age is something that must be considered in determining a sentence that‘s appropriate in this case.... [T]he government‘s points are also well taken.... [I]t‘s apparent that the previous encounters with law enforcement and the sentences that were imposed did not deter Mr. Marin-Castano.... Based on all the mitigating
factors that I‘ve just mentioned, as pointed out by the defendant‘s lawyer, I find a sentence at the low end of the Guideline range would be appropriate and would meet the sentencing aims of 3553.... Mr. Marin-Castano, you made a very serious mistake. It was a long time ago, I‘ll give you that, and you‘re going to pay a very serious price for it. I wish you well. Good luck to you. Sentencing Transcript, pp. 13-18.
Marin-Castano‘s claim that the court committed procedural error by failing to address his arguments is in part based on
Marin-Castano argued that in the 27 years since his 1985 conviction, he has led an honest and hardworking life free from crime and that this was evidence of his rehabilitation and greatly reduced risk of recidivism. He argued that a criminal history category of 3 greatly overstated the need to protect the public from his future crimes because once deported, he had little incentive to return.
To bolster this argument, Marin-Castano cited
He further argued that the 16-level enhancement, pursuant to
According to Marin-Castano, the district court failed to consider and address these factors at sentencing. In support of this, he relies heavily on two cases: United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2007), and United States v. Robertson, 662 F.3d 871 (7th Cir. 2011).
In both Miranda and Robertson, this Court vacated and remanded district court sentences for failure to adequately address the principal arguments of the defendants. United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 786 (7th Cir. 2007), United States v. Robertson, 662 F.3d 871, 874 (7th Cir. 2011). Marin-Castano attempts to draw comparisons between these cases and his own case, yet they are distinguishable in significant ways. For starters, the cases differ factually. In Miranda and Robertson, each defendant presented evidence that previous mental illness or drug dependency had likely been the catalyst for their predicate offenses, and because they had since been treated, the risk of recidivism was greatly reduced. This Court vacated and remanded both sentences because it was not satisfied that the district court gave the proper consideration to the defendant‘s arguments. In Miranda, we noted:
[T]he district court repeatedly stated that it could not “revisit” or “look beyond” [his prior convictions], apparently construing Miranda‘s argument as a collateral attack on the prior convictions. But Miranda was not collaterally attacking those convictions; rather, he was asking the court to consider an argument under
§ 3553(a)(1) that those convictions arose out of his mental health issues and that his criminal history category overstated both the seriousness ofhis prior conduct and the likelihood that he would commit further crimes. Miranda, 505 F.3d at 795.
In Robertson, the district court failed to acknowledge Robertson‘s “substantial and reliable evidence of rehabilitation, which presented a non-frivolous argument for imposing a sentence below the Guidelines range“; it remained silent on a material issue and argument, so this Court vacated and remanded the imposed sentence. Robertson, 662 F.3d at 880.
When responding to non-frivolous
In this case, however, we are satisfied that the district court properly considered and addressed the principal arguments. Not only did the district court specifically address both general and specific deterrence, the seriousness of illegal reentry and the need to enforce laws which have been created to protect the public, but it specifically referenced Marin-Castano, including his family and ties to Colombia. All of these considerations were factors in the court‘s determination of how much weight to give the 1985 conviction which was at the very center of Marin-Castano‘s argument for a below-Guidelines sentence. The district court explicitly noted that Marin-Castano was not previously deterred by his prior federal prison sentence and as a result, only a within-Guidelines sentence would meet the sentencing aims of
As to Marin-Castano‘s
We find that the district court‘s analysis satisfies the necessary requirements for proper sentencing, and thus, we find no error.
Finally, Marin-Castano argues that the sentence imposed was substantively unreasonable because it failed to give proper weight to the age of Marin-Castano‘s 1985 conviction, in accordance with the
It is clear, for reasons previously stated, that the district court considered the age of the 1985 conviction but was ultimately unpersuaded that a below-Guidelines sentence would sufficiently deter Marin-Castano from illegally reentering the United States again. In light of that we note, as we recently emphasized in United States v. Ramirez-Mendoza, “sentencing judges rightly maintain significant discretion in fashioning an appropriate sentence. It is the sentencing judge that hears evidence and makes credibility determinations, both of which give the judge insights into a case that a cold record simply cannot convey.” United States v. Ramirez-Mendoza, 683 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51-52). Moreover, as we stated at the outset, sentences falling within the Guidelines are presumptively reasonable. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51 (citing Rita, 551 U.S. at 347). We defer to the district court‘s determinations and find that a
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.