379 F. App'x 549
9th Cir.
2010

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Luis Alberto CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 09-50414

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit

May 14, 2010

Argued and Submitted May 6, 2010.

Shawn Jeffery Nelson, Assistant U.S., Michael J. Raphael, Esquire, Assistant U.S., Office of the U.S. Attorney, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Michael Tanaka, Deputy Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender‘s Office, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: O‘SCANNLAIN and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,* District Judge.

MEMORANDUM **

Luis Alberto Castro (“Castro“) appeals his conviction on one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Castro contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence seized during an investigatory stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. He also contends that the district court erred in excluding evidence of another passenger‘s juvenile adjudication for possessing the same firearm. The facts are known to the parties and will not be repeated here except as necessary.

I

The officers had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle based on the license plate check revealing an outstanding arrest warrant for Jose Raz. See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 129 S. Ct. 781, 784, 172 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2009). Because Raz had previously driven that vehicle, and because Castro matched Raz‘s physical description, “it was permissible to detain [Castro] in order to resolve questions about his identity.” United States v. Crapser, 472 F.3d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Therefore, the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the gun.

II

Even assuming, arguendo, that the district court erred in excluding the juvenile adjudication, we are fairly assured that any error was harmless given “the evidence‘s limited probative value.” United States v. 87.98 Acres, 530 F.3d 899, 907 (9th Cir. 2008). That “possession by one person does not necessarily preclude possession by another,” United States v. Carrasco, 257 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2001), distinguishes this case from United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343 (9th Cir. 1996), upon which Castro relies. In Crosby, the prosecution‘s theory was that the defendant had acted alone in committing an assault; therefore, we held that the exclusion of evidence tending to inculpate another person, which “would have tended to exculpate Crosby,” required reversal. Id. at 1349. Here, by contrast, evidence inculpating the other passenger would not have tended to exculpate Castro. See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 1 F.3d 742, 745 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Stewart, 770 F.2d 825, 830 (9th Cir. 1985).

AFFIRMED.

Notes

*
The Honorable Frederic Block, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
**
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.