DECISION AND ORDER
The government charged defendant Kenneth Luedtke with possessing firearms and ammunition while subject to a domestic violence injunction issued by a Wisconsin court, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. The magistrate judge handling pre-trial matters in this case recommended that the motion be denied. Defendant objects, re *1020 quiring me to consider the motion de novo. Fed.R.Crim.P. 59(b)(3). 1
I.
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const, amend. II. In
District of Columbia v. Heller,
— U.S.-,
Not surprisingly, defendants have seized upon
Heller
to mount various challengеs to federal prosecutions for firearm possession, thus far without success.
See, e.g., United States v. Fincher,
There seems to us no doubt, on the basis оf both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms. Of course the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not. Thus, we do not read the Second Amendment to protect the right of citizens to carry arms for any sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment to proteсt the right of citizens to speak for any purpose.
Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
Id. at 2799 & 2816-17 (internal citations omitted).
In the present case, defendant is charged with a violation of § 922(g)(8), which makes unlawful the possession of a firearm or ammunition by one:
who is subject to a court order that—
(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notiсe, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;
*1021 (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the pаrtner or child; and
(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or
(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bоdily injury[.]
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). Congress enacted § 922(g)(8) — and a companion provision prohibiting possession of firearms by those convicted of misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence, § 922(g)(9) — in 1996 as part of the so-called Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act.
United States v. Carr,
II.
It is true that the Lautenberg Amendment does not represent a “longstanding prohibition! ] on the possession of firearms,” but nothing in
Heller
suggests that the Court intended to permit only those
precise
regulations accepted at the founding.
2
Rather, the Court’s examples are best understood as representing the
types
of regulations that pass constitutional muster.
See United States v. Booker,
Laws barring felons and the mentally ill from access tо weapons have historically been based on the societal determination that such individuals pose a particular danger.
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis,
The Gun Control Act of 1968 carried on this tradition. As Congressman Celler, the House Manager of the Act, stated:
[W]e are convinced that a strengthened system can significantly contribute to reducing the danger of crime in the United States. No one can dispute the need to prevent drug addicts, mental incompetents, persons with a history of mеntal disturbances, and persons convicted of certain offenses, from buying, owning, or possessing firearms. This bill seeks to maximize the possibility of keeping firearms out of the hands of such persons.
Lewis,
Sections 922(g)(8) and (9) serve the same purpose. As Senator Lautenberg explained:
Under current Federal law, it is illegal for persons convicted of felonies to possess firearms, yet, many people who engage in serious spousal or child abuse ultimately are not charged with or convicted of felonies. At the end of the day, due to outdatеd laws or thinking, perhaps after a plea bargain, they are, at most, convicted of a misdemeanor. In fact, most of those who commit family violence are never even prosecuted. But when they are, one-third of the cases that would be considered felonies, if committed by strangers, are instead filed as misdemeanors. The fаct is that in many places domestic violence is not taken as seriously as other forms of brutal behavior. Often acts of serious spouse abuse are not even considered felonies.
There is no reason for [people] who beat[ ] their wives or abuse[ ] their children to own a gun ... This amendment would close this dangerous loophоle and keep guns away from violent individuals who threaten their own families, people who have shown that they cannot control themselves and are prone to fits of violent rage directed, unbelievable enough, against their own loved ones. The amendment says: Abuse your wife, lose your gun; beat your child, lose your gun; assault your ex-wife, lose your gun; no ifs, ands, or buts.
United States v. Smith,
Observing that “nearly 65 percent of all murder victims known to have been killed by intimates were shot to death,” 142 Cong. Rec. S10379 (daily ed. Sеpt. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Murray), Congress hoped that closing this loophole would help to reduce the 150,000 instances of household violence involving firearms that are reported each year. 142 Cong. Rec. S8831 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
United States v. Hartsock,
III.
Defendant also argues that § 922(g)(8) sweeps too broadly, applying to persons not found imminently dangerous by any court, and that the statute contains insufficient procedural protections. I address each contention in turn.
First, there is no requirement under the Second Amendment that only those persons found imminently likely to engage in gun violence may be dispossessed of their firearms. Indeed, under § 922(g)(1), all felons&emdash;save those convicted of “antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restrаints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices,” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20);
see also United States v. Jester,
Second, although the procedural protections under § 922(g)(8)(A) do not equal those afforded the criminally accused, defendant provides no authority for the proposition that counsel, a jury trial and/or proof beyond a reasonable doubt are always required before a person may be stripped of a constitutional right.
3
Indeed, even those courts which, pre-Heller, had adopted an “individual rights” interpretation of the Second Amendment rejected challenges to the procedures under § 922(g)(8)(A).
United States v. Emerson,
Section 922(g)(8)(A) requires an actual hearing with prior notice and an оpportunity to participate, and section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) requires that the order “explicitly” prohibit the use (actual, threatened or attempted) of physical *1024 force that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury. Congress legislated against the background of the almost universal rule of American law that for a temporary injunction to issue [there must be a likelihood that irreparable harm will occur].
Id.
at 261-62;
see also United States v. Lippman,
The domestic abuse order in the present case issued under Wisconsin law, which sets forth clear procedures for injunction matters, including the burden of proof, Wis. Stat. § 813.12(4)(a)3. (“reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in, or based upon prior conduct of the petitioner and the respondent may engage in, domestic abuse of the petitioner”); a limitation on the length of an injunction, Wis. Stat. § 813.12(4)(c) (up to four years); and a requirement that the respondent be advised of the applicable penalties under state law for firearm possession while under an injunction, аnd that he must “surrender any firearms that he or she owns or has in his or her possession to the sheriff of the county in which the action under this section was commenced,” Wis. Stat. § 813.12(4m). In Emerson, the court
concluded] that Congress in enacting section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) proceeded on the assumption that the laws of the several states were such that court orders, issued after notice аnd hearing, should not embrace the prohibitions of paragraph (C)(ii) unless such either were not contested or evidence credited by the court reflected a real threat or danger of injury to the protected party by the party enjoined. We do not imply that Congress intended to authorize collateral review of the particular state court predicate order in section 922(g)(8)(C)(ii) prosecutions to determine whether in that individual case the state court adequately followed state law in issuing the order. What we do suggest is that Congress did not have in mind orders issued under a legal system whose rules did not approximate the above stated general minimum standards for the issuance of contested injunctive orders after notice and hearing.
In any event, it is clear to us that Texas law meets these general minimum standards.
IY.
The parties and the magistrate judge discuss the appropriate standard of review under the Second Amendment, with defеndant arguing that I must subject the statute to strict scrutiny. It does not appear that the Heller majority endorsed any particular standard. Rather, it engaged in an historical analysis of the types of restrictions permitted by the Second Amendment. Therefore, I believe that the issue is best analyzed in the manner set forth above, i.e. by comparing the ehal- *1025 lenged regulation to those deemed permissible under the Court’s historical analysis.
However, even if I were to apply strict scrutiny, as defendant asks, the statute would survive. As Judge Kahn recently explained:
Reducing domestic violence is a compelling government interest, see, e.g., United States v. Lippman,369 F.3d 1039 , 1043 (8th Cir.2004), cert. denied,543 U.S. 1080 ,125 S.Ct. 942 ,160 L.Ed.2d 824 (2005), United States v. Calor,340 F.3d 428 , 432 (6th Cir.2003), Henderson v. City of Simi Valley,305 F.3d 1052 , 1057 (9th Cir.2002), and 922(g)(8)’s temporary prohibition, while the state court order is outstanding, is narrowly tailored to that compelling interest. Accord United States v. Emerson,270 F.3d 203 , 262-63 (5th Cir.2001) (finding that the Second Amendment protects individual rights, but nevertheless upholding § 922(g)(8)). The threatened conduct that is a prerequisite to the prohibition is serious: “harassing, stalking, threatening,” or other conduct that would cause “reasonable fear of bodily injury”; and the court order must make a specific finding of “a credible threat to the physical safety” of an intimate partner or child or an explicit prohibition on the use of force “that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). These are narrowly crafted limits on when a citizen may possess a firearm and well tuned to the legitimate concerns of avoiding serious physiсal injury to a partner or child.
United States v. Erwin,
No. 1:07-CR-556,
V.
Finally, I note that the Seventh Circuit rejected constitutional challenges to the Lautenberg Amendment prior to
Heller, Gillespie,
For all of these reasons and those stated by the magistrate judge in his recommendation on the motion, I join the courts which have uniformly upheld the Lauten-berg Amendment provisions against
Heller
challenges.
See, e.g., United States v. Lippman,
No. 4:02-CR-082,
*1026 VI.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss based on the Second Amendment (R. 11) is DENIED.
Notes
. Defendant аlso moved to dismiss on various other grounds, which I address in a separate decision.
. Indeed, the Court stated that: "We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”
. Defendant claims that the originalist approach adopted in
Heller
disapproves of supplanting 21st century policy decisions in place of 18th century practice, аnd argues that a prohibition on gun possession based on a private action without all of the protections afforded criminal defendants is far removed from any regulation that would have been deemed permissible at the time of the founding. However, he cites no authority in support of this argument, and many of the procedural prоtections criminal defendants now take for granted did not exist in the 18th century.
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright,
. The Seventh Circuit, which did not adhere to the individual rights view, found the statutе’s procedures sufficient in
United States v. Wilson,
. Defendant argues that Emerson placed too much confidence in Congress and the procedural protections afforded by applicable state law. However, he points to no significant flaws in Wisconsin’s procedures. It is worth noting that the injunction at issue in this very case clearly told defendant that he was “prohibited from possеssing a firearm until the expiration of this injunction” (R. 12-2 at 1); thus, his argument based on lack of notice rings hollow. I can leave for another day the issue of whether a viable constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(8) may be mounted if the applicable state law fails to provide the fundamentals of due process.
. I also note that every circuit court of appeals considering the issue prior to
Heller
upheld § 922(g)(8) against Second Amendment challenges.
Lippman,