This is an appeal by the government challenging the degree to which the district court reduced a sentence based on the defеndant’s provision of substantial assistance in the investigation and prosecution of another person. We conclude that the еxtent of reduction was unreasonable, and we therefore remand for resentencing.
Lori Lynn Coyle pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. A presentenee investigation report, to which Coyle did not object, recommended a sentencing range of 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment under the then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. The applicable statutory minimum term was 120 months. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). At sentencing, the gоvernment filed substantial-assistance motions pursuant to both USSG § 5K1.1, which authorized the court to depart downward from the applicable guideline range, and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), which permitted the court to sentence below the statutory minimum.
At a sentencing hearing, the government detailеd Coyle’s cooperation with authorities, which included a “proffer” of information, participation in two controlled purchases of methamphetamine from a suspect, and testimony before a grand jury regarding those purchases, which led to an indictmеnt of the suspect. The government indicated that “we didn’t have any concerns about her truthfulness” and that “[s]he came clean,” and “did рretty much everything she was asked to do.” (S. Tr. at 5). The government also reported that *1193 there were threats made to Coyle’s family members that apparently arose out of Coyle’s cooperation with the government. The prosecutor explained that Coyle “came in sort of at the tail end” of an investigation, and that “a lot of the people that she had information about had bеen done before.” (S. Tr. 18). Based on this report, the government recommended a reduction of 15 percent, which would have plаced her within the sentencing range two offense levels below the range that was otherwise applicable under the guidelines.
In suрport of her contention that a greater departure was warranted, Coyle testified that she had given names, phone numbers, license plate numbers, and other information about drug sources to police. She also detailed attempted purchases that she was not able to complete. In addition, Coyle’s daughter testified that she had received phone calls, identifying her mother as a “snitch” and threatening harm to Coyle. Coyle’s counsel argued for a reduction of 50 percent from the bottom of the applicable guideline range of 135 to 168 months, or a total term of about 62 months.
The court granted both of the government’s substantial-assistance motions, and advised Coyle that “based on my evaluation of the substantial, assistance you’ve provided using the five factors set forth in United States Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1, I am going to reduce your sentence to 36 months.” (S. Tr. at 24). The government appeals the extent of the reduction.
In three opinions filed earlier this year, and in another opinion filed today, we have described the standards apрlicable to our review of a district court’s decision to reduce a sentence based on substantial assistance.
See United States v. Saenz,
“An extraordinary' reduction must be supported by extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 1033. The district court’s reduction of 75 percent and 12 offense levels in Dalton was viewed as “extraordinary,” and we reach the same conclusion regarding the reduction of 73 percent and 14 offense levels in this cаse, which the district court itself characterized as “a whopping reduction.” (S. Tr. at 27). We must consider, therefore, whether the district court’s decision is supported by extraordinary circumstances that could reasonably justify such a reduction.
We are hampered to some extent by the limited record of the district court’s reasoning in making such a large reduction. It is evident, however, that Ms. Coyle did provide assistance that could justify a reduction that is more than minimal. She worked undercover by making controlled purchases, served as а primary witness against one defendant, and experienced threats to her and her family as a result of assisting the government. These factors are among those we have used to illustrate the type of assistance that may support an increased reduction.
See Dalton,
It is another question, however, whether an extraordinary reduction of the magnitude involved here can be charаcterized as reasonable. The district court did not merely reduce the sentence by, say, 30 or 40 percent, but 73 percent. This equаted to a reduction of not, say, four or six
*1194
offense levels, but 14 levels. It seems to us that a reduction of this degree must be reserved for cooperating defendants who provide assistance that is much more extensive and significant than what Coyle offered. There undoubtedly are defendants who provide long-term undercover assistance that is greater than the two controlled transactions invоlved here, who assist with the investigation of multi-mem-ber conspiracies rather than the single defendant prosecuted in this matter, whose сooperation results in the apprehension of particularly dangerous offenders or “kingpins,” and who suffer a more tangible risk of injury or actual harm as a result of their cooperation with the government.
Cf. Pizano,
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude thаt the extent of reduction granted to Ms. Coyle was unreasonably large, and we therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for resentencing.