OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
On My 6, 2010, the Grand Jury for the District of Delaware indicted defendant Marquis A. Lopez (“Lopez”) for: (1) possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B); (2) knowing possession a Glock 22C semiautomatic handgun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and (3) knowing possession of that handgun after having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (D.I. 14.) Presently before the court is Lopez’s Second Motion to Suppress Evidence. (D.I. 90.) The court held an evidentiary hearing in connection with Lopez’s First Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 28) on December 16, 2010 (see D.I. 37), after which the parties filed proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (D.I. 39; D.I. 48).
On January 20, 2011, the government filed a motion in limine seeking to admit, under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), the electronic surveillance evidence the WPD obtained from the GPS tracking devices.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
At the evidentiary hearing on December 16, 2010, the United States called three witnesses: Corporal David Diana of the Delaware State Police (“Diana”), Officer David Hamrick, a canine officer with the WPD (“Hamrick”), and Detective Robert Fox of the WPD (“Fox”). Detective Fox was the only witness the United States called at the supplemental evidentiary hearing on March 23, 2011. Lopez did not call witnesses at either hearing. After listening to the witnesses’ testimony at each hearing, the court concluded, as stated in its Memorandum and Order on Lopez’s First Motion to Suppress Evidence, that Diana, Hamrick, and Fox’s account of the facts, as recited at the December 16, 2010 evidentiary hearing, is credible. (D.I. 66 at 2.) The court also found Fox’s account of the facts, as recited at the March 23, 2011 supplemental evidentiary hearing, credible. The following represents the court’s essential findings of fact as required by Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
In November 2009, Detective Fox and his colleagues in the WPD Drug, Organized Crime, and Vice Division received information from a past proven reliable confidential informant about an individual known as “Lope” or “Curly” who was selling heroin within the City of Wilmington. (See D.I. 37 at 42.) After the informant identified a photograph of Lopez as the person he knew as “Lope” or “Curly,” the WPD detectives conducted a controlled
Detective Fox and his WPD colleagues also used GPS tracking devices to monitor the movements of the vehicles they observed Lopez driving. (Id.) During the course of their surveillance, two GPS devices were placed on five different vehicles at various times: a Ford Crown Victoria, a Volkswagen Jetta, a Honda Odyssey, a BMW 5 series, and a blue Dodge Durango. (D.I. 37 at 46.) While the Ford Crown Victoria was registered to Lopez, the other vehicles were registered to different Hispanic mаles with addresses in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. (Id.) At the time of the surveillance, the two WPD GPS devices used were three-inch by three-inch battery powered units designed to magnetically attach to the undercarriage of a tracked vehicle. (D.I. 58 at 18.) Here, the devices were installed on the vehicles while they were parked in a public parking lot outside Lopez’s residence on the 700 block of Townsend Street in Wilmington. (Id. at 27.) Once installed, the devices allowed the detectives to monitor the location of the tracked vehicle by logging on to the tracking device vendor website, Covert Track. (Id. at 19-21.)
Generally speaking, the information a GPS device can collect and log pertains to the tracked vehicle’s location, speed, and direction of travel. (D.I. 37 at 49, 51.) Moreover, a GPS device and Covert Track, when used in conjunction, allows law enforcement officers to set up a “geofence” in monitoring a vehicle’s travels. (D.I. 58 at 21-22.) As Detective Fox explained, a “geofence” is a specific geographic area that can be defined by detectives in the GPS computer program and causes the GPS device to send an email or text message to detectives when it has entered the selected area. (Id.) Here, the WPD detectives set up a geofence to ensure that such alerts were sent whenever the monitored vehicles entered the Interstate 95 corridor between Delaware and Pennsylvania. (Id. at 30.) Through utilization of the GPS devices installed on the automobiles Lopez used, the WPD detectives were able to determine that these vehicles would travel to areas known for high drag trafficking in Wilmington and Philadelphia. (Id. at 30-32, 42.) Specifically, the electronic surveillance showed that these vehicles would travel to the Kensington section of Philadelphia — an area known for heroin transactions — and that the driver of these vehicles would travel to Philadelphia in оne car, leave that car in Philadelphia, and return to Delaware in a different vehicle. (Id. at 32-53; see also D.I. 37 at 45-46.) Detective Fox testified that the WPD detectives used the GPS monitoring on the vehicles Lopez drove in order to “catch” him traveling back to Delaware after a “load run,” wherein they believed he would purchase a large quantity of heroin in Philadelphia. (D.I. 58 at 54.)
Throughout their surveillance, which, in total, was conducted from February 2010 until June 2, 2010, neither Detective Fox nor his WPD colleagues obtained a court order or warrant authorizing installation or use of the GPS devices. (Id. at 28, 72.) Detective Fox testified at the supplemental evidentiary hearing that he did not believe, based on his own past experience and consultation with senior police officers and
As noted, Lopez was arrested on June 2, 2010. (D.I. 66 at 3.) On June 1, 2010, the WPD detectives installed a GPS device on the blue Dodge Durango and, on the evening of June 2, 2010, Detective Fox received a text message from the GPS tracker indicating that the Durango entered Pennsylvania heading northbound on Interstate 95. (Id. (citing D.I. 37 at 47-48).) Detective Fox assembled a team of WPD detectives and a drug canine officer to conduct a traffic stop of Lopez as he was returning to Wilmington. Lopez was ultimately stopped by Corporal Diana, an officer unaffiliated with the WPD or its investigation and who was engaged in “proactive patrol” on Interstate 95. For the reasons stated in its Memorandum and Order denying Lopez’s First Motion to Suppress Evidence, the court concluded that the evidence found in the Durango’s secret compartment and incident to Lopez’s arrest — specifically, 19,500 bags of heroin and a firearm — should not be suppressed as the fruit of unlawful GPS monitoring because: (1) Corporal Diana had “probable cause independent of the GPS tracking to search Lopez and the Durango he was driving”; and (2) that search and the subsequent search of Lopez’s apartment were “sufficiently attenuated from the use of GPS tracking that the evidence obtained during those searches [was] not tainted by the use of GPS tracking.”
Following the Supreme Court’s January 23, 2012 decision in United States v. Jones,
III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Lopez asserts that the electronic surveillance evidence obtained from the WPD’s
Conversely, the government maintains that the GPS electrоnic surveillance evidence should be admitted under Rule 404(b) because: (1) while Jones did establish that GPS monitoring constitutes a search, it “did not reach the issue of whether probable cause or a warrant” is required prior to installation and, therefore, does not stand for the rule that warrantless GPS monitoring is a per se Fourth Amendment violation; (2) absent Supreme Court instruction that probable cause or a warrant is required to use a GPS device, the court can conclude that reasonable suspicion — which the government maintains was present here — is sufficient to meet Fourth Amendment requirements; (3) to the extent that Lopez has standing to challenge the warrantless installation of the GPS devices,
A. Lopez’s Standing to Challenge the Constitutionality of the WPD’s Warrantless Use of GPS Devices
Initially, the government contends that Lopez does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the WPD’s warrantless GPS monitoring of vehicles he used from February 2010 to June 2010. Specifically,, the government maintains that: (1) because Lopez was registered only to the Ford Crown Victoria and not to the other four monitored vehicles, he is limited to challenging only the GPS monitoring of the Crown Victoria;
It is well-established that a defendant must demonstrate standing to invoke the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule. United States v. Stearn,
Importantly, however, the Jones’ majority, while not repudiating the Katz test, grounded its finding that the installation of a GPS device on a vehicle is a “search” in the common law of trespass. Jones,
In view of the foregoing and in consideration of the instant facts, the court disagrees with the government’s assertion that Lopez has not established a property-interest in the vehicles at issue because: (1) all vehicles except the Ford Crown Victoria were registered to third parties; (2) Lopez “was only observed driving the vehicles for brief periods of time in the Wilmington area”; and (3) it is unclear from the record whether Lopez “had lawful authorization” to drive the vehicles. (D.I. 92 at 12.) Rather, as the Jones’ majority makes clear, an individual not registered to a vehicle can still have standing to challenge an alleged Fourth Amendment violation where that individual is the “exclusive driver” and, as a result, assumes the property rights of a bailee. Jones,
Here, the record makes clear that each time the WPD detectives installed a GPS device on one of the Lopez vehicles, the installation took place in a small public parking lot outside his residence on Townsend Street. (D.I. 96 at 5 (citing D.I. 58 at 27, 28, 38-39, 41, 46, 50, 53, 56, 59).) The record also indicates that there were instances in which WPD detectives witnessed Lopez driving the tracked vehicles, including the Crown Victoria, the Honda Odyssey, and the Dodge Durango, while they were simultaneously being monitored by a GPS device. (Id. at 5-6 (citing D.I. 58 at 39-41, 54; D.I. 66 at 4).) Moreover, while the government cites the Third Circuit’s holding in United States v. Kennedy to support its argument that Lopez does not have standing because there is no evidence that he was lawfully authorized to use the vehicles,
Instead, the parties do not dispute that the GPS devices were installed outside Lopez’s house and that he was seen driving the vehicles on at least three occasions when those vehicles were being monitored by the devices. As noted, Jones establishes that a non-owner who lawfully possesses a vehicle registered to a third-party has at least the property rights of a bailee. In this case, there is no evidence to contradict that Lopez was, at least at some points in time, in possession of the vehicles
The court further notes that it reаches the same conclusion applying the Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test supported by the Jones’ concurrence. The Katz test, in the main, focuses on whether the monitoring of a defendant via GPS would “impinge[ ]” on his or her reasonable “expectation[ ] of privacy.” Jones,
In view of the foregoing, the court concludes that Lopez has standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation because: (1) he had a possessory interest in the vehicles when the GPS devices were installed outside his apartment and, at least, at various times when the vehicles were be
B. The Validity of the WPD Detectives’ Warrantless Use of GPS Devices
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of individuals to be “securе in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. As the court recognized in its Memorandum and Opinion denying Lopez’s First Motion to Suppress Evidence, the “issue of whether the placement and use of [GPS] tracking devices constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment has become increasingly prominent in both federal and state court in recent years.” (D.I. 66 at 7.) The Supreme Court recently addressed this question in Jones, wherein it concluded that “installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and [] use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets” is a “search” under the Fourth Amendment. See Jones,
Importantly, and as the government correctly notes, however, the Jones Court did not reach the question of whether a warrant is required before installing a GPS device and/or whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion alone is sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the Fourth Amendment.
It is well-established that “suppression is not an automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.” Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137,
Thus, the question of suppression should ultimately “turn[ ] on the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police conduct.” See Herring, 555 U.S. at 137,
In keeping with this principle, the Supreme Court has, in certain instances, upheld the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment under the “good faith exception” to thе exclusionary rule. For example, the Court has upheld admissibility despite a Fourth Amendment violation where law enforcement committed that violation relying on: a warrant;
Here, the court concludes that the evidence the WPD obtained through the warrantless installation of GPS devices on vehicles Lopez used is admissible under the good faith exception because the WPD detectives: (1) acted in reasonable reliance on the absence of federal or state case law establishing that GPS monitoring of a vehicle in public is a Fourth Amendment “search”; and (2) attempted to comply with Fourth Amendment search requirements in good faith. First, and with regаrd to the case law available at the time the GPS devices were installed in this case, there were no Federal Courts of Appeals decisions indicating that the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices was unreasonable and unlawful. Instead, prior to the D.C. Circuit’s August 6, 2010 decision in United States v. Maynard that warrant-less GPS use is unreasonable, every circuit court that considered the question concluded that police do not need to obtain a warrant to install and monitor a GPS device on the exterior of a car, so long as that car remains on public roads. Importantly, the D.C. Circuit’s Maynard decision was issued two months after Lopez’s arrest. This meant that at the time of the WPD’s monitoring neither the Third Circuit Court of Appeals nor any other federal circuit court had concluded that warrantless GPS monitoring and installation was unlawful. Indeed, even the commentary to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, which governs warrants and was adopted by the Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), maintains the same view. See Fed. R.Crim..Prоc. 41 (Advisory Committee’s note to the 2006 amendments) (stating that a warrant is only required for a tracking device “if the device installed (for example, in the trunk of the defendant’s car) or monitored (for example, while the car is in the defendant’s garage) in an area in which the person being monitored has a reasonable expectation of privacy”).
Moreover, at the time of the WPD’s investigation, numerous federal courts had approved warrantless installation and monitoring of GPS devices on vehicles that remained on public roads based at least in part on the Supreme Court’s holdings in United States v. Knotts
In addition, during the WPD’s investigation of Lopez, which ended on June 3, 2010 following his arrest, there was no State of Delaware case law opining that the installation and use of a GPS tracking device to monitor a vehicle’s location while traveling on public roads required a warrant. In fact, the first Delaware case to consider the issue was decided six months after Lopez’s arrest. See State v. Holden,
Second, the court further concludes that the undisputed evidence in the record supports a finding that Detective Fox and the other WPD detectives who installed and monitored the GPS devices acted in good faith and in reasonable reliance on contemporaneous guiding case law and legal advice. Specifically, and as noted above, Detective Fox testified that he did not believe, based on his prior experience, that a warrant was needed before installing and monitoring a GPS device if the installation and monitoring occurred while the vehicle was in public. Detective Fox further explained that, in addition to drawing this conclusion based on his own experience, he spoke with a number of senior police officers and superiors and sought legal advice from the State Attorney General’s Office. Both the senior officers and the State Attorney General’s Office advised Detective Fox that his investigative methods were appropriate and that he did not need to obtain a warrant so long as the vehicles remained on public roads.
Conversely, Lopez asserts, as the only argument he advances in response to the government’s contention that the WPD’s actions fall within the good faith exception, that Detective Fox did not act in “good faith” because he did not seek advice from senior officers and the State Attorney General’s Office until shortly after he installed the first GPS device without a warrant. (D.I. 96 at 9.) Specifically, Lopez argues that “[h]ad the detective truly proceeded on a good faith basis, his inquiry regarding the legality of installing GPS tracking devices without the authorization of a search warrant would have been initiated well before he warrantlessly installed the first GPS device.” (Id. at 8-9.) In view of the evidence before it, however, the court finds Lopez’s argument unpersuasive.
As noted above, the central question trial courts are to assess in determining whether the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule applies is whether the law enforcement officers engaged in culpable conduct necessitating application of the rule for purposes of deterrence, or whether the officers acted in good faith. While Lopez is correct that Detective Fox did not seek legal advice until shortly after the first GPS device was installed, the court finds that there is no evidence in the record indicating that he or the other WPD detectives did not act in good faith. Instead, the record shows that: (1) at the
Considering this evidence, the court rejects Lopez’s assertion that Detective Fox’s failure to seek legal advice prior to installing the first GPS device demonstrates that he did not act in good faith. To the contrary, the record shows — and Lopez does not challenge — that, based on the case law available at the time and his own experience, Detective Fox did not have reason to believe that the warrantless use of GPS tracking devices would be unlawful. Furthermore, the court notes that Detective Fox took active steps to confirm that his conclusion was indeed accurate by consulting with senior police officers and the State Attorney General’s Office. This, coupled with the other evidence in the record, buttresses the government’s argument that Detective Fox acted in good faith. See Messerschmidt v. Millender, — U.S. -,
Thus, having considered the evidence in the record and credibility of the witnesses who testified at the suppression hearings held in connection with this matter, the court finds that suppression of the evidence in this case would be inappropriate. Davis,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby denies Lopez’s Second Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 90) and grants the government’s First Motion in Limine to Admit Evidence of Other Acts Pursuant to Fеderal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (D.I. 82).
ORDER
For the reasons stated in the court’s Memorandum of this same date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The defendant’s Second Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 90) is DENIED;
2. The government’s Motion in Li-mine to Admit Evidence of Other Acts Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) (D.I. 82) is GRANTED.
Notes
. Lopez’s First Motion to Suppress Evidence (D.I. 28) asked that the court exclude all evidence derived from his arrest-specifically, 19,500 bags of heroin and a firearm discovered in a secret compartment of the car he was driving-because the Wilmington Police Department ("the WPD”) installed Global Positing System ("GPS”) devices on certain vehicles he used without first obtaining a search warrant. (Id.) Lopez asserted that because the WPD's use of the GPS devices was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, the evidence found during his arrest was likewise tainted by that unlawful activity and, therefore, inadmissible. For the reasons referenced briefly below and detailed fully in its first Memorandum and Order (D.I. 66), the court concluded that Lopez's arrest was sufficiently attenuated from any such alleged illegality tо remove this "taint” and that the arresting officer did, in fact, have independent probable cause to arrest Lopez. Consequently, the court denied Lopez's First Motion to Suppress Evidence without addressing the legality of the WPD's use of GPS devices.
. As explained below, the government seeks to admit this evidence under Rule 404(b) to show: (1) Lopez’s knowledge of the heroin and firearm referenced in the indictment that were found in a secret compartment of the vehicle he was driving when arrested; and (2) Lopez's intent and modus operandi with respect to the charged offenses. (D.I. 82.)
. The court notes that its recitation of facts in this section is taken largely from the findings of fact it detailed in its Memorandum and Order denying Lopez's First Motion to Suppress Evidence. (D.I. 66 at 2-6.) The court includes a brief recitation of these facts here, along with additional facts relevant to the arguments the parties present in connection with Lopez’s Second Motion to Suppress Evidence. The court likewise excludes facts not relevant to the disрosition of Lopez's instant motion.
. As noted in the court’s first Memorandum and Order, it did not need to reach the question of whether the warrantless GPS monitoring itself was unlawful because the matter was decided on attenuation grounds. (D.I. 66 at 8-11.)
. As noted above and discussed in greater detail below, the Supreme Court held in Jones that law enforcement’s use of a GPS device to monitor the movements of a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment even if that installation and monitoring occurs in public. See Jones,
.As noted, the government filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of other acts pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). (D.I. 82.)
. Specifically, Lopez notes that the GPS electronic surveillance in this case lasted, in total, approximately four months and asserts that the WPD detectives cannot effectively argue on these facts that "there was insufficient time to apply for a search warrant or that exigent circumstances dispensed with the necessity of [] obtaining a search warrant.” (D.I. 91 at 16.)
. As noted in the findings of fact section supra, it is undisputed that Lopez was registered to only one of the five vehicles monitored via GPS during the relevant time period. The court notes, for purposes of clarification, that its use of the phase "Lopez’s vehicles” refers to the five vehicles that Lopez used and that were tracked by GPS monitoring, rather than simply to the one vehicle registered in his name.
. Specifically, and as explained in the Section III.B infra, Lopez challenges that Detective Fox and the other WPD detectives failed to act in good faith because they did not seek legal advice as to the constitutionality of warrantless GPS installation and monitoring until after the first GPS device was installed. (D.I. 96 at 9-10.)
. See infra Section III.A.
. In its Sur-Reply, the government states that it will not seek to introduce electronic surveillance evidence of the Ford Crown Victoria's movements during the GPS monitoring period in question. (D.I. 98 at 4 n. 1.) The government also notes that, because there is no evidence in the record indicating that information gained from the Crown Victoria tracking had any bearing on subsequent decisions to usе tracking devices elsewhere in the investigation, the surveillance of this vehicle did not impact the WPD's monitoring of the other four vehicles. (Id.) The court agrees and Lopez does not dispute that there is no evidence in the record demonstrating a connection between the Ford Crown Victoria tracking and the WPD's monitoring decisions with respect to the other four vehicles.
. In Jones, the Court found that the defendant had a property-based claim with respect to the vehicle search because the vehicle was registered to his wife and he was the exclusive driver, giving him "at least the property rights of a bailee” during the twenty-eight day moni
. In Kennedy, the Third Circuit established that a defendant has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a rental car where that defendant was an "unauthorized driver” and, therefore, had "no cognizable property interest in the ... vehicle” and, as a result, "no accompanying right to exclude.” See United States v. Kennedy,
. The evidence does not еstablish that Lopez was an "unauthorized” user of the vehicles and the parties do not fully develop this argument in their briefing. (D.I. 91; D.I. 92; D.I. 96; D.I. 98.) Indeed, Lopez requests that the parties submit addition briefing on this issue if standing does in fact turn on whether he was an "authorized” user of the vehicles and, therefore, capable of “possession” as a "bailee” within the meaning of Jones. (D.I. 96 at 6.) Because the court concludes that the evidence at issue is admissible under the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, it finds that this additional briefing is unnecessary as such filings would not affect the court's ultimate conclusion in this matter.
. Justice Alito was joined in his concurrence by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan. See Jones,
. The government states that Lopez was only in possession of the vehicles in Wilmington for "short, discrete periods of time.” (D.I. 98 at 4.) Specifically, the government details that this monitoring was inclusive of: February 23 (GPS installed on the Volkswagen Passat); April 30 through May 3 (GPS installed on the Dodge Durango); May 14 through May 15 (GPS installed on the BMW); May 22 through May 26 (GPS installed on the Honda Odyssey); May 28 to May 29 (GPS installed on the Volkswagen Passat); and June 1 through June 3 (GPS installed on the Dodge Durango). {Id.) Conversely, Lopez maintains that the court should consider the entire period of time during which the WPD employed GPS tracking in connection with their investigation — four months of surveillance — as opposed to the discrete time periods the government lists. The court notes that it considers both time frames the parties advance in evaluating the reasonableness of the WPD’s warrantless GPS use.
. The court notes that it does not address the government's argument that, if the court were to find, as it has, that Lopez has standing under Jones, he can only challenge the vehicle surveillance that occurred when the tracked vehicles were outside his apartment or when he was seen driving the vehicle as it was monitored. (Id. at 4-5.) Specifically, because the court finds that the WPD detectives acted in good faith in installing the GPS devices and, therefore, that Lopez’s motiоn to suppress is denied, it does not need to distinguish whether, had the officers not acted in good faith, Lopez could have challenged the admissibility of electronic surveillance conducted when he was not driving or in physical possession of the vehicle. (Id.) (citing United States v. Stearn,
. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia explained that “Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass, at least until the latter half of the 20th century” and this jurisprudence “was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (‘persons, houses, papers, and effects’) it enumerates.” See Jones,
.The Court in Jones did not reach the issue of whether the search was reasonable and, thus, lawful under the Fourth Amendment because the government “did not raise it belоw, and the D.C. Circuit therefore did not address it.” Id. at 954. Consequently, the question of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause could render a GPS search reasonable and legal was forfeited and not considered in Jones. Id.
. The court notes that while it does not fully examine whether the WPD had reasonable suspicion or probable cause in this case or whether either would prove sufficient under Jones to render a warrantless GPS search reasonable and, thus, legal, it is not persuaded by the government’s argument. Specifically, and as noted above, the government urges the court to accept its contention that Jones does not require the presence of probable cause or a warrant because it did not reach that issue and “[n]ot every search and seizure by law enforcement requires a warrant or even probable cause.” (D.I. 92 at 13 (citing Florida v. Jimeno,
While the government correctly observes that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence does not require probable cause and/or a warrant in all casеs, the court does not agree that Jones necessarily stands for the proposition the government maintains. As noted, the GPS device in Jones was placed on a vehicle for a period of twenty-eight days and collected 2,000 pages of data over the course of the surveillance. Here, the government argues that because the WPD detectives had reasonable suspicion and the GPS monitoring was "short-term” in nature — totaling seventeen days over a period of approximately four months — this "relatively short-term monitoring of a person's movements on public streets” accords "with expectations of privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.” (Id. at 17 (citing Jones,
Given the extent of the GPS tracking in this case and the period of time over which it occurred, the court disagrees with the government’s assertion that: (1) the facts of the instant case are clearly and necessarily reasonable under Jones; and (2) Jones may be read to support the proposition that a warrant would not be required where law enforcement conducts warrantless electronic surveillance for a period of at least seventeen days. Rather, it appears to the court that the length of the GPS monitoring in this case is not so distinguishable from the duration of the monitoring conducted in Jones that the court can authoritatively conclude the Supreme Court would consider seventeen days a short-term monitoring obviating the need for a warrant. See Jones,
. See Leon,
. See Illinois v. Krull,
. See Arizona v. Evans,
.See Herring,
. See Davis,
.
.