delivered the opinion of the Court.
•This сase comes from the Circuit Court of the United States for the state of Illinois, on a certificate of division of opinion upon the following points:
1st. Whether the obligation Set out in the second and third counts in the declaration, being without seal, is a bond within' the act of Congress.
2d.-Whether such instrument is good at common law.
Upon the first point no doubt can exist. There being no seal to the instrument, it is not a bond. This point was" abandoned by tlje Attorney General, on the argument; and the question must of course be answered in the negative. And as the act of Congress directs the security to be taken by bond, this answer necessárily implies that the instrument now in question is not in form the instrument required by the act of Congress. And the second point presents the broad question whether the instrument is good and binding at common law, independent of the statute, as to the mere form of the security.
If this is a contract entered into by competent parties, and for a lawful purpose, not prohibited by law, and is founded upon á sufficient consideration, it is a valid contract, at сommon law. In the case of The United States
v.
Tingey,
From this it follows, that a voluntary contract or security taken by the United Statеs for a lawful purpose, and upon a good consideration, although not prescribed by any law, is not utterly void. That the instrument in question was taken for a lawful purpose cannot be questioned. It was taken to secure the faithful performance of duties imposed by law upen a Receiver of Public Money.
Although the question came up in the Circuit Court upon a *312 demurrer to the declaration, the point certified does not involve any inquiry respecting the sufficiency of the declaration. The declaration is referred to merely for á description of the instrument upon which the question arose. And if the instrument can be made valid and binding at common law,'by any averments and legal evidence, the question must b'e answered in the affirmative.
This instrument, as set out in the second and third counts in the declaration, bears date on the first day of April, in the year 1836, reciting that the President of the United States had, pursuant to law, appointed the said William Linn to be Receiver of Public Money, for the district of lands subject to sale at Vandalia, in the state of Illinois, for the term of four years from the 12th day of January, in the year 1835, by commission bearing date on the 12th of February, 1835. That the said defendants did then and there, in and by said instrument in writing, by the names, contractions, abbreviations, and descriptions, &c., (naming all the defendants,) • acknowledge themselves to be held, and firmly bound, unto the said plaintiff’ in the sum of, and promised to pay unto the said plaintiffs, one hundred, thousand dollars of money of the United States; to which payment well and truly to be made, they, the said defendants, bound themselves jointly and severally, their joint and several heirs, executors, and administrators, by the said instrument in writing; which said instrument in writing was, however, to be void and of none effect, in case, and upon the condition., that the said William Linn should faithfully execute and discharge the duties of his office of Receiver of Public Moneys as aforesaid; otherwise the said instrumént in writing should abide and remain in full force and virtue. And the question is, whethér this instrument is binding at common law, as a security for the faithful discharge of the duties of Receivеr of Public Moneys, by William Linn. The argument urged to the Court against the validity of this instrument, has been presented under the following heads:
1. That the writing is without consideration.
2. - If not without consideration, it was a past and executed consideration.
3. That it is contrary to the policy of the act of Congress, and so void.
*313
The recital in the instrument is that the President of the United States, pursuаnt to law, had appointed the said William Linn Receiver of Public Money for the-district of land, subject to sale at Vandalia, in the state of Illinois, for the term of four years from the 12th of January, 1835, and who was duly commissioned for that purpose; and he was accordingly, by the laws of' the United States, entitled to receive the same’compensation and emoluments, and subject to the same duties in every respect in relation to the lands to be disposed of at his office, as are or may be by law provided in relation to the Receivers of Public Money in other offices established for the sale of public lands; and was by law required to give security in thе same manner and sum as other Receivers of Public Moneys for the sale.of public lands.
These emoluments were the considerations allowed him for the execution of the duties of his office; and his appointment and commission entitled him t!> receive this compensation, whether he gave' any security or not. ' His official rights and duties attached upon his appointment. This was so held by this Court in the case of The United States
v.
Bradley,
2. This was not a past and executed consideration. The mere appointment of Linn, as a Receiver of Public Money, was not the consideration of the contract, but the emoluments, and benefit resulting from the appointment formed the consideration. It was a continuing cоnsideration, running with his continuance iu • office; and existed in full force at the time the instrument in question was signed. This appears from the recitals in the contract. The term of office Was four years from the 12th of January, 1835.
'; 3. But it has, been very strongly pressed upon the Court, that it is against the policy of the act of Congress, to allow security to be taken otherwise than by a bond. It may be well questioned whether this objection comes properly under consideration in the question certified to this Court; which is simply, whether this instrument is good at common law. This, in strictness, presents the question entirely independent of the statute, and as if no statute'had ever been passed on the subjеct. But we do not wish to confine ourselves to ibis narrow view of the question. The act of Congress, under which this.instrument was taken, (
The point now presented to this Court is a single and abstract question; whether this instrument is good at common law. It is argued that this instrument is absolutely void, on the ground that it is - .gainst the policy of the act to permit security to be taken in any other form than is prescribed by the act. In a certain. sеnse this may be true. It is the duty of all public officers intrusted with the execution of powers delegated.to them, to. pursue the directions of the law conferring the power. But to construe all such laws as a special delegation of authority, to be strictly and literally pursued; and to consider every departure from it, as donе without authority, and absolutely void; would frequently be defeating the very object and purpose for which the law is made; and ought not to receive such a construction, unless the statute itself declares all such acts void. But if the mere omission to put seals to the instrument shall make it void, every other departure from a strict -and literal compliance with the direction of the act, would make void the -security.'
' This has not been the light in which this Court have viewed analogous cases. In the case of The United States v. Bradley, already referred to, the Court say, “it has been urged that the act. of 1816,ch. 69, does, by necessary implication, prohibit the taking of any .bоnds from Paymasters other than those in the form prescribed by the 6th section of the act; and, therefore; that bonds taken in any other form, are utterly void. We do not think so. The act merely prescribes the form and purport of the bond to be taken of-Paymasters by the War Department, r It is in this respect directory to that depаrtment; and, doubtless, it would he illegal for that department to insist upon a bond containing other provisions and conditions, differing from those prescribed or required by law. But the act has nowhere declared that all other bonds, not taken in the prescribed’ form, shall be *317 Utterly void. Nor does such an implication arise from any of the terms contained in the act, or from any principies of public policy which it is designed to promote. A bond may, by mutual mistake or accident, and' wholly without design, be taken in a form not prescribed by the act. It would be a very mischievous interpretation of the act, to suppose that, under such circumstances, it was the intendment of the act tha't the bond should be utterly void. Nothing, we think, but very strong and express language should induce a Court of justice to adopt such an interpretation. Where the act speaks out, it woirld be our duty ■to follow itr Where it is silent, it is a sufficient compliance with the policy of the act to declare the bond void, as to any сonditions which are imposed upon a party beyond what the law requires. This is not only the dictate of the common law, but of common sense.” . " _
The act under which the security, in that case, was taken, is substantially the same as the one under which the instrument now in question was taken.
We are accordingly of opinion that the second question must be answered in the affirmative.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the District of *318 Illinois, and on the points and questions on which the judges of the said Circuit Court were opposed in opinion, and which were certified to this Court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of Congress in such case- made and provided, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court, 1st. That the obligation set out in the second and third counts in the declaration, being without seal, is not a bond within the act of Congress; and 2d. That such an instrument is good at common law : whereupon it is now here ordered and adjudged by this Court, that it be so certified to the said Circuit Court.