Linda Carothers was sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release after pleading guilty to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder for hire. One condition of her release was that she “not commit any other federal, state or local crime.” After serving approximately 14 months of supervised release, Carothers was charged with second-degree assault, a Class C felony in Missouri. After a hearing, the district court 1 revoked Carothers’ supervised release and sentenced her to 24 months in *1019 prison. Carothers appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in revoking her supervised release because the government failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she violated a condition of her supervised release.
If the government proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant violated a condition of supervised release, unrelated to firearms or controlled substances, the district court has discretion to revoke supervised release.
See
18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (g) (2000) (“The [district] court may ... revoke a term of supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the term of supervised release ... if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release ... ”). “On appeal, the district court’s decision to revoke supervised release based on its finding of a violation is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.”
United States v. Whalen,
After an alleged “road rage” incident on December 18, 2002, Carothers was arrested and charged in Callaway County, Missouri, with second-degree assault. Under Missouri law, “[a] person commits the crime of assault in the second degree if he ... [ajttempts to cause or knowingly causes physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.060(2) (West 1999). A car can be a “dangerous instrument depending upon the circumstances under which it is used.”
State v. Dunn,
Carothers asserts that the district court abused its discretion in revoking her supervised release. Specifically, she argues that the only evidence presented— “he said, she said” testimony' — was insufficient to prove that she attempted to injure the alleged victim with her vehicle. In revoking her supervised release, the district court implicitly found that the alleged victim’s testimony was credible and that Carothers’ was not credible. Because credibility determinations are “virtually unreviewable on appeal,”
United States v. Hernandez,
Notes
. The Honorable Scott O. Wright, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
