MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Defendant James Lewis has been indicted for violation of the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228. The defendant has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, arguing that the CSRA exceeds Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and invades state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. For the reasons discussed below, I find that the CSRA is constitutional and that this Court may retain jurisdiction. Therefore, the defendant’s Motion is denied.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 26,1995, the defendant was indicted under the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228. The indictment charges that the defendant, starting January 7, 1993, willfully failed to pay a past due child support obligation as determined by the Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida. The indictment further alleges that the child is a resident of Rhode Island, while the defendant is not.
According to the defendant, on December 4, 1989, he was the defendant in a paternity suit in the Circuit Court in Broward County, Florida. On January 12, 1993, the Florida Hearing Officer in that court issued a report which established paternity and child support on the basis of the child’s mother’s affidavit. The report states that the defendant failed to appear at several scheduled blood tests.
The defendant alleges that he never received notice or service of process in these state court proceedings. Since his arrest in the present case, the defendant has apparently petitioned the Broward County Circuit Court to set aside the judgment on the grounds that he had never received notice of the state court proceedings. According to the defendant, Circuit Court Judge Thomas Lynch has reopened the matter and will hold a hearing on the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment
The defendant is currently released on bail and awaits trial on the CSRA charge. He has filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment, alleging that the CSRA is unconstitutional. The defendant’s Motion is proper under Fed. R.Crim.P. 12(b), which permits pre-trial motions for issues that can be decided without trial, including defects in the indictment. The Motion to Dismiss is now before this Court.
LEGAL DISCUSSION
The CSRA states, “[w]hoever willfully fails to pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).” 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). The statute defines “past due support obligation” as “any amount — (A) determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living; and (B) that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000.” 18
U.S.C. 228(d)(1). The defendant argues that the CSRA goes beyond the scope of Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and invades the exclusive province of the states under the Tenth Amendment.
Nine district courts and the Second Circuit have upheld the constitutionality of the CSRA; four district courts have found the CSRA unconstitutional.
Compare United States v. Sage,
The courts holding that CSRA is unconstitutional have found that the CSRA does not substantially affect interstate commerce as required under the Commerce Clause, that the CSRA upsets the federal-state balance envisioned by the Constitution and incorporated by the Tenth Amendment, and that federal jurisdiction is inappropriate because of the domestic relations exception and abstention doctrines. I shall consider each of these contentions in turn.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Section 8 of Article I of the United States Constitution provides that, “The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Starting with
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
In
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n,
Lopez identified three categories of activity that Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause:
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.
*1097
Lopez,
at-,
Channels of Interstate Commerce
The CSRA can be upheld as constitutional because the regulation of child support payments is, in itself, the regulation of the channels of interstate commerce. “The authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained and is no longer open to question.”
Caminetti v. United States,
Such reasoning would mean that Congress would have no power to prohibit a monopoly so complete as to thwart all other interstate commerce in a line of trade. Yet the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, is within the Commerce Clause power. To accept [the defendant’s] reasoning would disable the United States from punishing under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, making it a crime to “obstruct” interstate commerce, someone who successfully prevented interstate trade by extortion and murder. There would be no trade to obstruct.
Sage,
The court in Parker found that the CSRA did not regulate commerce because the failure to pay child support was not a commercial transaction:
Arm’s-length commercial actors are not involved in any way. The marketplace for goods and services and prices of commodities are not affected at all. There are no affiliates or cohorts that comprise part of a greater economic network or enterprise. ... The activity as issue, therefore, has simply nothing to do with commerce in the context of the limited power given to the federal, government and withheld from the states in the Commerce Clause.
Parker,
911 F.Siipp. at 835. However, Supreme Court precedent does not support the proposition that the Commerce Clause can only implicate voluntary, “arms’, length” transactions.
United States v. Bishop,
The CSRA essentially penalizes the failure to pay an interstate debt. The First Circuit has held that, “debt collecting ... involves interstate commerce directly....”
National Revenue Corp. v. Violet,
Substantial Effect on Interstate Commerce
Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause to pass the CSRA may also be upheld under Lopez’s third category, as an activity substantially affecting interstate commerce.
Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalidated in
Lopez,
the CSRA includes a specific jurisdictional element. A defendant is criminally liable for failure to pay overdue child support only for a child who resides in a different state. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a). Post-Lopez courts have considered the presence of a jurisdictional element to be very important to a Commerce Clause analysis. For example, the First Circuit upheld the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting possession of a firearm with obliterated serial numbers, relying on the. statute’s specific requirement that the firearm’ have been transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
United States v. Diaz-Martinez,
While the mere presence of a jurisdictional element does not render the statute
per se
constitutional, the jurisdictional element in the CSRA meaningfully demonstrates the regulated activity’s nexus with interstate commerce.
Bishop,
The
Lopez
Court points out that Congress made no express findings regarding the effects of gun possession in school zones on interstate commerce when passing the Gun-Free School Zone Act. -U.S. at-,
Congress made specific factual findings in the legislative history of the CSRA which demonstrate the statute’s nexus with interstate commerce. According to the House Report on the CSRA, 32% of families with an absent father live below the official poverty line. H.R.Rep. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Congress determined that every year more than $5 billion in child support goes unpaid, at least 40% of which is owed by parents living in different states from their children. 138 Cong.Rec. H7325 (statement of Rep. Schumer); 140 Cong.Rec. S9430 (statement of Sen. Kohl)., Despite the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, which was intended to facilitate interstate enforcement of child support orders, one Congressperson cited a study finding that only 41% of state courts actually enforce other states’ support orders. 138 Cong.Rec. H7326 (statement of Rep. Hyde). Another Representative stated that, “the ability of *1099 those States to enforce such laws outside their own boundaries is hobbled by a labyrinth of extradition laws and snarls of red tape.” 138 Cong.Rec. H7325 (statement of Rep. Schumer). The House Report on the CSRA stated that:
approximately one-third of child support cases concern children whose fathers live in a different state and, thus, require interstate collection. According to that [GAO] report, fifty-seven percent of the custodial parents in interstate cases reported receiving child support payments only occasionally, seldom, or never. Although there are many reasons for which a parent may fail to make a child support payment, research in this area reveals that a significant number of the parents who fail to pay do so intentionally. The statistics above suggest that their ehances for successfully avoiding such payments increase markedly when they cross state lines.
H.R.Rep. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Congress also connected the nonpayment of child support to the accompanying need for federal public assistance, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Medicaid. 138 Cong.Rec. H7325 (statement of Rep. Schumer). Thus, in numerous ways, the CSRA’s legislative history demonstrates that the failure to pay interstate child support orders is an activity that Congress can regulate within its Commerce Clause authority. The Commerce Clause was intended to allow Congress to regulate interaction between different states and their citizens, which otherwise might lead to disputes over which state’s law governs.
See, e.g., New York v. United States,
In
Lopez,
the government relied upon attenuated arguments to connect gun possession in school zones with interstate commerce. First, the government argued that gun possession can result in violent, crime, and violent crime is costly to victims and, through insurance, to all citizens.
Lopez,
— U.S. at-,
In contrast, the CSRA’s connection to interstate
commerce
is far more direct. As discussed above, the failure to pay child support is itself an interstate economic activity, involving an obligation to transfer money from a person in one state to a person in a different state. “The non-custodial parent reaps an economic gain each time a support payment is withheld, while the offspring suffers an economic loss.”
Sage,
While the
Lopez
court viewed
Wickard v. Filbum,
Unlike the law struck down in Lopez, the CSRA contains a jurisdiction requirement, has legislative history explaining its connection to interstate commerce, and relies on a direct causal connection between the activity regulated and its substantial effects on interstate commerce. For these reasons, I find that the activity regulated in the CSRA, failure to pay an interstate child support obligation, substantially affects interstate commerce.
THE TENTH AMENDMENT
The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Traditionally, courts have taken one of two approaches in evaluating whether Congressional action impermissibly invades state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. The first approach provides that rights under the Tenth Amendment are coextensive with limits to Congress’ authority under its enumerated powers.
See United States v. Lerebours,
In
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans. Auth.,
the Court appeared to adopt the first approach to the Tenth Amendment’s limitation on Congressional action, defining state sovereignty as only that authority beyond Congress’ enumerated power.
Garcia,
however, was not the Supreme Court’s last word on the Tenth Amendment. In 1992, the Court invalidated a federal statute which gave states a choice between enacting certain regulations or assuming ownership of radioactive waste.
New York v. United States,
The Tenth Amendment ... restrains the power of Congress, but this limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as we have discussed is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
Id.
at 157,
Nonetheless, the Court in New York declined to adopt one approach over another:
In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in this case as one ascertaining the limits of power delegated to the Federal Government under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either way, we must determine whether any of the three challenged provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 oversteps the boundary between federal and state authority.
Id.
at 159,
The
New York
Court’s decision, read in full, reconciles the two different approaches because it requires that courts not only determine if the Constitution confers on Congress the raw power to regulate a certain activity, but also requires courts to evaluate whether Congress’ chosen method of regulation impermissibly invades state sovereignty. In
New York,
the Court stated that Congress undoubtedly had the raw power to regulate disposal of low level nuclear waste. “Regulation of the ... interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause.”
Id.
at 160,
Thus, the
New York
Court requires that, in evaluating Tenth Amendment limits on Congressional legislation, courts examine the method by which Congress chooses to regulate a particular activity in addition to whether Congress has the raw power to regulate the activity. The method of regulation required by the New York Court is analogous to the often-neglected second prong of the Commerce Clause analytical framework, the determination as to whether the specific regulation is reasonably adapted to the goals permitted by the Constitution.
Hodel,
In sum, a proper analysis of the Tenth Amendment’s limits on Congressional power requires courts to examine not only whether Congress has the raw power to regulate, but also whether Congress’ chosen method of regulation interferes with state sovereignty. See
also ACORN v. Edwards,
Federal Relitigation of Issues Decided by State Courts
The defendant argues that the method of regulation embodied in the CSRA, by allowing review of state court orders, upsets the federal-state balance set forth in the Constitution. Several district courts which have found the CSRA unconstitutional have based their decision, in part, upon the necessity for federal courts to review state court child support orders. The court in Schroeder stated,
[A]ctual application of the CSRA would force federal courts to review and apply *1102 orders of state courts in violation of principles of federalism and comity. A defendant being prosecuted under the CSRA could arguably defend the action by challenging the validity of the underlying state court support order. Either the federal court would be forced to review the support order, or stay the pending federal criminal case while the support order is collaterally attacked in state court. Neither of these scenarios is desirable in light of the principles of comity and the speedy trial provisions federal courts are bound by in criminal matters.
Schroeder,
In the present case, the defendant claims that he received no notice of the state court proceedings which resulted in the child support order. The defendant alleges that he is not the biological father of the child awarded support. He also was not present when the court decided the amount of child support that he would be able to pay. Therefore, the defendant has put directly at issue the validity of the underlying state court support order. I must first determine whether the statutory language of the CSRA actually permits the relitigation of issues decided by the state court.
Statutory Construction
The government argues that the Court may not look beyond the “four corners” of the state child support order and that the defendant may not collaterally challenge the merits of that order. The CSRA criminalizes the failure to pay a child support obligation, as determined by an administrative or court order. A cursory reading of 18 U.S.C. § 228 leaves unclear whether a defendant can be convicted for failure to pay
any
child support order or whether the order must be valid and meritorious. When a statute is facially ambiguous, its intended meaning can often be best discerned from its legislative history.
United States ex rel. S. Prawer & Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine,
The operative language establishing the requisite intent under [the CSRA] is “willfully fails to pay.” This language has been borrowed from the tax statutes that make willful failure to collect or pay taxes a Federal crime, 26 U.S.C. §§ 7202, 7203. Thus, the willful failure standard of [the CSRA] should be interpreted in the same manner that Federal courts have interpreted these felony tax provisions. In order to establish willfulness under those provisions, the government must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at the time payment was due the taxpayer possessed sufficient funds to enable him to meet his obligation or that the lack of sufficient funds on such date was created by (or was the result of) a voluntary and intentional act without justification in view of all of the financial circumstances of the taxpayer. U.S. v. Poll,521 F.2d 329 , 333 (9th Cir.1975). The willfulness element in the tax felony statutes requires proof of an intentional violation of a known legal duty, and thus describes a specific intent crime. U.S. v. Birkenstock,823 F.2d 1026 , 1028 (7th Cir.1987). The word “willfully” under the tax felony statutes imports a bad purpose or evil motive. U.S. v. Bishop, 412 *1103 U.S. 346, 361,93 S.Ct. 2008 , 2017,36 L.Ed.2d 941 (1973). The Committee intends that the willful failure standard of [the CSRA] be given similar effect as the willful failure standard contained in these tax felony provisions.
H.R.Rep. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); see also 138 Cong.Ree. S17131. Thus, Congress clearly intended that defendants be allowed to offer inability to pay and lack of notice of legal duty as defenses to a CSRA prosecution, even though those issues would presumably have been resolved in state court proceedings.
Another basis for admissibility of evidence relating to the merits of the original support order can be found in the statute’s definition that a past due support obligation must have been “determined under a court order or an order of an administrative process
pursuant to the law of a
State-” 18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(1)(A). Although courts have not interpreted this phrase of the CSRA, the Supreme Court has discussed analogous language. In considering whether a defendant charged with reentry after deportation could challenge the merits of the underlying deportation proceedings, the Supreme Court distinguished the current reentry statute from the prior, superseded criminal statute based solely on their statutory language.
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez,
Congress thus had available to it in at least one of the predecessor sections— § 180(a) — express language that would have permitted collateral challenges to the validity of deportation proceedings in a criminal prosecution for reentry after deportation. It nonetheless failed to include in § 1326- the “in pursuance of law” language of § 180(a).
Id. The prior reentry after deportation language, “in pursuance of law,” is almost identical to the CSRA’s “pursuant to the law of a State.” Both clauses clearly imply that the underlying proceeding must have been lawful in order for federal criminal sanctions to attach.
If the CSRA did not permit any review of state court support orders, convictions under the CSRA might violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court found that imposing criminal sanctions for reentry after deportation violated the Due Process Clause where direct judicial review of original deportation was, in effect, denied.
Id.
at 837,
State Sovereignty
Since the CSRA must be construed to encompass relitigation of issues that may have been decided by the state court, I must now determine whether such
*1104
relitigation violates the notion of a federal-state balance, as conceived under the Constitution. In considering the connection between the state court custody decree and criminal prosecution under the CSRA, we must first look to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Under the full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts must give state court judgments the collateral estoppel effect that another court of that state would give.
Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank,
The dual sovereignty doctrine permits successive state and federal prosecutions for the same act, because each sovereign has a strong interest in prosecuting its own offenses without interference.
Heath v. Alabama,
The Armed Career Criminal Act, which significantly enhances sentences for firearm possession based on prior convictions, is one of the most common situations in which federal courts in criminal proceedings consider state court judgments. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The Supreme Court has held that defendants may collaterally challenge their previous state court convictions only on the basis that they were denied their right to counsel under
Gideon v. Wainwright,
Nonetheless, federal prosecution under the CSRA does not undermine the state court’s child support order. The federal court’s decision concerns only the defendant’s criminal
*1105
liability, not the continued applicability of the state court’s support order. This situation is completely different from a federal court enjoining a state court action.
See Parsons Steel,
A similar question was presented to the Ninth Circuit in
Sharifzadeh v. INS,
Congress is not forging new ground by requiring litigation of an underlying state law issue in a CSRA prosecution. Since 1934, it has been a federal crime to cross state lines to avoid prosecution of a state felony. 18 U.S.C. § 1073. As part of a federal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1073, the defendant’s violation of state criminal law must be proven:
Before a conviction could be had under the [federal] statute, the burden would rest on the United States to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed in some one of the states or territories the offense denounced in the statute, and that he was subject to prosecution in the state where the offense was committed and had fled therefrom to avoid prosecution.
United States v. Miller,
According to its legislative history, the CSRA’s goal “is to strengthen, not to supplant, State enforcement efforts.” 138 Cong. Rec. H7326 (statement of Rep. Hyde). The CSRA is intended to protect state court judgments. Because of cumbersome bureaucracies, states often fail to enforce other states’ child support orders. Congress decided to add a criminal penalty to discourage parents from taking advantage of this lack of enforcement of other states’ orders. The litigation of the defendant’s ability to pay and knowledge of his legal duty are intended only to insure that criminal penalties do not attach for actions which were not “willful.” If a federal prosecution of an act already subject to state prosecution is allowed, surely the lesser invasion of federal relitigation, only for federal purposes, of some issues *1106 decided by a state court in a civil case must also be permitted.
I find that relitigation in a CSRA prosecution of issues decided by the state court does not invade state sovereignty under the Constitution, as formalized by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the CSRA is reasonably adapted to the goals permitted by the Constitution, and its enactment was within the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION
One traditional area of state judicial sovereignty is in the issuance of divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
Some courts have found that the CSRA runs afoul of the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction.
Bailey,
Second, cases under the CSRA do not involve the issuance of a divorce, alimony, or child custody decree. The mere fact that the present case is related to a child support award is not sufficient to warrant the use of the domestic relations exception. Courts have found the domestic relations exception inapplicable in a suit for fraudulent concealment of marital assets during a state divorce proceeding;
Strasen v. Strasen,
Arguably, this Court should decline jurisdiction over this case and allow the Florida court to decide the defendant’s Motion to Vacate its Judgement before proceeding with this federal prosecution. The defendant has previously made a motion to stay these proceedings until the state court has resolved his pending motion. However, “[a]bstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,
Burford
abstention was named for
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.,
where the Supreme Court declined federal jurisdiction in a suit to enjoin the decision of a state railroad commission, an agency in a complex- state regulatory system devised for the conservation of oil and gas in the state.
*1107 Where timely and adequate state-court review is available, a federal court [should abstain]: (1) when there are “difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends the result in the ease then at bar;” or (2) where the “exercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern.”
New Orleans Public Service Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
Although the general rule is that a pending state action does not bar a federal court from considering the same matter, under
Colorado River Water Conser. Dist. v. United States,
federal courts may abstain because of pending state suits in exceptional circumstances when necessary for “wise judicial administration.”
In
Younger v. Harris,
the Supreme Court held that our country’s system of federalism prohibits federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions.
The final type of abstention that arguably could be applicable in this ease stems from the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. Under the
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, federal district courts cannot entertain challenges to state court orders, even when those orders violate federal law.
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
Moreover, the applicability of all of these types of abstention to federal criminal prosecutions is unclear. Very few courts have used abstention doctrines in criminal cases. Although the parties have agreed that the Speedy Trial Act is not applicable to the present case, I would certainly have concerns about undue delay incumbent in waiting for the resolution, and perhaps appellate review, of the state court case. Even if the state court decided the defendant’s legal duty to pay support and his financial condition, these issues will not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the legislative history of the CSRA. H.R.Rep. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Thus, staying this prosecution to wait for the state court’s decision about whether to vacate its original judgment will not even prevent relitigation of these issues. In reviewing a lower court’s decision to refer primary jurisdiction to a federal agency, the Ninth Circuit stated, “Our concern with the district court’s stay and referral is heightened by the fact that this action is a criminal prosecution_ Requiring the government to litigate issues central to a criminal prosecution in collateral agency proceedings is at odds with the general rule of prosecutorial discretion over the bringing of criminal indictments.”
United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, I find that the CSRA does not exceed Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause and that the CSRA does not encroach on state sovereignty, as embodied in the Tenth Amendment. Furthermore, federal jurisdiction over this case is proper, as neither the domestic relations exception nor the abstention doctrines are applicable. The defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment is therefore denied.
SO ORDERED.
