United States v. Leon Donald Farlee

of pronouncement initial court’s district America, STATES of UNITED simply a mis- range sentencing Plaintiff-Appellee pro- the oral at Looking statement. as hearing record nouncement, record, however, it whole, the written FARLEE, Defendant- Leon Donald district us whether unclear to remains Appellant. error. Under procedural court committed the best circumstances, conclude such 13-2315. No. district allow is to course action Appeals, States Court United inten- clarify its the opportunity court Eighth Circuit. tions. 13, 2014. March that the sentence Submitted:

Thomas also substantively unreasonable. imposed was July 2014. Filed: Thomas waived asserts government because, by stipulat- appeal this claim on imprisonment his sentence

ing that months, “explicitly at least

would be spe- to a himself voluntarily expose[d] “may not chal- sentence,” that he

cific appeal.”

lenge punishment that (8th. Cook,

Cir.2006) Nguyen, (citing United Cir.1995)). Because we do not grounds, other

we remand on waiv- government’s or the

reach this issue argument.

er Conclusion

III. district remand

Accordingly, we consistent proceedings for additional may The district court opinion.

with this at a sentence and arrive hearing

grant different, but is the same im- previously than the sentence

greater,

posed. Pechota,

Terry L. argued, Rapid City, SD, Appellant. for window, the back Eaton near AUSA, assaulted Hanson, argued, Gene

Mikal boots, his head with and SD, him in the Pierre, Appellee. kicking including lac- injury, caused severe SHEPHERD, COLLOTON, and Before arm, right and forearm on his left erations KELLY, Judges. Circuit trauma, on the multiple lacerations facial face, brain and traumatic of his SHEPHERD, Judge. right side Circuit injury. Farlee of Donald Leon juryA convicted weapon in viola- dangerous awith

assault 113(a)(3) and assault § tion of 18 U.S.C. II. injury in viola- bodily resulting in serious 113(a)(6). The district § of 18 U.S.C. tion commit- the trial court Farlee contends im- months to 60 court1 sentenced (1) motion for denying his by: ted error pay him to resti- and ordered prisonment (2) in- inadequately judgment acquittal, $127,716.74. Far- in the amount tution (3) failing suppress jury, structing the committed claiming the court appeals, lee a deficient search evidence seized with requesting the and trial errors numerous continuance, (4) warrant, grant a failing his conviction set aside verdict be (5) and cumulative permitting irrelevant alternative, or, in the reversed the Govern- testimony, permitting remand- and the case vacated be sentence during di- leading questions ment to use affirm. We a new trial. ed for each claim address examination. We rect

I. in turn. light in the most the facts state

“We United jury’s verdict.” to favorable Acquittal Judgment of A. for Motion 318 F.3d 850 Washington, argues Farlee Cir.2003). (8th in a relation- Farlee was judgment for his motion by denying erred night Late on the Leslie Oakie. ship with (1) was insuffi 31, 2012, returned to there couple acquittal because March Cheyenne River on weap trailer dangerous Oakie’s a he used cient evidence of drink- night a Reservation after Sioux he on, the evidence showed was locked, so trailer was to the ing. The door considering In acting in self defense. a window while through climbed Oakie mo of a defendant’s court’s denial district at the front door. She remained Farlee we view judgment acquittal, tion for her friend Merton to find surprised to light most favorable “the evidence previ- Eaton had the trailer. Eaton inside all as established accept the verdict gone car and had Oakie his ously loaned the ver supporting reasonable inferences keys. retrieve his the trailer inside Barrios-Perez, dict.” United States get Eaton leave attempted to Oakie Cir.2003) (internal (8th quo F.3d trailer, but did back of the through the omitted). uphold We will marks tation Farlee, and intoxi- belligerent so. not do “no reasonable convictions unless on cated, through a window punched guilty be found the defendant could have inside, sustain- and let himself front door (quotations Id. doubt.” yond a reasonable arm, causing signifi- ing deep cut omitted). trailer, bleeding. cant Inside Lange, Dakota. United Roberto 1. The Honorable Judge the District of South for States District Dangerous i. Use of a Weapon ii. Self Defense Farlee contends there was insufficient Next, because the prove evidence to the boots he was wear evidence supported an absolute defense— ing dangerous constituted a weapon be self defense—the court erred in not grant “ old, they “floppy, cause were and could not ing his motion acquittal. person ‘If a any injuries have caused of the that Eaton reasonably believes that force necessary claims, suffered.” He also due to lack of protect himself person or another from boots, blood on the there was insufficient what he reasonably believes to be unlawful indicating the boots had been in physical harm about to be inflicted an contact with Eaton. To obtain a conviction force, other and uses such then he acted 113(a)(3), § under 18 U.S.C. the Govern self defense or defense of another per ” ment must prove the defendant used a Milk, son.’ United States v. dangerous weapon, object “an capable of (8th Cir.2006) (quoting district court inflicting bodily injury,” during the course jury instructions); see also United States Steele, of the assault. United States v. 550 v. Tunley, (8th 1262 n. 3 (8th Cir.2008); United States Cir.2012) that, (noting because self-defense (8th v. LeCompte, 108 F.3d 952-53 is not statute, codified federal courts Cir.1997). object an Whether “constitutes generally rely on the common-law defini a dangerous weapon in a particular case is defense). tion of self “Although a federal a question of fact for jury.” defendant bears the production burden of Phelps, self-defense, the issue of once that bur upheld We have convictions for met, den is government prove must assault dangerous with a weapon involving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen kicking feet, a victim with shod including dant did Milk, not act in self-defense.” See, Steele, tennis shoes. e.g., 550 F.3d at 447 F.3d at 598. 699. theory Farlee’s trial at was Eaton jury eyewitness heard testimo trailer, was waiting'in Oakie’s and when ny from Oakie that Farlee kicked Eaton in Farlee came Eaton attacked him. inside the head repeatedly wearing while his Thus, Farlee acted in self defense. How boots. treating Emergency Eaton’s Room ever, record, having reviewed the we find physician testified that Eaton’s head was the Government presented substantial evi swollen and cut and had sustained “many dence negating this self-defense argument, Moreover, blunt-force impacts.” Farlee’s and the jury reasonably could credit have assertion on appeal that the boots did not ed this jury evidence. The has the ulti have Eaton’s blood on contrary them is to mate determining task of the facts and the presented from the Govern assessing the credibility of the witnesses. expert trial, ment’s DNA at which sup United States v. Gaona-Lopez, 408 F.3d ported finding the that Eaton’s blood was 505-06 Oakie testified found on the toe area of both of Farlee’s Farlee was drunk acting and had been in a Thus, boots. the evidence was sufficient jealous night. manner that She also testi jury for a to conclude Farlee used his that, fied once she saw Eaton inside the boots to assault Eaton and his boots were trailer, she did not unlock the front capable causing of door bodily injury. serious Accordingly, agree “thought Farlee because she the [Farlee] with district going court that the evidence was to supported come and beat up.” [Eaton] Farlee’s that, conviction for assault with a dangerous She then testified after Farlee broke weapon. the window to the front door and let him- § re- Act, 18 U.S.C. Crimes was similative Eaton and inside, at yelled he

self state court borrow of blood that the federal quires The location upset. angry and alleged- testimo- supports Oakie’s where crimes jury trailer instructions law inside the occurred near encounter as Indian that the such ny federal enclaves ly occur on than near States, rather the trailer back of Lewis United See reservations. entered, Farlee through which front door 1135, 140 523 U.S. that Farlee’s assertion contrary to (1998). However, unnec- isit L.Ed.2d Far- Finally, him as he entered. attacked a de- whether to determine essary for us physician Room Emergency treating lee’s is authorized instruction property of fense “ap- belligerent and Farlee testified not warrant- is an instruction such because Although quite intoxicated.” be peared to evidence. by ed evidence, including his presented Farlee property of defense Dakota’s South self-de- support of his testimony, in own force or to use any person allows statute reasonably have could theory, jury fense against another violence testimony and concluded Farlee’s rejected doubt, reasonably based believes on person reasonable beyond a when de- evidence, act in he did not self necessary pre to other conduct fense. person’s the other or terminate vent interfer on or other criminal trespass Jury Instructions

B. personal property real ence with court the trial contends next Farlee posses lawfully in his or her property to its instructions discretion in abused its who of another possession or in the sion (1) de- to instruct on failing jury immediate his or her member of is a (2) failing to instruct of property, fense a person or of or household family of assault offense the lesser-included legal or she has property whose wounding, beating, striking, protect. right of self the law erroneously instructing on § 22-18-4. S.D. Codified Laws defense. trailer when altercation Oakie’s was in Farlee’s was not in The trailer occurred. Jury Instruction Property of Defense i. and Farlee Oakie nor were possession, argues the district his justify family or household the same give proposed failing erred Therefore, because property. defense “We property. on defense instructions support this case do facts court’s refusal a district generally review under instruction property of defense for instruction requested a provide to law, court did the district Dakota South discretion.” abuse of refusing give to its discretion not abuse Cir.2001). (8th 942, Davis, F.3d 945 237 the instruction. instruction an party is entitled to “[A] legally it is long as of the case so theory its Offense Instruction ii. Lesser-included to is factual evidence there correct and next Farlee Bank v. First State Thornton support it.” failing instruct to its discretion abused (8th Cir.1993); 650, 4 652 Joplin, F.3d of of offense jury on the lesser-included 886, F.3d 540 Boesing Spiess, see also wounding. beating, and by striking, assault (8th instruction The 890 that, because the He contends Dakota from South was derived requested inju- regarding Eaton’s at trial presented circumstances, per which, law, in certain inju- a to believe jury lead ries could to or violence to use force persons mits falling and strik- from As- ries occurred contends property. Farlee protect floor, on the rather than from ing aggressor his head and that the need not be armed boots, jury Farlee’s fists and could for the defendant to assert self defense as guilty have found Farlee of the lesser of- an affirmative defense. The district court fense. gave the Eighth Circuit Jury Model In- struction on the issue of self defense: beyond dispute that a

“[I]t is not to a defendant entitled lesser-inelud If person reasonably believes that ed offense instruction unless the evidence necessary force is protect to himself at the trial provides adduced a rational person another from what he reasonably upon jury basis which the find him could believes to be physical unlawful harm not guilty greater guilty of the but of the by about to be inflicted another and uses lesser offense.” Eagle United States v. force, then he acted in self defense (8th Elk, Cir.1981); 658 F.2d see However, or defense of another. self de- States, also Keeble v. U.S. using fense which involves likely force to (1973). 36 L.Ed.2d 844 great bodily cause death or jus- harm is circuit, In our striking, beating, assault only tified if the person reasonably be- wounding is a lesser included offense lieves that such necessary force is resulting of assault bodily inju serious protect person himself or a third from ry. Young, See United States v. what reasonably believes to abe sub- (8th Cir.1989). 1357, 1359 stantial great bodily risk death or distinguishing factor between harm. degree injury the two offenses is the Specifically, and in part, relevant resulting from the assault. Assault result requested that the self-defense instruction ing bodily injury in serious requires, as an also include the following: offense, element of the bodily serious However, injury Although result. assault strik asserting defendant self de- ing, beating, wounding requires no fense required is not to retreat before “particular degree severity inju in the force, resorting to the availability of re- ry.” Knife, United States v. may treat be a jury factor (8th Cir.1979). Farlee admitted there in evaluating consider whether the force an presented assault and no evidence used was reasonable. An aggressor disputing the Government’s evidence of need not have been armed in order for Eaton’s resulting injury. serious Because the defendant to raise self defense. proof of the element differentiating the A right defendant has the to have two crimes was not in dispute, jury theory instructed on his of the rationally could not have convicted Farlee case when support there is evidence to it lesser, offense, on the greater, but not the proper request and a is made. See United thus, the trial court did not abuse its dis Manning, 47-48 cretion in refusing give the instruction. Cir.1980). However, “a defendant is not Felix, See United States v. entitled to a particularly worded instruc (8th Cir.1993). given tion where the instructions by the iii. Self-Defense Instruction judge adequately trial correctly and cover requested the substance the instruc Farlee asserts the district court’s final (citations omitted). tion.” at Id. 48 A in jury error its instructions was its refusal proper request timely, is one which give proposed his is is instruction on self defense, evidence, supported by which the included instructions that and sets forth a required the defendant is not to retreat correct statement of the law. United 818 (8th argu- or was no evidence Because there Brake, F.2d 339 596 v.

States requested additional regarding ment the instruction, the instruction would giving in the district find no error We impact on 'the had a substantial not have jury on the issue court’s instruction v. States jury’s verdict. See United is entitled to stand “One self defense. (8th Cir.1987). 1183, 1188 Krapp, 815 F.2d as rea [is] such force and use ground Instead, given instructions the self-defense circumstances under the sonably necessary jury on the to advise the were sufficient himself from protect his life or to save Walker, F.2d of self-defense. See law harm,” reasonably be if he bodily serious at 463. imminent, is danger lieves (8th Deon, v. Suppress C. Motion (internal Cir.1981) (alteration original) omitted), using force and marks quotation contends the district Farlee next bodily harm great or likely to cause death denying suppress his motion to erred justified per if the person is to the other pursu- taken sample a his boots and saliva reasonably be defense acting son self warrants. The Gov- ant to invalid search necessary to protect lieves that force sample to Farlee’s saliva ernment used harm, bodily great or himself from death to blood found at match his DNA Walker, and on his boots. Government trailer Cir.1987) in (holding a self-defense purpose for the demon- used his boots language adequately using this struction of Eaton’s strating that there was some law). principle This was ade stated The district court present blood on them. given in instructions forth quately set that, supporting the affidavits held while jury could have court. The were insufficient to establish the warrants determined, given instruc according to the cause, the evidence could be ad- probable tions, were reason that Farlee’s actions good excep- the Leon faith mitted under if the found justified and able requirement. tion to the warrant by Eaton and being attacked Farlee was exception faith does argues good the Leon that he reasonably believed that Farlee (1) the Government did apply not because great risk of death faced a substantial objective reasonableness not establish the However, jury was also bodily harm. faith reliance on the good of the officers’ credit Farlee’s evi to decline to permitted warrants, lay magistrate search respect to self defense. dence with judicial signing her role abandoned in- Moreover, requested the additional warrants.2 relevant to particularly not struction was a district court’s de We review a it constitute substan- the issues nor did ap probable termination of cause and un- It is tial of Farlee’s defense. portion faith good exception of the Leon plication a court to instruct necessary for a trial Perry, de novo. United States every nuanced area of the defense jury on (8th Cir.2008). Generally, a war do not arguments the evidence and when by a cause affida- supported probable rant jury. See id. bring those issues before brief, arguments asserted for person address issues and reply not 2. In his brief,” signing reply not a neutral Giovev. Stan the warrants was the first time in lay person acting (8th Cir.1995), magistrate, ko, detached but n. 4 and, thus, did magistrate, the warrants as a depart from the reason here to and see no of Criminal comply with Federal Rule general rule. However, generally do "we Procedure 41.

819 However, for a search. required vit Without when assessing the officer’s warrant, recognized exception valid or a good faith reliance on a search warrant requirement, the warrant a search violates under the Leon good exception, faith we Amendment, the Fourth Missouri v. can look outside of the four corners of the — -, 1552, McNeely, U.S. 133 S.Ct. affidavit and consider the totality of the 1558, (2013), 185 L.Ed.2d 696 and the evi circumstances, including what the officer pursuant dence seized the search should knew but did not include the affidavit. trial, be excluded from a United States v. Martin, 752, United States v. 756 Calandra, 338, 347, 613, 414 U.S. 94 S.Ct. (8th Cir.1987) (citing Creigh- Anderson v. (1974). Leon, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 In the Su ton, 635, 641, 483 3034, U.S. 107 S.Ct. 97 preme recognized exclusionary Court “the (1987)). L.Ed.2d 523 designed police rule is to deter misconduct Even if the affidavits do not set punish rather than to judges errors of probable cause, forth good find the Leon, magistrates.” United States v. faith exception to the requirement warrant 897, 916, 3405, 468 U.S. 104 S.Ct. would apply based on a (1984). totality of the Accordingly, L.Ed.2d 677 under circumstances. Although Larry Detective good exception, the Leon faith even if the provided LeBeau supporting affidavit does not set forth prob sufficient affidavits cause, able evidence obtained for the pursuant to search warrants rather than the subsequently search warrant invalidat investigator lead Leaf, Detective Russell “(1) ed will not be excluded if: the execut fully Detective Leaf briefed Detective Le- ing officers in good relied faith on a search Beau on the details of the investigation. signed by warrant a neutral and detached point, At that according to Leafs testimo magistrate, and the officers’ reliance on ny suppression at the hearing, he had al objectively warrant was reasonable.” ready spoken with Oakie and had deter Jackson, 1359, United States v. mined that suspect. Farlee was a He had (8th Cir.1995) Leon, (citing 468 U.S. also been to the trailer and seen what he 3405). 922-23, 104 at S.Ct. believed to be blood outside on the door. circumstances, Based on the totality of the

Farlee first the Gov we conclude that the officers possessed ernment did not establish the officers act good ed in giving faith reliance on information the search them reason to believe warrants because the good affidavits were fa faith that the search warrants cially may rely deficient. An officer were valid. entirely magistrate’s on the finding of lay Farlee next contends the mag probable application cause when the signing istrate the warrants abandoned the warrant probable so lacks cause that judicial her good role. The Leon faith the officer cannot have a reasonable belief exception apply will not to admit evidence in its Malley existence. v. Briggs, 475 if magistrate who issued warrants 335, 344-45, U.S. abandoned his or her neutral and detached (1986). L.Ed.2d 271 When a magistrate Leon, issuing role in it. 468 U.S. at affidavit solely relies on an to issue the “ may 104 S.Ct. 3405. A warrant be issued

warrant, ‘only that information which is only by an official is “neutral who found within the four corners of the affida detached” and “capable determining may vit in determining be considered ” probable whether cause exists for the re probable existence of cause.’ United (8th quested arrest or search.” Shadwick Etheridge, 165 F.3d Cir.1999) City (quoting Tampa, 407 U.S. Glad S.Ct. (8th Cir.1995)). (1972). ney, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 Other than a trailer and entry door of the damage in to the that the “deficiencies allegation broad inside, laying on any argument including that here belie the scene the affidavit excep good faith eyewit- the jury it could be saved Oakie’s The heard the floor. 36, points Farlee Br. tion,” Appellant’s way his Farlee forced testimony that ness that demonstrates in record nothing the Eaton, kick- trailer and attacked into the neutral and her magistrate abandoned the The his boots. him in the head with ing facts that allege does he role nor detached treating physician testimony of Eaton’s person to believe lead a reasonable would Ea- severity of of the provided evidence issuing the in was abandoned her role swelling injuries, including extreme ton’s reviewed Having independently warrants. head, by multiple caused blunt-force of his record, that Farlee’s we determine the presented also The Government impacts. than a nothing more amounts to claim behaving in a testimony that Farlee was and is conclusory allegation vague and night and that was jealous manner that States v. Ma merit. See United without “belligerent” when intoxicated” and “quite 541, thison, after the emergency room at the treated good Finally, even if the Leon circumstances, the these attack. Under and thus apply, does not exception faith evidence cumulative of other evidence was allowing court erred was not jury, and the verdict before evidence, into sample and saliva boots Thus, disputed evidence. affected For a federal consti harmless. error was doubt beyond a reasonable we conclude harmless, error to “be held tutional a guilty have returned jury that the would must be able to declare belief admission into evidence without the verdict beyond a reasonable harmless it was sample. See Unit- of the boots and saliva California, 386 U.S. Chapman doubt.” Noske, 1053, 1058 ed States v. 23-24, 17 L.Ed.2d 87 S.Ct. (8th Cir.1997) (“Even if the search violated ask, (1967). respect to this issue we With Fourth Amendment defendant’s] [the unconstitutionally evi admitted absent was ... of the rights [evidence] admission dence, beyond a reasonable “is it clear doubt.”). beyond a reasonable harmless jury would have returned doubt that the v. Has guilty?” reasons, verdict there was no these we find For 510-11, 103 S.Ct. ting, 461 U.S. in the district court allow- error reversible (1983); Burger also L.Ed.2d 96 see admit- and saliva to be ing Farlee’s boots 782 n. Kemp, 483 U.S. into evidence. ted (assuming that 97 L.Ed.2d 638 to the was charge the trial court’s D. Continuance unconstitutional, any was harmless error its argues next the court abused because the beyond a reasonable doubt a continu- refusing grant discretion dispositive” was “so presented unavailability of one ance based on rely jury would not have had that the Far- At conclusion of his witnesses. given). unconstitutional instruction any case, attorney informed the court lee’s beyond a here was harmless Any error that one of the defense witnesses light of the over doubt reasonable moved for a continuance. present and presented by the Gov whelming evidence testify about “his witness was to absent ernment, of the boots and sa independent Eaton for assaultive be- opinion of Merton Bud liva, jury’s verdict. supporting court denied Trial Tr. 640. The havior.” uncle who made Eagle, Lone Oakie’s the denial Farlee’s motion. what he police, call to the testified to initial the court’s discretion be- attack, was an abuse of including the night saw the of the testimony every incident, cause the was material and fa- almost day before the defendant, give vorable to the and it would “plumb Eaton was fine.” Trial Tr. 465. significant weight argu- to his self-defense She also testified there physical were and ment. changes behavioral in Eaton after the inci- dent compared as to before. Farlee ar- In determining grant whether to a gues irrelevant, this evidence was and thus continuance, judge the trial must balance should not have been admitted under Fed- the asserted need for the continuance eral Rule of Evidence 402. argues He against the hardship resulting delay, of the that, relevant, further even if it was the complexity and should also consider the of testimony should not have been admitted case, diligence the the of party the re under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 be- continuance, questing and the conduct of cause it was cumulative and prejudicial. opposing party. the v. United States Co 1284, ronel-Quintana, 752 F.2d 1287-88 “The trial court has broad discretion in (8th Little, Cir.1985); v. 567 determining relevancy the and admissibili (8th Cir.1977). 348-49 Because ty Jiminez, of evidence.” United States v. balancing requires familiarity this with the 1140, 1145(8th (internal Cir.2007) 487 F.3d parties particular and circumstances of the omitted). quotation marks Only relevant case, the trial court retains broad discre evidence is admissible a trial. Fed. grant tion to a continuance. Morris R.Evid. 402. Relevant evidence is evi 1, 11, Slappy, 461 U.S. 75 dence having any tendency to make the (1983). only L.Ed.2d 610 We review for any existence of fact that is of consequence discretion, abuse of that United States v. to the determination of the action more (8th Reeves, Cir.1984), 730 F.2d probable probable or less than it would be only and will reverse if “the moving party without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. prejudiced by denial,” was “The quite threshold for relevance is mini Hyles, Holmes, mal.” United Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omit (8th Cir.2005) (internal quotation ted). omitted). marks Under Rule relevant While district court observed may probative be excluded “if its that the testimony likely witness’s ad substantially value is outweighed by a dan missible, Farlee had ten prepare months to ger prejudice, of ... unfair confusing the for the trial and to locate character wit issues, misleading jury, delay, undue nesses. Given the broad discretion afford time, wasting needlessly presenting cu ruling ed district courts when on requests mulative evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 403. We continuances, for and because the testimo only if reverse there is an abuse of the ny regarding the victim’s character was trial court’s discretion. United States v. unlikely weight to overcome the and sub Nelson, (8th Cir.1993). evidence, stance of the Government’s district court did not abuse hold district court did not its abuse admitting its discretion in this evidence. denying discretion in the continuance mo testimony helped Serr’s the Government tion. bodily establish Eaton suffered serious E. Testimony of Danette Serr injury, an element of one of the crimes charged. with which was Farlee would the trial court abused its stipulate bodily not Eaton suffered serious discretion in allowing testimony of Serr, injury, requested Danette long-time girlfriend lesser-included of Eaton’s son. Serr testified she require saw Eaton fense instruction that did not seri- concurring COLLOTON, Judge, Circuit To demonstrate bodily injury.

ous judgment. concurring part injuries, bodily serious sustained in fact in the condition to Eaton’s testified Serr except the court join opinion I in his condition changes and the hospital, in Part harmless error the discussion before. compared to as the assault after that is II.C, a close issue which resolves record, we conclude Having reviewed unnecessary to the decision. abuse its discre- court did testimony was this determining tion in other so cumulative and not

relevant that it ne-

testimony prejudicial or so exclusion.

cessitated Leading Questions

F. WALDOCH, Rodney Plaintiff- district finally argues the Appellant permitting in discretion court abused its leading questions to use the Government of Leslie examination during its direct INC., MEDTRONIC, Defendant- Oakie, for a mistrial. the basis providing Appellee. determining trial court defer to the

We No. 13-2543. necessary, and are leading questions when of discretion. for abuse review Appeals, Court Stelivan, Eighth Circuit. leading questions are While 11, 2014. March Submitted: ex during direct permitted generally amination, Rule of Evidence July Federal 2014. Filed: 611(c) to allow the district court permits July 2014. Corrected: necessary to devel questions when leading case, In this testimony. op to ask lead the Government

court allowed noting was hesitant Oakie

ing questions, delays preceded lengthy

responding and Tr. 557. We are Trial

the answers. abuse its court did not

satisfied the district allowing Government

discretion in this examination. leading questions

use that there was no er

Having determined rulings under

ror in the district court’s reject argument Farlee’s

Rule formed the leading questions

the use of for a mistrial.

basis

III. affirm Farlee’s convic-

Accordingly, we

tion.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Leon Donald Farlee

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 9, 2014

Citation: 757 F.3d 810

Docket Number: 13-2315

Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.