UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plаintiff - Appellee, v. LUIS ALFONSO LEON, Defendant - Appellant.
No. 22-1070
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
September 11, 2023
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:19-CR-00442-CMA-GPG-1)
Bretta Pirie, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Scott Keith Wilson, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Office of the Federal Public Defender, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Defendant-Appellant.
Michael Conrad Johnson, Assistant United States Attorney (Cole Finegan, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge.
Mr. Luis Alfonso Leon was stopped by law enforcement after he was observed illegally driving in а passing lane. During the traffic stop, the officer began to suspect Mr.
Background
On December 28, 2017, Mr. Leon was traveling eastbound on I-70 in Colorado when Colorado State Patrol Trooper Shane Gosnell observed him driving in the left lane while not passing another vehicle in violation of
As he approached the truck, Trooper Gosnell made several observations. First, hе noticed disorganized boxes and clothing in the backseat. Second, he observed food wrappers, a soda bottle, an energy drink can, and religious pamphlets in the front. Based on these conditions, he believed the vehicle had “a lived-in or hard-traveled look.” Supp. Rec., vol. IV at 14. Finally, he saw a single key in the ignition.
Mr. Leon acknowledged the traffic violation, apologized, and explained he was tired. He produced an Arizona driver’s license after Trooper Gosnell asked for his
Trooper Gosnell asked where Mr. Leon was headed that day. Mr. Leon responded that he was going to stop in Denver at the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (“ISKCON”) to pick up religious books and that he might stay for an event if ISKCON was hosting one. Trooper Gosnell then asked if Mr. Leon was from Arizona. Mr. Leon answered affirmatively but told Trooper Gosnell he was transitioning to Minnesota. About a minute later, Trooper Gosnell asked if Mr. Leon was traveling from Phoenix, Arizona. When Mr. Leon responded that he was, Trooper Gosnell asked how long Mr. Leon had been living there. Mr. Leon responded that he received his legal permanent residency in 2014 but had lived there as a young child. Trooper Gosnell then expressed curiosity about Mr. Leon’s ties to Minnesota and asked how he came into possession of the truck. Mr. Leon stated that he went to Minnesota for a woman but had most recently been living with a friend named Marco. He explained that he got a good deal on the truck when purchasing it from Marco’s friend, a coreligionist, and that everything had been transferred over in his name. Upon questioning, Mr. Leon told Trooper Gosnell he had purchased the truck about two weeks prior.
During this interaction, Troopеr Gosnell believed Mr. Leon was “overly cooperative” and “super nervous.” Supp. Rec., vol. IV at 23. He found Mr. Leon’s answers to his questions to be indirect and felt Mr. Leon was attempting to control the conversation.
A combination of these circumstances led Trooper Gosnell to suspect Mr. Leon was involved in drug trafficking and to ask for the mileage on the truck. After running some checks and returning Mr. Leon’s documents, Trooper Gosnell asked for Mr. Leon’s consent to search the vehicle. Mr. Leon refused consent, but Trooper Gosnell decided to conduct a dog sniff of the vehicle’s exterior. The K-9 alerted to the odor of narcotics, and Trooper Gosnell and another officer searched the vehicle. The officers found seventy-six pounds of methamphetamine and placed Mr. Leon under arrest.
Mr. Leon was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of
Mr. Leon was indicted again,1 and his case was assigned to a new district judge. Mr. Leon filed a new motion to suppress evidence discovered and statements made
Mr. Leon pleaded guilty pursuant to a conditional plea agreement, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion. The court found that Mr. Leon was eligible for the safety valve under
Discussion
Mr. Leon argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, accept the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, and review de novo the ultimate question of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.’” United States v. Cortez, 965 F.3d 827, 833 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. McNeal, 862 F.3d 1057, 1061 (10th Cir. 2017)).
The Fourth Amendment establishes a right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
The parties agree that a Rodriguez moment occurred when Trooper Gosnell asked Mr. Leon for the car’s mileage. Our inquiry is therefore whether Trooper Gosnell reasonably suspected Mr. Leon was engaged in criminal activity at the time he asked for the mileage. See United States v. Frazier, 30 F.4th 1165, 1174 (10th Cir. 2022) (“[W]e consider only those facts known to the trooper at the point he diverted from his traffic-based mission . . . .”). “The government bears the burden of satisfying this standard, but it is not an onerous one.” Id.
“In reviewing an investigatory stop for reasonable suspicion, we must сonsider ‘the “totality of the circumstances” of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Under this totality approach, factors consistent with innocent travel may collectively amount to reasonable suspicion. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277–78. “Given the specialized training and experience that law enforcement officers have, we generally defer to their ability to distinguish between innocent and suspicious behavior, but deference becomes inapprоpriate ‘when an officer relies on a circumstance incorrigibly free of associations with criminal activity.’” Frazier, 30 F.4th at 1174 (quoting United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1133 (10th Cir. 2005)). “Moreover, the officer must point to specific, articulable facts. Inchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches do not provide reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
The district court cited numerous factors in concluding that Trooper Gosnell had reasonable suspicion to extend the stop beyond its traffic-based mission:
The potential origin of the trip from Arizona, which is known to be a drug hub; traveling from that destination to Minnesota; vaguе travel plans; unsure how long he was going to be in Denver; vague reasons for even being in Denver; attempting to control the conversation; inconsistent statements regarding where he was currently living; the Arizona driver’s license; the Minnesota registered vehicle; the condition of the interior of the vehicle; and Mr. Leon’s nervousness . . . .
First, the characterization of Arizona and Minnesota as drug hubs or destinations adds nothing to the reasonable suspicion calculus. United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 951–52 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because law enforcement officers have offered countless cities as drug source cities and countless others as distribution cities, . . . the probativeness of a particular defendant’s route is minimal.”); United States v. Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787–88 (10th Cir. 2007) (defendant traveling from drug source area was a factor “so broad as to be indicative of almost nothing”). Moreover, it is not clear that Trooper Gosnell knew or believed Mr. Leon was traveling to Minnesota. In fact, the government argues Mr. Leon did not disclose his final destination and that his failure to do so was suspicious.
Second, the district court placed undue emphasis on Mr. Leon’s travel plans of driving from Phoenix to Denver to pick up books and perhaps stay for an event. While
Moreover, we afford no weight to the condition of the vehicle’s interior, which had food wrappers, soda and energy drink containers, miscellaneous boxes, and clothes.
Next, we have consistently held that ordinary nervousness bears little weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus. Simpson, 609 F.3d at 1147. This is because most motorists experience some degree of nervousness when stopped by police and “unless the police
Trooper Gosnell described Mr. Leon as “super nervous” because he was “overly cooperative,” provided “drawn out or roundabout answers,” and “tried to control . . . the conversation.” Supp. Rec., vol. IV at 23–24. Trooper Gosnell also testified that Mr. Leon’s nervousness did not dissipate after being told he would only get a warning. As an example of Mr. Leon controlling the conversаtion, Trooper Gosnell noted that Mr. Leon brought up the cold Colorado weather and then began talking about something else after Trooper Gosnell responded that it gets colder.
Although the district court considered Mr. Leon’s nervousness, it did not find he was extremely nervous. In any event, we conclude that the evidence does not support that finding. Mr. Leon exhibited no physical manifestations of extreme nervousness. He was cooperative and offered explanations to questions posed by Trooper Gosnell. Trooper Gosnell may have thought Mr. Leon offered an inordinate amount of detail or engaged in
The court noted several factors that Trooper Gosnell found suspicious because they indicated Mr. Leon was not the legitimate owner of the vehicle or had acquired the vehicle only for the purpose of drug trafficking. Specifically, Trooper Gosnell testified the difference between the origin of the vehicle and where Mr. Leon was licensed was suspicious because drug traffickers often use third-party vehicles. In addition, the court referred to the single key in the truck’s ignition, which Trooper Gosnell found suspicious because car owners usually put their car keys on rings with other keys and because a single key opens the door for traffickers to argue they were merely borrowing the vehicle and were unaware it contained drugs. Trooper Gosnell further testified it was suspicious that Mr. Leon kept the vehicle documents in an envelope in his backpack instead of in his glovebox. Relatedly, he found it odd that Mr. Leon gave him the envelope beсause it signified Mr. Leon was not familiar with its contents. Trooper Gosnell also testified that Mr. Leon did not know the name of the person he purchased the truck from. Finally, the
To the extent Trooper Gosnell found these factors suspicious because they suggested Mr. Leon was traveling in a third-party vehicle, we afford them no weight. Prior to the Rodriguez moment, Mr. Leon told Trooper Gоsnell the truck belonged to him, which Trooper Gosnell confirmed by looking at the title transfer. At that point, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that Mr. Leon was not traveling in a third-party vehicle and could not distance himself from the vehicle as a defense.
Although Mr. Leon exhibited some unfamiliarity with the vehicle documents, he did know where they were located and quickly produced the envelope. We must consider this action in context; Trooper Gosnell asked for Mr. Leon’s “license, registration, and stuff.” Dashboard Camera Footagе at 3:17–3:18. Mr. Leon therefore may not have been certain about what documentation he needed to produce. The location of the envelope in Mr. Leon’s backpack and the single key do align with the government’s theory that the truck had been purchased and registered to Mr. Leon for the sole purpose of transporting drugs.6 But they also align with any recent purchase of a car. Documents being stored outside of the glovebox and a single key tell us more about how recently a vehicle was purchased than what purpose the vehiсle was purchased for. And a single key makes even
Trooper Gosnell testified, and the district court reiterated, that Mr. Leon did not know the name of the person he bought the truck from. Having reviewed the dashboard footage, we conclude this is an unfair characterization of the interaction. After Mr. Leon explained he got the truck from Marco’s friend, Trooper Gosnell asked Mr. Leon two questions in a row without giving him the opрortunity to respond: “Do you know their name by chance? Is it still registered to them I assume since it has the Minnesota plates?” Id. at 5:29–5:33. Mr. Leon quickly responded, “No, no, no, no,” and Trooper Gosnell interjected, “It’s under your name now?” Id. at 5:33–5:36. Mr. Leon then confirmed it had been “transferred and everything.” Id. at 5:36–5:37. Trooper Gosnell responded, “Ok, perfect.” Id. at 5:37. From this quick interaction, Mr. Leon may have reasonably assumed Trooper Gosnell was primarily interested in knowing whether the car was registered to him, not whether he could recall the name of Marco’s friend. By responding рositively and not inquiring further into the identity of the seller, Trooper Gosnell conveyed that he had the information he wanted. In sum, this interaction does not suggest Mr. Leon lacked knowledge of who sold him the car. In fact, Mr. Leon knew the seller was Marco’s friend and a coreligionist. If asked again in a more targeted fashion, Mr. Leon very well may have been able to give the friend’s name.
“The recent registration of a vehicle can contribute to reasonable suspicion,” although we “have generally placed limited emphasis on” that factor. United States v. Moore, 795 F.3d 1224, 1231 (10th Cir. 2015) (emphasis added). While this is a relevant
On appeal, the government urges us to consider an additional factor: Mr. Leon purchased the vehicle for a suspiciously low price of $500, which was listed on the title. We decline to consider this factor in our de novo review of reasonable suspicion for two related reasons. First, the government did not raise this factor below, and the district court did not appear to consider it. The government posits that the price can still be considered because Trooper Gosnell testified about it during the first suppression hearing in Mr. Leon’s original case and both parties attached the transcript of that hearing to their suppression pleadings in the instant case. This district court noted that it skimmed this transcript but made clear it would decide the motion de novo and wanted to hear the testimony and consider the evidence firsthand. The government provides no reason for its failure to alert the district court to this factor, and “[w]e, therefore, need not address the new reasonable suspicion argument the government makes for the first time on appeal.” United States v. Hernandez, 847 F.3d 1257, 1269 (10th Cir. 2017).
We have discretion, however, to “consider alternative arguments to affirm if the record is adequately developed.” United States v. Gaines, 918 F.3d 793, 800 (10th Cir. 2019). We conclude that the record on this point is inadequately developed because it is devoid of details concerning the condition of the vehicle and market rates at the time of
The factors cited by the district court and the government are not inconsistent with drug trafficking, but they are also not meaningfully indicative of drug trafficking. Although reasonable suspicion is a low bar, “[t]he articulated factors together must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” Neff, 681 F.3d at 1142 (quoting United States v. Brugal, 209 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)) (alteration in original). This is a close case, but we cannot say the factors operate together to eliminate a sufficient portion of innocent travel. “Reliance on the mantra ‘the totality of the circumstances’ cannot metamorphose these facts into reasonable suspicion.” Wood, 106 F.3d at 948. We therefore conclude that Trooper Gosnell’s suspicion was inchoate rather than reasonable.
Conclusion
We hold that Trooper Gosnell did not have reasonablе suspicion to extend the stop. Accordingly, we reverse the denial of Mr. Leon’s motion to suppress and remand with instructions to vacate his conviction.