184 F.2d 411 | 3rd Cir. | 1950
Lead Opinion
JAMES ALGER FEE, District Judge.
Defendant was indicted for knowingly failing to do an act required of him under the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, as amended, 50 U.S.C.A.Appendix, § 301 et seq., and the rules and regulations pursuant thereto. There were two counts in the indictment, the first of which charged defendant, and the second charged one Aleli. The counts were vaguely interrelated, but the defendants were not charged jointly. On conviction of both, an appeal was taken to this Court, which reversed the cause and discharged Aleli on the ground that he was not the employer and was therefore under no duty to report the layoff of Lembo and remanded Lembo. United States v. Aleli and United States v. Lembo, 3 Cir., 170 F.2d 18. There is no indication that the unparalleled procedure of an indictment charging defendants, not jointly but each separately in different counts, was called to the attention of the Appellate Court.
The elements of the charge of Count I of the indictment are distorted by the necessity of nexus with the charge against Aleli and are that defendant knew his draft status depended upon the certification by Stout’s that he was a full time employee from June 22, 1944, to February 23, 1945, which certification, as he well knew, was false and fraudulent, and he failed to notify the Board that he was not a full time employee at 56 hours a week, but was chronically absent during all that period of time. There is a clause which suggests that he was not employed at all at Stout’s from October 6, 1944, to January 25, 1945, but the charge of the indictment is not that he failed to tell the Board of this fact, but only of the alleged fact that he was not employed full time but was chronically absent during the whole period. It is also charged that he was accessory after the fact to a false and fictitious certification by Aleli.
The charge as laid was not proved. The Affidavit — Occupational Classification, filled out by Aleli in behalf of Stout’s, the employer, on April 7, 1944, was the only document of record which in any way appertained to the situation on October 6, 1944, and from there on until the filing of another like affidavit on March 3, 1945. The part of the April 7 affidavit relating to employment is:
“Date employed Aug. 23, 1943 Date entered present job Aug. 23, 1943 Average weekly rate of pay $65.00
“Average hours worked per week 56”
This affidavit was true on its face. The defendant could not know it was false and fraudulent, because it was not. A similar statement as to hours worked, salary and date of employment, made upon February 27, 1945, was filed with the Board March 3, 1945, as above noted, but this falls beyond the limit of the indictment. Defendant could not know therefore that there was on file from October 6, 1944, to February 23, 1945, any representation or certification as to the work of defendant at Stout’s between June 22, 1944, and February 23, 1945, in view of these facts. The Court found that defendant did not participate in filing of any statements as to the employment of the defendant, but that all this was done by Aleli in behalf of Stout’s without participation of defendant.
Thus the Trial Judge held the indictment attempted to state two different crimes and was duplicitous. However, there was an attempt upon the part of the Court to cure this defect by finding unproved certain allegations of the indictment and finding the defendant guilty of another portion thereof only. The allegations of knowledge of and participation in the filing of a false and fraudulent certification of full employment without layoff during the whole period were essential for joinder of this count
The vice of this indictment, however, was failure to state a crime in definite terms so that the accused would know with what he was charged. The failure of the indictment in this regard was highlighted by a dramatic incident. During the final argument, the Trial Judge asked the Assistant United States Attorney upon what theory the government was proceeding. The Assistant United States Attorney then outlined the basis upon which the Trial Court finally founded judgment. The Trial Judge then pointed out the confusion caused by the unsatisfactory indictment, saying, “Well, that was not generally understood during the trial of this case.” If
The Court also found that the government failed to prove that defendant was not a full time employee from June 22, 1944, to February 23, 1945, and failed to prove that he was chronically absent from the employment. This was the gist of the charge. The only fact proved, which might have had pertinency under a proper indictment, was that defendant was laid off from October 6, 1944, to some time in January, 1945.
The indictment would then have been sufficient if it had set out that between October 6, 1944, and February 23, 1945, defendant knowingly failed to perform a duty imposed upon him by the Selective Training and Service Act, and rules and regulations adopted pursuant thereto, in that, knowing that his classification depended upon continuous full time employment without temporary layoff at Stout’s and knowing that he had been discharged by Stout’s on October 6, 1944, he wilfully
However, even this proper charge was not proven. It was not shown that defendant knew that continuous or uninterrupted employment without layoff was essential to continued deferment from and after October 6, 1944. No Board member was asked this exact question. No one testified that a layoff of that length, due to a slackening of war orders, would have had an influence on reclassification. The implication is that the matter necessarily would have been referred to the State Board. The evidence in this respect is apparently different from that on the former appeal. United States v. Aleli and United States v. Lembo, 3 Cir., 170 F.2d 18. It results that the findings on which defendant was held guilty do not constitute a crime and that sufficient allegations were not made in the indictment to advise defendant of the crime of which he was convicted.
The praiseworthy effort of the learned Trial Judge, in attempting to cure the duplicity and inadequacy of the indictment by a fair trial covering the entire situation and a finding of not guilty as to portions of the indictment, cannot establish due process
Reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the indictment.
. McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 17 S.Ct. 31, 41 L.Ed. 355. Neither Buie 8, Buies of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S. C.A., nor the current interpretation thereof, permit stringing together charges of different crimes by different persons in separate counts of one indictment. Oataneo v. United States, 4 Cir., 167 F.2d 820, distinguishes that situation.
. “Indictment
“Count I. The Grand Jury Charges:.
“From on or about the 22d day of June, 1944, down to and including the 23rd day of February, 1945, Joseph John Lembo, Jr., one of the above-named defendants, being a registrant of Local Draft Board No. 46, in the City and County of Philadelphia, did knowingly fail and neglect to perform a duty required of him under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act of September 16, 1940, as amended, and the rules and regulations made pursuant thereto, by failing to report to his Selective Service Board, in writing, or otherwise, certain facts which might have resulted in the said defendant being placed in a different classification than that in which he was placed during the aforesaid period, the said facts being that he, the said defendant was not a full-time regularly employed workman of Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc., 228 South 69th Street, .Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, averaging 56 hours per. week, as was alleged in an Occupational Classification Request, Form 42-A, for deferment dated April 7, 1944, submitted by the said Company to the aforementioned Local Draft Board, No. 46, as a result of which said Form 42-A, the defendant was classified II'-B, that he was chronically absent from said employment having not been employed by the said Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc., from October 6, 1944, to January 25, 1945, the said defendant at all times well knowing that the classification which he then and there enjoyed was given him as a result of the said Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc.; representing and certifying to the said Local Draft Board No. 46, of the City and County of Philadelphia, that he, the said defendant, during the period June 22, 1944, down to and including February 23, 1945, was a full-time reg- ' ularly employed workman working 56 hours a week, all of which the defendant then and there well knew to be false and fraudulent, in violation of Section 626.1-b, of the rules and regulations under the Selective Training and Service Act of September 16, 1940, as amended.
“Count' II. The Grand Jury further Charges:
“From on or about the 22d day of . June, 1944, down to and including the 23rd day of February, 1945, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Louis Anthony Aleli, one of the above-named defendants, did knowingly fail and neglect to perform a duty required of him under the provisions of the Selective Training and Service Act,, of 1940, as amended, and the rules and regulations and directions made and issued pursuant thereto, having presented and caused to be presented June 22, 1944, an Occupational Classification Request, Form 42-A to Local Draft Board, No. 46, in the City and County of Philadelphia, for one Joseph John Lembo, Jr., a registrant of said Local Draft Board, alleging that the said Joseph John Lembo, Jr., was a necessary employee of Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc., and that the said Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc., was engaged in essential war work, as a result of which, the said Joseph John Lembo, Jr. received a classification of II-B, which deferred him from service in the Armed Forces of the United States, the said Louis Anthony Aleli, did knowingly fail and neglect in writing, or otherwise, to notify Local Draft Board No. 46, in the said City and County of Philadelphia, of the change of status which might have-resulted in the said Joseph John Lembo, Jr., being placed in a different classification than that in which he was placed during the aforesaid period, the facts being, that the said Joseph John Lembo, Jr., wasi not regularly employed by Stout’s 69th St. Service, Inc., as heretofore represented, all of which the said Louis Anthony Aleli then and there well knew, by reason of which said failure to so notify the Local Draft Board, the-said defendant did obtain the unlawful deferment of the said Joseph John Lembo, Jr., from service in the Armed Forces of the United States, in violation of Section 626.1-b, made pursuant to the Se- ■ lective Training and Service Act of September 16, 1940, as amended.”
. Rule 8, Rulos of Criminal Procedure. It was necessary for joinder that Lembo participate in the same series of acts or transactions “constituting an offense or offenses.”
. “Sec. 11 [of the Selective Training and Service Act] makes criminal a wilful failure to perform any duty required * * Estep v. United States, 327 U. S. 114, 119, 66 S.Ct. 423, 426, 90 L.Ed. 567.
. Sutton v. United States, 5 Cir., 157 F. 2d 661, 666; Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81-83, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314.
. “It is as much, a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to convict him upon a charge that was1 never made.” Cole v. State of Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201. 68 S.Ct. 514. 517, 92 L.Ed. 644.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I concur in the view expressed by Judge FEE that the indictment must be dismissed. The grounds for my conclusion, however, are somewhat different from those expressed by him.
Count 1 of the indictment, the only count attempting to charge Lembo with the commission of a crime or crimes, is so turgid as to be almost incomprehensible. Certainly it cannot be said fairly to apprise the defendant of the charges against him. One could stop here and properly order the indictment dismissed in view of Lembo’s motion, made prior to trial, to dismiss for failure of the indictment to state sufficient facts to constitute an offense. Some ■further explanation is desirable, however, in view of the long history of this case.
It is very far from clear from the voluminous record under what theory the United States tried Lembo and this probably was due to the confusion cast by the
That part of the indictment which the trial court referred to as “First” probably does not charge any crime. That part of the indictment which the trial court referred to under the heading “secondly” does state a crime cognizable under the Act if the numerous clauses of qualification which immediately follow it be excluded. To excise these clauses, however, or such of them as would be necessary to render the indictment valid, would cause the court to exercise the functions of a grand jury and would constitute far more than a disregard of surplusage. The court below found Lembo guilty of what the indictment probably intended to charge, designated by the District Court as “secondly”. But it also found Lembo not guilty of the alleged crime which the trial court referred to under the heading, “First”. In endeavoring to cure the obvious defects of the indictment the trial court in effect found Lembo both “guilty” and “not guilty” on the same count. This course cannot enjoy the sanction of law. The fault lies in the indictment which is so badly drawn and so obfuscated with charges that do not constitute crimes as to be unintelligible.
For these reasons I concur in the view that the indictment must be dismissed.
. Regulation 628.1(b) provides: “Each classified registrant shall, within 10 days after it occurs, and any other person should, within 10 days after knowledge thereof, report to the local board in writing any fact that might result in such registrant being placed in a different classification.”
. Defendant’s brief, page 31.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting).
I cannot agree that the indictment herein is fatally defective.
Rule 12(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that “Defenses and objections based on defects in the * * * indictment * * * other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may be raised only by motion before trial.” Duplicity is, I should think, a defect which comes within those necessary to be asserted prior to trial, and the failure to raise it seasonably results in preclusion from later advancement. Cf. Connors v. United States, 1895, 158 U.S. 408, 410-411, 15 S.Ct. 951, 39 L.Ed. 1033; Beauchamp v. United States, 6 Cir., 1946, 154 F.2d 413, 415, certiorari denied 329 U.S. 723, 67 S.Ct. 66, 91 L.Ed. 626. Moreover, it is not the defendant, but the Court of its own motion, who complains of duplicity; indeed, he has expressly disavowed
Llowever closely duplicity is associated with the further asserted defect, that the indictment lacks clarity, it would seem that in this instance both difficulties arise primarily from the assumed contradictory statements of the learned trial judge concerning the guilt of the defendant. Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Further, the charge of the indictment^ while awkward,- is nevertheless legally adequate. It is historically clear that the indictment serves three purposes, as a notice to the defendant, as a pleading in litigation, and as the basis for the determination of former acquittal or conviction. If it is sufficiently- clear to discharge these functions then, in- view of the modern distaste for dependence upon niceties of expression, it should not be dismissed merely because of obstensible ineptness in drafting. “Not readily stricken down are Indictments or Informations because of defects in draftsmanship. * * * the true inquiry is. whether the substantial rights of the parties have been affected. The ‘obvious requirements’ are ‘(1) that the accused shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may be enabled to present his defense and not. be taken by surprise by the evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offense.’ * * * ■ See also Hagner v. United States, 1932, 285 U.S. 427, 431; 52 S.Ct. 417, 419, 76 L.Ed. 861: ‘The rigor of old common-law rules of criminal pleading has yielded, in modern practice, to the general principle that formal defects, not prejudicial, will be disregarded.’ United States v. Angelo, 3 Cir., 1946, 153 F.2d 247, 250. Accordingly, I assume that an indictment is not subject to dismissal for lack of clarity unless it would result in prejudicial harm.
Here, the offense specified in the indictment is that the defendant failed to notify his draft board of a change in status which may have brought about a different draft classification had it been known to the draft board. The indictment, it seems to me, is sufficiently specific to satisfy historical usage. Cf. Stassi v. United States, 5 Cir., 1946, 152 F.2d 581, certiorari denied 328 U.S. 842, 66 S.Ct. 1020, 90 L.Ed. 1617. If the defendant desired a further specification, he could have availed himself of a'bill of particulars as provided in Rule 7(f), although it would appear that the inclusion of the specific facts in the indictment could only operate in the defendant’s favor. And -the finding of the court below that the defendant was not employed for a substantial and continuing period of time within the designation of the indictment is in support of the charge therein. Cf. United States v. Weiss, 2 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 447, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 767, 68 S.Ct. 76, 92 L.Ed. 352; United States v. Wain, 2 Cir., 1947, 162 F.2d 60, certiorari denied 332 U.S. 764, 68 S.Ct. 69, 92 L.Ed. 349. But even were the indictment not so clear as to appease the precise mind, still I do not think it so badly constructed that the defendant might not have known of what he was accused or might not have been able to prepare his defense.
Moreover, an indictment which contains all the essential averments should not be dismissed so readily in the absence of a showing of harm, such as surprise at the evidence offered, particularly when the issue is raised for the first time after the verdict has been rendered. The testing ground then should be the practical consideration of whether harm actually resulted to the defendant, rather than what might have been if the point were raised before trial. As stated in Hagner v. Unit
For the reasons stated, I should not dismiss the indictment at this time. Whatever was unnecessarily included in the indictment is surplusage, which the defendant could have had stricken pursuant to Rule 7(d): “It is a settled proposition of law that an indictment is amended only when it is so altered to charge a different offense from that found by the grand jury.” United States v. Krepper, 3 Cir., 1946, 159 F.2d 958, 970, certiorari denied 330 U.S. 824, 67 S.Ct. 865, 91 L.Ed. 1275.
Finally, I believe the record adequately supports the finding of guilt made by the trial judge, and therefore would affirm the judgment below. But even were the proof insufficient, I would not deem appropriate a judgment of acquittal, since on a new trial the government may well be able to make out its case. Bryan v. United States, 1950, 338 U.S. 552, 70 S.Ct. 317.
