United States v. Lawrence ShawUnited States v. Lawrence Shaw
Case Information
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SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge:
Congress enacted the Bank Fraud Act in 1984, and ever
since, the federal courts have grappled with whether its
provisions require proof of an intent to cause harm to the
bank itself. The Act contains two clauses: the first
criminalizes schemes “to defraud a financial institution,” and
the second schemes to obtain bank assets or property under its
control “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises.”
The principal intended victim in this case, at least according to the defendant, was a bank customer, Stanley Hsu. The defendant, Lawrence Shaw, had access to the victim’s bank statements. The gist of Shaw’s scheme was to use PayPal, an online payment and money transfer service, to convinсe the banks that he was Hsu and thus had authority to transfer money out of Hsu’s bank accounts and into the PayPal account in Shaw’s control.
The government charged Shaw with violating
While the circuits are divided as to the requirements of
These cases help define the meaning in this circuit of
BACKGROUND
The charges in this case arose from a scheme defendant Shaw devised to take money from bank accounts belonging to Stanley Hsu, a Taiwanese businеssman. Hsu opened a Bank of America account while working in the United States. When he returned to Taiwan, he arranged for the daughter of one of his employees to receive his mail in the States and forward it to him in Taiwan. Shaw was living with the daughter and routinely checked her mail. When Hsu’s Bank of America statements began to arrive, Shaw opened them and learnеd Hsu’s account and personal information.
Shaw used the information from Hsu’s statements to execute the following scheme: he opened an email account in Hsu’s name, then used this email account and Hsu’s personal information to open a PayPal account. Shaw “linked” the PayPal account to Hsu’s account with Bank of America. He was able tо circumvent PayPal’s security measures because of his access to the information in Hsu’s bank statements.
On June 4, 2007, Shaw opened two accounts with Washington Mutual under the name of his father, Richard Shaw, without his father’s knowledge or permission. One account was a savings account (“Tier 1” account), which Shaw linked to the fake Hsu PayPal account. During the process оf linking the Tier 1 account with the Hsu PayPal account, PayPal identified the request as suspicious. PayPal sent an email to the fake Hsu email account asking for additional information. In response, Shaw faxed PayPal a copy of Hsu’s Bank of America account statement, and a bank statement he had altered to appear as if Hsu owned the Richard Shаw accounts. He also sent a copy of Hsu’s driver’s license, which he had altered to have a younger birth *5 6 U NITED S TATES V . S HAW date. On the basis of these falsified documents, Washington Mutual and PayPal allowed the savings account in the name of Shaw’s father and the PayPal account in Hsu’s name to be linked.
The second account Shaw opened in his father’s name was a checking account (“Tier 2” account). This account was linked to the Tier 1 savings account. Shaw’s scheme ultimately siphoned the funds into a third Washington Mutual account, a joint account which Shaw had previously opened in his and the daughter’s name, although without her knowledge.
Once the accounts were set up and linked, Shaw began to withdraw money from Hsu’s Bank of America аccount through a series of online transfers and checks written to himself. He would transfer money from the Hsu Bank of America account first to the Hsu PayPal account, then transfer it from the Hsu PayPal account to the Tier 1 savings account with Washington Mutual. Then, Shaw would transfer money from the Tier 1 account to the Tier 2 checking account, which allowed him to write chеcks to himself, signing his father’s name. Finally, he would deposit those checks into the Washington Mutual joint account that he controlled.
Using this scheme, Shaw was able to convince the banks to transfer and release approximately $307,000 of Hsu’s money to Shaw between June and October 2007. Hsu’s son discovered the missing money in October 2007, reported the fraud and closed the Bank of America account.
Bank of America returned approximately $131,000 to Hsu, covering the fraudulent activity that occurred within 60 days of the reported fraud. PayPal reimbursed Bank of America for this amount. In the end, PayPal bore approximately $106,000 of the loss and Hsu over $170,000, because Hsu did not notify the banks of the losses within 60 days of many of the fraudulent transactions, as thе parties all agree was required by standard banking practice.
DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
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The government charged Shaw with 17 counts of bank
fraud in violation of
(1) The defendant knowingly carried out a scheme to defraud [the bank]; that is a scheme designed to victimize [the bank] by causing [the bank], not only Stanley Hsu, monetary loss;
(2) The defendant actively deceived [the bank] as to a material fact; that is, a fact that had a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing, [the bank] to part with money or property;
(3) The defendant acted with the specific intent to defraud [the bank]; that is, with the intent to deceive and cheat [the bank] in order to expose [the bank], not only Stanley Hsu, to monetary loss.
(4) [The bank] was federally insured by the FDIC.
It is not enough for the government to prove that Mr. Shaw carried out a scheme to obtain Mr. Hsu’s money by deceiving [the bank]. In order to convict Mr. Shaw, you must find that [the bаnk] itself was both the target of his deception and an intended victim of the fraud.
The district court declined to give Shaw’s requested jury instructions. The district court concluded that risk of loss was an element that the bank fraud statute did not require, and that the bank need not be an intended financial victim of the fraud. Instead, the trial judge gave instructions based on a *7 combination of modеl jury instructions and instructions used in previous bank fraud cases in the Ninth Circuit. The judge instructed the jury that:
[i]n order for the defendant to be found guilty of bank fraud, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, the defendant knowingly executed a scheme to defraud a financial institution as to a material matter;
Second, the defendant did so with the intent to defraud the financial institution; and Third, the financial institution was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. . . . .
The phrase “scheme to defraud” means any deliberate plan of action or course of conduct by which someone intends to deceive, cheat, or deprive a financial institution of something of value. It is not necessаry for the government to prove that a financial institution was the only or sole victim of the scheme to defraud. It is also not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant was actually successful in defrauding any financial institution. Finally, it is not necessary for the government to prove that any financial institution lost any money or property as a rеsult of the scheme to defraud. . . . .
An intent to defraud is an intent to deceive or cheat.
The jury convicted Shaw of 14 counts of bank fraud on December 13, 2012, and this appeal followed.
10 U NITED S TATES V . S HAW
DISCUSSION
The bank fraud statute,18 U.S.C. § 1344 , provides: Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute a scheme or artifice— (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under thе custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises; shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
In
Loughrin v. United States
, the Supreme Court construed
the second clause, and held that it does not require the
government to prove that the defendant intended to defraud
the bank.
In holding that the two clauses create separate offenses,
the Court rejected the reasoning of the Third Circuit.
See id.
at 2388–89. The Third Circuit held that clauses 1 and 2
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conjunctively create only one offense, and thus all violations
of the statute require both the intent to defraud the bank and
that the bank be exposed to a risk of loss under the relevant
law.
United States v. Thomas
,
Shaw’s argument in this case therefore focuses on the
difference between thе two clauses. He points out that the
second clause covers schemes intended to obtain a third
party’s property. He argues that the first clause, under which
he was convicted, therefore must require that a defendant
intend to obtain the bank’s property. Thus, he asks us to
conclude that a conviction under
Shaw thus seeks to characterize the difference between
the two clauses as involving the intended financial victim of
the fraud, i.e., the intended bearer of the loss. The language
of neithеr clause of the statute, however, refers to monetary
loss or to the risk of such loss. The statutory language
focuses on the intended victim of the deception, not the
intended bearer of the loss.
Analysis of our circuit’s law before counsels the
same result. In
United States v. Bonallo
,
In Bonallo , a bank employee withdrew funds from his own account via the ATM, then manipulated the bank’s сomputer system to charge the withdrawals against other customers’ accounts. Id. at 1429–30. The defendant argued that the other customers were the intended victims of his scheme and therefore the bank was not defrauded within the meaning of the statute. We rejected this argument, finding that the bank was the target of his misrepresentation, even if the customers’ accounts were the source of the funds. See id. at 1434 n.9. In short, the defendant was guilty of bank fraud because he intended to deceive the bank.
In
United States v. Wolfswinkel
, 44 F.3d 782 (9th Cir.
1995), we considered whether a risk of financial loss to a
bank was as an element of
In affirming Wolfswinkel’s conviction, we recognized a
circuit split as to whether
The Supreme Court’s decision in does not affect
the validity of our precedent, or undermine it in any way. If
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anything, it lends credence to our reluctance to impose any
risk of loss requirement in a prosecution under the bank fraud
statute.
Loughrin
confirms our conclusion that the difference
between the two clauses is which entity the defendant
intended to deceive, not which entity the defendant intended
to bear the financial loss.
See
134 S. Ct. at 2389–90
(emphasizing that nothing in
We recognize that some circuits have held that risk of
financial loss to the bank is an element that must be proven
under
The Court in held that
AFFIRMED .