United States v. Lawrence Ray Carmichael

510 in this Bankruptcy and the Code ERISA IV. language of section plain The case. contention address the PBGC’s nextWe 412(n)(4)(C) only the amount requires contri- funding minimum the missed ... treat- imposed [to] be which a “lien is million are entitled in excess of butions $1 added.) Accord- (Emphasis ed as taxes.” under 11 U.S.C. priority “tax” to a by the stipulated parties, ing to facts (current 507(a)(7) at U.S.C. § version 412(n)(4) would imposed by section lien statutory lien im- 507(a)(8)), to a § due January days following have arisen 60 412(n). § pursuant to 26 U.S.C. posed (the mini- upon which missed date 412(n)(l)(B) exceeded funding $1 that mum contributions provides Section million). However, Copperweld had al- plan a lien in favor of there shall be reorganization Chapter filed for ready and overdue unpaid amount

when the total 22, 1993, an auto- triggering on November Furthermore, million. exceeds $1 “any act prevented stay matic which 412(n)(4), it existed § as U.S.C. create, any against lien perfect, or enforce part: pertinent states estate.” U.S.C. property (B) lien. Period of 362(a)(4). § ... arise on imposed lien shall a lien was never We hold that because date for day following the due the 60th funding minimum missed imposed on the required installment.... to 26 pursuant U.S.C. contributions (C) apply rules to Certain 412(n)(4), § claim cannot be PBGC’s to which a Any respect amount with and, therefore, does not as a tax treated ... be treated as imposed lien is shall under 11 U.S.C. priority status warrant owing due and the United taxes 507(a)(7). § States.... 412(n)(4) added). § V. (emphasis 26 U.S.C. reasons, thought court it was neces- foregoing

The district For the affirming bankruptcy court order sary interplay to examine the between AFFIRMED. Bankruptcy provisions Code ERISA to determine whether involved order the “tax” in section

Congress intended

412(n)(4) in the given tax treatment to be first

bankruptcy context. The court “explicit connection” be- looked for America, UNITED STATES 412(n) in and the tween section ERISA Plaintiff-Appellee, Finding no “connector” Bankruptcy Code. statutes, per- then the court between CARMICHAEL, Ray a “functional examination” to de- formed Lawrence Defendant-Appellant. nature of the “tax” in section termine the 412(n) fund- and concluded the missed No. 99-5179. pri- were not entitled to ing contributions Appeals, United States Court 507(a)(7) in “tax” under section ority as a Sixth Circuit. true na- Bankruptcy Code because the Argued: June was not to fund ture of the tax issue 20, 2000 function of the United States. Decided and Filed: Oct. Rehearing Rehearing Suggestion agree with the district court’s We En Banc Denied Dec. 2000.* entitled conclusion that the claim was not bankruptcy con priority to a “tax”

text, necessary think it but do not between interrelationship

examine the * rehearing participation in this rul- Judge grant for the recused himself from Keith would ing. Judge Siler stated in his dissent. reasons

5H torting money from a local bookmaker in Act, violation of the Hobbs 18 U.S.C. § 1951. He was sentenced to twenty-sev- en months of incarceration years and two supervised release. For the reasons set below, forth we AFFIRM Carmichael’s conviction.

I. BACKGROUND In late November or early December of 1997, a man named Rodney Adams was charged with endangerment wanton or as- (the sault record is not clear on point) in Kentucky in state court one of the coun- ties within jurisdiction. Adams pawn shop owned a and commer- Somerset, cial rental property in Ken- (and tucky. He thriving also ran a illegal) bookmaking operation poker and game out pawn of his shop. Adams’s bookmaking operation, in which he handled bets for players Tennessee, Kentucky, from and Alabama, $400,000 grossed up week, to per in profits and resulted net up to $150,000per week. He also had a criminal record consisting of a 1979 conviction for robbery and a 1989 conviction for cocaine Wisdom, (briefed), Charles P. Jr. Asst. possession. KY, Attorney, Lexington, U.S. Edwin J. Walbourn, (briefed), III Office of the U.S. Adams, being worried about indicted as KY, Attorney, Covington, Plaintiff-Ap- for a result of the 1997 criminal charge, direct- pellee. attorney, ed his Knight, telephone Mark to Carmichael. As a Commonwealth attor- (briefed), Ned B. Pillersdorf R. Joseph ney, responsible Carmichael was prose- for briefed), (argued Pillersdorf, Lane cuting charged individuals who are with Barrett, KY, Prestonsburg, DeRossett & felonies. Knight Carmichael told for Defendant-Appellant. county attorney could handle the matter. KEITH, DAUGHTREY, Before: county attorneys Because Kentucky in GILMAN, Judges. Circuit prosecute persons accused of misdemean- ors, felonies, but not implica- obvious J., GILMAN, opinion delivered the tion of this statement that was Carmichael DAUGHTREY, J., which was not interested in prosecuting the of- KEITH, joined. 523-28), (pp. J. delivered Carmichael, however, felony. fense as a separate dissenting opinion. charged felony could have Adams with a in question. for the offense OPINION conversation, During the Carmichael GILMAN, Judge. Circuit if Knight willing asked Adams would be Carmichael, Lawrence Ray formerly a pay donate several hundred dollars to for attorney Commonwealth for three counties Christmas decorations Carmichael’s of- (Carmichael Kentucky, eastern was convicted of ex- fice. was not allowed to use decorations.) allegations regarding determined that Knight for the funds state were “unfounded.” Adams’s involvement Adams, agreed who relayed request that Carmichael pay on the basis 19, 1998, told Carmichael March On offi- law enforcement highest-ranking word” he had “received Knight that it would be county and cer in the very making interested Adams was Car- him mad for $500.” “make foolish also Carmichael large campaign donation. gam- illegal Adams’s knew about michael had come name Knight that Adams’s told that Car- and Adams knew business bling investigation in the course of a federal up it down and to shut power had the michael had “been knew that Adams and that he the circum- arrested. Under have Adams from a money, cash wiring large sums have been stances, thought it would Adams During area.” stop truck Somerset pay Carmichael. stupid” “very conversation, Carmichael added the deal on up to his end of he had “lived purchase asked Carmichael Knight matter, Rodney’s name McKinney obliged, giving receipts and Carmichael used, secret, not been had kept had been acknowledging pay- Knight receipts Finally, public.” made had not been [and] of more decorations for Christmas ment stepped that Adams “had said Carmicha- reimbursed than Adams $500. the Feds in [the] the toes of on some of than he el, amount was more although the McKinney investigation.” Carmichael county attorney’s of- The expected. had for Knight ask his client suggested agreed to dismiss subsequently fice $100,000 cash, go into a which would in after the charges against Adams pending creation to be slush of Carmichael’s fund sixty days. At the end of passage campaigns on Carmicha- spent political charges were dismissed sixty days, request, Carmichael told The el’s choice. prejudice. with that if reasoning on the Knight, was based $100,000, might asked January Knight In Carmichael asked Adams $50,000. investigation give in to to him the be inclined Adams assist Jerry McKinney. named an individual to Knight reported On March investigation nature of this precise The had requested Adams that Carmichael the rec- readily be ascertained from cannot $100,000 cam- him “to distribute for from ord, related to although apparently it $40,000 funds,” hoped get but to paign promi- involved sex videos that homemade $50,000. Adams what Knight repeated to agreed, Adams and Car- nent individuals. had about Adams’s name said Carmichael for Adams meet with arranged michael to ongoing in of an “coming up” the course David Mi- Kentucky Police Detective State investigation. Adams “freaked federal rus. news, reported and Carmicha- out” this Attorney Nie- request County Fred el’s and meeting between Adams At the first in kirk and Det. Mirus the belief Mirus, introduced Adams Det. Carmichael an threat making oblique was Carmichael bookie,” he although Carmichael said as “a prosecuted if he did would be Adams Adams. prosecuting not interested was $50,000. $40,000 or give Carmichael his name promised Adams that Carmichael later, days summoned Two Carmichael investigation. At not be used would office, he explaining that Adams to his already ac- Carmichael had point, telephone. As talk on the preferred not to videos, McKinney’s and quired one of sex requested, Adams went he would promised Carmichael that Adams office, him in a conference meeting with he had a second. After be to obtain able room. McKinney investigation discussed appreciated that he Adams, said Carmichael with Det. Mirus learned kept Adams’s name Adams’s and had ongoing help an up had come Adams’s name McKinney investigation. He it was later out investigation, although drug having that Carmichael identified as told him Adams that he had “an idea” also told Adams, “very to be help having any but wanted this later denied such conversa- could Adams, Carmichael.) According to the idea careful.” tion with either Adams or a manila delivering of Adams consisted initially Carmichael asserted that he told $50,000 in cash to envelope containing Guffy, David a detective under his com- office, picked where it would be Knight’s mand, investigation, that Adams was under secretary. money was up by Knight’s dispatched Guffy and that he had Det. officials, help several local to be used to Knight’s pick up office to Adams’s at- county eventually sheriff and including tempted and then to it payoff take home. himself, secure re-election. Carmichael said, point, At that Carmichael he and Det. agreed and Adams to meet the Carmichael Guffy what to it “figure would out do with day. Adams then left Carmichael’s next Carmichael, however, subsequently next.” door, as through office the back Carmicha- Guffy only admitted that he had told Det. el had instructed. pick up package, and that he never day, telephoned The next Adams Carmi- package supposed told him that the arranged Burg- and to meet him at a chael money contain that was evidence in bribe had in hand King er restaurant. Adams ongoing official-corruption investiga- $5,000 money provid- that had been bait fact, law tion. no enforcement officer King, At Burger ed Det. Mirus. (other possibly than Det. Carmichael $5,000 offered Adams Carmichael Guffy) anything knew about Carmichael’s him promised money that more would be supposed investigation of Adams. forthcoming. opened money put briefcase and Adams inside. charged Carmichael was indicted and gam- that some of his suggested Adams with two counts of extortion violation of willing to bling associates were contribute Act. I of the the Hobbs Count indictment they slush fund because to Carmichael’s pertained alleged to the extortion of $500 hurting nobody” preferred and “were not at Christmas decorations law enforcement authorities let that local pertained alleged office. II to the Count peace. re- gamble them Carmichael fund contributions. At extortion slush understanding.” “I think we have an plied, ease, government’s the close of the Carmi- later, days Two Carmichael called judgment acquittal. chael a moved for arrange meeting to a at which Adams granted the motion as to The district court payment. Adams would make the next indictment, I but the Count of the denied police videotape to this meet- planned motion as to II. Carmichael was Count ing, meeting but the was aborted because II by on Count the subsequently convicted that police Carmichael discovered the jury, by and then sentenced the court to him. watching were About an hour after incarceration, twenty-seven months of surveillance, detected the Ken- Carmichael years supervised by be followed two tucky Jerry Police Lieutenant Pro- State release. Captain Larry vence and Lewis inter- viewed Carmichael. (1) argues that appeal, On Carmichael alleged requisite conduct lacked the trying

Carmichael insisted that he was with interstate commerce to connection up, way to set Adams instead of the other (2) conviction, Act support a Hobbs claimed a officer police around. He that withheld evidence prosecution may have him him that approached had and told impeach have been used to might in buying Adams was interested influence (3) witness, Adams, officials, government’s star political and among pre- local (4) convict, the evidence was insufficient pared to contribute substantial sums of excluded the improperly the district court money campaigns to various order (The witness, testimony prospective defense carry plan. police out his officer that Rather, (5) in- interstate commerce. improperly fected district court and by proof element is satisfied jurisdictional jury. structed (cita- potential impact.”) probable of a omitted). marks quotation tion and internal II. ANALYSIS that a law recently concluded This with interstate com- A. Connection pay- officer’s extortion enforcement merce $3,500 job exchange for a ments of each does not have The United States con- deputy requisite had the as a sheriffs the Commerce Clause power under because interstate commerce nection to See, e.g., intrastate crime. purely outlaw probability” a “realistic there was Lopez, U.S. United States who were deputies, sheriffs’ prospective (1995) 131 L.Ed.2d financial as- significant and lacked young author congressional (refusing to “convert sets, lender would turn to an interstate gen to a ity under the Commerce Clause in order to by the defendant recommended by retained power of the sort police eral money payments. for the up come with States”). alleged crimi Consequently, Mills, at But Unit- 672. See cf. connection to nal conduct have some must Wang, Min Nan F.3d 234 ed States v. in order to state an interstate commerce Cir.2000) that a residen- (concluding Act. offense under the Hobbs robbery satisfy jurisdiction- tial did not Act). al element Hobbs jurisdictional pro The Hobbs Act’s vision, however, presented Based on the evidence extremely broad. See 1951(b)(3) trial, jury a reasonable could (providing § that Carmichael’s 18 U.S.C. attempted have concluded of the Hobbs purposes “commerce” for the money exchange extort from Adams “all ... commerce over which Act includes illegal down on Adams’s cracking for not jurisdiction”); States has Sti United poker bookmaking operations, States, 212, 215, 80 rone v. United (1960) (“[The probability was a realistic there 270, 4 L.Ed.2d S.Ct. money would come from the some of speaks language, Hobbs in broad Act] thus proceeds gambling. of interstate We manifesting purpose to use all the consti its bur conclude that the met Congress punish has to in power tutional showing required connection to den of ex terference with interstate commerce commerce. interstate tortion, or violence. The robbery physical any way Act interference ‘in outlaws such Brady B. camera review material/in (citation omitted). ”) As a re degree.’ sult, that the district very argues minimal connection to Carmichael even a by sufficient to court abused its discretion not review- interstate commerce is sustain See, e.g., ing transcripts in of Adams’s wire- charge. a Hobbs Act United camera Mills, 669, tapped telephone conversations. Those States v. 204 F.3d Cir.2000) (“The part of a ‘de non conversations were obtained as maxim minimis Title III apply determining wiretapping operation pursuant curat lex’ does not suffi Crime Control and Safe whether an effect on commerce is Omnibus at a time when the satisfy jurisdictional predicate Streets Act of 1968 cient Attorney’s suspected It Office long of the Hobbs Act. has been United States engaged drug understanding might in this circuit that even a that Adams be trial, dealing. appeal, commerce At and now on ‘de minimis’ effect on interstate suffice.”); investigation government also asserts will see United States (9th Cir.1996) Atcheson, 1237, 1243 any uncover evidence that could 94 F.3d failed to (“To Adams, and impeach have been used to establish a de minimis effect on inter commerce, wiretap of this revealing not that the existence state the Government need (which at the time of actually ongoing af- was still show that a defendant’s acts trial) rely would have “blown” the Carmichael’s on the Government’s representations investigation. as to the materiality potential impeach- evidence, ment but should instead under- government long un has been take an independent in camera review of obligation exculpa der an to disclose both relevant Government files to determine tory evidence and evidence that might materiality.”). Counsel for govern- impeach credibility key tend to of a ment represented has unambiguously that government Giglio witness. See v. United all material that was then in possession its States, 763, 405 U.S. 92 S.Ct. might have impeach been used to (1972); Brady L.Ed.2d 104 v. Maryland, Adams was disclosed. 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). court, however, This has held that trial, During Carmichael’s counsel for prosecutors because are officers of the asked, the government received, twice may district courts take them permission from the approach court to they their word when inform the court that alone, bench in order to explain to the they specified have reviewed sealed docu judge—out of the earshot of Carmichael ments and that those do documents and his attorney—what was on wiretap subject contain compulsory material dis recordings, why none of it implicated Brady. closure under See United States v. Adams in drug dealing or illegal other Hernandez, (6th Cir.1994) Despite highly activities. unusual na- that, (holding absence “some indi ture of request by this counsel for the government, cation of misconduct” government, attorney did not required court is not to con object. argues Carmichael now that his duct an in verify camera review to rights Sixth Amendment were violated by assertion). government’s discussions, these two ex and that violation, alleged along with the dis-

Although we do not believe that it trict court’s refusal to review the sealed satisfactory would be a solution to force transcripts judges suspected large to scrutinize volumes might material, Brady contain sealed materials whenever constitutes defense so, request they counsel reversible error. do we never misgivings theless have serious about the thumb, general aAs rule of in all

breadth of the rule announced Hernan circumstances, all, exceptional but the most ex dez. After it is difficult to conscien parte communications with the court tiously are conclude that the has extraordinarily bad idea. court obligations met its under This Brady without strong has not concealed its seeing disapproval materials that the cases, concededly Nevertheless, approaches did criminal rea not disclose. soning giving published opinion government private Hernandez is a and is the law of this circuit. access to the ear of only See Salmi v. Secre is not “a Servs., tary Health gross justice,” and Human 774 breach of the appearance of of (6th 685, Cir.1985) F.2d 689 (noting “dangerous that a but also procedure.” United panel (6th this court “cannot overrule the v. Minsky, States 963 F.2d 874 Cir.1992) (citation omitted); decision of panel” another and that “[t]he see also Unit (8th prior decision controlling remains authori ed Earley, States v. 416 Cir.1984) ty an unless inconsistent parte decision of the (suggesting ex com discouraged United Supreme requires States Court strongly munications should be modification of the decision or this ]egardless Court of the propriety of the “[r sitting motives,” prior en banc overrules the allowing parte deci court’s because ex sion”). United v. Leung, approaches States in undermines confidence Cf. (2d Cir.1994) (“[I]n F.3d impartiality). approaches some court’s Ex parte circumstances justified the trial court should not “can only be and allowed com- jury. If parte F.2d communicated ex with the

pelling Minsky, state interests.” say it this govern- at 874. Suffice to counsel had been concerned about demonstrating ment bears the burden of to the they could have voiced their concern prejudiced by that the defendant was not record appropriate district court and communication, its parte an ex and burden made.” Id. could have been omitted). (citation “a Id. heavy is one.” colloquy The contents of the between response argu to Carmichael’s government and the have the district court ment, government first asserts that to now been made available both Carmi- jurisdiction lacks to consider this appellate counsel and to this court. chael’s Amendment claim be Carmichael’s Sixth in of what nothing We find the content in cause he did not raise it adversely actually communicated that af- and, court. This assertion is incorrect as rights, substantial fected Carmichael’s acknowledged in government properly that he has waived therefore conclude post-hearing supplemental au its notice of on right appeal. to raise this issue This thority, squarely rejected by has been full brings us back circle to the rule Hayes, court. v. See United States Hernandez, by which we are bound. We (6th Cir.2000) (explaining F.3d 619-20 therefore find no merit in Carmichael’s although appeals the courts of ordi arguments relating to the failure of the narily arguments not entertain do transcripts review district court to were not advanced in the wiretapped telephone Adams’s conversa- prudence rule is one of than one rather tions. jurisdiction). The dissent claims that we have distort- hand, On other precedent in an effort ed Sixth Circuit in pointing is correct out the unfairness of teachings circumvent the of United States allowing Carmichael to raise for the first (6th Cir.1992). Minsky, v. 963 F.2d 870 time on appeal acquiesced conduct that he however, Op. Minsky, Dis. at 524. does Torres, in below. See United States v. flatly parte not ban ex communications. (2d Cir.1999) F.3d 1324 (unpublished table that, if Minsky gov- court noted decision) (finding that the defendant had heavy ernment is able to meet its burden right waived his at a present be sidebar proving prejudice a lack of the de- attorney contemporane when his failed to fendant, “there are circumstances where - ously object). acquiescence Such lulled parte might an ex communication be believing the district court into that Car F.2d at ‘overlooked.’” 963 874. Such is objection michael govern had no to the the case here. The Min- request. ment’s unusual To now allow the any sky justifica- was unable to articulate parte objected communications to be tion for denying op- defense counsel the “sandbagging” after-the-fact form of conference, portunity participate permit that we will not in the absence of and the information discussed in the ex proof that the content of what was in fact parte communication was found to consti- adversely communicated affected Carmi a Brady tute violation. Id. at 874-75. chael’s rights. substantial See United Here, contrast, government provid- Throckmorton, States 87 F.3d 1069 justification ed a reasonable for its re- Cir.1996), where the district court was quest, object, defense counsel did found to have erred its ex commu nothing we find the ex communi- jury, nication with the but the error did adversely cations that affected Carmicha- require not reversal because the defen rights. el’s substantial rights” dant’s “substantial were not affect ed. Id. at 1073. The Ninth Circuit noted The dissent also asserts that a “thor- ough reading that the district court in the judge “disclosed record demonstrates open objection by Op. court and on the record that he had Defendant.” at Dis.

519 record, Sufficiency of the evidence of the thorough reading A C. 525. however, just opposite. the establishes In to convict order Carmichael government the for both While counsel Act, government the Hobbs the violating bench, at the the defense were and the prove wrongfully had to that Carmichael discuss the attorney asked to government attempted property obtained or to obtain In re- judge. with the privately matter Adams, from and that he did so either “Well, lawyer replied, sponse, Carmichael’s right,” “by under “color of official your call.” Then when Judge, that’s force, actual or threatened wrongful use of see what the judge stated that he would violence, or fear.” See 18 U.S.C. to, defense coun- prosecution referring was 1951(b)(2). argues § Carmichael answered, “Yes, If ever there sir.” sel prove failed' to either of these acquiescence, this to be a case of appears In beyond elements reasonable doubt. only objected to the it. counsel is Defense reviewing challenges regarding the suffi govern- of the acceptance court’s ciency presented of the evidence to the parte representations ment’s after jury, ascertaining we are limited to wheth itself fact, not to the ex discussion er, in most viewing light the evidence counsel’s that was done under defense government, favorable to the see United objection. very without nose 989, Talley, States v. 164 F.3d 996 argues further that Carmi- The dissent denied, Cir.), 1137, cert. U.S. S.Ct. adversely rights were chael’s substantial (1999), 1793, “any L.Ed.2d 1020 ra “because the made affected fact could have found the tional trier of during the ex commu- misstatements beyond a elements of the crime essential corrected, that, have if would nication Virginia, doubt.” Jackson v. reasonable the district court to review prompted 319, 2781, S.Ct. Op. at 526- in camera.” Dis. documents (1979) (emphasis original). L.Ed.2d 560 nature of speculative 27. Aside from the conclusion, there is no basis such argues that there Carmichael would that the documents fact believe jury insufficient for a to con evidence any been of value to Carmichael have attempted property that he to obtain clude gov- testimony. Adams’s impeaching right under color of official from Adams to the affirmatively represented ernment is no evidence that Carmi because there and the district court was within contrary, explicitly told Adams words chael ever government’s rep- rights accept its you give “if me the effect that do Hernandez, at resentation. See you prose I will to it that are money, see 360-61. answer is that under cuted.” The short Act, pay- and the the Hobbs official help “[t]he cannot but note the Finally, we dissent, quid pro quo as- or need not state adopted by tone strident the law’s disregard express [Otherwise for terms.... serting majority’s “total Amendment,” by knowing be frustrated effect could meaning of the Sixth nods.” See Evans v. United purported our “desec- winks and Op. Dis. States, 255, 274, 112 U.S. S.Ct. protectors oath “to serve as ratfion]” (1992) J., con Constitution,” (Kennedy, Dis. 119 L.Ed.2d 57 of the United States reasonably A could have curring). jury unwillingness and the dissent’s Op. at jus- “understanding” Carmicha miscarriage found that party to “be a to this that Adams would el had with Adams was Op. at 523. We find such tice.” Dis. payments cash to Carmi light than on make substantial rhetoric to shed more heat us, continu respectfully exchange chael in before and we the issue gam illegal conduct his ing is to let Adams that none of these accusations suggest being end, without the risk of only thing bling operations “de- justified. by Carmichael. collegiality. prosecuted language secrated” such shortly attorney also asserts contact Carmichael after Carmichael charged with a new offense in [police] “none of the officers involved testi Adams was prohibited, late 1997. fied that the Defendant dis any or couraged, [sic] otherwise stalked that there Carmichael also asserts any to criminal attempt by agency pursue attempt evidence that was no Carmichael charges against illegal gam Adams for his property by from Adams ed to obtain there, bling anything or else.” From Car “wrongful use of actual or threatened “[cjlearly, michael reasons that if there force, violence, jury, or fear.” howev kind, any had been a deal of the involved er, reasonably have found that the could officers would have noted such deals implication of re intended Carmichael’s investigative argu their This repprts.” quest very large for a cash contribution ment is meritless for several reasons. pay, that if did not was Adams Carmichael exhaustive, one of those being Without would cause Adams to be arrested and Carmichael, any of reasons is that and not prosecuted, or would assist federal author officers, police public was the official in prosecuting ities Adams. We therefore ultimately responsi who would have been government produced conclude that (or prosecuting prosecuting) ble for jury sufficient evidence for a rational to Another Adams. reason is under violating convict Carmichael of the Hobbs Act, public a official who de Hobbs has Act. in exchange manded funds for official ac tion need not on good or inaction make his Challenge D. to the exclusion of a quid pro quo end of the in order for his defense witness demand to be considered extortion. See proffered Carmichael the testimo States, 255, 268, Evans v. United ny Guffy, assigned of David the detective (1992) 119 L.Ed.2d 57 If to Carmichael’s office. called to the (“[T]he at completed offense is the time stand, argues, Guffy Carmichael Det. when the official public payment receives would have testified that had agreement perform return for his to that he trying up said to set Adams acts; specific quid official fulfillment of the making illegal campaign contributions. offense.”). pro quo not an element of the allegedly Because Carmichael told this to Guffy any Det. before Carmichael had rea points Carmichael also out that know that son to law enforcement officials taped “[t]he conversations are devoid of him, investigating were Carmichael claims by references the Defendant to his elected Guffy’s testimony that Det. would have status, position, his law enforcement jury apt made the more to believe Carmi any power prosecute, to or other authori explanation apparent chael’s that his extor ty.” He appears suggesting to be reality tion of Adams was in attempt public money for a official to extort order legitimate investigation conduct a covert right, from someone under color of official Adams. The following explicitly the official must remind the vic colloquy Guffy’s with counsel Det. about official, tim that public he is a and that he proposed testimony, concluded that it power things happen has the to make bad hearsay. would be inadmissible Because to the victim if he does not accede to the ruling, of this Carmichael did not call Det. explicit implicit official’s demand for Guffy testify. payment. authority Carmichael cites no support argument, reject such an agree we We with the district court that event, In any it. there can be question Guffy’s testimony no Det. would have been 801(c) us that hearsay. case before Adams was well Fed.R.Evid. (defining See statement, aware of position “hearsay” and his as “a other than one Indeed, power prosecute Adams. made testifying the declarant while very hearing, was the reason that Adams had his the trial or offered evidence

521 asserted.”). truth of the matter er Carmichael was available as a witness. prove the fact, Carmichael, that Det. concedes See Fed.R.Evid. 803. The argument that testimony was intended to show Guffy’s Guffy’s testimony Det. was un- admissible Guffy just 803(3), that Carmichael told Det. however, not der Rule was not ad- Adams, “that investigating that he was but vanced in Pinney the district court. See actually] conducting his [Carmichael Transport Dock & v. Penn Co. Central Adams.” investigation own (6th Cir.1988) 1445, Corp., 838 F.2d 1461 (“ general ‘It is the rule ... that a federal stand, Had Carmichael taken the appellate court does not consider an issue Guffy’s testimony might Det. have been ”) passed upon (quoting Single- not below.’ with admissible as statement consistent 106, 120, v. Wulff, ton 96 S.Ct. testimony and offered to re 2868, (1976)). 49 L.Ed.2d 826 only charge but a that Carmichael had recently fabricated the idea he was event, any even if had investigating Adams. See Fed.R.Evid. argument raised the district 801(d)(1) (providing that a witness’s state Guffy’s we have doubts whether Det. testi is ment that “consistent with declar mony would have been admissible under testimony ant’s and ... offered to rebut an 803(3). Rule United States v. See LeMas express implied charge against or the de ter, (6th Cir.1995) (ob 1224, 54 F.3d 1231 improper clarant of recent fabrication or serving that in order for a statement to be hearsay influence or motive” is not if the 803(3), admissible under Rule “the declar- subject declarant testifies and is to cross- opportunity ant must not have had an statement). regarding examination misrepre reflect and fabricate or possibly testify, But a ma Carmichael did thoughts”). beyond sent his It is not jor prohibition hearsay reason for the on possibility realm of that Carmichael in precisely prevent litigants evidence Adams, money tended to extort from but introducing from second-hand statements misrepresented thoughts had to Det. they thinking doing about what were Guffy hedge in an attempt to his bet subjecting without themselves to cross-ex something might go wrong event la See, e.g., Anderson v. amination. United ter, even if Carmichael did not know at the States, 211, 220, 2253, 417 94 41 U.S. S.Ct. target investiga time that he was the of an (1974) (“The primary justifica L.Ed.2d 20 tion. hearsay lack tion for the exclusion of is the any opportunity adversary for the applicable standard review re cross-examine the absent declarant whose garding rulings hearsay ap on evidence out-of-court statement is introduced into pears to be somewhat unsettled within the States, evidence.”); Cannady v. United Belew, Stalbosky v. Compare circuit. (D.C.Cir.1965) (“The 796, (6th Cir.2000) (observing F.3d purpose hearsay prohibit rule is to traditionally that this court has reviewed unsworn, ... the use of uncross-examined de novo district court conclusions about testimony as in a substantive evidence proffered hearsay) whether evidence is case.”). Inc., Express, Trepel Roadway with v. (6th Cir.1999) Guffy’s testimony might (concluding

Whether Det. F.3d 716-17 admissible, Supreme also have been as Carmichael Court’s decision Gen Joiner, argues, exception now under the to the eral Electric Co. U.S. (1997), hearsay permits rule that the admission 139 L.Ed.2d 508 regarding silently overruled this court’s “heretofore statements declarant’s “then emotion,” hearsay existing precedent state of mind Fed. well-settled eviden- [or] 803(3), tiary are de appear rulings R.Evid. would to be a rea- reviewed novo” review). un- We sonably question. Admissibility requires close abuse-of-discretion 803(3) conclude, however, that court’s depend der Rule does not on wheth- (1992) (“We today be dis- hold that the Govern- ruling on this issue should not only public turbed under either standard. ment need show that a official he was payment has obtained a which Jury E. instructions entitled, knowing payment the that acts.”). To was made return for official argues that the district Carmichael arguing the extent that Carmichael is that jury faulty court’s instructions the were First, required the district court was to instruct respects. in two he asserts that the that, the in order to convict Carmi- regarding spe- jury court’s instructions Second, chael, it that cific intent were defective. he had conclude Carmichael Act, that the district after di- intended to violate the Hobbs we re- contends I recting judgment acquittal ject argument unsupported by of on Count the as the indictment, appropriately the failed to law. jury not instruct the to consider evidence argues that the Carmichael also during that to the count related dismissed by only requiring district court erred that II. its deliberations on Count jury the find that Carmichael’s behavior argument regarding the fearful, made Adams and not that Carmi appears lack of a specific-intent instruction inspire chael intended his behavior to Collins, based on be United States 78 argument supported by fear. This is not Cir.1996), n. F.3d 9 which the record. court The district instructed he proposition cites for the that the district jury that if enough public “it is the court required jury was to instruct official him person giving knew that that, Carmichael, in order to convict it had thing expectation of value had the that conclude that he intended to violate the public official extend would some bene Collins, law. In which Act was Hobbs fit or refrain from some harmful action case, this court observed in a footnote thing return for the of value.” We find jury had received “the in- standard the instruction to be a correct statement intent, i.e., specific struction” on that “the what Carmichael must have known in or prove beyond must a reason- guilty der to be of extortion under the able doubt that the defendant knowingly Hobbs Act. did an act which the law forbids or know- ingly failed to do an act which the law addition, In Carmichael asserts requires, purposely intending to violate the that the district court’s instruction to the law.” Id. jury regarding the dismissed count of the

The Collins court not hold did that this indictment was defective. The district fact, required. instruction was In a num jury court instructed the that Carmichael “only ber other courts have concluded in particular was on trial for the crime See, indictment,” Hobbs Act cases that it e.g., charged is not. and that the Arena, job United States v. 918 F.Supp. jury’s deciding was “limited to whether (N.D.N.Y.1996) (concluding that a con proved has the crime addition, viction for Act Hobbs extortion does not charged.” the district court intent); require a finding specific gave Unit the instruction that “for reasons that Furey, ed States v. F.Supp. you should speculate not consider [or] (E.D.Pa.) about, 1058-59 (concluding that because Count One of indictment is no “knowingly” “willfully” words such as longer your consideration.” Carmicha conspicuously are absent from requested the Hobbs el the district court also Act, ordinary criminal jury law rule that instruct the that the dismissed count “ignorance of the law is no excuse” applies), testimony of the indictment “involved the (3d 'd, Cir.1980); decorations,” 636 F.2d 1211 regarding the Christmas and aff States, see also Evans v. jury United speculate regard U.S. “should not 255, 268, 119 L.Ed.2d 57 ing pertaining the evidence to Count One.” KEITH, Judge, dissenting. Circuit requests. rejected both The district counsel to ex- attempt by no There was distressing majority opinion is a The what, wrong was with opinion, in his plain meaning of the disregard for the total instruction, and there proposed court’s to the United States Amendment Sixth by counsel. objection no further the law of this Circuit. Constitution any dis identified counsel, has not right to effective assistance in court’s Constitution, cernible error “requires assured as (“No Fed.R.Crim.P. structions. See every represented a defendant be any portion of assign as error may party States stage of his trial.” United critical Cir.1992) unless (6th therefrom charge 870, or omission the Minsky, F.2d 874 963 v. jury the objects thereto before party Cronic, 466 U.S. (citing United States v. verdict, stating dis its 2039, to consider 648, 25, retires L.Ed.2d n. 104 S.Ct. 80 659 party ob tinctly (1984)). the matter to which guarantee This 657 constitutional objection.”); jects grounds and the ex prohibition to as a near absolute stands 1031, Leombruni, 1035 F.3d v. 200 Pena government the conferences between parte Cir.1999) (discussing analogous Civil keeping In with and the district court. (“An 51) to instructions is objection Rule I must ex- guarantee, fundamental this ... distinctly failure state by a to outrage forfeited my deep disappointment press It is not objection. grounds of the Condoning the majority’s the decision. with instruction.”) a correct propose to enough the trial between parte ex discussions marks, (brackets, quotation tolerated, internal be court and cannot — denied, omitted), U.S. cert. citation miscar- party I not a and will be 2207, 240 —, 147 L.Ed.2d 120 S.Ct. Accordingly, respectful- I justice. riage ly dissent. (2000). case, indictment con- the present In the judicial proceeding is of a “The value counts, is no and there only two

tained is process where the substantially diluted already knew which jury that the question does not have the court parte, ex because Re- conduct. pertained to which count instrument available the fundamental instruction proposed the additional garding adversary proceed- judgment: an judicial about “the evi- jury speculate may participate.” parties ing which both One,” it we find to Count pertaining dence President & Comm’rs Carroll v. how difficult understand 183, Anne, 175, 89 S.Ct. 393 Princess U.S. he clarified what would have proposal (1968). 347, This state- 21 L.Ed.2d 325 We instruction. was an unclear claims ment, by Supreme Court articulated the has conclude that therefore Indeed, this 1968, today. true is no less jury objections to the preserve his failed very Court’s adopted Supreme Court instructions, error of plain and we find no ex distaste for espousing our words us to over- type that would authorize Minsky, See proceedings. parte ruling in the ab- the district court’s turn Carroll, (citing 393 U.S. at 874 objection. See United proper sence of 347). S.Ct. Olano, v. States Minsky, this Court United States (1993) (explaining L.Ed.2d (“Minsky”) ap- Minsky’s L. heard Gerald “plain error” function proper mail and wire from his convictions peal Rules of Criminal rule under Federal kill a horse for conspiracy fraud and Procedure). Af- F.2d at 871. proceeds. insurance testified witnesses ter two III. CONCLUSION requested, pursu- Minsky, Minsky against Act, § U.S.C. above, ant to the Jencks forth set For all of reasons state- produce prior the prosecution conviction. we AFFIRM Carmichael’s by ‘overlooked,’ might ments made the witnesses. See id. at munication be ‘the bur- Specifically, requested Minsky 872. Fed- proving prejudice den of lack of on ” Bureau of Investigation eral forms con- [government], heavy and it is a one.’ Id. statements, taining 860). the witnesses’ Haller, but the (quoting my 409 F.2d at To prosecution objected. See id. In resolv- bewilderment, majority distorts Sixth situation, ing the the district court held an precedent Circuit in an effort to circum- forms, in camera review of followed vent the I teachings Minsky.1 strongly private with prosecu- conversation object. appeal, Minsky tion. id. See On chal- Initially, majority correctly demon- conviction, lenged arguing that the ex strates this strong preference Court’s 'parte perverted conference his trial. See discourage ex ma- conferences. The id. at 871. that, jority acknowledges “in all but the Timbers, Ultimately, Judge speaking on circumstances, exceptional most Court, behalf of this held with communications the court are an ex- parte court’s ex prose- conference with the Furthermore, traordinarily bad idea.” the grounds cution was indeed for reversal. majority notes that this Court has held id. at 873-74. The See Court did not soft- parte that ex gross communications are “a Instead, pedal against the issue. it railed breach of appearance justice.” the of Fi- the exclusion of a criminal defendant from nally, majority recognizes that “the proceedings crucial to his trial. The Court government’s burden of demonstrating resolutely declared that “[t]he constitution prejudiced defendant was not by requires that a represented defendant be parte ex heavy communication is ‘a every stage at critical of trial.” Id. at ” one.’ articulating After pro- this Court’s continued, 874. The Court only “not is it a parte found distaste for ex communications gross appearance justice breach of the of and acknowledging jurisdiction the Court’s principal when the defendant’s adversary to consider Carmichael’s Sixth Amendment given is private access to the ear of the claim, majority then in engages curso- court, it is a dangerous procedure.” Id. ry analysis summarily before rejecting Robbins, (quoting Haller v. 409 F.2d Carmichael’s claims. (1st Cir.1969)). proper The analysis begins Indeed, with a fair it dangerous procedure. is a Ex determination of whether a defendant parte at ob- very conferences tear heart of jected parte to the ex a communication. defendant’s fair trial severely under- objects When a defendant contemporane- mine judicial process. confidence our such, ously parte communication, As to the ex only this our Court allows for ex parte analysis proceeds directly conferences under a the narrowest of determina- tion of Minsky, government circumstances. In this whether the Court not- has dem- parte ed that onstrated proceedings only compelling “[e ]x ‘can state interest and justified be by prejudice and allowed lack of compelling to the defendant. See ” state Minsky, interests.’ Id. at 874 (quoting In re 963 F.2d at 874. After a careful (2d Cir.1977)). Taylor, record, review of the I find that Carmicha- The Court stated that “[a]lthough sufficiently there el preserved this issue for re- are circumstances where an ex parte com- by view this Court. majority

1. The mischaracterizes and legally dilutes standards are majority’s distinct. The requirements Minsky, concluding the the of improperly invented gov- standard lowers the government only need "articulate” a "rea- "heavy” ernment's burden to demonstrate a justification” parte sonable ence. The for the ex confer- Moreover, compelling state interest. majority manufactures its own wholly unsupported standard by the law of standard, justification” "reasonable and sub- respectfully reject this Circuit. I majori- "compelling stitutes this standard for the state ty's proposed standard. imposed by interest” Minsky. standard These court,” Fed. R.Crim. the attention court re- open During a discussion 52(b), Appeals’ power “[t]he Pro. Court for disclo- request garding 52(b) signifi- is limited three material, under Rule Brady Jencks sure of respects.” Id. cant de- both judge instructed court district ap- and the counsel fense error in limitation is that the “The first then the bench. proach must have occurred question that this dis- judge to the district stated accord, 629; at proceedings.” Id. court “without be conducted should cussion Olano, 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. i.e., In them,” counsel. without defense (1993). Thomas, this 123 L.Ed.2d 508 suggestion counsel’s to defense response legal from a held “that a deviation Court appropriate was the the trial court an error within the mean- rule constitutes propriety authority to determine 52(b) long as the rule has Rule so ing of discussions, permit- court the district these by the defendant.” not been waived private After parte ex conference. ted the “that the The Court noted F.3d 629. eight pages that constitute discussions to make a failure of a defendant mere record, an- transcripted does not consti- timely right assertion of a represen- satisfaction with nounced its waiver, rather, constitutes a tute a but In ob- government. made tations that in those circumstances forfeiture and acceptance 52(b) court’s jecting to the district is not extin- under Rule an error representations, Here, ex government’s commu- Id. guished.” by the district counsel was assured defense a deviation from well- nications were were “sufficient” that his concerns which Carmichael legal court rule established Therefore, the record. Defendant has for did not waive. requirement. the first satisfied clear dissatis- Despite defense counsel’s au- government appellate of the on with the actions “The second limitation faction 52(b) majority con- that the error thority under Rule is and the district ” Olano, (quoting not 507 attorney did Id. at 630 ‘plain.’ that “Carmichael’s be cludes 1770). 734, ex majority ana- Because U.S. at 113 S.Ct. object.” Accordingly, generally are disallowed parte to Fed- conferences pursuant claim lyzes Carmichael’s 52(b). Circuit, Minsky, of see the law this Procedure under Rule of Criminal eral 874, “plain.” error is F.2d at However, reading the record 963 thorough a of by Defendant objection an demonstrates appellate au- limitation on “The third unnecessary. analysis rendering this 52(b) plain ‘is that the thority Rule under ” un- analysis is maintaining that this While Thom- rights.’ affect[s] substantial error claim meets I find necessary, Olano, as, 507 U.S. (quoting 11 at 630 F.3d by Rule scrutiny required heightened 1770). Generally, “the 734, 113 at S.Ct. 52(b). means rights’ ‘affect substantial phrase asserted the sense object during ‘prejudicial’ fails to Where a defendant 52(b) affected the outcome ‘must have Rule error prosecution, a federal criminal ” United proceedings.’ court the district with the discretion appellate courts vests (6th 615, 622 Hayes, 218 F.3d plain error. States these claims for to review 734, Cir.2000) Olano, at 507 U.S. (quoting correctly majority states The 1770). However, Supreme 113 S.Ct. regard- claim hear Carmichael’s Court can noted, recognized, this Circuit Court it raised of whether was less “[tjhere category Thomas, may special be a 11 that In States v. court. United corrected re- can be Cir.1993), errors that 620, forfeited this Court 629-30 F.3d the outcome” affect on gardless of them appellate re- requirements for outlined the prej- presumed be that should errors and “errors “[pjlain plain error. While view a cannot make may if defendant rights udicial affecting substantial or defects Olano, 507 showing prejudice.” specific brought not although they were noticed be 526 735, 1770; objected Having at see also found that Defendant

U.S. parte having and also proceeding, to the ex Supreme at 622. The Hayes, 218 F.3d found that the claim deserves correction examples types listed as of these Court analysis, “plain under a error” the sole where “a criminal trial errors instances question government is whether the has function a vehi- reliably cannot serve its as Minsky. 963 F.2d met its burden under guilt for determination of or innocence cle Minsky, parte pro- “[e ]x at 874. Under Fulminante, ...” Arizona v. ceedings only justified ‘can be and allowed L.Ed.2d S.Ct. ” by compelling state interests.’ Id. More- (1991). By allowing parte conferences over, only this Court can “overlook” an ex trial, during before and the district parte prejudicial communication if it is not willingness demonstrated a to share inti- Id. the defendant. government with while mate discourse I conclude that has affinity an excluding Defendant. Once be- present compelling failed to a state inter- govern- tween the district court and the justify est to the ex communications. established, ment has been Although government undoubtedly has a ability court’s to serve as neutral arbiter strong protecting interest the details suspect. affinity perverts This the ad- on-going drug investigation, of its this in- process versarial and creates intoler- protected through terest could been have partiality. Supreme able air Court fact, less intrusive measures. In as noted found that a trial conducted before “a by majority, representation simple judge impartial” who to be a [i]s open court that the affecting “structural defect the framework sought material Defendant did not contain which the trial Id. proceeds.” within Brady material would have satisfied both 309-10, light 1246. S.Ct. Hernandez, F.3d Minsky majority’s foregoing, the conclusion that (6th Cir.1994). Oddly, while Hernandez the ex communications did not affect rely allows the district court to on state- rights Carmichael’s substantial offends by prosecutors concerning ments the ab- opens traditional of fairness notions and Brady possession, sence of material in its prosecutorial the door for abuse. government the. opted engage to unnec- Having concluded that Carmichael’s essary protracted parte and ex discussions “[p]lain affecting claim is a ... error[ ] government, with the district court. The rights,” substantial Fed. Pro. [his] R.Crim. having representations elected to make be- 52(b), analysis the turns on whether this yond those deemed sufficient Hernan- dez, should required representa- Court exercise its discretion to cor was to make its open Supreme government rect the error. The has tions court. The fails Court sufficiently compelling to state a reason for appeals stated that of “[t]he court should excluding Defendant from these discus- plain a error affecting correct forfeited Moreover, any sions. state interest in ex rights ‘seriously substantial if the error parte government discussions the between fairness, integrity public the affect[s] ” outweighed by and the trial court is the judicial of reputation proceedings.’ Ola resulting prejudice to Carmichael. no, Atkinson, (quoting United States 157, 160, 80 L.Ed. previously, As stated “the burden of (1936)). matter, genuine this no proving prejudice lack [govern- of is on the dispute parte exists as to whether the ex ment], heavy it a Minsky, and one.” compromised conference below “the fair Haller, at (quoting F.2d ness, integrity, and public reputation 860). argues the con- Therefore, judicial proceedings.” Id. prejudicial adversely ference and af- authority, Court has the and indeed rights the fected his substantial because the duty, to review claim. government during his made misstatements in criminal that, allowing parte proceedings ex if cor- communication parie the ea: cases. the rected, prompted have would between parte in camera. communications Ex the documents to review

court deprive the and the court government asser- veracity of Carmichael’s Putting precise con- of notice defendant aside,2 of the district failure tions op- an communications and tent of the to opportunity counsel to afford defense respond. These communi- to portunity rep- government’s to respond hear and thereby can create both cations right to his Defendant denied resentations and the impropriety appearance of Allowing of counsel.3 assistance effective Even actual misconduct. possibility to the access unfettered good acts where adversarial undermines ear court’s attempts present diligently faith and judi- appearance taints the and process parte an ex fairly during information rul- court’s The district impartiality. cial informa- government’s proceeding, “may have well Brady material on the ing and to be less reliable likely tion is fact that only to the been due not findings less accu- ultimate the court’s but, first, even pitch in his got prosecutor had been if the defendant rate than relationship, very to the insidiously, more im- However participate. permitted thought may it have been as innocent be, may mean to a partial prosecutor Hal- be, disclosures.” permitted such advocate, to stat- accustomed is an he govern- ler, Since F.2d at 859-60. An ex side of the case. ing only one burden of substantial met its ment has not places a proceeding substantial parte Carmichael, prejudice lack of proving judge perform upon a trial burden compelling failed to demonstrate and has func- naturally properly a what is interest, communication parte this ex state tion of an advocate. exceptions fall within the narrow does Napue, 834 F.2d United States v. Minsky. outlined Cir.1987) (citations omitted); 1318-19 (2d between the communication parte An ex accord, Taylor, 567 F.2d In re trial court and the Haller, counsel government’s Cir.1977); 409 F.2d at 859-60. communications, right pro- to due such Moreover, parte denies defendant ex Fur- below, representation. guidelines. ethical and effective violate cess as that 3(A)(4) con- Associ- an ex the American Bar ther, considers this Court Canon appearance Conduct states breach of the of Judicial “gross ation Code ference nor ... initiate of his neither judge a defendant should justice” deprives “[a] or other communications jurist perverts consider impartial to an right pro- impending pending Minsky, concerning process. the adversarial 2(A) 859). Further, provides Canon Haller, ceedings.” F.2d at (quoting at 874 comply respect and issue, judge “[a] other should import of this the Recognizing himself at conduct law should and dangers of with emphasized the circuits have Carmi- any not of value documents were ... majority "the dissent asserts that 2. The However, presented rights has chael. argues Carmichael's substantial misleading govern- adversely prosecutor affected ‘because made were evidence that the during undoubtedly made misstatements ment trial to the statements corrected, that, have would if communication potential relin- review and an in camera avoid doc- review the prompted district court to possession documents in its quishment of the " a dis- is camera.' This assertion uments in misstate- prosecutor’s The to Carmichael. truth. tortion of the "an indi- constitute the district court ments to misconduct,” eliminating the thus cation there is majority opinion concludes 3. The govern- truth bestowed on presumption of in fact to believe document "no basis Hernandez, Accord- F.3dat361. ment any Carmichael.” value to have been of would govern- majority's reliance on ingly, the conclusion, majority re- reaching this misplaced. is ment's assurances government's on the assertion lies promotes public in a manner that all times integrity impartiality

confidence in the and judiciary.” protection The afforded

criminal defendants from ex commu- court and

nications between the district merely is “not a matter of prosecutor

ethics; part right it is of a defendant’s representation.” process

due effective

Haller, F.2d at 861. judicial system premised

Our criminal rights certain fundamental upon —the counsel,

right to effective assistance of judge jury, the

right impartial to an innocence,

right presumption process. majority

right opin- to due guarantees.

ion vitiates each of these basic judges

As we have sworn to this Court protectors

serve as of the United States majority

Constitution. The desecrates

that sacred oath. Consistent with the rea- above, vehemently

sons stated I dissent. NOLAN,

In re: Sahnica Denise Debtor.

Chrysler Corporation, Financial

Appellee, Nolan, Appellant.

Sahnica Denise

No. 99-5676. Appeals,

United States Court of

Sixth Circuit.

Submitted: June

Decided and Filed: Oct.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Lawrence Ray Carmichael

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Oct 20, 2000

Citation: 232 F.3d 510

Docket Number: 99-5179

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.