UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Brandon LAUREYS, Appellant.
No. 10-3047.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued May 10, 2011. Decided Aug. 19, 2011.
Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 6, 2011.
In light of these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court‘s refusal to issue further discovery orders without a showing that there was a basis for believing that the requests satisfied the CMO‘s predicate conditions.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, the district court‘s denial of Al Alwi‘s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
Affirmed.
Patricia A. Heffernan, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Ronald C. Machen, Jr., U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Julieanne Himelstein, and Amy H. Zubrensky, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: HENDERSON, BROWN and KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the Court filed PER CURIAM.
Opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.
Opinion dissenting in part filed by Circuit Judge BROWN.
PER CURIAM:
Brandon Laureys appeals his conviction for attempted enticement of a minor under
I
The present case arises from Laureys‘s online communication in 2008 with Detective Timothy Palchak, who was impersonating a child molester with access to a minor. Unfortunately, this was not Laureys‘s first encounter with Palchak.
Laureys first communicated with Palchak in 2006, in a Yahoo chat room. Palchak was posing as a twelve-year-old girl
Laureys was out on probation when the events relevant to this case took place. In November 2008, Palchak—this time playing the part of an adult male—nabbed Laureys again. Palchak‘s alter ego, “Jim,” employing the username “DaughterLover_Maryland,” advertised on an “Incest Forum Meeting Place” at IncestTaboo.com that he was a 38-year-old white male “into no limit fun.” His advertisement bore the warning “Discreet only.” The next day Laureys responded to Jim‘s advertisement via Yahoo private message. After exchanging their “stats” (age, sex, and location), the men started discussing their sexual interest in young girls. When “Jim” asked “what ages are your fav[orites]?” Laureys responded, “9-11 or 12 maybe . . . maybe 8. maybe 13 . . . [I] can[‘]t pick . . . love [th]em all lol.”1 When Laureys learned that Jim‘s girlfriend frequently brought her nine-year-old daughter over to Jim‘s place and that Jim had been “messing around” with the girl, Laureys expressed excitement, requested photos of the girl, and ultimately asked to be invited over to “help with the little girl.” Laureys assured Jim he would “make sure she wants to do it,” and offered to “watch her an[d] [Jim] [un]til she feels more comfortable.” When Jim said he “would love to see her with another” man, Laureys replied enthusiastically that he “would definitely be all about that,” adding that he would “teach her to take two at once.” After Jim electronically sent a girl‘s picture to Laureys during the chat, Laureys expressed excitement, told Jim “you . . . NEED to let me hang out with her[,] man,” and asked him in explicit terms about his sexual conduct with the girl depicted in the photograph.
In the course of this conversation, Laureys and “Jim” arranged to meet each other. Jim initially suggested “get[ting] a beer first to make sure we are comfortable[,] then hav[ing] fun at my [place].” Instead, Laureys proposed meeting at Jim‘s home “if you got anything fun we could watch or something while we‘re there.” Eventually, the men arranged to meet each other at an address near Jim‘s apartment, and Jim asked Laureys to call him.
During a gap of more than two minutes in the time-stamped chat transcript, Laureys called Jim. Laureys and Palchak agree there was no mention of the girl during the unrecorded phone call. Laureys testified at trial that in the phone call he reassured Jim he was discreet and said “I just want a quick blow job and go. My girlfriend doesn‘t even know that I still mess with guys.” According to Laureys, Jim responded, “Okay, we‘re on the same page.” Palchak testified, however, that during the phone call, Jim asked Laureys if he was discreet, the men exchanged physical descriptions again, and Laureys described the car he would be driving.
The men quickly ended their chat, and Laureys left in his car to meet Jim. When he reached the address Jim had provided, Laureys was arrested.
At trial, Laureys testified in his own defense, and Palchak testified for the prosecution. At the close of all the evidence, Laureys moved for a judgment of acquit
The jury convicted on all counts. The district court sentenced Laureys to ten years (the mandatory minimum) under
II
Laureys argues the Government‘s evidence was insufficient to prove his intent to persuade a minor to engage in sexual activity under
A
Laureys devotes just two pages in each of his briefs to the sufficiency of the evidence. His only argument against both counts is that the evidence does not prove his intent to have sex with a minor. According to Laureys, the transcript of his chat shows he only wanted a quick and legal liaison with “Jim.” Laureys‘s references to the fictional girl were, he says, pure fantasy. Laureys points to certain turns of phrase, such as “down low,” “discreet,” and “perv out” that he says are consistent with his intent to engage in same-sex intercourse with an adult male, but not an underage girl. Even if we were to accept the connotations Laureys attributes to these phrases, and which he argued to the jury, we would have no basis for reversing the jury‘s conviction. The rest of the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, permitted the jury reasonably to find Laureys meant what he said, whether or not he also intended to have sex with Jim.
Laureys is a self-described “bisexual . . . sexual addict” with a “sexual attraction to children” that he expects to “live with the rest of [his] life.” Tr. 5/26/2010, at 316, 373. Laureys admits he intended to have sex with a fictitious twelve-year-old girl in 2006, id. at 318, and he responded to DaughterLover_Maryland‘s advertisement on a website that he admitted to frequenting “as part of [his] sexual attraction” to little girls, id. at 365—a website Detective Palchak described as a meeting place for persons seeking sex with children. Tr. 5/25/2010, at 144. Laureys chatted in explicit terms about sexual conduct with a particular nine-year-old girl Jim said frequented his apartment. Laureys asked for pictures of the girl and pleaded with Jim, “you . . . NEED to let me hang out with her[,] man.” Laureys then arranged to meet Jim at his apartment. Viewed together, this evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury‘s findings that Laureys attempted to persuade Jim to grant him sexual access to a child and then travelled to the District for the purpose of engaging in sexual conduct with her.
B
The dissent objects sua sponte to the district court‘s instruction that the jury could convict under
Whoever, using . . . any . . . means of interstate . . . commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
We need not wade into this question of statutory interpretation because Laureys has not raised it.2 Laureys asked “Jim” in no uncertain terms to grant him access to the girl Jim claimed to be molesting, and that is the theory under which the jury convicted him. It is not our duty to sift the trial record for novel arguments a defendant could have made but did not. See Potter v. District of Columbia, 558 F.3d 542, 553 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Williams, J., concurring) (“[J]udges ‘are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in briefs’ or the record.” (quoting United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991))). Moreover, the instruction at issue was proposed jointly by the defense and the prosecution, Dist. Ct. Docket No. 30, at 4-5, and “[i]f a defendant invites error by the district court, he is ‘barred from complaining about it on appeal.‘” United States v. Ginyard, 215 F.3d 83, 88 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Harrison, 103 F.3d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
Even if Laureys had properly challenged on appeal the district court‘s formulation of the requisite intent, our review would be for plain error because he did not object to the jury instructions at trial. See United States v. Bryant, 523 F.3d 349, 353 (D.C. Cir. 2008). Under that standard, Laureys would have to establish “(1) a legal error that was (2) plain (a term that is synonymous with clear or obvious), and that (3) affected his substantial rights.” Id. (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “Even if these three conditions are met, we will correct a plain error as a matter of discretion only if the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 353-54 (quotation marks and alterations omitted).
Laureys cannot make the basic threshold showing of plain error. “Generally an error is plain if it contradicts circuit or Supreme Court precedent.” In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851 (D.C. Cir. 2009). The district court‘s instructions contradicted no precedents of this Court or the Supreme Court. Rarely do we find an error to be plain where “this court has not ruled on the question.” United States v. Thomas, 896 F.2d 589, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
C
According to Judge Brown, we should also reverse Laureys‘s conviction under
III
Laureys claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to call some potential witnesses to testify in his defense. Specifically, Laureys says his lawyer should have secured the testimony of Laureys‘s psychologist and two men with whom Laureys had engaged in sex-oriented online chats. This testimony, Laureys argues, would have proven he lacked the requisite intent for each of his convictions.
In order to succeed on a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show two things: (1) that counsel‘s performance was deficient, and (2) that the deficient
When a colorable claim of ineffective assistance is made for the first time on direct appeal, this Court generally will remand the claim for an evidentiary hearing “unless the trial record alone conclusively shows that the defendant either is or is not entitled to relief.” United States v. Rashad, 331 F.3d 908, 909-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard, we remand Laureys‘s ineffective assistance claims for analysis by the district court in the first instance.
IV
The district court sentenced Laureys to a ten-year term of supervised release following imprisonment. Laureys challenges the conditions of supervised release that prohibit him, without the probation office‘s prior approval, from loitering in arcades and parks, among other places where children congregate; possessing “any type of camera or video recording device“; and “patroniz[ing] any place where pornography or erotica can be accessed.” Laureys also challenges the requirements that he keep a log of all internet addresses he accesses and that he consent to disclosure to his employer of the computer-related restrictions.
A sentencing court has discretion to impose any condition of supervised release that is “reasonably related” to “the nature and circumstances of the offense“; “the history and characteristics of the defendant“; the deterrence of criminal conduct; the protection of the public from the defendant; and the effective provision of educational, vocational, medical, or correctional services to the defendant; provided the condition is consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines and “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.”
Because Laureys did not object at sentencing to the conditions of his supervised release, our review is for plain error. See Burroughs, 613 F.3d at 240. On plain error review, we will vacate a condition of supervised release only if it is “plainly out of sync with the statutory goals enumerated in
His challenges to the restrictions on loitering in arcades and parks and on possessing a camera are foreclosed by United States v. Love, a child pornography case with similar facts to Laureys‘s, in which we upheld the same conditions on plain error review. 593 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Especially in light of Laureys‘s requests for photographs of his child-victims, we cannot conclude these conditions are “plainly out of sync” with “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,”
For the same reason, Laureys cannot succeed in his challenge to the ban on patronizing any place where pornography can be accessed. In United States v. Sullivan, we dismissed as “meritless” a challenge to the same condition by a defendant
Finally, the computer-related conditions of supervised release are not plainly erroneous. For good reason, Laureys does not challenge the most restrictive of these—a total ban on the possession or use of a computer with internet access without prior approval from the probation office. We upheld the same condition on review for abuse of discretion in Love. 593 F.3d at 12. Because the defendant in that case had also “solicited sex with Palchak‘s fictitious daughter” online, we concluded the broad restriction on internet access “[was] properly tailored to the circumstances of the offense and [the defendant‘s] background, and it [was] reasonably necessary to deter future misconduct and to protect children.” Id. The more limited restrictions Laureys does challenge come nowhere close to plain error. We vacated a similar log-keeping requirement in United States v. Burroughs, because “Burroughs did not use a computer to facilitate his crimes.” 613 F.3d at 242. But Laureys did. In the offenses underlying both the present case and his 2006 conviction, Laureys used the internet to facilitate criminal sexual conduct with minors. That Laureys will need the probation office‘s permission to use the internet is likely relevant to an employer‘s decision to hire him. So too are the requirements that he log his internet access and that he “submit to periodic unannounced examinations of . . . any computer accessed by him“—a condition Laureys does not appeal. “We see no reason why potential employers should not be made aware of [these] fact[s].” Burroughs, 613 F.3d at 246.
V
For the foregoing reasons, we reject Laureys‘s challenges to his conviction and to the conditions imposed on his term supervised release, but we remand for an evidentiary hearing on whether his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
So ordered.
KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant must show . . . that his lawyer made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment, and that . . . there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‘s
Laureys contends that his trial counsel was ineffective by, inter alia, not calling Frederick Berlin, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine and founder of a sexual disorders clinic there, to testify at trial. The record indicates, however, that Berlin had not finished his evaluation of Laureys and was not prepared to testify at the time of the trial. At a status conference on June 25, 2009, Laureys‘s trial counsel informed the court that he was trying to arrange for a psychosexual evaluation of Laureys. Gov‘t App. Tab 10. At subsequent status and pretrial conferences held over eight months—from August 10, 2009 to April 7, 2010—Laureys‘s trial counsel repeatedly informed the court that Berlin had not completed his evaluation of Laureys. Gov‘t App. Tabs 11-14. At the April 7, 2010 conference, trial counsel informed the court that Berlin would not complete his evaluation until August 2010. The court then determined the trial could be delayed no longer and ordered trial counsel to produce, within ten days, a letter, affidavit or other writing from Berlin assuring the court of his testimony in support of the defense‘s theory. Gov‘t App. Tab 14. The case proceeded to trial when trial counsel failed to do so. That Laureys‘s trial counsel did not call an expert witness who, according to the record, was not prepared to testify hardly renders his representation deficient. That Laureys‘s trial counsel sought to use Berlin‘s testimony for a purpose different from the use his appellate counsel would have made of it does not change the fact that, according to the record, Berlin never completed his evaluation of Laureys and was not prepared to testify. In his reply brief, Laureys asserts that “Dr. Berlin has confirmed to us that he believed Mr. Laureys is suffering from paraphilia; that he formed that opinion before trial . . . and that he would have testified to that effect,” Reply Br. 14, but Laureys provides nothing—such as an affidavit from Berlin—to support his assertion.
Even assuming arguendo that the failure to call Berlin to testify was deficient, there is no “reasonable probability that, [had Berlin testified], the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kelly, 552 F.3d at 829. On appeal, Laureys claims that Berlin would have opined that Laureys is a paraphiliac and would have explained that a paraphiliac is someone who suffers from “‘recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one‘s partner, or 3) children or other nonconsenting persons, that occur over a period of at least 6 months . . . [and that] cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.‘” United States v. Carta, 592 F.3d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 2010) (ellipsis and alteration in Carta) (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass‘n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed. 2000)); see Appellant‘s Br. 43 n. 116. In addition to explaining paraphilia, Laureys contends Berlin would have testified that a “paraphiliac can suffer from pedophilia and yet maintain sexual relations with adults.” Id. at 43. Finally,
I cannot fathom how Berlin‘s proposed testimony could have possibly aided Laureys‘s case. A description of paraphilia would have simply emphasized Laureys‘s “recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving . . . children or other nonconsenting persons.” Carta, 592 F.3d at 38 (quoting Am. Psychiatric Ass‘n, Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed. 2000)). Nothing in the quoted description of paraphilia from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders suggests an inclination toward homosexuality. Nor is there any reason to believe Berlin‘s testimony that a paraphiliac can suffer from pedophilia but maintain sexual relations with adults would have helped Laureys‘s case. Nothing in Berlin‘s purported testimony calls into question the jury‘s conclusion that Laureys intended to have sexual relations with the 9-year-old girl. That Berlin‘s testimony might have led the jury to conclude that Laureys also intended to have sexual relations with Jim P does not create “a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Kelly, 552 F.3d at 829 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, Berlin‘s testimony about the internet tendencies of paraphiliacs would have strengthened the Government‘s—not Laureys‘s—case because Laureys went well beyond using the internet to make inappropriate remarks or engage in fantastic sexual discussions with anonymous correspondents. He took the significant further step of arranging to meet Jim P—and, a reasonable jury could conclude, the 9-year-old girl—and driving to the location Jim P gave him.
Finally, and crucially, any marginal benefit Laureys might have derived from Berlin‘s testimony could never, in my view, erase the irremediable damage Laureys did through his own testimony. I believe there is no reasonable probability that Berlin‘s proposed testimony—as weak as it is—would have led any reasonable juror who heard Laureys‘s disturbing and graphic testimony to acquit him. By testifying, Laureys was truly the author of his own misfortune.
BROWN, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part:
The district court instructed a jury to convict Brandon Laureys of attempted enticement of a child if the Government proved Laureys tried to persuade an adult to grant him access to a minor. The district court also allowed the jury to convict Laureys of crossing state lines to engage in sexual conduct with a minor, absent any evidence Laureys expected the fictitious child to be present at his destination. Because the jury instruction was plainly erroneous and the evidence insufficient as a matter of law, I would reverse Laureys‘s convictions and his twenty-year prison sentence.1
I
Count One of the indictment charged Laureys with using the internet in an attempt to persuade a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity. The statute under which he was convicted provides,
Whoever, using . . . any . . . means of interstate . . . commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in . . . any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be . . . imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life.
The district court nevertheless instructed the jury to convict Laureys under
On appeal, Laureys argues
The court does not attempt to defend the district court‘s statement of the law on the merits, and there is no dispute that—if it is erroneous—the district court‘s jury instruction was prejudicial.2 The court disagrees only with my conclusion that any error was plain. Maj. Op. at 33.
It is an open question in this circuit whether
The court cites out-of-circuit precedent in an effort to prove any error in the district court‘s instruction was not plain. I am not persuaded. Only one circuit court
The other courts that have affirmed convictions under
More to the point, the errors of other courts do not immunize the district court‘s jury instruction on plain error review.
[W]e have recognized that a division of authority on a given point may provide cause to question the plainness of an error, but we did so in cases lacking the kind of clear statutory language at issue here. Moreover, [this court has] not hesitated to deem an error involving clear language plain, even when another circuit considered the provision ambigu
ous enough to defeat a finding of plain error.
In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). In In re Sealed Case, we explicitly rejected “the government‘s view [that] [a] circuit split on [the relevant] issue necessarily means that the error could not have been plain.” Id. at 851. We found plain error in the district court‘s treatment of rehabilitation as justifying a longer prison term despite precedent from the Eighth and Ninth Circuits supporting the district court‘s decision. See id. at 848-51. Here, as in In re Sealed Case, the relevant statute “speaks with absolute clarity” on the subject of the district court‘s decision, id. at 851, so the contrary view of one out-of-circuit case does not save the jury instruction from plain error.
In Murrell, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[b]y negotiating with the purported father of a minor, [the defendant] attempted to stimulate or cause the minor to engage in sexual activity with him” and therefore his “conduct fits squarely within the definition of ‘induce.‘” 368 F.3d at 1287. The Eleventh Circuit noted that “induce” could mean either “‘to lead or move by influence or persuasion; to prevail upon,’ or alternatively, ‘to stimulate
As the district court correctly observed, “there is no equivalent of Murrell in this circuit.” Tr. 5/26/2010, at 286. Despite its concern about “[t]he way [§ 2422(b)‘s] language has to be parsed and chopped and sliced and diced in order to make everything fit,” id., the district court allowed Laureys to be convicted under Murrell‘s plainly erroneous interpretation. We should reject Murrell‘s flawed reading of
First, the second definition of “induce” (“to stimulate the occurrence of; cause“) is incompatible with that word‘s statutory context. In
Second, the word “induce,” in its first definition, is not “essentially synonymous with the word ‘persuade,‘” as the Murrell court said it was. 368 F.3d at 1287. The word “persuade” suggests the use of reason, but the word “induce,” though it can bear that meaning, may signify any force, such as trickery, that acts upon the will. For example, one may induce a person to donate to one charity by convincing her that she is donating to another. Moreover, Congress often uses multiple words with overlapping meaning to capture a broad swath of conduct. That the most sensible definition of “induce” overlaps with “persuade” and “coerce” does not render it superfluous. Cf. Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 120-21 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since iteration is obviously afoot in the relevant passage, there is no justification for extruding an unnatural meaning out of ‘falsely made’ simply in order to avoid iteration. The entire phrase ‘falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited’ is self-evidently not a listing of differing and precisely calibrated terms, but a collection of near synonyms which describes the product of the general crime of forgery.“).
Third, the statutory history of
[A]ny person who shall knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any woman or girl under the age of eighteen years from any State . . . to any other State . . . , with the purpose and intent to induce or coerce her . . . to engage in
prostitution or debauchery, or any other immoral practice, and shall in furtherance of such purpose knowingly induce or cause her to go and to be carried or transported as a passenger in interstate commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony. . . .
White Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, § 4, 36 Stat. 825, 826 (1910) (emphasis added). If “induce” meant the same thing as “cause,” then Congress would not have used these words in the alternative in the phrase “induce or cause.” That phrase suggests that when “induce” is used elsewhere in the statute, it does not simply mean “cause,” but instead has in common with “persuade,” “entice,” and “coerce” an element of mental force. See California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The canon of statutory construction noscitur a sociis, i.e., a word is known by the company it keeps[,] is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” (quotation marks omitted)); see, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1323-24 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (applying the canon to one statutory term in a series of six related words).
Finally, the Murrell court reasoned that the “efficacy of
II
Count Two of the indictment charged Laureys with driving from Maryland to
As for the interstate travel with intent count, . . . if I were a juror, I would probably find a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant thought there was going to be a girl in that apartment or not. . . . But I think it‘s a jury question, and I‘m just making this record of my own concern about this statute and its razor thin application to the facts of this case in case the jury convicts and another court wants to look at it.
Tr. 5/26/2010, at 287. Because Laureys moved for a judgment of acquittal, the district court‘s hesitant finding about the sufficiency of the evidence is entitled to no deference. Reviewing de novo, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, I would reverse Laureys‘s conviction.
“The crime of attempt . . . consists of (1) an intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences which would in law amount to a crime; and (2) an act in furtherance of that intent which . . . goes beyond mere preparation.” United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983, 1005 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 18 (1986)). Assuming that Laureys believed the girl existed, that Laureys believed Jim would allow him to engage in sexual conduct with her, and that Laureys intended to do so at his earliest opportunity, the Government still failed to show Laureys took a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.
A substantial step is one that manifests “a true commitment toward completing the
“Important to a substantial-step assessment is an understanding of the underlying conduct proscribed by the crime being attempted.” United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 148 (2d Cir. 2011). Here, the underlying conduct is interstate travel for the purpose of sexual conduct with a minor. Driving to the address Jim provided would be a substantial step toward the commission of that conduct only if Laureys intended that drive to culminate in sex with a minor.
The evidence is insufficient as a matter of law, because it cannot possibly prove Laureys intended to have sex with anyone but Jim during the relevant trip. Even if Laureys entertained some hope that he might have sex with a child in the future, his drive to meet with Jim was at best “mere preparation” for a future crime. See United States v. Bolden, 514 F.2d 1301, 1307 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“‘[C]asing’ [a] store preparatory to a later attempt to rob” would be “mere preparation” for the robbery, not “an indictable attempt.“).
There is no evidence whatsoever that Laureys was driving to the District to have sex with a child. Detective Palchak admitted there was “no implication anywhere that the girl [was] going to be at this setup meeting” at Jim‘s place. Tr. 5/25/2010, at 215. Jim said only that his girlfriend “comes over a lot” and that he had been “messing around” with her nine-year-old daughter. Indeed, the chat was remarkably silent about Jim‘s ability and intent to procure the victim. Laureys was focused instead on arranging a meeting between him and Jim. Unlike Laureys‘s very practical arrangements to meet Jim, his lewd statements about the fictitious girl were never more than hypothetical. Merely proposing illegal sexual conduct at some
The most likely interpretation of this evidence is that Laureys assumed the girl—if she even existed—would not be present at this meeting. Laureys‘s assumption was reasonable, since Detective Palchak‘s statements as “Jim” were consistent with a sexual liaison between two men, not a prelude to child molestation. He invited Laureys to “get a beer first to make sure we are comfortable then have fun at my [place].” And he described himself physically: “I‘m a white dude about 6 foot 190[;] 38[;] you[?]” Any reasonable juror would have entertained grave doubts about Laureys‘s intent to engage in sexual conduct with a real child upon his arrival in the District.
III
This is a disturbing case. Laureys‘s chat with Detective Palchak and his testimony at trial demonstrate moral depravity, but they do not meet the Government‘s burden to prove the requisite criminal intent. I would reverse Laureys‘s convictions. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.