17 Johns. 4 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1819
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court. The plea demurred to can only be supported on the ground, that, by the constitution of the United States, no state court can take cognizance of any suit in behalf of the United States, for penalties or forfeitures. The whole case, then, depends on the provisions of' the constitution of the United States.
By the first section of the third article, it is provided, that •‘the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.” The second section of the same article declares, that “ the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies between two or more states; between a state and citizens of another state ; between citizens of different states ; between citizens of the same Asíate claiming lands under grants of different states ; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.”
The act of Congress under which this suit is brought, was passed at the first session of the 13th Congress, (ch. 38.) After declaring the forfeiture for noncompliance with its provisions, it proceeds to enact, that for the recovery of all fines, penalties, and forfeitures, incurred under it, suits may be prosecuted and maintained, in the name of the United States, before any court of the state having jurisdiction in like cases, where tfie cause of action shall arise or accrue more than fifty miles distant f orn the nearest place by law established for the holding a district court, within the district in which the same shall arise or accrue.
The question which we are called upon to decide involves considerations of great delicacy and magnitude, and on which several very enlightened tribunals have held different opinions. Í cannot doubt, that in some of the enumerated cases, to which
*It is not eulogy to say, that, perhaps, there never was a human production more profoundly considered, by an assemblage of the most distinguished men, than this great national pact, which has secured to the people of the United States such innumerable blessings. Many members of that illustrious convention were eminent lawyers, conversant with the practice, organization, and proceedings of the courts of the several states; and we are, therefore, authorized to conclude, that in vesting the judicial power of the United States, they would avoid every thing leading to confusion or derangement in the proceedings of the state courts; and, if I am not greatly mistaken, it will appear, that a denial to the state courts of a concurrent jurisdiction with the courts of the United States, in some of the specified cases, and an imposition upon them of jurisdiction in others, would, in the one case, lead to the most absurd and extraordinary results, and, in the other, to a violation of fundamental principles.
There were several great objects in the view of the convention in adjusting the judiciary system. The government was invested with the powers of peace and war; they assumed the national debt, and became liable for future national engagements ; they were charged with the common defence of every portion of the empire ; the power of fulfilling these obligations required the collection of a revenue, in the shape of taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; and to preserve the public peace, and fulfil the public faith, it was all important that the power to do both should be enjoyed and exercised by the government itself. It would have been unwise and unsafe to depend on the judiciary of the several states, over whom the United States had no control, for the exposition or execution of the laws of
It was necessary to guard against the probable partialities ana prejudices incident to the state courts, in legal controversies between citizens of different states. Indeed, the declaration of the extent of the judicial power of the United States, in all the specified cases, was justified by the great interests of the nation. It is not, however, necessary that *the courts of the United. States should have exclusive primary jurisdiction in all the enumerated eases. A subsequent part of the third article of the constitution declares, “ that in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases, before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.”
The requisitions of the constitution are satisfied, if the judicial power of the United States is ultimately vested in a court constituted by them, without excluding the state courts from a concurrent jurisdiction; and from whose decisions a right of appeal, both as to law and fact, is secured. I cannot but conclude, on this branch of the subject, that inasmuch as there is no express negation of jurisdiction to the state courts, in the specified cases, their jurisdiction is not taken away, except as to such of the cases as they did not before hold cognizance of, and such as, from the nature of the jurisdiction, they could not hold cognizance of, from the incompatibility between the powers granted to the courts of the United States, and a reservation of any portion of the same powers to the state courts.
This conclusion derives support from another part of the constitution. The sixth article provides, “ that this constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; ” and the constitution further requires, that judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support the constitution.
If. is evident that the framers of the constitution contemplated, that the state courts might entertain questions involving the consideration and construction of the constitution and laws of the United States, and treaties made under their authority, and yet the judicial power of the United States #extends “ to all cases in I mi or equity arising under the constitution, the laws o f the United States, and treaties made under their authorityIt seems to me, that if we regard the whole
Perhaps it was unnecessary to discuss a proposition, which I do not learn has ever been doubted in any of the courts ; but it came within the range of observations called for by the case.
How far Congress can confer power or jurisdiction upon the state courts, and whether those courts, if the act was silent upon the subject of jurisdiction, could take cognizance of actions for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, remains to be considered. We hare seen, that the judicial power of the United, States is to be rested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.
On this clause of the constitution, we have the direct opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case already cited, of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessees. (] fi'licut. Rep. 330.) that “ Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States, except in courts ordaimd and established by itself.” Indeed, it appears to me too plain for discussion, that the expression in the constitution, “ and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish,” can have no reference to the courts established by the respective state legislatures: the conferring of jurisdiction on such courts, is not to ordain and establish them; and in no sense can the state courts become the inferior courts intended in the constitution. Where, then, it may be asked, is the authority in the constitution to invest the state courts with jurisdiction of causes, which they did not enjoy concurrently before the adoption of the constitution ? On this point, also, we have the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States. They say, (1 Wheaton, 337.) “ no part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals. The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction ⅜ of the same exclusive cognizance ; and it can only be in those cases where, previous to the constitution, state tribunals, possessed jurisdiction, independent of national authority, that they can now, constitutionally, exercise a concurrent jurisdiction.”
It cannot be doubted, that a pecuniary penalty for a violation of, or nonconformity to, an act of Congress, is as much a punishment for an offence against the laws, as if a corporal penalty had been inflicted; and, as regards crimes and offences, made so by legislative enactment, the government of the United States stands in the same relation to the state governments, as any foreign government; and it is a fundamental maxim, that the courts of one sovereignty will not take cognizance of, nor enforce the penal code of, another. Thus,
The act of Congress establishing the judicial courts of the United States, passed the 24th of September, 1789, I consider as a true exposition of the constitutional provision, with respect to the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts, and the exclusive jurisdiction of those of the United States. When we call to mind, that it is among the first acts of the first Congress, held under the constitution, and that many of the leading members of the convention were, also, members of that Congress, we cannot but regard it as entitled to the most profound respect, in settling the question of concurrent, and exclusive, jurisdiction.
The 9th section of this act gives the District Courts of the United States cognizance, exclusively of the courts of the several states, of all crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, and exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred under the laws of the United States, and cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only, in ^violation of the laws of nations, or of a treaty of the United States, and of all suits at common law, where the United States sue, and the matter in dispute amounts to 100 dollars, and jurisdiction, exclusively of the state courts, of all suits against consuls and vice-consuls. The 1.1th section vests the Circuit Court of the United States with original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states, of all suits of a civil nature, at common law, or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds 500 dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs or petitioners, or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state; and exclusive cognizance of crimes and offences.
It will be perceived, that this act, throughout, makes the distinction between those cases of a civil nature, and of which the state courts had, or would have had, cognizance, independently of the constitution, and such as originate under the laws of Congress. The jurisdiction of the state courts is in no instance excluded where they had a pre-existing jurisdiction, except in those cases of a national character, such as admiralty and maritime cases, and suits against ambassadors and other public ministers, consuls, and vice-consuls ; but the jurisdiction of the state courts is excluded in cases of crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States; and in
It cannot be supposed that there existed any distrust of the state courts when the act of 1789 was passed. On the contrary, if, as is contended by some distinguished jurists, it is in the power of Congress to vest the cognizance of all the cases enumerated in the constitution, exclusively in courts established by Congress, (a proposition on which I give no opinion,) it will at once be seen, that the act of 1789 left a great mass of jurisdiction in the state courts untouched.
In whatever light, then, this question is considered, I am fully of the opinion, that this court has no jurisdiction of the criminal offences, or penal laws of the United States; and that it is not competent to Congress to confer jurisdiction ; *and that, therefore, the defendant must have judgment on the demurrer.
Dissenting Opinion
dissented. The question of jurisdiction in this cause involves the construction of the constitution of the United States, the validity of an act of Congress, and the inherent rights of state sovereignty. I approach the subject with unfeigned diffidence ; but, in performing the unpleasant duty of dissenting from all my brethren on this occasion, I feel some consolation in the reflection, that if my opinion be erroneous, it will be harmless also.
By the act of Congress, entitled, “ An act laying duties on licenses to retailers of wines, spirituous liquors, and foreign merchandises,” passed the 2d day of August, 1813, it is enacted, that “ all fines, penalties, and forfeitures which shall be incurred by force of this act, shall and may be sued for and recovered in the name of the United States” &c. : “ and where the cause of action, or complaint, shall arise, or accrue, more than fifty miles distant from the nearest place by law established for the holding of a district court, within the district in which the same shall accrue, such suit and recovery may he had before any court of the state, holden within the said district, having jurisdiction in like cases.”
The attorney for the United States has brought an action of debt in this court, for a penalty accrued under this act of Congress; and the question is, whether we can rightfully hold jurisdiction of the cause ?
The constitution of the United States (art. 3. sec. 1.) declares, that “ the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish.”
Much criticism has, on various occasions, been bestowed on the words “ shall be vested,” as used in this article. I admit that these words are imperative; but, in my judgment, they arc used here, generally, to mark out, and define one oí the
By the 2d section of the 3d article it is declared, that “ the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity, arising under this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority ; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty, and maritime jurisdiction ; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party ; to controversies between two or more states ; between a state and citizens of different states; between citizens of the same state, claiming lands under grants of different states ; and between a state, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.”
“ In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as the Congress shall make.” The words, “ the judicial power shall extend to, <fcc. mean, that the federal organs of judicial power shall *h ave jurisdiction of, &c. Here it is important to note a distinction between legislative and judicial power: Jurisdiction, or jus dicere, in our courts, implies nothing exclusive; but legislation, or jus facen, often implies exclusive power. To make law is an exercise of the will, in establishing a rule of action ; to expound, and administer the law, is the exercise of judgment, and legal science in the application of that rule.
The powers of Congress “ to regulate commerce with foreign nations,” and :: to make war,” are, in their nature, exclusive ; because they are utterly repugnant to, and irreconcilable with, the exercise of á concurrent power of willing, or legislating, on
This legislative discretion I find in that clause of the constitution which empowers Congress “ to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”
It is here worthy of remark, that the constitution has so completely framed and reared the legislative and executive departments, that nothing remained but to elect and appoint the representatives, senators, president, and vice president; and those functionaries were ready to move in *their appointed spheres. But the primary duty of creating the judiciary department, is referred to Congress. The constitution, in regard to that branch of the government, has done no more than to enjoin upon Congress the duty of organizing the Courts of the Union; and of distributing and regulating the judicial power in the specified cases.
The legislative discretion on that subject has, indeed, important constitutional limits. There must be a Supreme Court; there may, and I think there must be, at all times, courts of the United States inferior to the Supreme Court. The judicial organs of the Union shall have jurisdiction in all the specified cases. Congress, therefore, cannot divest them of such jurisdiction. In certain of those specified cases, !! the Supreme Court shall have origin al jurisdiction and in all the other specified cases, it “ shall have appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions, and under such regulations, as Congress shall make.”
These are all the provisions in the constitution, in regard to the judicial power; and we find, that in the “ act to establish the judicial courts of the United States,” (24th September, 1789.) Congress not only organized the courts, and gave a legislative exposition of the constitution in many particulars, but also exercised a broad discretion in enacting, that in certain cases the jurisdiction of the various courts shall be origi
The question now is, whether Congress have transcended the limits of the constitution in enacting, that for the pecuniary penalty in this case, a “ suit and recovery may be had in any state court,” Sfc. ‘■having like jurisdiction ?” I admit that Congress cannot rest judicial power in a state court, nor transfer such power from the federal courts, so as to divest them of it; but there is a class of cases, in which I think Congress has a discretion to make the jurisdiction of the federal courts either exclusive or concurrent, as they shall judge expedient, from time to time. Iri all the specified cases, the judicial power of the Union, either original or appellate, must exist, and be maintained in the federal courts, except where Congress may see fit to limit *the right of appeal. But the constitution is as completely satisfied, and the design of the federal judica-tures is as well answered, in many of the specified cases, by the exercise of appellate, as of original, jurisdiction. Nor does it make anv essential difference, whether the jurisdiction of the federal courts be exclusive of, or concurrent, with, that of the state courts ; because the appellate power of the federal courts is made co-extensive with the concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in the specified cases, unless Congress choose to limit the right of appeal. For instance, “ in all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority,” it is not very important, as it regards public policy, whether the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction or not, because the appellate power of the federal courts attaches in all those cases, and it is ordinarily an ample remedy for correcting state influence or partialities, and producing uniformity of decision.
In the particular case now before us, I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion, that Congress has violated the constitution in enacting that this “ suit may be brought, and a recovery had,” in a state court. That statute has, in effect, only waived the exclusiveness of federal jurisdiction, quoad hoc; and our entertaining this suit is perfectly consistent with the concurrent, as well as the appellate, jurisdiction of the federal courts. Whether we hold cognizance or not, the judicial power of the United Stales, in this case, is “ vested in” the federal courts; it does “ extend to” the case now before us; and if we decide wrong, it is a case for an appeal from the court of dernier resort of this state, to the Supreme Court of the United States.
The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, (1 Wheaton, 304.) has my entire approbation ; and I gladly avail myself of this occasion, to render my tribute of respect for the profound, perspicuous. and dispassionate reasoning of the two learned judges
That case shows, that I am correct in assuming the position, that in this case, one of those specified the Federal Court is “ vested” with jurisdiction, although the state court also ha? original arid concurrent jurisdiction over the same subject; or in other words, that to be vested with, does not imply exclusive jurisdiction.
The questions in this case, according to my apprehension, are these: 1st. Whether, independent of any provision in the constitution of the United States, the general common law jurisdiction of this court, attaches in such a case ? and 2dly, If such a right exists on general principles, as an inherent power in this court, whether there be any thing in the constitution of the United States which deprives us of such jurisdiction ? These questions depend upon the positive enactments of the constitution, and our peculiar municipal regulations; and, therefore, we cannot expect to derive much light; from any adjudged cases in England, or from any foreign jurists. But, with patriotic pride, I refer to the opinions of a profound jurist, and illustrious statesman of our own country, whose mind illumined every object to which it ivas directed. The intellect of Hamilton has beamed upon this subject; and his cotempo-rary exposition #of the constitution, deserves the most respectful deference.
In the number 82 of Publius, (see Federalist, 2d vol. page 243.) he says, “ the states will retain all pre-existing authorities, which may not be exclusively delegated to the federal head ; and this exclusive delegation can only exist in one of three cases; where an exclusive authority is, in express terms, granted to the Union ; or where a particular authority is granted to the Union, and the exercise . of a like authority is
“ But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, is only clearly applicable to those descriptions of causes, of which *the state courts have previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to cases which may grow out of, and be peculiar to, the constitution to be established ; for not to allow the state courts a right of jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as the abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I mean not, therefore, to contend, that the United States, in the course of legislation upon the objects entrusted to their discretion, may not commit the decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation, to the federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient; but I hold, that the state courts will be divested of no part of their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal; and, lam even o f opinion, that in every case in which they were not expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature, they will, of course, take cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary power, and from the general genius of the system. The judiciary power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal laws; and in civil cases, lays hold of all subjects of litigation between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of dispute are relative
“ Here another question occurs ; what relation would subsist between the national and state courts, in these instances of concurrent jurisdiction? I answer, that an appeal would certainly lie from the latter, to the Supreme Court of the United States. The constitution, in direct terms, gives an appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, in all the enumerated cases of federal cognizance, in which it is not to have an original one, without a single expression to confine its operation to the inferior federal courts. The ^objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated.” “ Agreeably to the remark already made, the national and state systems are to be regarded as one whole. The courts of the latter will, of course, be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal, which is destined to unite and assimilate the principles of national justice, and the rule of national decision. The evident aim of the plan of the convention is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the courts of the Union.”
If I do not deceive myself, the whole scope of this commentary corresponds with the view which I have taken of this subject, and fully authorizes the inference, that if the act of Congress, imposing these pecuniary penalties, had not appointed the forum, the original jurisdiction would have been concurrent. Congress have said, that the federal courts shall ha\e exclusive jurisdiction in regard to these penalties, except where the cause of action arises more than fifty miles from the place of holding the District Court; and in this peculiar class of cases they allow a concurrent jurisdiction.
The “act to establish the judicial courts of the l mted States,” (September 24, 1789,) and all the successive acts of Congress on that subject, accord with this interpretation of the constitution ; for it will be seen, that Congress have exercised a discretion, which has been varied from time to time, so as, at one time, to give exclusive, and at other times only concurrent, original jurisdiction to the federal courts over the same subject.
The decision in the case of Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (before cited,) has settled the point, that wherever a state court holds cognizance in any of the specified cases to which “ the judicial
have read and examined, with respectful attention, the opinion of the General Court of Virginia, in the case of Jackson v. lioiv, (delivered by White, presiding judge, and published in the National Intelligencer, on the 23d of December, 1815.) on the very point now before us ; and, with great respect for that high tribunal, I think it erred in pronouncing, that £i the act of Congress was unconstitutional;” and “ that to assume jurisdiction over the case, would be to exercise a portion of the judicial power of the United StatesI am of opinion, that this court has jurisdiction to give a civil remedy for a debt due to the United States, whether that debt accrued upon contract, or by way of penalty for a violation of a statute. We do not acquire such jurisdiction by virtue of the act of Congress ; it is inherent in this court, as a court of general common law jurisdiction. Congress cannot compel a state court to entertain such a suit. If they had said, imperatively, that state courts shall hold cognizance in such cases, then, indeed, the question would have arisen, whether they had aright to constitute us the organ of judicial power for the United States1 In the present case, I do not understand them as intending such an absurdity. In enacting that “ such suit and recovery may be had before any state court, &c., having jurisdiction in like cases,” I understand nothing more than that the United States voluntarily submit, themselves as suitors in our courts, and the attorney for the United States is authorized for that purpose. In doing so, Congress have not attempted to ordain and establish the state courts, as inferior courts of the United States, in the sense of the constitution; but have, in effect, merely qualified, or repealed in part, the original statute of the United States, (passed the 24th of September, 1789,) which gave exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts for such penalties. If a state has no organs of judicial power adapted to such a case; or if a state court refuse to hold cognizance in such a suit, then the provision in the act of Congress becomes nugatory, and the remedy must be had in the federal court. If a state court exercises jurisdiction in such case, it is subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the federal court.
Whether the courts of one sovereign would hold jurisdiction of civil suits, wherein another sovereign appears as plaintiff, depended originally on the pleasure of the sovereign to whom the suitor applied for justice; but by the usage and 'comity of
Suppose Congress should enact, that custom-house bonds shall be sued in the state courts; such a law would not establish new courts for the United States; it would not enlarge the jurisdiction of state courts ; but must be considered as directory to their attorney to ask a remedy in our courts. Suppose our national government should direct the attorney for the United States to sue for like penalties in the courts- of Florida, or of Canada, it might be justly said, that such an act would be inexpedient and unwise, as improperly asking a favor of a foreign government, which it might lawfully grant or refuse; but I see no ground to say, that such an act would be unconstitutional.
In regard to the distinction between civil actions founded on penal statutes, and actions on contracts, the law and usage of nations impose no obligation on one sovereign to afford a remedy to enforce a penal law of another sovereign ; and it is optional for the former to do it or not, according to his own convenience.
It is said to be a fundamental maxim, that the courts of one sovereign will not take cognizance of, or enforce, the pena! laws of another sovereign ; but I think it more correct to say, that one sovereign ought not to entrust the execution of his penal laws to the courts of another sovereign ; and as applicable to sovereigns of distinct and separate territorial ^jurisdictions, there is obvious reason and wisdom in the policy of such usage. But when we consider the complex and peculiar structure and relations of our federal government and our state governments, moving, indeed, in different spheres, but occupying the same territorial space, and operating upon, and for the benefit of the same people, the practice of other independent nations affords no analogy sufficiently strong to guide us in the present case.
That a state court can in no case hold jurisdiction to punish, criminaliter, for an offence against the United States, is clear, for this plain reason, that every criminal prosecution must charge the offence to have been committed against the state or sovereign, whose courts sit in judgment on the offender. In the administration of criminal justice, every sovereign acts as judge in his own case, as the offended party ; and a state court cannot act as an organ of judicial power representing
This court, in its judicial functions, now represents the sovereignty of the state of JS'eiv- York, as to the question before us ; and, considering the intimate relation between the state, and the United States, and the common interest which all the states have, in maintaining and giving complete effect to the laws of the Union ; and considering, also, that the provision in the act of Congress in this class of cases, is for the benefit and accommodation of our own citizens, in rendering it more cheap and easy to defend themselves when sued for such penalties; I think it fit and expedient to afford the remedy of a civil action, to enforce this penal statute of the United States.
In coming to this conclusion, I perceive no great danger of introducing those evils, so eloquently described, and so feelingly deprecated by the General Court of Virginia, as a system of a strange kind of Mosaic war, in the judiciary of nations. Here a Cadi sitting in judgment upon an Italian, denying the pope’s infallibility; there the stern fathers of the holy inquisition, putting a poor Turk to the rack, because he denies that Mahomet is the prophet of God; the judges of republican Virginia, pillorying an Englishman *for libeling royal-1y; and the court of King’s Bench, inflicting the same punishment upon an American, for libeling the government of the l hiited States, for the late declaration of war.” (Jackson v. Row, before cited.)
Whenever either of the cases supposed by the General Court of Virginia shall occur, I will examine it without, prejudice ; but in this case, I am of opinion, that there ought to be judgment for the plaintiffs.
Judgment for the defendant.
Vide ante, p. 4