United States v. LatchinUnited States v. Latchin
A jury found Sami Latchin, an Iraqi native who moved to the United States in the early 1990s, guilty of procuring citizenship illegally by making false statements in a naturalization application and of acting as an “unregistered agent” (a spy) for the Iraqi government. The case against Latchin was built on a treasure trove of Iraqi government materials seized by the FBI in Baghdad in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein. After his convictions, Latchin’s citizenship was revoked. On this appeal, he asks us to vacate his convictions for want of sufficient evidence and error in the jury instructions. Because the government supposedly failed to prove that he was ineligible for citizenship, Latchin asks us to undo the revocation order as well. We begin with the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
The government alleged that Saddam Hussein, anxious to recover from his defeat in the First Gulf War, established an ambitious spy program. The plan: install “sleeper” agents in countries around the world; have them spend the next few years earning the trust of their communities; and then, when they had gained positions of influence, activate them to gather intelligence and influence policy in favor of Saddam’s Ba’athist regime. All spy programs, of course, operate on deception— the spies pretend to be people they aren’t.
Latchin was selected as one of the sleeper agents and given the dubious honor of being the only spy planted in the United States. He was a natural choice. Latchin joined the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) in 1979, so he had years of experience under his belt. More importantly, though, he was uniquely positioned to facilitate the IIS’s chief mission in the United States— to gather intelligence on Iraqi opposition groups. As a member of the minority Christian community in Iraq, Latchin would have the inside track to befriending Iraqi Christians in the United States, individuals Saddam thought were hostile to his regime. And Latchin had experience spying on these people. In the 1980s, he posed as an Iraqi Airways employee in Athens, gathering information on Iraqi Christians entering the United States by way of Greece.
As we said, though, participants in the sleeper program, including Latchin, had no idea they were part of this particular program. So when Latchin moved to the United States in 1993, he was unaware that he had been chosen as a sleeper agent. But that doesn’t mean Latchin thought he was out of the spy business altogether. An IIS agent testifying under the pseudonym “Ali” said that he approached Latchin while Latchin was still in Iraq and informed him that the IIS approved his relocation to the United States. Ali did not give Latchin “any details about the plan,” but Latchin must have known there would be work to do. The agent told Latchin “not to do anything whatsoever, just get [to the United States] and settle until I give you further details about the plan later.” It is unclear whether those “details” ever came or whether Latchin took any covert action once he arrived in the United States. What we do know is that, after he moved here, Latchin traveled to Eastern Europe on several occasions between 1994 and 1997 to meet with Ali, who was then acting as Latchin’s “handler.” As a handler, Ali was essentially a liaison between Latchin and the IIS: he gave Latchin a codename; devised a cover story in case Latchin ever ran into trouble with the authorities; and filed reports with the IIS following meetings with Latchin. But the most salient action taken by Ali was compensating Latchin for his services, payments that totaled approximately $24,000 per year. 1 To counter this evidence, Latchin argued that he simply thought it was his retirement pay. Latch-in presented evidence that he had retired from the IIS and moved to America with the agency’s blessing (but nothing more).
In any event, Latchin settled down in 1993 with his family in Chicago and acquired a job as a counter agent at O’Hare International Airport. After residing in the United States for five years, Latchin successfully applied for naturalization in 1998. That may strike the reader as a shock. How could a spy for Saddam Hussein — whether past or present — acquire citizenship so easily? According to the government, only by lying.
The application form asked three critical questions. First, it asked Latchin to “[l]ist [his] employers during the last five (5) years.” Latchin reported his work at O’Hare but said nothing of the IIS or any other involvement with the Iraqi government. He maintained his silence when he
After Latchin completed the naturalization form, he met with Emily Reyes of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) for a live interview. Reyes quizzed Latchin on his command of the English language and knowledge of United States history and government. She also reviewed the naturalization form and asked Latchin to confirm his answers, which he did without exception. With no inkling of Latchin’s connections to the IIS, Reyes approved the application “on the spot.” Had Latchin disclosed his affiliation with the IIS, however, Reyes testified she would have investigated further and passed the matter along to her supervisor.
With this evidence in place, the jury was asked to decide whether Latchin (1) procured citizenship illegally by making false statements in violation of
When a defendant disputes the sufficiency of the evidence, we “must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Haddad,
The pivotal decision in all this is
Kungys v. United States,
It is tempting to end the analysis there (and hold Latchin’s
Kungys is not a clean opinion. It is maddeningly fractured. Here is how the Supreme Court Reporter explained who was on what side:
Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II-A, and III-A, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan, White, and O’Connor, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-B and III-B, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Brennan and (as to Part III-B only) O’Connor, JJ., joined. Brennan, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 783. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., joined, post, p. 784. O’Connor, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, post, p. 801. White, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 801. Kennedy, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The
Kungys
majority held that there are “four independent requirements” to the offense of procuring citizenship by misrepresentation: “the naturalized citizen must have misrepresented or concealed some fact, the misrepresentation or concealment must have been willful, the fact must have been material, and the naturalized citizen must have procured citizenship as a result of the misrepresentation or concealment.”
Kungys,
So, did the government in this case prove as much beyond a reasonable doubt? Absolutely. It established a material misrepresentation with Reyes’s testimony that, had Latchin been forthcoming about his affiliation with the IIS, she would have investigated the matter further and passed it along to a supervisor. It matters not that there is no firm evidence showing Latchin’s application would have been denied absent his lie; Latchin’s misrepresentation had a “natural tendency to influence” the naturalization decision, and that is all that is required.
Kungys,
As for procurement, the government established this element because it was “fair to infer that [Latchin] was actually ineligible.”
Id.
at 784,
Before leaving
We have explained that a conviction under
First, that the defendant while under oath testified falsely before an officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service as charged in the indictment.
Second, that the defendant’s testimony related to some material matter.
And third, that the defendant knew the testimony was false.
At first blush that seems incomplete— where’s the procurement requirement? Further examination shows, however, that the court included that element within its explanation of materiality:
A false statement is material underSection 1425(a) if (1) the production of truthful information would have led to the discovery of facts relevant to the applicant’s petition for naturalization, and (2) the production of that evidence would raise a fair inference that the defendant was statutorily ineligible for naturalization.
In future cases, we advise district courts to treat procurement as a separate element rather than a concept subsumed within the definition of materiality. Nonetheless, the superficial error in this case did not harm Latchin. If anything, in fact, the instructions made it more difficult for the government. Latchin’s conviction under
So is his conviction for acting as an unregistered foreign agent in violation of
Affirming these convictions makes Latchin’s final argument — that the court
Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and order of denaturalization are Affirmed.
Notes
. The government also introduced evidence that Latchin had other handlers and received other payments after Ali retired in 1998.
. Latchin was also convicted of three other counts, but those are not before us on appeal.
. We acknowledge that
Kungys
dealt with a different statute, a civil statute,
. This reading of
Kungys
is consistent with our own precedent,
see Kalejs v. INS,