Defendant Larry Jones appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Michael B. Mukasey, Chief Judge), revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to a term of imprisonment. Jones argues that he was deprived of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination by the district court’s decision to proceed with a revocation hearing prior to adjudication in state court of the charges that served as the basis for the revocation request. Jones further contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses was violated by the district court’s reliance оn hearsay testimony. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
On June 22, 1995, Jones pleaded guilty to charges that he participated in a racketeering enterprise through predicate acts of murder (as an accessory after the fact) and conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. At sentencing, the district court granted the government’s substantial assistance motion, see U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, § 5K1.1, and departed downwards from the presumptive sentence under the Guidelines of 360 months to life imprisonment. Jones received a sentence of time served, with a five-year term of supervised release.
On May 24, 2001, the U.S. Probation Department submitted a Request for Court Action/Direction (“Request for Action”), which it subsequently amended on June 25, 2001, alleging that Jones had violated the terms of his supervised release. The Request for Action explained that Jones had been arrested twice by the *106 New York City Police Department in recent weeks. The first arrest, which occurred on May 17, 2001, was on charges of menacing, criminal trespass, resisting arrest, public lewdness, and exposure, arising from an incident in which Jones was alleged to have exposed himself to a minor. The second arrest, which occurred on June 12, 2001, stemmed frоm a threatening phone call that Jones allegedly made to his former girlfriend, The Request for Action also stated that Jones had failed to notify his probation officer within seventy-two hours of the May 17th arrest, as required under the conditions of his supervised release.
Judge Mukasey held a preliminary hearing on the Request for Action on July 13, 2001. At the time of the hearing, Jones had been freed on bail by the Supreme Court of New York, pending resolution of the state charges against him. The government moved the district court to remand Jones to federal custody while awaiting the final revocation hearing. Jonеs’s counsel opposed this motion and requested that the revocation hearing be delayed until after disposition of the state charges. Judge Mukasey denied the government’s motion for remand, but moved ahead with the revocation proceedings and scheduled an evidentiary hearing for September 5, 2001.
At the hearing, Jones’s counsel repeated his request to postpone the proceedings until the state charges were adjudicated, arguing that an evidentiary hearing would “seriously imping[e]” Jones’s Fifth Amendment rights in the pending state cases. (Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing, Sept. 5, 2001 (“Tr.”), 2-3). Defense counsel also noted the government’s intent to rely on hearsay testimony concerning the alleged exposure incident, rather than on direct testimony from eyewitnesses. Defense counsel contended that the use of hearsay would “almost obligatfe]” Jones to testify in his own defense at the revocation hearing in order to show the unreliability of that evidence. (Tr. 3). Relying on
United States v. Sackinger,
As for the hearsay testimony itself, defense counsel objected that the admission of such testimony would violate Jones’s Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses because the testimony lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and the government had no legitimate reason for declining to call the eyewitnеsses. In response, the government explained that its decision not to call the firsthand witnesses was justified by both Jones’s history of violent behavior, exposing the witnesses to the risk of retribution, and the sexual nature of the testimony that would be elicited from a 15-year-old girl. The district court stated that it could “understand not putting a 15-year-old girl on the witness stand to testify to allegations of the sort involved here” (Tr. 5), and further acknowledged Jones’s history of violent conduct. (Tr. 11). The district court decided to rule on the admissibility issues after hearing the testimony.
The government called two New York City police officers, Calvin Morelаnd and Kevin Owens, to testify regarding defendant’s arrest on the exposure-related *107 charges. 1 Officer Moreland testified that he was off duty in the late afternoon of May 17, 2001, working in the garage at the back of his residence on 1731 Popham Avenue in the Bronx, New York. Around 5 o’clock p.m., Moreland heard his wife calling from the front of the house, “honey, honey, come to the front, quick, quick, quick.” (Tr. 13). He ran around to the front and saw his daughter’s fifteen-year-old friend, Karin, outside the gate to his house. Moreland stated that his wife, who was standing at a front window, told him that there was a man in the lobby of the six-story apartment building directly across from the house who had been masturbating and giving Karin “catcalls.” (Tr. 13). She told Moreland that the man had run back into the building from the lobby, and described the man’s clothing. More-land also spoke to Karin. He testified that Karin told him that there had been “a guy across the street,” in the doorway to the lobby, with “his pants down around his ankles,” who was “masturbating” and calling to her “psst, psst, psst.” (Tr. 14-15). When asked on cross-examination whether Karin had indicated that she feared “serious physical injury or death,” Moreland stated that “[a]ll she told me is she was scared.” (Tr. 31).
Immediately after speaking with his wife and Karin, Moreland went across the street аnd entered the lobby of the apartment building. He testified that he encountered the defendant coming down the stairs. According to Moreland, Jones was wearing clothing that matched the description he had received from his wife and Karin — a blue jacket and dark-colored pants. Moreland asked Jones what he was doing “in front of my home, in front of my family.” (Tr. 16). Moreland testified that Jones responded that he did not know what Moreland was talking about, and that he “had people that live in this building.” (Id.). Jones then turned around and went back upstairs. Rather than pursuing him, Moreland ran to his house to get his police shield, and tоld his wife to call 911. When Moreland returned to the apartment building, he again encountered the defendant coming down the stairs. Moreland testified that Jones “motioned to [him] like he was reaching for a weapon or something.” (Tr. 17). Moreland explained, however, that he only saw a “black object” in Jones’s hands (Id.), and conceded on cross-examination that he could not tell whether the object was actually a firearm or other type of weapon. (Tr. 25). When More-land displayed his police shield, Jones ran back up the stairs, at which point More-land left the building as uniformed officers rеsponded to the scene. He remained outside until he was told that the officers had a suspect in custody. Moreland went inside the building to identify Jones, after which Jones was placed under arrest. According to Moreland, as Jones was being led from the building to a police car, he asked why Moreland was “doing this,” and then said to Moreland, “[fit’s not over. Okay. I’ll get you.” (Tr. 18).
The government next called Officer Owens. He was one of the police officers who responded to the 911 call placed by More-land’s wife, searched the apartment building, and apprehended Jones. He testified that when hе arrived at the scene, he was informed by Moreland that a man had *108 exposed himself to one of Moreland’s relatives and that the man had a gun. Owens entered the building and eventually encountered Jones leaning against a wall on the fourth floor, immediately to the right of the elevator. Owens recalled that Jones was wearing a white t-shirt, but did not have a jacket. Owens and his partner placed Jones in handcuffs and asked Jones what he was doing in the building. Owens testified that Jones explained that he was “looking for a friend” who lived in Apartment 4F. (Tr. 40). When the officers knocked on the door of that apartment, however, there was no response. A search of the fourth floor landing was then conducted, and Owens recovered a jacket in the elevator, near the top of the elevator door. Owens’s partner placed Jones under arrest.
On cross-examination, Owens acknowledged that no weapon had been recovered from the apartment building, even though Jones was booked for weapons possession. Cross-examination also revealed certain inconsistencies between Moreland’s account of the incident and Owens’s testimony as to what Moreland had told him and the other officers who arrived on the scene. Specifically, Owens recalled that Moreland had informed the arriving officers that one of his relatives was in the apartment building and that Moreland himself had seen Jones exposed.
After calling another law enforcement witness (but not questioning him), the government requested an adjournment of the hearing to secure the testimony of More-land’s wife. The government explained that it was concerned about defendant’s hearsay objection to Moreland’s testimony. The district court, however, indicated its belief that there was no need to call More-land’s wife to testify because Moreland’s account of the exposure incident was covered by either the present sense impression or excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Rule 803(1) and (2), Fed.R.Evid. In response, defense counsel disagreed that the statements made to Moreland fell under the exception for present sense impressions, but conceded the possible applicability of the excited utterance exception. Counsel further asserted that eyewitness testimony was necessary because Moreland’s аccount “stretche[d] the imagination.” (Tr. 79). Judge Muka-sey disagreed. The government then rested.
Following the close of the government’s case, Jones testified in his own defense. He stated that on May 17, 2001, he “went up to the Bronx” in order to “see a friend about some business” involving the sale of videotapes. (Tr. 87) (emphasis added). Later, however, Jones testified that he lived at his “sister’s house” in the Bronx, only “a block and a half away” from where he was arrested. (Tr. 88, 93). Jones stated that his friend lived in Apartment 4F of the building across from Moreland’s home. Jones gave the following account of his arrest: After knocking on his friend’s door but getting no rеsponse, Jones walked down the stairs to the lobby of the building, where he was approached by a man who claimed Jones had been “doing stuff in front of him and his family.” (Tr. 88). Jones stated that he told the man that he had no idea what the man was talking about and that he lived in a nearby apartment building. Jones denied having exposed himself and denied wearing a jacket that day, although he stated that he was wearing a white t-shirt and blue pants.
On cross-examination, Jones acknowledged that on more than one prior occasion he had been ticketed by the police for exposing himself, although Jones testified that he had been merely urinating. Jones also explained that after the initial confrontation in the lobby, he returned to his *109 friend’s door because he believed that “there [was] going to be a problem now.” (Tr. 94). Jones denied that Officer More-land had displayed his police shield at any time. Finally, Jones admitted to having told Moreland “I won’t forget you,” but denied that this was a threat. (Tr. 96).
At the close of the evidence, defense counsel renewed his objections to Officer Moreland’s testimony. Counsel argued that the government’s case relied primarily on “somewhat unreliable hearsay” (Tr. 98), and suggested that the government could have called Moreland’s wife and Karin to testify as eyewitnesses to the alleged exposure incident. The district court once again rejected these arguments, finding Moreland’s hearsay testimony to be admissible under the present sense impression and excited utterance exceptions. Judge Mukasey specifically credited Moreland’s testimony that “his wife summoned him in a highly upset and excited state.” (Tr. 99). Consequently, the district court found that the hearsay testimony could be relied on “regardless of the availability of the de-clarants.” (Tr. 100). Although acknowledging that certain inconsistencies in the officers’ testimony had been developed on cross-examination, the district court found that these inconsistencies were immaterial. The district court further determined that defendant’s testimony was “incredible on its face,” observing that Jones’s account “would have Officer Moreland simply falsifying the story for no reason.” (Tr. 101).
On November 19, 2001, the district court issued an order revoking defendant’s five-year term of supervised release and sentencing him to six months’ imprisonment, to be followed by a new supervised release term of four years and six months.
DISCUSSION
Before turning to Jones’s specific claims, we pause to note that the constitutional guarantees governing revocation of supervised release are identical to those applicable to revocation of parole or probation.
See United States v. Sanchez,
I. Fifth Amendment Claim
On appeal, Jones first argues that he was denied the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination by having to testify at his revocation hearing before the adjudication of the state charges against him. Jones seeks a bright line rule that federal courts should delay revocation proceedings until after the disposition of state charges that form the basis of revocation requests.
Jones relies heavily on
United States v. Sackinger,
The Supreme Court has identified the key inquiry in determining whether a violation of the right against compelled self-incrimination has occurred as “whether the accused was deprived of his free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer.”
Garrity v. New Jersey,
Jones was not
compelled
to testify. He could have pursued any number of legal strategies at his revocation hearing. While offering his own testimony was certainly
one
option, he could have chosen to attack the government’s case by offering the testimony of other individuals, including hearsay testimony of the kind presented by the government, as well as other kinds of evidence.
See Morrissey v. Brewer,
Jones nevertheless decided to testify himself, presumably having determined that such testimony was the most effective means to discredit the government’s case. To be sure, this determination carried with it the risk that his testimony would prejudice his state court defense. But it remained defendant’s choice to testify or remain silent. The Fifth Amendment does not immunize a defendant from all the potentially negative consequences of making such a choice. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he criminal process, like the rest of the legal system, is replete with situations requiring ‘the making of difficult judgments’ as to which course to follow.”
McGautha v. California,
In sum, the fact that Jones was required to choose between asserting his right to silence and pursuing what he believed to be the most effective defense against revocation does not mean that Jones faced the kind and intensity of coercion that could deprive him of the right against compelled self-incrimination. Accordingly, we find no Fifth Amendment violation; nor do we conclude that imposing a “bright line” rule as to the timing of revocation hearings visa-vis state court proceedings is either necessary or desirable. The issue is one for the exercise of the district court’s discretion.
*112 II. Sixth Amendment Claim
Jones next argues that the district court erred in not demanding that Karin and Officer Moreland’s wife testify at the revocation hearing, rather than receiving hearsay evidence from Officer Moreland as a substitute. Jones suggests that the district court’s determination as to the admissibility of the hearsay evidence was in error, and further argues that the district court’s reliance on this evidence violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him. Because we find no error in the district court’s admissibility determination, we reject Jones’s Sixth Amendment claim.
We review admissibility determinations for abuse of discretion.
See United States v. Tocco,
The hearsay exception for excited utterances is premised on a similar, though distinct, assumption that the reliability of a statement increases as opportunity for reflection by the declarant decreases. An “excited utterance” is “[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” Rule 803(2), Fed. R.Evid. As we have explained, “[t]he rationale for this hearsay exception is that the excitement of the event limits the declar-ant’s capacity to fabricate a statement and thereby offers some guarantee of its reliability.”
Tocco,
*113 For several reasons, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Officer Moreland’s hearsay testimony under either of these exceptions. First, the events reported to Officer More-land (i.e. a man exposing himself, masturbating, and making catcalls to a teen-age girl) were certainly startling enough to support application of the excited utterance exception. Second, the statements made by the declarants to Officer More-land were nearly contemporaneous with the event described. Third, Karin reported being “scared” by what she had witnessed, and Moreland’s wife appeared, from his testimony, to be agitated, calling to him to “come to the front, quick, quick, quick.” These circumstances clearly justify invocation of either the present sense impression or excited utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule.
Jones nevertheless urges us to overturn the district court’s determination, citing
United States v. Chin,
The hearsay testimony offered in
Chin
did not appear to fall within any exception to the hearsay rule; neither was there any discussion in
Chin
of the applicability of hearsay exceptions.
See id.
at 123. This is significant because it is well established that where the government seeks to introduce testimony under the excited utterance exception, and where that testimony is properly admitted by the district court, the government is under no constitutional obligation to explain the unavailability of the hearsay declarant.
See White v. Illinois,
As for the reliability of Officer Moreland’s hearsay testimony, the fact that this testimony is covered by “firmly rooted” exceptions to the hearsay rule provides the necessary guarantee of its trustworthiness.
See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright,
497
*114
U.S. 805, 815,
Thus Chin does not support defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim, and his appeal on this ground must fail.
CONCLUSION
Having considered all of Jones’s arguments on appeal and finding no basis for reversal, the judgment of the district court is accordingly affirmed.
Notes
. The governmеnt also called witnesses to testify about Jones’s arrest for alleged harassment and threatening of his former girlfriend. The district court, however, found that this allegation had not been proven. This testimony is therefore irrelevant to the instant appeal. Additionally, the government chose not to pursue the allegation that Jones failed to timely report his May 17th arrest to the Probation Department, noting that Jones had, in fact, called his Probation Officer immediately upon his release from police custody.
. As Justice O'Connor noted in her concurrence, the Supreme Court in
Lile
was unable to rеach a conclusive decision "on the question of what standard to apply when evaluating compulsion for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in a prison setting."
Lile,
. Thus while the hearsay exception for present sense impressions focuses on contemporaneity as the guarantor of reliability, and requires that the hearsay statement “describe or explain” the contemporaneous event or condition, Rule 803(1), Fed.R.Evid., the excited utterance exception is based on the psychological impact of the event itself, and permits admission of a broader range of hearsay statements-i.e. those that “relate to” the event. Rule 803(2), Fed.R.Evid.