23 F. 585 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Southern New York | 1882
The accused, having been convicted of perjury, now moves for a now trial and in arrest of judgment. The principal question presented for determination is whether the crime of perjury was committed by the accused when he made the false statement, under oath, which is set forth in the indictment. This statement was made under the following circumstances, as shown at the trial: The ac
On the part of the accused the point made is that the false matter so stated by the accused before the commissioner was not material matter, within the meaning of the statute, and therefore the crime created by the statute was not committed.
An essential element of the offense created by the statute (section 5392, Eev. St.) is the materiality of the matter charged to have been falsely stated. The words employed in the statute are “material matter.” These words were, doubtless, adopted from .the common law, and they must be given a signification broad enough to cover, at least, cases of perjury at common law. The rule of the common law in regard to perjury is thus stated by Archbold: “Every question in cross-examination, which goes to the witness’ credit, is material for this purpose.” Archb. Crim. Pl. & Proc. 817, (Eng. Ed.) The same rule was declared by the twelve judges in Reg. v. Gibbons, 9 Cox, C. C. 105.
The inquiry here, therefore, is whether the imprisonment of the accused in this state and in New Jersey was calculated to injure his character and so to impeach his credit as a witness; for it is not to be doubted that when the accused offered himself as a witness, he placed himself upon the same footing as any other witness, and was liable to be impeached in the same manner. Upon this question our opinion is that the matter stated by the accused as a witness had an obvious bearing upon the character of the witness, and could properly be considered by the commissioner in determining what credit was to be given to the testimony of the witness in respect to the crime with '¡yhich he stood charged. In Reg. v. Lavey, 3 Car. & K. 26, the accused, -when a witness, had falsely sworn that she had never been tried in-the Central criminal court, and had never been in custody at the Thames police station. On her trial for perjury these statements were ruled to be material matter, and the conviction was sustained. In Com. v. Bonner, 97 Mass. 587, a witness had been ashed “if he had been in the house of correction for any crime.” Objection to the question on the ground that the record was the best evidence was waived, and the case turned upon the materiality of the question. The master was held to be material. The present case is
The other points discussed have received our attention, and are thought to be untenable. They are not such as require attention. ii\ this opinion. The motions are denied.