So Kwong Shing (So) appeals from his conviction on seven counts of currency violations and conspiracy in connection with a “money laundering” operation involving a Hong Kong bank and its branch office in San Francisco. The district court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I
The Liu Chong Hing Bank, Ltd. of Hong Kong (the Hong Kong bank) has maintained a branch office in San Francisco since 1977 to serve its existing customers. This office has filed currency transaction reports (CTRs) with the Treasury Department on cash transactions over $10,000 as required by the Currency Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311-5322, and its accompanying regulations. Since 1978, when codefendant Chan became the branch manager, the office has not disclosed the identity of the depositor on its CTRs if the deposit was to a corporate account.
In May 1982, Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agents began an investigation to locate and halt money laundering transactions. On May 28, a government informant, Jones, met with a former associate, codefendant Lee, who suggested that he might be able to launder money through Hong Kong. Jones arranged a meeting between Lee and undercover IRS agent Whitehead. Lee agreed to set up a Hong Kong shell corporation, Transeata Corp., to launder Whitehead’s money, which Lee had been led to believe was from smuggling operations in Florida.
Lee traveled to Hong Kong to find a cooperative bank. He met with So, director of United States dollar operations at the Hong Kong bank, who proposed several alternatives to Lee but finally suggested nominee shell corporations as the best laundering vehicle. Lee returned to San Francisco, met with Whitehead, and on July 7, 1982, the first $42,000 was deposited in Transeata’s account through the San Francisco branch of the Hong Kong bank. Lee also telephoned Chan, who had been informed by So of the transaction. Chan filed a CTR, but did not disclose the individual depositor.
After the first transaction, Whitehead pressured Lee to avoid filing any CTR’s in the future by making several deposits in Transeata’s account on the same day of less than $10,000 each. When Chan refused to treat such deposits individually for purposes of the CTRs, Whitehead and another agent, Dyer, traveled to Hong Kong, where they met with So and a Hong Kong accountant, codefendant Lam. The agents complained of Chan’s refusal to bend the filing requirements. So assured them that this would be rectified. So provided the agents with the necessary documents to set up another shell corporation, the Benrich Corporation, and negotiated a 1% personal fee. So remarked that he did not care if Whitehead and Dyer were smugglers because he had smuggler clients from Thailand and Taiwan. So also solicited future money laundry customers for a 2% fee that he offered to divide with Whitehead and Dyer as finders. At the conclusion of the meeting, So remarked: “You have just bought yourself a Chinese laundry.”
After again meeting briefly with So in Hawaii, the agents returned to the mainland. Meanwhile, Chan was informed by the IRS that he had to identify the individual depositors on all CTRs, along with the corporate account holder. He subsequently proved obstructive to the Benrich conspiracy by insisting on such disclosure for the Benrich transactions. This resistance led Whitehead and Dyer to telephone So in Hong Kong, who recommended a “split deposit” approach to avoid government scrutiny. The scheme involved setting up *1353 numerous individual accounts in Hong Kong in the names of various cooperative Hong Kong residents and fictitious persons. Lam forwarded a package of documentation to assist in the split deposit scheme, including false depositor aliases in the names of Lam’s clients. Before the package arrived, So explained the procedure to the agents on the telephone in great detail, emphasizing the deposit method was necessary to avoid scrutiny. The numerous accounts would allow the laundering of up to $500,000 per day in increments of less than $10,000 to avoid the necessity of the CTRs.
After these conversations, the laundry scheme that is the subject of this appeal went into operation. Between March 24, and April 5, 1983, seven split deposits were made without filing CTR’s, in the following aggregate amounts: $62,595, $63,850, $70,-925, $70,785, $79,622, $73,620, and $81,993. Although Chan was acquitted, So, Lee, and Lam were indicted and convicted on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy), and seven counts of violating 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5322 as implemented by 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.22 and 103.25 (1984) (failing to file a CTR), for engaging in the split deposit scheme; the previous Transeata and Benrich transactions were not charged. The first two CTR counts were charged as misdemeanors under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(a), and the last five were charged as felonies under 31 U.S.C. § 5322(b).
II
So argues that the government engaged in outrageous conduct that violated his fifth amendment rights and that he was entrapped as a matter of law. These defenses, though related, focus on entirely different facts. The “outrageous government conduct” defense focuses on the government’s actions,
see, e.g., United States v. Lomas,
A.
Even when a defendant is predisposed to commit an offense, his conviction may be overturned if the government is so involved in the criminal endeavor that it shocks our sense of justice and violates due process.
See United States v. Russell,
We can assume that our sense of justice would be shocked were “government agents [to] engineer and direct [a] criminal enterprise from start to finish.”
United States v. Ramirez,
In this case, the creative inspiration for the charged crimes was provided by Lee, So, and Lam. Lee made the suggestion to the government informant and also made the initial approaches to So and Chan. Moreover, Lee made the technical arrangements for depositing and forming nominee corporations. So and Lam elaborated on these arrangements by providing the de
*1354
tailed documentation contained in the packet sent from Hong Kong. Thus, the government’s conduct in this case, while providing the funds and opportunity to launder money, was clearly not “so grossly shocking and so outrageous as to violate the universal sense of justice.”
United States v. Ryan,
B.
Entrapment, however, focuses on the predisposition of the defendant to commit a crime, and its existence is a factual issue for the jury.
See, e.g., Marcello,
We have described five factors to consider when determining predisposition: (1) the character or reputation of the defendant; (2) whether the government made the initial suggestion of criminal activity; (3) whether the defendant engaged in the activity for profit; (4) whether the defendant showed any reluctance; and (5) the nature of the government’s inducement.
See United States v. Diggs,
Ill
So argues that his convictions for five felonies under 31 U.S.C. §§ 5313 and 5322(b) must be reduced to misdemeanors. Section 5322(a) treats willful violations of the currency reporting laws as misdemeanors.
See
18 U.S.C. § 1(1), (2). Section 5322(b), however, treats them as felonies if they are a “part of a pattern of illegal activity involving transactions of more than $100,000 in a 12-month period.” Section 5322(b) is a recodification of 31 U.S.C. § 1059,
see
31 U.S.C. § 5322 note, and was not intended to and did not change the substance of the original section 1059.
See United States v. Booky,
The first two substantive counts of So’s indictment were charged as misdemeanors because neither of the first two split deposits individually exceeded $100,000 and the cumulative total of the deposits did not exceed that amount until after the second occurrence of the split deposits. The last five counts, however, were charged as felonies because the later split deposits amounted to a pattern of violations after the cumulative deposit total had exceeded $100,000.
We must initially decide whether individual currency misdemeanors aggregating to more than $100,000 amount to separate felonies each time the violation in a pattern adds to a total exceeding $100,000. In
United States v. Beusch,
Only one circuit has squarely faced this question of statutory interpretation. In
United States v. Kattan-Kassin,
We are not unmindful of the general rule that a single transaction with one illegal purpose cannot be divided into multiple offenses without a clear mandate from Congress.
See, e.g., Bell v. United States,
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is persuasive. If we adopted So’s interpretation of the statute, a violator who “com-mitt[ed] two violations involving more than $100,000 ... would be immune from prosecution under Section [5322(b)] for the remainder of the twelve-month period.”
Kattan-Kassin,
IV
Finally, So argues that because section 5322(b) is subject to different interpretations, it is unconstitutionally vague on its face. But the statute is subject only to “as applied” review because section 5322(b) is not impermissibly vague in all its applications.
See Schwartzmiller v. Gardner,
So’s argument that the statute provides insufficient notice for multiple felony convictions lacks merit because of our reading of the legislative history as clearly mandating that result. Thus, even if the bare language of the statute leaves some doubt, the language as narrowed by the legislative history clearly envisioned his conduct.
See Kattan-Kassin,
AFFIRMED.
