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United States v. Kriesel
508 F.3d 941
9th Cir.
2007
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 district reverse the Accordingly, we summary judgment grant

court’s product the useful doc- under

Defendants proceedings for further

trine and remand opinion.4 with this

consistent AND REMANDED.

REVERSED America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, KRIESEL, Jr.,

Thomas Edward

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-30110. Appeals, States Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 29, 2007.

Filed Nov. appealed mony designee, that Aleo 4. The State also the district court’s of Alco’s who stated excluding testimony expert of its preferred purchase slag lead with at least order witness, content, thirty percent explain Mr. Brodwin. Because Mr. Brod- lead but fail to ap- proposed testimony why preference a “commer- win’s concerned Alco’s constituted recycling exemption, grade” meaning plicability this as- specification cial within the pect appeal is moot. of the statute. *2 Green, Colin Fieman and Joanne Feder- Defenders, Tacoma, WA, al Public for the appellant. Brunner, McKay,

Helen J. John Dion, Attorneys, Mike United States Se- attle, WA, appellee.

Before: B. FLETCHER and M. McKEOWN, Judges, MARGARET Circuit SCHWARZER,* and WILLIAM W Judge. District McKEOWN, Judge: Circuit In Analysis 2004 we held that the DNA Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 “satisfies requirements of the Fourth Amend- respect super- ment” with to individuals on vised release. United States v. (9th Cir.2004) banc). (en required The 2000 Act collection of DNA samples custody from individuals and on probation, parole, release had .been of “qualifying who convicted offenses,” Federal then defined as certain (2000). violent crimes. 14135a Congress amended the Act 2004 to ex- all pand qualifying offenses to felonies. Joining every other circuit to consider the Act, we hold that the amended stat- passes ute constitutional muster with re- spect to a convicted felon on release.1 * Schwarzer, sue, emphasize The Honorable William W Senior that we confine our dis Judge United States District for the Northern resolving constitutionality cussion to California, sitting by designation. amendment, District applied the 2004 to individu als like Kriesel. 379 F.3d at 837-38. doing, acknowledge we that in Kin- 1. In so Cf. elsewhere, cade and much ink has been spilled over this sensitive and contentious is- Regulatory Statutory qualifying fenses” to the list of offenses. Back- ground 107-56, No. See Pub.L. Stat. Together, qualify- these 2000, Congress enacted the DNA generally are ing offenses characterized as (the *3 Elimination Act Analysis Backlog violent crimes. “Act”), required Act” or the which “DNA collected from individ- samples DNA to be Congress passed the Justice for All Act custody probation, and those on uals 2004, which further amended the DNA being release after parole, or by expanding “qualify- Act the definition of offenses.” “qualifying convicted of Federal ing Federal offenses” as follows: origi- § 42 14135a. The DNA Act U.S.C. (d) Qualifying Federal offenses “qualifying Federal offenses” nally defined The offenses that shall treated for (A) murder, voluntary following: as the purposes of qualifying this section as manslaughter, relating or other offense to following Federal offenses are the of- (B) homicide, relating an to sexual offense fenses, by Attorney as determined abuse, exploitation to sexual or other General: children, transportation or to abuse of (1) Any felony. (C) an relat- illegal activity, sexual offense (D) (2) Any slavery, kidnaping, chapter offense under 109A of peonage to (E) robbery burgla- or involving an offense Title 18 abuse [sexual crimes]. (F) §

ry, any violation of 18 U.S.C. 1153 (3) (as Any crime of violence that term murder, involving manslaughter, kidnap- 18).2 is defined in section of Title 16 maiming, felony relating offense to ing, (4) Any to com- attempt conspiracy or abuse, incest, arson, burglary, or sexual (1) anymit of in paragraphs the offenses (G) robbery, any attempt conspiracy or to (3). through any commit of the above offenses. See 108-405, 203(b), § Pub.L. No. 118 Stat. Act, Analysis Backlog DNA Elimination (2004).3 2260, specifying 2270 Rather than 2726, 106-546, 3,§ Pub.L. No. 114 Stat. crimes, certain the amendment included all (2000). 2001, In PATRI- 2729-30 the USA felonies, violence, all crimes of and all sex- “[a]ny § Act to offense OT added 14135a Chapter ual abuse crimes under 109A of of Title 2232b(g)(5)(B) listed section Title 18. transcending of terrorism national [acts (as Attorney authority has boundaries],” General “[a]ny crime of violence 18, promulgate regulations carry out the in section 16 of Title defined 14135a(e); § Code),” “[a]ny attempt or con- statute. See States 28.2; any Sample § of~ Collection spiracy to commit of the above C.F.R. § “crime of violence” 3.The Act has since been amended to author- 2. 18 U.S.C. 16 defines are “(a) ize DNA collection "from individuals who an element the an offense has as arrested, facing charges, [of or convicted use, use, attempted phys- or threatened use felonies,] qualifying or from non-United against person property ical or force persons under the States who are detained another, (b) any that is a or other offense authority of the United States.” See Violence that, nature, felony its involves a sub- Department Against Women and of Justice against physical force stantial risk 2005, Act of Pub.L. No. 109- Reauthorization person property may or of another be used 2960, 1004(a), § 119 Stat. committing the course of the offense.” All constitutionality of the We do not address the violence, crimes of whether felonies or misde- Act, greatly which ex- 2006 version of meanors, are covered the statute and im- applicability beyond panded the of the statute plementing regulation. convicted individuals. (a) provides general, “any sample that in Under the Jus- From Federal Offenders 4,763- under, Fed.Reg. any analy- Act tice for All collected result 2005) (“DNA (Jan. 31, Sample Collec- under, sis carried out section tion”). changes, to the 2004 response 14135a, or 14135b of this title be used Attorney revised 28 C.F.R. General only purpose specified for a in such sec- quali- § that identifies 28.2, regulation 14135e(a). tion.” Id. purposes offenses for the

fying federal collection, track the new sample II. Kriesel’s Claims 14135a(d). language of Kriesel, In March Thomas Edward Act, original proba- As under *4 pleaded guilty conspira- Jr. to one count of samples from indi- tion offices collect DNA cy possession to commit the crime of probation, parole, supervised viduals on or methamphetamine in intent distribute quali- convicted of a release who have been 841(a)(1) §§ violation of 21 U.S.C. and 846. offense, fying federal U.S.C. im- thirty He was sentenced to months of 14135a(a)(2), fur- samples § and the are prisonment years supervised and three of the Federal Bu- nished to the Director judgment, release. At the time of (the “FBI”), Investigation reau of “who terms of Kriesel’s release in- ... out a DNA on each carriles] cluded this standard condition: “You shall sample such and the re- include[s] truthfully by all inquiries pro- answer 14135a(b).4 CODIS,” § sults in id. CODIS bation officer and follow the instructions of Sys- DNA Index is the FBI’s Combined probation officer.” Kriesel was also centrally-managed database link- tem—a “shall person, advised he submit his federal, culled from profiles residence, place employment or vehicle state, pro- territorial DNA collection upon request by to a search Pro- the U.S. grams, profiles as well as drawn from bation Office.” evidence, unidentified re- crime-scene mains, genetic samples voluntarily initially When he was scheduled for missing persons. provided relatives testing, proba- informed Kriesel (plurality at 819 See 379 F.3d in opposed princi- tion officer that he was opinion). ple government’s per- to the collection and storage August manent of his DNA. In provided privacy pro- Act also

The 2000 Department petitioned the Probation standards, place in tection which remain super- the district court to revoke Kriesel’s Each act of after the 2004 amendment. report vision because he failed to for DNA collection, use, or disclosure unauthorized testing. Because Kriesel’s conviction for crime, and sample separate of a DNA is a conspiracy methamphetamine to distribute person knowingly discloses a sam- “[a] who (a) felony, “qualifying is a it is a Federal in in ple or result described subsection Backlog offense” under the DNA Elimina- any person not authorized manner to in uses, tion Act as amended 2004. U.S.C. it, or receive or obtains without 14135a(d) (2004). authorization, result, hearing § At the on sample such or shall release, $250,000, petition to revoke impris- not more than fined argued Attorney of not more than one Kriesel’s counsel that the period oned for a 14135e(c). year.” promulgated regulation gov- Subsection General U.S.C. description (plurality opinion). provides a fuller of the F.3d at 817-20 Kincade of the DNA Act and CODIS. 379 mechanics Administration, (9th of the collection violation erning DNA Cir.2003) (“In terms, general interpretive the Ad- provisions comment notice and (“APA”), merely to, explain, 5 rules but do not add Procedure Act ministrative already law that substantive exists and that the DNA Act as rule.”). legislative form of a statute or violated the Fourth amended on prohibition Amendment’s unreasonable The 2004 amendment dictates the basis Const., and seizures. See U.S. searches regulatory revision. The statute amend. IV. provides part: relevant “[t]he offenses purposes that shall be treated for of this rejected argu-

The district court these qualifying section as Federal offenses are upheld validity both the of the ments offenses, the following as determined constitutionality regulation and (1) Attorney Any felony.” General: stay granted Act. The district court also 203(b). Act, § for All Justice pending appeal. order its Attorney regulations General issued Challenge III. APA statute, by designating mirror first contends that the At Kriesel “any' felony” a qualifying offense. 28 *5 required 28.2(b)(1). torney General was follow § regulations C.F.R. The de- in 5 procedures notice and comment “felony” fine in accord with federal law as § in revising 553 because 28 C.F.R. U.S.C. an “offense that would be classified as a 3559(a) 28.2, Attorney § promulgated felony § General under 18 U.S.C. or that is APA legislative specifically by a rule. The a grade substantive classified letter as a 28.2(a). felony.” § that administrative rules must be provides Id. adopted through rulemaking process, contention, easy Kriesel’s which is not opportunity which includes notice and an divine, apparently by designating is 551(4), §§ public comment. 5 for U.S.C. felonies, some, “all” rather than the Attor- (5); not referenced in the Although ney legislating was rather than General statute, the courts have denominated such interpreting argument the statute. This is “legislative rules as rules.” Richard J. See Attorney difficult to countenance as the Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative felony in simply General defined accord Rules, from, Interpretive

Rules 52 Admin. existing with an federal standard and (2000). 547, contrast, In L. Rev. 549 felony” adopted “any designation di- APA specifically exempts “interpretive rectly statutory from language. See rulemaking process. rules” from the 5 (2004), H.R.Rep. reprinted No. 108-711 as 553(b)(3)(A). § 2274, 2284, in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2004 WL Attorney regulation (stating

The General’s is 2348416 that the 2004 amendment response sued to the 2004 amendment is meant to authorize of DNA collection sam- interpretive ples a classic rule: it a rule “all from felons convicted Federal offenses.”). military agency public qualifying “issued an to advise the crimes and agency’s promulgating regulation, construction of the statutes In the Attor- Chrysler ney specifically recognized and rules which it administers.” General Brown, 281, 31, standard, ‘felony’ v. 441 n. notion of a Corp. 302 99 “[t]he (1979) 1705, law, (quoting concept S.Ct. familiar Federal criminal Justice, Department existing simply United States At and this rule refers to stat- definition,” torney utory provisions on the Adminis for its General’s Manual (1947)); simply ‘felony’ trative Procedure Act see also 28.2 “defines as it is i.e., Hemp Drug ordinarily referring Indus. Ass’n v. understood — Enforcement 946 the maximum author- the Act does not violate the which Fourth

offenses for one imprisonment exceeds majority ized term of Amendment.6 The of circuits Collection, 70 Fed. year.” Sample DNA “totality adopt of the circumstances” 4,766 4,764, (citing 18 U.S.C. Reg. Weikert, framework. v. United States 504 3559(a)). (1st 1, Cir.2007); F.3d 9 Banks v. United (10th States, 1178, Cir.2007); 490 F.3d 1183 Attorney explained, General he As the Kraklio, 922, United States v. 451 F.3d 924 itself to understood the 2004 amendment (8th Cir.2006); v. sample from United States Castillo- collection “authorize[ ] (11th Cir.2005).7 Lagos, Fed.Appx. offenders convicted of felo 71 all Federal Collection, contrast, Sample Fed. nies.” the Second and Seventh Cir 4,766. Reg. “pe We earlier observed that rely “special cuits on the test.” needs nalizing agency” explaining bad Amerson, 73, States v. 483 F.3d ; Act, “by labeling about the news (2d Cir.2007) Hook, v. United States ‘substantive,’ killing explanation would (7th Cir.2006). F.3d 772-74 The Sixth messenger. regulation impose[s] upheld Circuit has the 2004 Act under both legal duties ... no other substantive other Conley, tests. United States already imposed.”5 than what the statute (6th Cir.2006).8 674, 677-81 (9th Block, 613-14 Alcaraz v. In light California, of Samson v. we

Cir.1984). regulations in these Nothing ground continue to our supports legisla a claim that the rules are totality of circumstances test. 547 U.S. tive and thus merit a full-blown rulemak- S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 250 ing process. Before no Supreme *6 Challenge IV. Constitutional Court case had addressed this issue. See (plurality 379 F.3d at 832 n. 27 Every circuit to' consider a Fourth Samson, however, opinion). In challenge Amendment to the 2004 Act has Court applied totality collecting reached the same conclusion: of the circumstances upholding from nonviolent felons as authorized test in provid- DNA a California law contrast, By Attorney specifical- meaning 5. General within the of the Constitution.” ly acknowledged “mak[mg] (plurality his discretion in 379 F.3d at 821 n. 15 judgments determining particular opinion). which of violence' as de- offenses constitute 'crimes judg- [§ ] fined in 18 U.S.C. 16—but these 2007, 7. Prior to the Eleventh Circuit allowed made, already following public ments were unpublished dispositions per- citation to as comments, receipt notice and the of 36-2, authority. suasive See 11th Cir. R. Rob- pub- Center, ] version of 28 C.F.R. 28.2 that was [§ Timothy Reagan, ert Federal Judicial 2003, 29, lished on December and went into Citing Unpublished Appellate Opin- Federal 28, 74,- January Fed.Reg. (2007), 2004 [68 effect on http://www. ions Issued Before 2007 regulation change 855]. The revised does not gov/rules/Unpub_Opinions.pdf. uscourts. Sample these determinations.” Collec- tion, 4,766. Fed.Reg. 70 up 8. The federal and state courts have also variety authorizing held a of other statutes 6. Whether a search is unreasonable under the DNA collection all from convicted felons. See, question (7th Fourth Amendment is a of law re- e.g., Berge, Green v. 354 F.3d 675 Stafford, Cir.2004) viewed de novo. United States v. (upholding Wisc. Stat. Ann. 1068, (9th Cir.2005). (West 1999)); 1073 "The § Murray, 165.77 v. Jones (4th 1992) compulsory pro- extraction of blood for DNA (upholding F.2d 302 Cir. Va.Code State, filing implicates right (1990)); unquestionably Ann. 19.2-310.2 v. Doles personal security (Wyo.1999) embodied in the Fourth (upholding Wyo. P.2d 315 Stat. Amendment, (1997)). a and thus constitutes 'search' Ann. 7-19-403 (“[C]ondi- release, opinion) every (plurality F.3d at 834 that, as a condition enjoy severely must constricted parole for state tional releasees eligible prisoner seizure subject privacy gen- to a search or of relative to the expectations to be agree a war- citizenry.”) with or without parole a officer eral rant, cause. 126 S.Ct. or without and with consequence of Kriesel’s sta As a direct 2199 n. at releasee, he has a tus as a Samson, we Taking our cue from in his expectation privacy of diminished “the touchstone reaffirm identity specifically, tracking his own reasonableness,” id. Amendment is Fourth consequence of identity primary is the “general adopt n. at 2201 analyzed by The DNA DNA collection. “ex- approach,” which Fourth Amendment “junk primarily the FBI consists circumstances totality amin[es] not “non-genic stretches DNA”— is reason whether search to determine recognized being responsible presently (quoting at 2197 United States able.” Id. coding” purposefully for trait that were 112, 118, 122 U.S. S.Ct. Knights, “they are not associated selected because (2001)) (internal quo or medical characteristics.” physical known omitted). a search tation marks “Whether ade, at Kinc by assessing, is reasonable ‘is determined (internal (plurality opinion) quotation hand, degree to which it the one on omitted). (“Recent marks But see id. n. 6 privacy, individual’s upon intrudes an begun question the notion studies have other, to which it is degree on junk does not contain useful legitimate promotion needed material.”). And, genetic programming ” (quoting Id. interests.’ governmental as a qualified based on Kriesel’s status 118-19, 122 Knights, 534 S.Ct. release, he can offender on 587).9 only expectation most limited claim any, identity given if in his that he privacy, Privacy Interest A. Kriesel’s predicate of lawfully was convicted of of Kriesel’s assessing the nature (Gould, J., n. fense. See id. at 842 *7 interest, resolution begin “we our privacy it concurring) (noting permissible that of the well- by taking of the issue note of felons identifying fingerprints maintain and oth principle parolees that established released be they even after have been er conditional releasees are not entitled only identity, fingerprints cause reveal but panoply rights protections full and retain declining practice to endorse the general public.” Kin possessed a database after ing DNA CODIS cade, opinion). (plurality 379 F.3d at 833 society). paid felon has his debt Rather, has often rec Supreme Court privacy assessing the nature of the yet again in ognized, as it did intrusion, are mindful of the caution severely we parolees that “have diminished than identi- that DNA often reveals more privacy,” and that expectations technology, ty, and that with advances necessarily Fourth Amendment does not far more extensive junk a reveal conducting a officer from prohibit police ob- Judge information. Gould parolee. genetic of a 126 suspicionless search Kineade, “un- concurrence in 2199, 2202; served in his at see also 379 S.Ct. cade, (citing F.3d at 817 n. purposes, our cases 9. For Fourth Amendment (9th Harper, 896 n. 1 distinguish among parolees, probation- States v. 928 F.2d do not ers, 1991)). Cir. supervised release. Kin- and those on fingerprints, DNA stores and reveals 86 S.Ct. A like personal, private data inherently massive amounts of blood draw “is more intrusive individual, that and the advance of purely about than a external fin search such as only- Weikert, to make stored DNA promises science gerprinting.” See 504 F.3d at 12. DNA, revealing over time. Like a Nevertheless, more Supreme held Court has person, a but unlike fingerprint identifies that the intrusion caused a blood test DNA, says nothing about the fingerprint a significant, itself “is not since such ‘tests health, person’s propensity partic- their for are a commonplace days period these disease, gender race charac- ular their physical ic experience examinations and teristics, perhaps propensi- even their quantity with them teaches 3; ty certain conduct.” Id. n. see also minimal, blood extracted is and that for Amerson, (recognizing 483 F.3d at 85 “the procedure most people, the involves virtu ” vast amount of sensitive information risk, trauma, ally pain.’ no or Skinner v. person’s can from a be mined Ass’n, Ry. Labor Executives’ 489 U.S. very strong privacy interests that all (1989) 625, 109 1402, 103 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 639 information”) (cit- have in this individuals Schmerber, (quoting at 384 U.S. (Reinhardt, at 1826). commonly S.Ct. “[I]t [also] J., dissenting)). accepted condition of probation super [or vised probationer re- release] [or samples being

The concerns about DNA tests, drug submit to with the re leasee] beyond purposes used identification are that, often, sult requisite sample Nevertheless, legitimate. real and those can any be collected without incremental mitigated by priva- concerns are the Act’s Amerson, intrusion.” cy protections, provide pen- which criminal Consequently, privacy the additional impli unauthorized use of DNA alties for the DNA, collecting cations of blood test samples. They outweighed by are also opposed ato cheek swab or other mecha competing notion that releasees nism, significantly do not analy alter our privacy have little to no interest their (distinguishing sis. id. at 84-85 be 14135e(c) (“A identities. Cf. See physical taking tween the samples of DNA person knowingly who discloses a[DNA] “analy and the “more serious invasion” of sample any or result ... manner to sis and maintenance” of an in individual’s it, person not authorized to receive or ob- formation). Based on all these consider uses, authorization, tains or without such ations, we conclude that as a convicted result, sample or shall be fined not more currently felon who continues to serve his $250,000, imprisoned period than for a release, term of Kriesel has a *8 year. of not more than one Each instance diminished in privacy interest the collec disclosure, obtaining, of or shall use consti- tion of his purposes. DNA identification tute a separate offense under this subsec- tion.”).10 emphasize ruling today We that our drawing

The physical impli- of blood also does not cover DNA collection from arres- bodily cates Kriesel’s interest in integrity, custody tees or non-citizens detained in the States, “a society.” cherished of required value our of the United who are 757, 772, California, Schmerber v. 384 submit to DNA collection the 2006 ver- 'junk "Should necessary,” the uses to which DNA’can ness balance struck would be 10. put signifi- be respect be shown in the future to be even with to individuals in Kriesel's Amerson, cantly greater today position. than the record before us exact 483 F.3d at 85 n. suggests, a reconsideration of the reasonable-

949 large” significant. 42 mitted while “at Act. DNA See sion 14135a(a)(1)(A)(2006). DNA evidence is often central to the we have While Nor do investigations of violent crimes such as fully paid has petitioner “a who before us assault, murder or sexual see Roe v. Mar has com society, who his or her debt (2d cotte, Cir.1999), term, 193 F.3d it can or her and who served his pletely solving nonviolent be useful crimes system.... Once those penal left the has noted, recently well. As the Tenth Circuit release have supervised on previously important to realize ... that DNA society, “[i]t their debt to wholly cleared hair, saliva, can extracted from raised, be the CO- question ‘Should ” Kincade, our that parts numerous other of bodies entry be erased?’ DIS (Gould, J., even a non-violent criminal could leave be concurring in the F.3d piece inculpatory hind on a evidence.” ques do not answer these judgment). We Banks, 1190; Green, F.3d at also see 354 F.3d at 679-81 tions. See also Amerson, 37; n. (Easterbrook, J., 379 F.3d at 838 concurring) (noting that (“[Tjhere “[fjelons at 88 n. 15 are also indications expired” form whose terms have be, increasingly, that DNA can and is be individuals than category a different crimes.”). Al ing used to nonviolent of a solve purposes releasees for the supervised Rather, though fingerprint might evidence often be inquiry). our Fourth Amendment offender, identify past sufficient to precise confined to the circum decision is means for the provides collection another us. stances before significant to meet its need to B. Government’s identify who continue to serve a offenders Interests Banks, release. term of Cf. plurality identified as at 1190. “undeniably and “monumen compelling” effect, justify interests governmental respect tal” three With to the deterrent collection from violent felons: rec- ing Supreme repeatedly Court has “[t]he First, a means of identi “[b]y establishing ognized among pa- that rates of re-arrest link significantly that can be used to conditional probationers fication rolees and are they general to crimes committed while than the crime rate.” higher releasees Banks, 1189; large,” compulsory profiling are at F.3d at see also society’s ensuring (collecting interest cases serves 126 S.Ct. at describ- comply reducing with the conditions of recidi- releasees the state’s interests ... (plurality noting “parolees 379 F.3d at 838 are their release. vism and Second, effect of criminal of- opinion). likely the deterrent more to commit future fenses”) (internal society’s quotation interest marks and ci- profiling such fosters omitted). reducing Finally, collecting very assumption Id. “[T]he recidivism. tation probation” DNA of offenders contributes to the institution past elaborating probationer crimes. Id. In is “more solution release is interests, likely did not ... to violate the law.” on those Griffin Wisconsin, 868, 880, matter between 107 S.Ct. distinguish practical as a 483 U.S. *9 Here the violent and nonviolent felons. arguments advances the same that nonviolent offend- Kriesel counters felons, Kin- respect to nonviolent and

with rates than vio- ers have lower recidivism applies equal rationale force. cade’s with per- is not argument lent offenders. This Indeed, in case. he identifying interest in suasive Kriesel’s governmental The recidivist, as he violated already to crimes com- a linking releasees and them sum, when he posi- agree principle terms of his release tested we in substances. it is that tive for controlled While other circuits have considered the issue, vary us, rates with fac- true that “recidivism and hold that in the case before age type and of requiring tors like the offender’s comply Kriesel to with the 2004 nonetheless, conviction,” “the high likeli- amendment to the Act is constitu hood that non-violent offenders will re- tional because government’s significant therefore, Supreme offend—and as the in identifying supervised interests releas- Knights, put ees, in recognized recidivism, Court preventing solving and their crimes and position to conceal identi- past outweigh crimes priva diminished ties from the authorities —underscores the cy may that interests be advanced obtaining Government’s interest currently convicted felon serving a term of most accurate identification information it supervised release. Banks, can from these individuals.” See AFFIRMED. at 1191.11 FLETCHER, BETTY B. Judge, Circuit Finally, plurality the Kincade also ex- dissenting:

plained “by contributing to the solu- holds, majority with an air of shrug- crimes, past profiling tion of of quali- warrant, ging inevitability, that without a helps bring fied federal offenders closure cause, probable without indeed without long to countless victims of crime who whatsoever, any suspicion gov- the federal languished knowledge have ernment repeatedly seize and search perpetrators large.” remain at the DNA of all super- federal felons on Although weight at 839. of this ratio- release, vised regardless of their offense or may vary considering nale when individual their likelihood They to re-offend. sanc- crimes, types of nonviolent crimes can also tion the inclusion of that DNA in a massive significant lasting damage cause and database, permanent computer and example, innocent individuals. For a fami- purpose sole generalized which is to aid home, ly savings, defrauded of its life and criminal investigation. This offends not stability by an unscrupulous financial con only the Fourth prec- Amendment but our running telemarketing or mail artist I respectfully edents. dissent.1 just fraud scheme is as much a victim as a family burglary, that is the victim of a Background Statutory I. Factual just samples suspects as DNA can clear Framework crimes, they can also contribute to the past

resolution govern- crimes. The In March of Kriesel was convicted may certainly offense, ment drug credit those concerns of a non-violent conspiracy to pursuing ways open investiga- possess methamphetamine solve with intent tions. thirty distribute. He was sentenced to sure, majority's 11. To be the rate of opin- recidivism non- I concur in Part III of the violent offenders is less than for violent of- challenge. ion and of Kriesel’s APA Nonetheless, signif- fenders. the rate remains below, however, explained For reasons example, icant. For the recidivism rate for portion opinion merely holds that the drug Sentencing offenders is 21.2%. Attorney General did not violate the APA’s Commission, Measuring Recidivism: The procedural requirements promulgating reg- History Computation Criminal Fed- implement ulations to an unconstitutional 2004), Sentencing (May eral Guidelines 30 statute. http://www.ussc.gov/research. available htm. *10 super- gest drug pres- that nonviolent offenders placed and on imprisonment months in Febru- high After his release ent a risk of recidivism. vised release. urinalyses, Kriesel failed three ary approves today The statute the court and morphine once for

testing positive revision, extension, significant and steady marijuana. light of his twice for version of the 2000 DNA Act. predecessor ties to the employment and established Act, Under the 2000 DNA a limited num- however, court nonetheless community, categorized “quali- of crimes were as a ber on Kriesel to remain allowed offense,” fying only ... early he has consis- release. Since qualifying releasees convicted of those of- drug and alcohol tests and tently passed required fenses were to submit to DNA fully employed. specific No has remained sampling as a condition of their release. submit to DNA requirement that Kriesel Analysis Backlog See DNA Elimination his testing was included the terms of Act, 106-546, 3,§ Pub.L. No. 114 Stat. that he language It did include release. (2000) (hereinafter 2726, 2729-30 “2000 proba- “follow the instructions of the must Act”). The DNA from obtained per- and that he “submit his tion officer” “CODIS,” samples placed those are within upon request by ... son search System. the FBI’s Combined DNA Index requested Probation Office.” When U.S. is a a clear- CODIS database acts as by the officer to submit to DNA probation inghouse for DNA information taken from testing, objection he based on his refused pro- state and federal DNA collection privacy of his in- principle on to invasion grams, as well as crime scenes. The of- This resulted in rev- terest without cause. fenses enumerated in the 2000 DNA Act however, probation, stayed, of his ocation primarily and crimes were violent crimes appeal. pending illegal activity. related to sexual Id. like Kriesel drug Non-violent offenders 2004, however, All The Justice for Act federal category fall within a offenders “any the DNA Act so that felo- amended that, according government-conducted ny” qualifying now serves as a offense. studies, have one of the lowest rates of 108-405, 203(b), Pub.L. No. 118 Stat. Commission, Sentencing recidivism. U.S. (2004) (hereinafter “2004 Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal Act”). before, As that DNA is filed History Computation Federal Notably, although CODIS database. 2004), (May Sentencing Guidelines 13 uni- brought 2004 amendment the entire http://www.ussc.gov/research. available at verse of non-violent federal felonies within (Commission (drug trafficking Report) htm purview, Report the House the Act’s group of offenders within the offenders accompanied sug- the amendment does not likely that “are overall the least to recidi- gest any utility that DNA has evidence vate”); Justice, Dept. Bureau Rep. crimes. H.R. solving non-violent See Statistics, Returning to Justice Offenders (2004), reprinted 108-711 Prison, (Sept.2000) Federal 1986-97 contrary, the U.S.C.C.A.N. 2274. To the (persons drug convicted of offenses were that, point on this clearest statement likely prison, the least to return to full evi- potential, “When used to its property lower recidivism rate than offenses). help pre- dence will solve and even public-order government most serious violent vent some dispute accuracy does not of these (em- studies, crime.” 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at nor did the come for added). any contrary sug- phasis ward with evidence to *11 DNA, his blood will to obtain

In order II. Discussion from Kriesel while he is on be extracted in opinion In our fractured release, Act but the 2004 DNA plurality States v. of the court requires that the de- provision no contains reasoned that the 2000 DNA Act was that biological return of sam- struction or analyzed properly under “a traditional as- it) (or analysis derived from ple gauged by sessment of reasonableness release ends. period once his totality of the circumstances.” Indeed, only provides the statute Cir.2004) banc). (9th (en 813, 831 That analysis of a per- of the DNA destruction not, however, majori- view did command a very in limited included in CODIS son ty Judge separately burden to remove of the court. Gould circumstances. The that was collected as a DNA from CODIS arguing concurred that qualifying for a of- result of a conviction regime suspicionless DNA Act’s Only by providing fense falls on the felon. subject “special to a searches was needs” a final court copy of order a “certified Thus, analysis. although Id. at 840. establishing that such conviction has been ultimately upheld Kincade the court person’s will a overturned” Act, constitutionality of the 2000 DNA expunged. U.S.C. opinion produce any failed to cohesive view 14132(d)(l)(A)(i). Thus, § once Kriesel’s appropriate analytical on the construct. CODIS, it placed DNA is will re- within analytically approach can How the consti permanently main there be contin- ually long and searched so as the tutionality effectively by accessed was answered Federal, State or search is conducted Supreme California, Court Samson v. justice agencies for law en- local “criminal 547 U.S. S.Ct. 165 L.Ed.2d ” purposes.... forcement identification Samson, the Supreme 14132(b)(3)(A). Simply put, § once U.S.C. totality-of-the-cireum- Court held that the DNA, any level of they police have his proper stances test was the mode of anal criminal inves- general with a ysis to examine a California statute tap can into tigative interest Kriesel (Cal.Penal 3067(a) (West 2000)) § Code consent, suspicion, that DNA without permits suspicionless and warrantless warrant, long period super- or after his they parolees searches of California while vised release ends. parole. remain on Id. at 2197. Although easy enough it is to conceive of however, merely “totality clarifies that in- hypothetical risks to civil liberties proper analytical the circumstances” is the by approving regime, vited this kind of construct when confronted with a statute here, to speculate. there is no need that authorizes and suspicion- warrantless per- most recent version of the DNA Act parolees. less searches of Samson does extraction of DNA from “individuals mits dictate, to, give any support not or arrested, facing charges, who are or con- majority outcome reached in this qualifying victed or from non- felonies] [of case. persons who are detained United States authority Samson re-stated now familiar to- under the of the United States.” 14135a(a)(l)(A) (2006).2 tality-of-the-circumstances test used to parallel provision of the act that been dismissed or resulted in an [have] [have] There is acquittal expunged charge arrestee's to be was filed allows for an no within Attorney applicable period." only the General receives "a final time 42 U.S.C. if 14132(d)(1)(A)(ii). establishing charge[s] court [] order *12 (2) searches; special needs grammatic not search is whether or determine a. (3) hand, searches; one by “assessing, on searches conducted as “reasonable” upon it intrudes an degree the to which part pro- of a state’s conditional release other, the privacy, and on individual’s gram. category This last is limited pro- to it is needed for degree which language to a state search Court’s inter- legitimate governmental motion of program genuinely designed that is to im- States v. (quoting Id. ests.” monitoring reintegration of prove 112, 118-119, 122 S.Ct. Knights, 534 releasees.”). frame- conditional With this (2001)). guidance work and from the Court statute under consideration California mind, I turn to the 2004 DNA Act. scrutiny Amendment Fourth survived First, Samson, premises.

based on two Totality-of-the-Circumstances A. parolee, as a had a by virtue of his status and Kincade “severely expectation pri- ] diminished apposite precedents The most in this Second, vacy.” Id. at 2199. the Court pass constitutionality to on the Circuit in- acknowledged legitimate California’s Act are the 2004 DNA Samson and the as a “supervising parolees” terest plurality from Kincade. As not- decision present means to deter recidivism ed, years ago three the far more limited But, Id. at 2200. parolee population. upheld by plurality 2000 DNA Act was repeatedly emphasized, the Court Kincade, relying totality-of-the-eir- on a inextricably interest was governmental analysis. cumstances 379 F.3d 838-40. supervise parolee linked to the need however, plurality, was careful to note parole. remained on See id. at while he that their decision was limited to the ver- (“Thus, require in- parolees 2200-01 most court, sion of the Act before the a version ... individualized sus- supervision tense targeted violent criminals. Distin- ability undermine the State’s picion would in- guishing programs state that collected ... effectively supervise parolees drug formation from “non-violent offend- justified concern an incentive-to-conceal ers,” plurality emphasized that “it is system supervising proba- ‘intensive’ particularly important to therefore observe ap- ... That tioners in concern Griffin. solely legality deal here we system force to a plies greater with even profiling requiring compulsory parolees ... supervising [individualized on conditional qualified federal offenders required by parole other State suspicion plurality Id. at 819 n. 9. The release.” systems of little to our deter- relevance] clear that their decision therefore made supervisory mination whether California’s authority not concern “the of the feder- did system is drawn to meet its needs and is narrowly ... pass al less reasonable.”) added). Thus, (emphases legislation.” (emphasis Id. add- tailored sup- does not lend constitutional Samson ed). Thus, provides Kincade some while that sanctions warrant- port to a statute it guidance, by its own terms does not searches untethered suspicionless less and “less purport to decide whether or not the supervisory from an immediate need. See narrowly legislation” before us to- tailored Weikert, United States scrutiny. day passes Fourth Amendment Cir.2007) (1st (Stahl, J., dissenting) id. See (“[T]he Supreme Court has [in ] Samson ma- Although controlling, none are now identified three limited circumstances deci- jority places great weight on recent suspicionless in which a search will sur- (1) upheld that have pro- sions from other circuits vive Fourth Amendment review: sions, against Act a Fourth but it does not consider how lowered the 2004 challenge. Maj. Op. at 945- Amendment among recidivism rates non-violent offend A look at those cases re- closer government’s ers would affect the inter . issues before us precise veals that analysis ests under that at 12- *13 today have been treated with more 13. Two those deci- depth. breadth than In Conley, United States v. in order to “special relied on a needs” test sions justify special the 2004 DNA Act under a

which, improper in is the light of analysis, needs the Sixth Circuit discussed analytical analysis method for of the 2004 approval government with sug data that Amerson, Act. States v. See United gested that white-collar crime had recidi (2d Cir.2007); 73, F.3d 78 United 483 (7th vism rates “in certain Hook, 766, groups,” close to 772-74 v. 471 F.3d States Cir.2006).3 robbery recidivism rates for firearms and (6th offenses. F.3d Cir. Eighth The decisions of the and Elev 2006).4 however, Conley, is silent on recidi analysis little to enth Circuits contain no drug vism rates for non-violent offenders govern at the interests stake when Kriesel, like and the court in Conley does subjects felony non-violent ment all offend argument not cite to recidivism ad compulsory sampling. ers to In Unit Kraklio, government vanced when trying to ed States v. 451 F.3d 924-25 (8th Cir.2006), justify the the court’s discussion is de 2004 DNA Act under the totali entirely choosing voted almost between ty of the circumstances. Id. at 680-81. special totality-of-the-circum a needs States, Only v. Banks 490 F.3d analysis. totality-of-the stances Once (10th Cir.2007), genuinely addresses chosen, Kraklio sum circumstances test is government’s whether in interests marily with a one-sentence de concludes maintaining a permanent DNA collection that the DNA Act is con termination of felons on release are dimin- stitutional Id. at under standard. 925. in ished the case of non-violent offenders. Similarly, unpublished opinion in an The Tenth Circuit in Banks concedes upholds Eleventh Circuit the 2004 DNA that, sure, might prove “[t]o less precedent concerning Act based on circuit in solving valuable non-violent crimes than statute, a DNA collection with staterbased crimes, making violent the Government’s any analysis out engaging whatsoever as interest in testing compelling more government’s perma to the interests in respect to felons convicted of violent nently maintaining DNA of non-violent crimes.” 490 F.3d at 1189-90. The court federal felons. United States Castillo- (11th goes distinction, explain away on to this Lagos, Fed.Appx. Cir. however, 2005). Weikert, by characterizing a supervised First en Circuit totality-of-the- privacy releasee’s gages virtually in a more substantial interests as analysis contending eircumstances than the other deci- non-existent and that “the ef- Supreme 3. The has considered and re- review under that Court rubric. jected government’s J., that the (Reinhardt, the contention dissenting) (analyz at 854-57 ever-present generalized interest criminal needs). special 2000 DNAAct under qualifies “special law enforcement as a need.” Edmond, 32, 41-42, Indianapolis v. 531 U.S. appellant Conley had been convicted Thus, 121 S.Ct. fraud, of bank committed while she was on even (and proper if it were the method of probation for a similar fraud offense. 453 not), after Samson it is the 2004 DNA 674-75. Act would fail to Fourth Amendment survive (for example, that DNA plan might need crimes solve of the Government’s fectiveness signifi- offenses, offenses, objective drug proper- where the violent high not be offenses.).” mini- intrusion is privacy and the ty unsupported leap cant Id. This at 1190. remarkable, mal.” Id. given just pages two the court that “DNA earlier concedes analysis. problems I two with this have might prove solving less valuable non- First, places weight little on Banks such violent Id. at 1189.6 crimes[.]” to make it a privacy interest as releasee’s Second, consideration. meaningless Because of the substantial erosion of argument “significant” protection posed by Fourth Amendment if objective is sufficient even the statute *14 Act, the 2004 should not uncriti- we actually pro does not under consideration cally adopt decisions from other Circuits objective sophistry is mote that is —and controlling where law this Circuit does shockingly wrong. Knights instructs Thus, not dictate the same outcome. with evaluating the reasonableness of a search the limitations from Kincade and Samson purposes should for Fourth Amendment guide, as a we should consider Kriesel’s “degree which it is grounded privacy by interests as affected the 2004 legitimate of promotion needed hand, DNA Act on the one balanced governmental interests.” 534 at 118— U.S. against by gov- the interests advanced added) (emphasis (quot 122 S.Ct. 587 the other. ernment on ing Wyoming Houghton, 526 U.S. S.Ct. Privacy B. Kriesel’s Interests (1999)). that a simply It cannot be correct authorizing statute warrantless searches It is true that conditional releasees like scrutiny pass can Fourth Amendment with privacy expecta Kriesel have diminished nothing hypothetical more than a interest Samson, 2199; tions. at Kin S.Ct. government not actu by advanced but cade, plurality F.3d at 833. But as the ally promoted by the statute. does not observed diminished (“Let at extinguished. mean

The Tenth Circuit in Banks also cited way inti holding us be clear: Our in no prisons data collected from state statistical mates that conditional releasees’ diminish indicating in 1994 that “non-violent offend- to extin expectations privacy ed of serve higher ers have recidivism rates than the ability guish protections their to invoke the (citing at general population.” Id. guarantee of the Fourth Amendment’s Justice, Bureau of Justice Dept, sei against unreasonable searches and Statistics, Nonviolent Profile of Offenders given search or class zures. Where (2004), Exiting http: State Prison //www. satisfy to searches cannot the traditional ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdfipnoesp.pdf).5 test, a tality-of-the-circumstances condi statistics, Working these the court may lay to constitu tional releasee claim argue authority on to without goes Banks citizen.”). just any other of- tional like empirical evidence that non-violent relief — Thus, cannot claim the level “committing who recidivate are while Kriesel fenders type offenses” are.of a where DNA 5. The statistics relied on in Banks are under- "violent by government regarding mined data fed- could be of assistance. evidence Profile of placed by eral offenders in the record Kriesel Exiting at 4. State Prison Nonviolent Offenders here, particularly drug offenders. categories, "property two offenses” The other offenses,” "drug are not defined or char- study by 6. The of state offenders relied on study offenses. acterized as violent indicate whether the court in Banks does not ordinary again afforded citizens un- ernment protection once to defend the 2004 Amendment, privacy his DNA Act. der the Fourth weightless cannot be treated as

interests The interest in ensuring compliance with balance. reasonableness release, obviously legiti terms while interest, privacy mate, I considering must be viewed in light of the also cannot overlook that the search here Court’s decision in As Samson. Samson not to the initial of a explained, limited extraction suspicionless warrantless and Kriesel, it, biological sample from and with searches of parolees justi are sometimes Rather, his DNA. totality-of-the-circumstances warrantless “search” fied under a permitted the 2004 DNA Act extends to provided they are based on a repeated of his DNA legitimate searches whenever supervisory need. 126 S.Ct. But, has some minimal investi- 2200-01. unlike California stat gative interest. 379 F.3d at 873 ute under consideration in (“[I]t (Kozinski, J., dissenting) important permits 2004 DNA Act those searches to that the recognize Fourth Amendment period continue once the re primarily ended, intrusion here is not taking lease has enabling searches di *15 blood, seizure but of the DNA fin- government’s vorced from the supervisory gerprint and its inclusion in a face, searchable interests. On its the 2004 DNA Act database.”). Thus, I only look to the interests allows a releasee’s DNA profile to be by government, advanced the mindful of removed if his or her underlying conviction the fact that the Act permits ongoing this is later overturned. 14132(d)(1)(A)(i). search of Kriesel’s Thus, § DNA for his lifetime.7 ensuring while compliance supervised with the terms of C. Government’s Interests government release stands as a credible objective, the 2004 DNA Act is far broader plurality pointed the to necessary objective. than to achieve that three interests it deemed in “monumental” balancing government’s the un- majority disingenuously interests The refuses to der the 2000 DNA Act. 379 F.3d at 839. confront the fact that the 2004 DNA Act First, it relied on the use of clearly permits DNA to the retention of Kriesel’s provide “a means of identification that can DNA once his term of release be used to link conditional releasees to is over. Apparently, it defines “the pre- they crimes committed while large,” are at cise circumstances before us” as the rights in to that complies order ensure a of a parolee parole, releasee while on with no con- with the terms of his or her Id. at release. sideration of the fact that his DNA will be Second, profiling 838. was claimed retained in CODIS and be searchable for provide to a deterrent effect that “fosters the rest of Maj. Op. Kriesel’s lifetime. at society’s reducing 949; enormous interest in re- see also 379 F.3d at 841 Last, (Gould, J., cidivism.” Id. at 839. plurality concurring the judgment) the (“Once pointed to past the use of DNA to solve previously those on re- notes, majority crime. Id. As the wholly these lease have cleared their debt same interests are by gov- society, raised, advanced question may penalties 14135e(b); 14132(b)(3)(A)(dis- unauthorized disclosure of 42 U.S.C. nothing DNA held in CODIS do to address permitted justice agen- closure “to criminal this, gener- as disclosure of Kriesel’s DNA for pur- cies for law enforcement identification investigation al “permissive criminal ais poses”). under use[]” Act. See 42 U.S.C. erased?’”). population a that persons from all within entry be CODIS ‘Should permissible rates of recidivism is found statutes not has low previously But we have is a to conclude that regulations so as because there basis by appropriate “limited Thus, searches,” will re-offend. unconstitu- Kriesel himself general preclude escape waiting majority government allows the without tionally overbroad justify program Amend- its failure to a that re- of the Fourth violation discrete Rush v. to submit their DNA quires participants statute. enabled ment (9th Cir.1985) suspicion, it has sus- Obledo, without because syllo- This picion particular statute this case.8 (invalidating portion of California gism help government of fami- does not do searches that allowed warrantless showing it must—make some appropriate without what ly day care centers drug DNA from non-violent of- reaching extracting narrowing regulations). Without persons from re- indepen- discourages DNA Act is fenders those the 2004 whether offending. Fourth Amend- dently invalid under the reason, fact that a DNA

ment for Finally, majority reasons that creat entry lodged CODIS permanently felons like profile non-violent weight detracts from the very least Kriesel will to the solution “contribute] claim that the government’s afforded past Maj. Op. agree crimes.” at 950. I truly designed supervisory statute is program that a DNA with some principle tool. with solving demonstrable effect on crime Next, the deterrent effect advanced may satisfy the population profiled seriously undermined Oregon, Fourth Amendment. Rise *16 Kriesel has offered unrebut- here because (9th Cir.1995) (“The 1556, 1561 defen F.3d recid- demonstrating that rates of ted data produced dants uncontroverted evidence among the lowest for non-violent ivism are documenting high rates of recidivism Measuring Recidivism: drug offenders. among types of murderers and sex certain History Computation and The Criminal Moreover, investigations of ual offenders. Sentencing at the Federal Guidelines offenses are more like murders and sexual 13; Pris- Returning to Federal Offenders of evidence from ly yield types on, majority at 1 and 3. The ex- 1986-97 derived, DNA information can be which government’s failure to rebut cuses the saliva, blood, semen, hair evi such as recidivism rates Kriesel’s evidence low dence, of property crimes or other than already by asserting that he “is a recidi- per fenses committed without substantial vist, terms of his release as he violated the contact.”). totality-of-the- But the sonal sub- positive when he tested controlled test is not so standardless cireumstances Ironically, at 949-50. Op. stances.” justi speculative invent that the court they needed to authorities had all the tools offers none government fications when the resort detect the recidivism without majority’s suggestion that of its own. The DNA, except nor was his conduct a crime is true as non-violent crimes have victims parole. itas violated go far goes, it but it does not far as the closure enough. Kincade exhorted majority per- reasons that a statute crimes, but brought to victims of violent suspicionless extraction of mitting Moreover, suggest that Kriesel would prior drug in the record to as noted Kriesel’s 8. lapses detected addressed without lapses were from those if have been deterred profile gov- the need for his DNA possessed government had his DNA. —which nothing yet have. There is ernment does not only analysis. justi- half of the It

that is fects the Fourth analysis, Amendment as it grounds fied the 2000 DNA Act on the majority’s has with the blessing of the actually contributes “to “significant” statute the so- crime-solving purposes of crimes.” 379 past lution of 839. profiling, there limiting princi- is no Thus, enough majority it is not ple beyond government says what the it government simply argue that non- needs. The line should be drawn far short victims; rather, violent crimes have there majority of where the puts it. I dissent. must be some .basis to believe actually

profiling aids those victims. The

government placed nothing before the speak aspect

court to to that inqui-

ry.

Because the interests artic-

ulated Kincade and re-constituted here sufficiently weighty

are not to overcome interests, privacy Kriesel’s I 30, INC., would hold ABILENE RETAIL # that the warrantless permitted by searches Plaintiff-Appellant, unreasonable, the 2004 DNA Act are that the Act fails to survive review under a BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF

totality-of-the-circumstances test. COUNTY, KANSAS;

DICKINSON Hoffman, III. Conclusion Keith Defendants-Appel lees. When the 2000 DNA Act narrowly sur-

vived Fourth Amendment review this No. 05-3473. just years court ago, three we were told to United States of Appeals, Court take solace in the “limited nature of[the] Tenth Circuit. holding.” Yet, 379 F.3d at 835. invoking from Oct. *17 majority approves, without flinching, a

statute that effects a far broader and far R. Baumgardner, Raymond Lorraine V. justified less Vasvari, Jr., erosion of Fourth Amend- Murray, John Michael Berk- ment, extending man, Gordon, Devan, Kincade without Murray Cleveland, acknowl- & edging OH, it does so. Bryant, However well-inten- Richard T. Bryant Richard T. be, it comfort Associates, MO, tioned I find cold City, the & Kansas for Plain- majority’s assurance that its today tiff-Appellant. decision precise “confined to the circumstances Pigg, Watson, J. Steven Teresa L. Fish- Maj.

before Op. us.” at 949. er, Patterson, Smith, Sayler & Topeka, I question efficacy do not of the KS, TN, D. Bergthold, Scott Chattanooga, government’s methods. An ever-expand- for Defendants-Appellees. ing and unerasable electronic index of

DNA profiles, TACHA, monitored govern- KELLY, Before Judge, Chief unblinking digital eye, may HENRY, BRISCOE, LUCERO, ment’s no doubt prove MURPHY, HARTZ, O’BRIEN, to be an effective law enforce- ment compact gov- McConnell, tymkovich, tool. But our with the requires means, GORSUCH, ernment HOLMES, constitutional not Circuit just expediency effective ends. Once in- Judges.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Kriesel
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Nov 29, 2007
Citation: 508 F.3d 941
Docket Number: 06-30110
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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