delivered the opinion of the court.
This is а writ of error brought by the United States to reverse-a judgment of the'Circuit Court sustaining pleas in bar pleaded to an indictment by the defendants in error. 173 Fed. Rep. 823. The first count of the indictment alleges that the defendаnts in error and others named, on December 30,1903, and from that day until the day of presenting the indictment (July 1, -1909), have engaged in ah unlawful conspiracy in restraint of trade in refined sugar among the several States of thе Union, that is to say, to eliminate free competition and.prevent all competition with the American Sugar Refining Company, *606 one of the defendants, by a would-be competitor, the Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company. It then sets forth, at length, the means by which the alleged purpose was to be accomplished, and what are put forward as overt acts done in pursuance of the plan. In other counts, referring to the first, the defendants are alleged to have conspired to monopolize the trade in refined sugar among the States. They are similar counts as to the trade in raw sugar and molasses, and as to trade with foreign nations. The offenses aimed at, of course, are the conspiracies punished by the act of July 2, 1890j c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, commonly known as the Sherman Act.
There are other counts in the indiсtment, but the argument was devoted mainly to these. The defendants severally pleaded to all of them the limitation of three years fixed by Rev. Stat., § 1044, alleging that for more than three years before the finding of thé indictment on July 1, 1909, they did not engage in, or do any act in aid of, such conspiracies. The defendant Kissel added averments that all the overt acts alleged to have been done within three years beforе July 1,1906, were done without his participation, consent or knowledge. He also pleaded that since October 6, 1906, the Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company had been in the hands of a duly appointed receiver.
We deem it unnecessary to state the pleadings with more particularity, because the only question before us under the act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246, is whether the plea in bar can be sustained. That this сourt is confined to a consideration of the grounds of decision mentioned in the statute when an indictment is quashed was decided in
United States
v.
Keitel,
The defendants argue that a conspiracy is a completed crime as soon as formed, that it is simply a case of unlawful agreement,.and that therefore the continuando may be disrеgarded and a plea is proper to show that the statute of limitations has rim. Subsequent acts in pursuance of the agreement may renew the conspiracy or be evidence of a renewal, but do not change the nature of . the original offense. So also, it is said, the fact that an unlawful contract contemplates future acts or that the re-suits of a successful conspiracy endure tо a much later date does not affect the character of the crime.
The argument, so far as the premises are true, does not suffice to prove that a conspiracy, although it exists'аs soon as the agreement is made, may not continue beyond the moment of making it. It is true that the unlawful agreement satisfies the definition of the crime, but it does not exhaust it. It also is true, of course, that the mere continuance of the result of a crime does not continue the crime.
United States
v.
Irvine,
The mеans contemplated for the exclusion of the Pennsylvania Sugar Refining Company were the making of a large loan by the American Sugar Refining Company through Kissel to one Segal and the receiving from him of more than half the stock of the Pennsylvania Company with a power of attorney to vote upon it, Sega! not knowing that the American Company was behind Kissel. The loan was to be for a year, but the American Company was to .use the power of voting to prevent the Pennsylvania Company from going on with its business, and, as Segal was dependent largely upon the returns from that company for means of repaying the loan, he was. to be prevented from repaying it and the control of the Pennsylvania Company retained until it should, be ruined and finally driven from business. It is alleged that the loan was made and that a vоte was passed that the Pennsylvania Company, refrain from business until further order of the board of directors. Now of cours¿ it well may be that the object was so far accomplished by this vote that *609 the. conspiracy was at an end; but a vote upon pledged stock that might be redeemed was not necessarily lasting, and further action might be necessary to reach the desired result. The allegation that, the ’ conspiracy continued down to the date of the indictment is not contradicted by the vote. Furthermore, as we have said, the only question here is whether the plea of the statute of limitations is goоd.
Taking it that the conspiracies made criminal by the act of July 2, 1890, may have continuance, we are of opinion that the pleas are bad. To be sure, it still might be argued that the general rule that time need not be proved as laid applies to continuing offenses, that therefore the allegation in the indictment, so far as it specifies the time in which the conspiracy was maintained, is immaterial, and that a plea traversing only that is, in substance, a plea in confession and avoidance and good. Whether in a charge of a continuing offense even such specific earmarks of time аs those in this indictment make it enter into the essence of the offense we shall not discuss. Time is held to be of the essence , in Massachusetts and some other States
i*-Commonwealth
v.
Pray,
The discussion at the bar took a wider range than is open at this stage. It hardly is necessary to explain that we have nothing to say as to what evidence would bе sufficient to prove the continuation of the conspiracy, or where the burden of pleading or proof as to abandonment would be. We deal only with a naked and highly technical question, when оnce the' possibility of continuation is established,' and as to that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt.
To- sum up and repéat. The indictment charges a continuing conspiracy. Whether it does so with technicаl sufficiéncy is not before us. All that we decide is that a conspiracy may have continuance in time, and that where, as here, the indictment, consistently with the other facts, alleges that it did so continue to the date of filing, that allegation must be denied under the general issue and not. by a -special plea. Under the general issue all defenses, including the defense that the conspiracy was ended by success, abandonment, or otherwise more, than three years before July 1, 1906, will be open and unaffected by what we now decide.
Judgment reversed.