UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REUBEN KING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
December 14,
Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge
Defendant‘s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, ECF No. 21 - Denied
OPINION
The defendant, Reuben King, was indicted by a grand jury with a single count of dealing in firearms without a license from on or about October 24, 2019 through on or about January 12, 2022, in violation of the Gun Control Act, specifically,
i. The Act is not unconstitutionally vague.
King first argues that the sections of the Gun Control Act at issue are void for vagueness and violate the rule of lenity. A criminal statute may be deemed void for vagueness if it “(1) fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits; or (2) authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 152 (3d Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Similarly, the rule of lenity provides that “an ambiguous criminal statute is to be constructed in favor of the accused.” Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994). The two doctrines work together to ensure that criminal statutes provide a fair warning as to what conduct is unlawful. See States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997). With that in mind, the Court reviews the language of the Act at issue in this case.
as applied to a dealer in firearms, as defined in section 921(a)(11)(A), a person who devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms, but such term shall not include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of his personal collection of firearms
that the intent underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is predominantly one of obtaining livelihood and pecuniary gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or liquidating a personal firearms collection: Provided, That proof of profit shall not be required as to a
person who engages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms for criminal purposes or terrorism.
King argues that those sections of the Act are vague because a man of common intelligence would have to guess as to what conduct was prohibited. To support that argument, King points out that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives published guidance that stated “[f]ederal law does not establish a ‘bright-line’ rule for when a federal firearms license is required.” ECF No. 21, Ex. A. The guidance goes on to state that “there is no specific threshold number or frequency that triggers the licensure requirement.” Id. King also claims that Congress amended the definitions for “engaged in the business” and “with the principal objective of livelihood and profit” in 2022 because the prior versions were ambiguous. In sum, King argues that
The Court first points out that although King claims that Congress amended the Act because of its supposed vagueness, he does not cite any legislative history or other sources to support that claim. More importantly, King‘s challenge for vagueness must be considered in light of the facts of this case. In other words, it is not enough for King to claim that the Act could be vague as applied to the conduct of others; he must show that the Act is vague as applied to his alleged conduct. Vill. of Hoffman Ests. v. Flipside, Hoffman Ests., Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 495 (1982) (“A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.“). In this case, King‘s alleged conduct is clearly proscribed by the Act.
For example, the Government alleges that King sold nine firearms in total to three different undercover police officers over the course of six separate transactions during the relevant time period. See ECF No. 23, Resp. at 1-2. The Government further alleges that, upon executing a search warrant, it discovered that King had 615 firearms in his barn, many of which were marked with price tags, as well as receipts for advertisements in a local newspaper offering firearms for sale. Id. at 2. Indeed, the indictment lists more than 100 firearms and more than 10,000 rounds of ammunition as being involved in the alleged violation of the Act.
Even though there is not a bright-line rule for how many firearm transactions it takes to trigger the need for a license, King‘s alleged conduct clearly trips that trigger because it goes well beyond the occasional buying and selling that occurs with maintaining a personal collection or for pursuing a hobby. King may, of course, present evidence to a jury that his conduct did not require a license under the Act, but neither the vagueness doctrine nor the rule of lenity is grounds for dismissing the indictment in this case.
King contends next that the Gun Control Act is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment of the Constitution. The Second Amendment states, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”
King argues that his alleged conduct-buying and selling firearms-is protected by the Second Amendment because it is “[a]n inescapable pre-condition of keeping and bearing arms . . . making the implicit right to buy and sell firearms a necessary complement protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment.” Resp. at 20. However, that argument is unpersuasive because in determining whether the Act violates the Second Amendment, the Court looks at the Second Amendment‘s plain text; it does not consider “implicit” rights that may be lurking beneath the surface of the plain text.
Even if the Court assumed that there is an implicit right in the Second Amendment to buy and sell firearms in order to keep and bear arms, that is not the same thing as a right to buy and sell firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principal objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of firearms. In other words, the Second Amendment does not protect the commercial dealing of firearms. King cites to two cases to support his argument that his alleged conduct is protected by the Second Amendment, but both cases confirm that the government may regulate the commercial sale of firearms. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626-27 (2008) (“nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding . . . laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms“); see also United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that a regulation on “the commercial sale of firearms” is “presumptively valid“).
In sum, King is alleged to have violated the Gun Control Act by engaging in the commercial sale of firearms without a license. That conduct is not protected by the plain text of the Second Amendment. The Act does not stop King from keeping or bearing arms. The Act does not keep him from buying and selling firearms in order to maintain a private collection. Nor does the Act prohibit the commercial sale of firearms outright; it simply requires a license to do so. As a result, the Act does not violate the Second Amendment.
iii. The Act does not place a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.
King contends next that the Act violates his First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion and the Religious
Whether a burden is substantial under the RFRA is a question of law. Real Alts., Inc. v. Sec‘y Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., 867 F.3d 338, 356 (3d Cir. 2017). The RFRA provides relief only if the burden on religious exercise is indeed substantial; it does not provide relief “from all government burdens.” Id. at 357. “There is no substantial burden if the governmental action does not coerce the individuals to violate their religious beliefs or deny them the ‘rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens‘-even if ‘the challenged Government action would interfere significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs.‘” Id. (quoting Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass‘n, 485 U.S. 439, 449 (1988)).
As a practicing and observant member of the Amish faith, King argues that the Act substantially burdens his exercise of religion. See Mot. at 27. Specifically, King takes issue with Section 923 of the Act, which requires applicants to submit a photograph of themselves when applying for a license. See
In Quaring, Quaring applied for a Nebraska driver‘s license but refused to have her photograph taken for religious reasons. Id. at 1122. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the photograph requirement placed “an unmistakable burden upon her exercise of her religious beliefs” because the privilege of driving a car was an “important” one. Id. at 1125. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the privilege of driving a car was important because Quaring needed “to drive a car for numerous daily activities“, which included both personal and work-related activities. See id. The Eight Circuit therefore affirmed “the district court‘s issuance of an injunction requiring the Nebraska officials to issue Quaring a driver‘s license without requiring her to be photographed.” Id. at 1128. Unlike Quaring, King never applied for a license under the Act.
Submitting a photograph is only one requirement under the Act. See
Moreover, the commercial selling of firearms is not an important benefit or privilege, unlike the privilege of driving a car. As the Eighth Circuit explained in Quaring, the privilege of driving a car is an important one because many citizens rely on driving to complete daily personal and work-related activities. The same cannot be said for the privilege of dealing in firearms commercially. King does not make any arguments as to why such conduct is an important privilege for him. For example, King does not claim that dealing commercially in firearms is central to his Amish faith. Nor does he claim that the practice is important in his personal or business life.
iv. The Act does not violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Finally, King contends that the Act violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. That doctrine prohibits the government from coercing people into giving up their constitutional rights in exchange for something else. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 U.S. 595, 604 (2013). Even if “a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable government benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely.” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). “It may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech.” Id.
King argues that the Act violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine because it forces him to choose between a license to deal in firearms commercially or his First Amendment right to exercise his religious belief of not being photographed. However, as the Court has noted, King never applied for a license under the Act. As a result, he was never officially denied a license for any reason, including for failing to submit a photograph. Because King never applied for a license under the Act, he cannot claim that he was denied the benefit of a license based on his refusal to submit to photographing.
King cannot have been denied a benefit that he never applied for.
CONCLUSION
The Act is not vague when applied to King‘s alleged conduct because the alleged conduct is clearly proscribed by the Gun Control Act. Nor does the Act violate the Second Amendment because the Second Amendment does not create a right to deal in firearms commercially. Also, because King never applied for a license under the Act or sought a religious exemption from the photograph requirement, he cannot claim now that the Act caused a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion, nor can he claim that he was coerced to give up a constitutional right to receive a license under the Act. For those reasons, and for those given above, King‘s Motion is denied.
A separate Order follows.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.
JOSEPH F. LEESON, JR.
United States District Judge