A jury сonvicted Khalat Jamalthaeal Alama of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. Alama appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidenсe and arguing that the admission of evidence seized during a warrantless search of his residence violated the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Georgia v. Randolph,
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Alama argues that the government failed to prove the elements of a conspiracy offense, namely, “that: (1) a conspiracy existed for an illegal purpose; (2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly joined in it.”
United States v. Tensley,
Thе government’s main witness was Sa-tar Alkafaji, a fellow Iraqi with whom Ala-ma lived at times during the alleged conspiracy. Alkafaji first admitted that he pleaded guilty to a charge that he conspired to distribute methamphetamine. He thеn testified that, beginning in early 2004, he allowed Alama to sell methamphetamine, initially a few grams at a time and later in larger quantities. Alkafaji accompanied Alama on his first large sale but thereafter did not supervise Alamа, *1065 require prepayment for the drugs, or meet Alama’s customers because “we were building a relationship and the confidence and trust was strong.” Alkafaji testified that he and Alama shared a cell phone for their drug related activity, and that customers called and dealt with either of them. Alkafaji also testified that he took Alama to meet Alkafaji’s methamphetamine source in Grand Island, Nebraska.
The government also introduced testimоny by various methamphetamine customers of Alkafaji and Alama. Chadwick Walters testified that he bought ounces and half-ounces from Alama six to eight times. Teresa Jones testified she bought half-ounce and ounce quantities of methamphetamine from Alama and Alkafaji for resale and personal use. Joshua Love and Daniel Zeiger bought methamphetamine from Alama and Alkafaji. Alama testified in his own defense that he occasionаlly used methamphetamine, once with Alkafa-ji. But he denied buying methamphetamine from Alkafaji, selling methamphetamine to anyone, or knowing Walters and Zeiger.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, as wе must, we conclude that the government’s evidence was more than sufficient to prove a conspiracy between Alama and Alkafaji to distribute methamphetamine. Our later cases make clear that
West
was a nаrrow ruling that has no application to the facts of this case.
See United States v. Bewig,
II. The Georgia v. Randolph Issue
Following his indictment and arraignment, Alama was released on bond. An arrest warrant issued when he violated the terms of release, and he was seen at the home of Jane Snelling, who lived with her two daughters and her niece, Alama’s girlfriend, Nicole Delgado. U.S. Marshals went there to arrest him, accompanied by local law enforcement officers. The officers knocked on the door, announced their purpose, and ordered everyone out of the house. Snelling, her daughter, and Delgado emerged and were taken across the street, where Snelling consented to a search of her home and signed a written consent form. Surveillance continued, and some time later Alama came out of the house and was taken into custody. The officers then seаrched the home, finding methamphetamine and marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a digital scale, and numerous plastic baggies in the bedroom where Alama had been living with Delgado and in a nearby toilet.
Alama filed no pretrial motion to suppress this evidence. At trial, Snelling and the officer who obtained her consent to search briefly described the above sequence of events. The government then called Officer Forrest Dalton, who conducted the search and took custody of the seized contraband. After laying foundation, the government offered three physical exhibits Dalton identified as comprising the contraband. Defense counsel оbjected *1066 based upon a Supreme Court decision “just before we started this trial,” a reference to Georgia v. Randolph. After a brief colloquy outside the presence of the jury, the objection was clarified:
THE COURT: I understand you to be objecting to the degree that your client has a Fourth Amendment right.
MR. GOOCH [defense counsel]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you assert that it’s a logical extension of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to say that you’ve got to get consent of guests in a home in a circumstanсe such as this.
MR. GOOCH: Yes.
THE COURT: And now having made that objection, it is denied ... I don’t think that’s what the [Supreme] Court intended.
On appeal, Alama argues that the district court erred in admitting this evidence because Randolph required the police to obtain thе consent of Alama as well as Snelling, the primary occupant, before searching the portion of the house where Alama was living and the contraband was found. We disagree.
Prior to
Randolph,
the Supreme Court held that the poliсe may conduct a war-rantless search with the consent of an occupant who they reasonably believe has common authority over the property even if a co-occupant later objects.
See Illinois v. Rodriguez,
if a potential defendant with self-interest in objecting is in fact at the door and objects, the cо-tenant’s permission does not suffice for a reasonable search, whereas the potential objector, nearby but not invited to take part in the threshold colloquy, loses out.
This case obviously falls on the
Rodriguez
and
Matlock
side of the line. The police knocked on Snelling’s door for the purpose of executing the arrest warrant. Alama did not come to the door and object to a search of the house. Instead, he disobeyed the officers’ command that evеryone come out of the house and remained hidden inside until, he later testified, his lawyer urged him by telephone to give himself up. Up to this point, Alama was like the sleeping co-occupant whose consent to seаrch was not constitutionally required in
Rodriguez,
Alama argues that
Randolph
was nonetheless violated because the Supreme Court stated that its bright-line test would not apply if there is “evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of avoiding a potential objection.”
III. Admission of Conspirator Plea Agreements
Alkafaji and four other cooperating witnesses testified during the government’s case in chief. On direct examination, each testified that he or she had entered into a plea agreement. Each agreement was then received into evidence without objection by the dеfense, as expressly authorized by
United States v. Brown,
You must not consider such a guilty plea as any evidence of this defendant’s guilt. You may consider such a guilty plea only for the purpose of determining how much, if at all, to rely upon a witness’s tеstimony.
On appeal, Alama urges us to reconsider our decision in
Brown,
arguing that “to permit the introduction of plea agreements of coconspirators listed as co-defendants in the Indictment renders the defendant’s presumption of innocence nugatory.” Only the en banc cоurt may overrule a prior panel decision,
see, e.g., Murphy v. United States,
At oral argument, counsel for Alama argued for the first time that plea agreements should not be admissible during the direct examination of cooperating witnesses in the District of Nebraska because the terms of the standard agreement used by the United States Attorney’s office in that District contain impermissible vouching of the witness’s credibility. District cоurts have discretion to exclude all or part of a plea agreement whose specific terms would have an “ ‘undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis.’ ”
United States v. Morris,
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.