MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiff United States of America (the “United States” or “Government”) moves pursuant to § 2(b) of the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act (the “Tunney Act”), 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(h) for entry of a final judgment (the “Consent Decree”) settling its antitrust claims against Defendant Keyspan Corporation (“Keyspan”). This application presents a novel issue of law: whether the Department of Justice can seek disgorgement for a Sherman Act violation. This Court answers that question in the affirmative. For the following reasons, the Government’s motion for entry of the Consent Decree is granted.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that Keyspan, an electricity generator, manipulated New York City electricity prices using a swap agreement (the “Swap”) in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Specifically, the Swap provided Keyspan with an indirect financial interest in the sale of electricity generating capacity by its largest competitor, Astoria Generating Company (“Astoria”). That financial interest obviated Keyspan’s need to bid competitively during the sale of its own electricity generating capacity at auction. (Compl. ¶¶ 4-5, 30.) According to the Complaint, Keys-pan’s anticompetitive bidding drove up capacity prices as a whole and, in turn, increased the cost of electricity to consumers in New York City. (Compl. Preamble, ¶¶ 4-5, 30.)
I. The New York City Electricity Market From May 2003 to March 2008
The New York Independent System Operator (“NYISO”) regulates the sale of electricity in New York City by companies that generate electricity (“generators”) to companies retailing electricity to consumers (“retailers”). (See Compl. ¶¶ 12-14, 17.) The NYISO requires retailers to purchase a product known as “installed capacity” from generators. (Compl. ¶¶ 12-14.) The price of installed capacity is established through seasonal, monthly, and spot auctions administered by the NYISO. (Compl. ¶ 14; Competitive Impact Statement (“CIS”) dated Feb. 22, 2010 at 3.) During those auctions, generators offer capacity by submitting price and quantity “bids,” which are then “stacked” from lowest- to highest-priced and compared to demand from retailers. (Compl. ¶ 14; CIS at 3.) The offering price of the last bid required to meet demand establishes the market price for all installed capacity sold in that auction (the “Clearing Price”). (Compl. ¶ 15.) Any capacity bid at a higher price is unsold, as is any capacity bid at the Clearing Price in excess of demand. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
The New York City electricity market is highly concentrated, with three generators — Keyspan, NRG Energy, Inc., and Astoria — “controlling a substantial portion of generating capacity....” (Compl. ¶ 17.) Accordingly, from 2003 to 2008, Keyspan possessed market power in the New York City capacity market. (Compl. ¶ 18.) As
II. Keyspan’s Anticompetitive Conduct
From June 2003 to December 2005, demand for installed capacity was high. (CIS at 4.) As a result, Keyspan was able to sell nearly all of its installed capacity, even while offering it at the highest possible price, i.e., “bidding its cap.” (CIS at 4.) However, tight supply and demand conditions were expected to end in 2006 with the planned entry of additional capacity. 1 Accordingly, Keyspan anticipated that bidding its cap would be less profitable and began investigating options for preserving its profit margins. (CIS at 4-5.)
While Keyspan initially considered purchasing Astoria’s assets, it concluded that such an acquisition would raise market power concerns. (CIS at 5.) Instead, Keyspan decided to acquire an indirect financial interest in Astoria’s capacity sales. (CIS at 5.) On January 18, 2006, Keyspan entered into the Swap with a financial services company (the “Bank”). (CIS at 6.) The parties’ obligations under the Swap were price dependent. If the Clearing Price was above $7.57 per kW-month, the Bank was required to pay Keyspan a multiple of the difference between those two prices. (CIS at 6.) In contrast, if the Clearing Price was below $7.57, Keyspan was required to pay the Bank a multiple of the difference. (CIS at 6.)
According to the Complaint, Keyspan recognized that (i) the Bank would have to enter into a separate swap agreement with another generator to offset its payments to Keyspan and (ii) Astoria was the only generator with sufficient capacity to do so. (CIS at 5.) As expected, the Bank conditioned the Swap on the execution of a suitable offsetting agreement. On January 9, 2006, the Bank entered into an offsetting swap with Astoria. (CIS at 6.)
The Complaint alleges that the Swap eliminated Keyspan’s incentive to pursue competitive bidding strategies by allowing it to continue to bid its cap, even though much of its capacity was unsold. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-32.). Absent the Swap, Keyspan would have bid its capacity at lower prices in response to the entry of additional capacity into the market, thereby causing capacity prices to decline. (Compl. ¶ 22, 31-34.)
The anticompetitive effects of the Swap continued until March 2008. (CIS at 7 n. 2.) Keyspan was sold in August 2007 and New York conditioned its approval of the sale on Keyspan bidding its New York City capacity at zero from March 2008 until the divestiture was completed. (CIS 7 n. 2). According to the Government, from May 2006 to April 2008, Keyspan earned approximately $49 million in net revenues under the Swap. (PL United States’s Resp. to Public Comments (“Gov’t Resp.”) dated June 11, 2010 at 6; Declaration of Oliver M. Richard (“Richard Decl.”) dated Oct. 26, 2010, ECF No. 37.)
III. The Consent Decree & Tunney Act Requirements
The Consent Decree requires Keyspan to pay $12 million to the United States
On June 11, 2010, the Government filed its Response to Public Comments. On July 20, 2010, the Government moved for entry of the Consent Decree. On August 12, 2010, this Court permitted the Public Service Commission of the State of New York (“PSCNY”) to file a reply to the Government’s Response to Public Comments. On October 12, 2010, this Court held a hearing (the “October Hearing”), posed questions to the parties, and directed the Government to provide a declaration concerning its calculations of Keys-pan’s net revenues under the Swap. On October 26, 2010, the Government submitted the declaration of Oliver M. Richard, Assistant Chief in the Economic Litigation Section of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, which described those calculations.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standard
The Tunney Act requires a court reviewing an antitrust consent decree to determine whether the decree is “in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1);
see also United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp.,
(A) the competitive impact of such judgment, including termination of alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, duration of relief sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered, whether its terms are ambiguous, and any other competitive considerations bearing upon the adequacy of such judgment that the court deems necessary to a determination of whether the consent judgment is in the public interest; and
(B) the impact of entry of such judgment upon competition in the relevant market or markets, upon the public generally and individuals alleging specific injury from the violations set forth in the complaint including consideration of the public benefit, if any, to be derived from a determination of the issues at trial.
15 U.S.C. § 16(e)(1).
“While the Tunney Act was designed to prevent ‘judicial rubber stamping’ of proposed Government consent decrees, the Court’s role in making the public interest determination is nonetheless limited. The Court’s function is not to determine whether the proposed [decree results in the balance of rights and liabilities that is the one that will
best
serve society, but only to ensure that the resulting settlement is ‘within the
reaches
of the public interest.’ ”
United States v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc.,
II. Analysis
a. Availability of Disgorgement
The Government submits that it has never pursued disgorgement as a remedy for a Sherman Act violation, 2 but contends that disgorgement of Keyspan’s revenues will best remedy its anticompetitive conduct.
Disgorgement is an equitable, as opposed to legal, remedy derived from the court’s equity powers. “The primary purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate [victims] ... [but rather to] forc[e] a defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched. The emphasis on public protection, as opposed to simple compensatory relief, illustrates the equitable nature of the remedy.”
Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Cavanagh,
In
Cavanagh,
the Court of Appeals upheld the equitable disgorgement of profits earned from an illegal “pump and dump” scheme.
The Court of Appeals examined this question at length and found,
inter alia,
that (1) “[cjommentators have observed
However,
Cavanagh
does not end the analysis because limitations may still exist under traditional equity and antitrust principles. As to equity jurisdiction, “[ujnless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.”
Porter v. Warner Holding Co.,
Moreover, disgorgement comports with established principles of antitrust law. When fashioning a consent decree in an antitrust action, district courts “are invested with large discretion to model their judgments to fit the exigencies of the particular case.”
Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States,
Disgorgement is particularly appropriate where, as here, the anticompetitive conduct in question has ceased. As discussed below, this Court defers to the Government’s conclusion that restitution— i.e., making New York City consumers whole — is likely unavailable. Further, the Swap has expired and, unlike many other antitrust actions, there are no assets to be divested. Thus, “the exigencies of [this] case” are that, absent disgorgement, the Government is without recourse to remedy Keyspan’s anticompetitive conduct.
Int’l Boxing Club,
This Court notes that the Second Circuit and D.C. Circuit have interpreted similar language under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and found that disgorgement is either limited or unavailable as a remedy for a RICO violation. Section 1964 of RICO provides that:
[t]he district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain [RICO] violations ... including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, director indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
18 U.S.C. § 1964. The D.C. Circuit held that “[t]his language indicates that [RICO] jurisdiction is limited to forward-looking remedies that are aimed at future violations” and that disgorgement “is a quintessentially backward-looking remedy focused on remedying the effects of past conduct to restore the status quo.”
United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc.,
These decisions are not controlling. First, the Sherman Act does not contain the same limiting provisions found in RICO.
See United States v. Lane Labs-USA Inc.,
b. Whether the Settlement is in the Public Interest
Public comments on the CIS leveled three principal objections to the Consent Decree: (1) the Government provided an insufficient factual basis for its calculation of the net revenues earned by Keys-pan under the Swap; (2) $12 million in disgorgement is inadequate because it is neither commensurate with Keyspan’s enrichment under the Swap nor sufficient to deter future anticompetitive conduct; and (3) the settlement proceeds should be returned to New York City electricity customers, not the United States Treasury. (Gov’t Resp. at 9-12.)
As to the factual basis for the Government’s revenue calculation, at the Court’s request, the Government submitted the declaration of Dr. Oliver M. Richard, an economist responsible for supervising analyses performed by Department of Justice staff economists. In his declaration, Richard outlines the formulas set forth in the Swap for determining the parties’ respective payment obligations, applies those formulas to the market prices established in
The adequacy of the disgorgement amount must be evaluated in view of the Government’s decision to settle its claims and seek entry of the Consent Decree. When a litigant chooses to forgo discovery and a trial in favor of settlement, full damages cannot be expected.
See In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig.,
Moreover, public comments calling for a disgorgement figure commensurate with the losses suffered by New York City consumers fail to comprehend the nature of the disgorgement remedy. “The primary purpose of disgorgement is not to compensate investors,” but rather to divest a wrongdoer of the proceeds of their misconduct.
Cavanagh,
$12 million in disgorgement is also an adequate deterrent. It represents 25% of Keyspan’s net revenues under the Swap. Moreover, disgorgement for a Sherman Act violation was never judicially sanctioned prior to this action. Future manipulators of electricity markets or those who seek to leverage derivative products in the restraint of trade now face the prospect of disgorgement in addition to other remedies. This case is an important marker for enforcement agencies and utility regulators alike. Approving disgorgement as part of the Government’s arsenal tilts incentives back in favor of competitive bidding and deters the use of derivatives as tools to manipulate a market.
Moreover, the Government raises valid concerns regarding potential violation of the filed-rate doctrine.
“The filed rate doctrine bars suits against regulated utilities grounded on the allegation that the rates charged by the utility are unreasonable. Simply stated, the doctrine holds that any ‘filed rate’ — that is, one approved by the governing regulatory agency — is per se reasonable and unassailable in judicial proceedings brought by ratepayers.”
Wegoland Ltd. v. NYNEX Corp.,
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Government’s motion for entry of the final judgment is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the motions pending at Docket Nos. 25 and 27.
SO ORDERED.
Notes
. Supply conditions were expected to tighten again in 2009 with the retirement of old generation units and growth in demand. (CIS at 4.)
. On rare occasions, the Department of Justice has sought disgorgement of profits in contempt actions for violation of a consent decree. (See, e.g., Proposed Settlement Agreement & Order filed Nov. 26, 2007, United States v. Cal Dive Int’l Inc., et ano., 05 Civ. 2041 (D.D.C), ECF No. 31.)
. Some courts have recognized limitations on
Grupo Mexicano’s
scope.
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Rahman v. Oncology Assocs.,
. To the extent that disgorgement of wrongly obtained assets due to securities fraud differs from the relief sought here — i.e., disgorgement of revenues earned under a lawful agreement executed for the purpose of restraining trade — Cavanagh’s analysis is broad and applies with equal force in the antitrust context.
.
Carson
is also distinguishable because the plaintiff sought disgorgement of funds earned long in the past, more than eight years prior to the filing of the action.
