UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Kerajia R. WILLIAMSON, Defendant-Appellant.
Nos. 14-2518, 14-2519.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
April 6, 2015.
782 F.3d 397
Submitted: Jan. 12, 2015.
(emphasis added). This passage explicitly refers to the unidentified male as Cotton‘s companion. Characterization of the relationship between the two men did not differ between the R & R and the district court‘s order adopting the R & R. Cotton, therefore, could have objected before the district court adopted the R & R. Furthermore, because Cotton and the unidentified male were standing in the vicinity of each other and awaiting keys to enter the apartment, the record supports the conclusion that a reasonable officer could have viewed Cotton and the unidentified male as companions.
Cotton has made no showing to warrant reconsideration by the district court. As a result, the district court did not err by denying the motion to reconsider.
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Keith D. Sorrell, AUSA, Cape Girardeau, MO, for Appellee.
Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
In December 2013, Kerajia Williamson pleaded guilty to participating in a counterfeiting conspiracy in violation of
Williamson‘s guilty plea agreement and presentence report (PSR) relate that, in the first conspiracy, she printed counterfeit checks purportedly drawn on the accounts of local businesses. Two associates cashed the checks at area stores using stolen Social Security numbers Williamson obtained from her aunt. Williamson followed directions from her cousin, Martez Williams, then incarcerated for counterfeiting checks. Williamson was arrested after a warrant search of her home in April 2013 and admitted her involvement. The second conspiracy was uncovered in August 2013, after Williams was released from prison. Williams manufactured the counterfeit checks that were cashed by others, including Williamson. On August
The two cases were consolidated for sentencing. In a pre-hearing Sentencing Memorandum, the government noted that Williamson “helped plan the initial scheme and engaged in multiple frauds.” It urged the district court to impose “incremental punishment for each offense,” namely, three consecutive 10-month prison sentences, comparable to the sentences imposed on other members of the conspiracy. At sentencing, the district court determined that Williamson‘s advisory guidelines sentencing range was 8 to 14 months in prison. Williamson requested a sentence of intermittent or home confinement, noting that she had obtained steady employment, returned to school, and was looking after her daughter, and that Williams had been the “impetus” for the two check fraud conspiracies. The government again urged a 30-month sentence. After hearing the parties, the district court stated to Williamson:
You know, I agree with what your lawyer is saying, it looks like you turned the corner on most of this. But what is just inexplicable and what is a very aggravating circumstance ... is that you got caught on one of these fraud schemes, and then ... you went back and did it again. And not only did you do it again, you were one of the leaders in this fraud, forgery thing with Wal-Mart, and then again with the other [store]. So ... I certainly agree with the government‘s position in this case. Had it not been for that, I would have given you much more lenient treatment.
The court sentenced Williamson, “pursuant to
On appeal, Williamson argues the district court committed procedural sentencing error by “constructing consecutive sentences without explanation” and refusing to follow the consecutive sentencing instructions of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(c) of the advisory guidelines. We disagree. First, as we have repeatedly held, “the now-advisory Guidelines cannot mandate concurrent sentencing. . . . [I]f multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant at the same time ... the district court, in determining whether the terms imposed are to ... run concurrently or consecutively, shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a). . . . [Section] 5G1.2 does not ... limit the district court‘s discretion to sentence consecutively when the total punishment is less than the statutory maximum.” United States v. Richart, 662 F.3d 1037, 1050 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotations omitted); see United States v. Lone Fight, 625 F.3d 523, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jarvis, 606 F.3d 552, 554 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 821-22 (8th Cir. 2010).
Second, “[w]e will not sustain a procedural challenge to the district court‘s discussion of the
Finally, Williamson challenges the substantive reasonableness of her sentence, arguing the district court gave inadequate consideration to mitigating factors—her steady employment and return to school; a minor child who would suffer if Williamson was incarcerated; her minimal criminal history; and Martez Williams‘s substantial influence. The district court expressly acknowledged that Williamson had “turned the corner” but nonetheless determined that her quick return to fraud after being arrested and her central role in the counterfeiting conspiracies outweighed these mitigating factors. The district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing discretion by weighing aggravating factors more heavily than mitigating factors and concluding that an upward variance was warranted. See United States v. Gant, 721 F.3d 505, 512 (8th Cir. 2013).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.