Lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM
Kenneth Scott Gordon was arrested and convicted for conspiring to distribute and
Gordon argues the district court erred by: (1) denying his motion to suppress evidence from the duffel bag and wallet; (2) admitting a 35-second video; (3) refusing to apply a minor role downward adjustment; and (4) imposing a procedurally and substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.
First, the district court properly denied Gordon’s motion to suppress evidence from the duffel bag and wallet. Law enforcement agents searched the duffel bag within seconds of Gordon being handcuffed. It was, therefore, “roughly contemporaneous with the arrest” and, thus, lawful. United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Smith, 389 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also United States v. Cook, 808 F.3d 1195, 1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2015) (upholding search of a backpack after a suspect was handcuffed where there were reasonable security concerns); United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding search of a bag two to three minutes after the suspect was handcuffed and seated in an apartment hallway). Unlike the suspect in Arizona v. Gant, Gordon was “within reaching distance” of the duffel bag when it was first searched. 556 U.S. 332, 351, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). Although a close call, the initial search was lawful. Further, the district court’s conclusion that the duffel bag remained in the uninterrupted control of law enforcement was not clearly erroneous. Gordon points to no evidence that anyone other than law enforcement had access to the duffel bag after he was arrested. As to the wallet, Gordon stipulated that officers would testify the wallet was taken from his person at the time of his arrest. He also stipulated that the wallet was then transported to DEA headquarters. The district court properly relied on these stipulations in finding the search of the wallet was lawful. See United States v. Passaro, 624 F.2d 938, 944 (9th Cir. 1980).
Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting a 35-second video. A DEA agent testified the video was made on the day of Gordon’s arrest, so a reasonable jury could conclude the erroneous time and date stamp was due to technical error.
Third, the district court did not clearly err by concluding Gordon was not entitled to a minor role adjustment. That Gordon was far less culpable than the leaders of the conspiracy is not dispositive. Rather, the question is whether Gordon’s behavior was substantially less culpable than the average participant, including the other couriers. Gordon.did not show his behavior was substantially less culpable than average.
Fourth, the district court did not procedurally or clearly err by treating the $18,020 found in the duffel bag as drug money. The monéy was found in a macadamia candy box, the method used to conceal the proceeds from drug sales. Higa was not so incredible that the court could not believe her. In any event, as Gordon concedes, the district court’s treatment of the $18,020 as drug money did not affect his
Fifth, Gordon’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court properly considered the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and concluded a “substantial sentence above the mandatory minimum” was appropriate. That reasoning was not “(1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation- marks omitted) (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 577, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). Indeed, although Gordon’s sentence was lengthy, it was still two years shorter than the lowest guidelines range sentence.
AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I agree with the majority in full. I write separately only to clarify that I would reverse the denial of the motion to suppress, in accordance with Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009) and our decision in United States v. Camou, 773 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014), if not for United States v. Cook, 808 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2015). On similar facts as here, the court in Cook concluded that the dual purposes of the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine were sufficiently served to uphold the search. Although, in light of Gant and Camón, I would not have con-eluded the same, I view Cook as controlling here.