UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Kesetbrhan M. KELETA, Appellant.
No. 07-3021.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Argued Sept. 4, 2008. Decided Jan. 23, 2009.
552 F.3d 861
Finally, a remand is not required on appellant‘s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to call the woman in the apartment as a witness and to preserve errors for appeal. That defense counsel was “functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), is demonstrated by the fact that he hired an investigator and presented stipulations as well as proposed voir dire questions and instructions in addition to opposing the government‘s in limine motion to introduce
Leslie Ann Gerardo, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With her on the brief were Jeffrey A. Taylor, U.S. Attorney, and Roy W. McLeese III, Florence Pan, and Jay I. Bratt, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: SENTELLE, Chief Judge, and HENDERSON, Circuit Judge, and WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge.
Opinion for the Court filed by Chief Judge SENTELLE.
Dissenting opinion filed by Senior Judge WILLIAMS.
SENTELLE, Chief Judge:
Kesetbrhan M. Keleta was convicted of operating a money-transmitting business without a license, in violation of
Because we conclude that Keleta‘s sentence was reasonable, that there was no error in denying him safe harbor, and that his attorney was not ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Background
The Embassy of Eritrea established a money-transmitting business in Washington, D.C., in the mid-1990s to enable Eritrean citizens living in the United States to send money back to Eritrea. In August 2000, the business was taken over by a
The district court sentenced Keleta pursuant to
The court also considered whether USSG
The court gave Keleta a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility as well as an additional 2-level reduction for mitigating circumstances, including Keleta‘s belief that he would receive some protection from the Eritrean Embassy for his involvement with Himbol, as well as Keleta‘s belief that he thought he was helping his country and those who lived there. His base offense level was therefore 21, with a corresponding sentencing range of 37 to 46 months. The court then subtracted six months, for Keleta‘s status as a deportable alien, from the bottom of the range. His final sentence was therefore 31 months.
Discussion
Keleta now appeals his sentence, arguing that it was unreasonable, that the district court improperly denied him the benefit of the safe harbor provision, and that his lawyer at sentencing was ineffective.
Unreasonable sentence
Keleta was convicted of violating
Loss to a victim is not a requirement. Loss is clearly not an issue in these 1960 transaction[s]. They are more akin to money laundering. And the table in [§] 2B1 is used really only to indicate the levels to be increased by the funds.
Keleta‘s primary focus on this appeal is the district court‘s “akin to money laundering” statement. That statement shows, he argues, that the court‘s rationale for using the value of the transferred funds to increase his sentence was to equate his crime to money laundering. But, he asserts, money laundering was not a part of the nature and circumstances of his crime, contending that money laundering is “a specific intent crime” and the subsections of
Given his individual facts and circumstances, Keleta argues that his sentence was not reasonable. He notes that in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court directed sentencing courts to consider the factors set forth in
Responding to Keleta‘s claim, the government contends that the district court in fact did not increase his sentence because of a presumption of money laundering. The government asserts that the district court‘s “akin to money laundering” remark was not a factual finding but rather was made in response to an argument raised by Keleta, and was only intended to explain why the table in
Regardless of the district court‘s use of the term “akin to money laundering,” its calculation of Keleta‘s base offense level was correct. In Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.” As the government notes, USSG
Safe harbor provision
As noted above, during sentencing Keleta was sentenced pursuant to USSG
If (A) subsection (a)(2) applies and subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) do not apply; (B) the defendant did not act with reckless disregard of the source of the funds; (C) the funds were the proceeds of lawful activity; and (D) the funds were to be used for a lawful purpose, decrease the offense level to level 6.
The safe harbor provision essentially permits the district court to disregard the value of the funds involved in the offense and return the offense level to 6 when specified circumstances exist. In order for Keleta to benefit from the safe harbor provision, he was required to prove that he did not act with reckless disregard of the source of the funds being transferred, that the funds were the proceeds of lawful activity, and that the funds were to be used for a lawful purpose. Keleta argues that the district court erred in denying him safe harbor when it found the safe harbor provision inapplicable because he failed to prove that he met the provision‘s requi-
As Keleta admits, under United States v. Burke, 888 F.2d 862, 869 n. 10 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the government bears the burden of proof in seeking sentencing enhancements under the Guidelines, but the defendant bears the burden in seeking sentencing reductions. The safe harbor provision of USSG
Ineffective assistance of counsel
Keleta argues that his attorney‘s representation of him at sentencing was ineffective. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), an attorney is ineffective if, first, his performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and, second, the deficiencies in his representation were prejudicial to his defense. First, Keleta argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the shift in the burden of proof requiring him to disprove that he laundered money, and for failing to object when the burden of proof was shifted to him to prove that his behavior fell within the safe harbor. He claims that if his attorney had argued that these burdens of proof were improperly allocated, the government would have had to present evidence in support of the separate criminal acts implied by the Guidelines and the only appropriate outcome would have been for the court to impose a lower sentence. As we already discussed, the burden to prove his eligibility for the safe harbor was in fact Keleta‘s. Consequently, Keleta‘s attorney was not ineffective for failing to make these objections.
Second, Keleta argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence during sentencing to satisfy the safe harbor provision of
Keleta argues, however, that the district court erred in finding that he did not meet the criteria because the court used the wrong standard in determining that he acted with reckless disregard of the funds, controls tracking the funds were in fact in place, the business was established by and operated through the Embassy of Eritrea, it operated openly, and the funds were meant to help people back in Eritrea. Because these specific claims raised by Keleta were not presented to the district court, we will review them only for plain error. Under that standard the district court‘s error must be “obvious.” See United States v. Bolla, 346 F.3d 1148, 1152-53 (D.C. Cir. 2003). After review of the district court‘s findings and consideration of Keleta‘s arguments, we do not find any obvious errors in the district court‘s determination that he failed to meet the criteria of
We conclude that even if Keleta‘s attorney had presented evidence concerning the criteria of the safe harbor provision, there is no “reasonable probability” that the district court would have given Keleta a different sentence. On the record and argument before us, we cannot conclude that Keleta‘s counsel could have offered evidence to meet the criteria of the safe harbor provision so as to entitle Keleta to the reduction provided by that provision. He has shown us nothing to support a reasonable probability that the district court would have found controls establishing lawful origin of the funds, or that the purpose of aiding Eritrean citizens was ultimately for assisting lawful activities of those citizens, as opposed to unlawful ones. In short, there is no “reasonable probability” that a more thorough and aggressive counsel could have convinced the court to sentence any differently than it did. Keleta‘s attorney was therefore not ineffective for failing to present such evidence.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
WILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, one of our first tasks is to make sure the district court did not “improperly calculat[e] the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, — U.S. —, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007). Here the district court added 20 levels to Keleta‘s base offense level, bringing it to 26, in what seems to me a clear misapplication of the pertinent guideline, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG“)
Section
No published opinion in our circuit or elsewhere has dealt with the application of USSG
The court in Bariek also argued that “it would be illogical to penalize unlicensed money transmitters without regard to the amount of money they transmitted.” Id. In a vague sense the argument has some merit: the more money an unlicensed business transmits, the higher the odds of some of the transmissions defeating some public interest, such as the policies trying to thwart the financial activities of terrorist organizations. But the link is far more attenuated than the one between such risks and a failure to report a financial transaction-or structuring to avoid reporting-which directly undermines the government‘s ability to track the money. Treasury regulations identify types of transactions required to be reported, obviously the ones perceived as posing the greatest risks, but the government neither charged nor proved a violation of any of those provisions. In its brief here the government claimed that
