United States v. Juvenile MaleUnited States v. Juvenile Male
Lead Opinion
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 On June 7, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States issued a per curiam order certifying to this Court a question of Montana law related to a petition for certiorari pending before the Supreme Court. United States v. Juvenile Male, 560 U.S._,
Is respondent’s duty to remain registered as a sex offender under Montana law contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender, seeMont. Code Ann. §§46-23-502(6)(b) , 41-5A513(1)(c) (2005); State v. Villanueva,328 Mont. 135 , 138-140,118 P. 3d 179 , 181-182 (2005); see also§46-23-502(9)(b) (2009), or is the duty an independent requirement of Montana law that is unaffected by the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenile-supervision conditions, see§46-23-502(10) (2009); 2007 Mont. Laws ch. 483, §31, p. 2185?
¶2 Our answer to the certified question is that Respondent’s state law duty to remain registered as a sex offender is not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but is an independent requirement of Montana law.
¶4 The Montana Sexual or Violent Offender Registration Act (SVORA or the Act) was enacted in 1989 and generally imposes a lifetime requirement, unless relieved by court order, upon sexual offenders to register with a law enforcement agency when present in Montana. Section 46-23-506(1), (3), MCA (2009);
¶5 From SVORA’s enactment in 1989, sexual offenders convicted in other jurisdictions have been required to register for offenses that are “reasonably equivalent” to any of the listed Montana sexual offenses. State v. Hamilton,
¶6 Noting that the term “sentenced” used within the retroactivity provision is defined in
¶7 Whether legislation is applied retroactively is a question of legislative intent. See Hamilton, ¶ 10. There is a presumption against applying statutes retroactively, Neel v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assoc. of Great Falls,
¶8 The defendant in Hamilton argued that the 2005 SVORA amendments were not retroactive. Hamilton, ¶ 10. In taking up the question, we noted that the Legislature had failed to provide an explicit statement of retroactivity for the 2005 amendments. Hamilton, ¶ 13. In order to determine whether the Legislature unmistakably intended the amendments to operate retroactively, we considered the purposes of SVORA, the purposes of the 2005 amendments, and the Legislature’s previous efforts to make SVORA retroactive. Hamilton, ¶ 14. We reasoned that ‘tgjiven the Legislature’s goal of administrative efficiency, it is only logical that the Legislature intended the amendments to apply retroactively. If the amendments were applied only to offenses committed after October 1, 2005, the result would be administrative chaos rather than efficiency.” Hamilton, ¶ 15. We thus concluded, despite the failure of the Legislature to provide a retroactivity provision, that “[c]learly ... the Legislature intended the Act as a whole to be retroactive.” Hamilton, ¶ 15. We reached a similarly reasoned conclusion in Neel, where we analyzed the homestead statute and concluded that “the legislative intent is
¶9 The pertinent provisions of the retroactivity section of the bill containing the 2007 SVORA amendments state as follows:
Section 31. Retroactive applicability. [Sections 2,3, and 19 through 24] apply retroactively, within the meaning of 1-2-109, to:
(1) sexual offenders who are sentenced or who are in the custody or under the supervision of the department of corrections on or after July 1, 1989 ....
Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §31(1), at 2185 (brackets in original). This section makes retroactive Section 2 of the bill, which amended the Youth Court Act to exempt from the requirement to seal youth records information disseminated about an offender pursuant to SVORA. Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §2, at 2155. It likewise makes retroactive Section 3 of the bill, which amended the Youth Court Act to authorize youth courts to impose registration when required by SVORA, and provided that “[t]he duration of registration for a youth who is required to register as a sexual or violent offender shall be as provided in [SVORA]” unless the court would order, upon findings, exemption from or a lesser duration of registration. See Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §3, at 2157-58. Also made retroactive was Section 19 of the bill, which amended SVORA by revising the definition of “sexual or violent offender” to include “a person who has been convicted of or, in youth court, found to have committed or been adjudicated for a sexual or violent offense.” Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §19, at 2174. This provision clearly included youth court offenders within the registration requirements of SVORA.
¶10 Thus, in addition to stating that Section 19-eontaining the youth registration requirement-was to be retroactive, the Legislature explicitly made retroactive the revisions to the Youth Court Act (Sections 2 and 3) it had enacted to correspond with the youth registration requirement. Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §31, at 2185. Making retroactive the corresponding revisions to the Youth Court Act would have been completely useless and meaningless if the youth registration requirement had not also been made retroactive. “A presumption exists that the Legislature does not pass meaningless legislation; accordingly, this Court must harmonize statutes relating to the same subject, as much as possible, giving effect to each.” State v. Brown,
¶11 Respondent argues that retroactive application of either the 2005 or 2007 SVORA amendments are ex post facto to him. In State v. Mount,
¶13 Respondent was adjudicated delinquent by the United States
¶14 Under the federal statute, a “sexual act”includes contact between genital areas, genital-oral contact, and penetration of genital openings or genital touching ‘hot through the clothing” of children under 16 years old committed with “an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.” See
¶15 While not identical, Respondent’s federal offense clearly constitutes a “violation of a law of ... the federal government that is reasonably equivalent” to the listed state offense of sexual assault on a child.
¶16 Respondent raises several novel constitutional challenges to SVORA which we conclude are unnecessary to address in order to answer the certified question based upon current Montana law. These
Notes
All references to SVORA are to the current 2009 version, unless otherwise indicated.
The Laws of Montana indicate language added by amendments with the use of italics. Italics have been omitted from all quotations herein, unless otherwise provided.
Respondent also argues that, notwithstanding our decision in Hamilton declaring the 2005 amendments retroactive, we should conclude that the 2005 SVORA amendments do not apply retroactively to Respondent because Hamilton did not specifically discuss the distinction between criminal and juvenile proceedings, and this Court did not apply SVORA to juveniles in State v. Hastings,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
¶17 Respondent Juvenile Male had no independent requirement to register as a sexual offender under Montana law. Juvenile Male was adjudicated as a youth in Federal District Court in 2005, pursuant to the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act.
¶18 “‘Conviction’ means a judgment or sentence entered upon a guilty or nolo contendere plea or upon a verdict or finding of guilty rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury.”
[N]o adjudication upon the status of any youth in the jurisdiction of the court shall operate to impose any of the civil disability imposed upon a person by reason of conviction of a criminal offense, nor shall such adjudication be deemed a criminal*326 conviction, nor shall any youth be charged with or convicted of any crime in any court except as provided in this chapter.
¶19 This Court has previously addressed the issue of whether a youth court “adjudication” constituted a “conviction” pursuant to
Section 46-18-201(7), MCA , and the SVORA statutes require a “conviction” before SVORA registration requirements may be imposed. The statutes are unambiguous in that regard. Thus, because it is undisputed that Hastings’ youth court adjudication did not constitute a ‘faonviction” as contemplated in§ 46-23-502(7), MCA , the SVORA registration requirements could not be imposed by a district court under those statutes.
Hastings, ¶ 15 (emphasis added).
¶20 The Court noted, “the problem, of course, is that unless Montana statutes permit the imposition of a SVORA registration requirement, a court may not impose one.” Hastings, ¶ 19.
¶21 Thus, under Montana law in effect at the time, had Juvenile Male, like Hastings, been adjudicated under Montana’s Youth Court Act he would not have been “convicted” and would not have been subjected to SVORA. Additionally, even if this Court were to apply federal law, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act also creates a distinct process of justice for youths and likewise adjudicates delinquency and imposes judgment as a “disposition” and does not “sentence” youths in youth court proceedings. See
¶22 There is no question that Juvenile Male’s “adjudication”in federal youth court did not constitute a “conviction” for a “sexual or violent offense” under either federal or Montana law. Thus, at the time that he was adjudicated as a delinquent youth in federal court, Juvenile Male had no independent obligation to register as a “sexual offender” under Montana law. Accordingly, had the Montana Legislature amended the registration requirement to include Juvenile Male within the definition of those required to register and further impose the amended definition retroactively, that is the only way in which Juvenile Male would subsequently be required to register.
¶23 The majority concedes that it was not until 2007 that the Montana Legislature expanded the definition of “sexual offender” to specifically include a person who “in youth court” was ‘found to have committed or been adjudicated for” a sexual offense. Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, §19, at 2174. ‘Sexual offense” was likewise amended to include “any violation of a law of another state, a tribal government, or the federal government ... after an adjudication or conviction” for which the offender is required to register. Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483, § 19, at 2173-74. These 2007 amendments made SVORA applicable to adjudicated youths for the first time in Montana.
¶24 These amendments were made retroactive to specific sexual offenders “who are sentenced or who are in the custody or under the supervision of the department of corrections on or after July 1,1989.” Laws of Montana, 2007, ch. 483 §31(1), at 2185 (emphasis added). Although the majority opines that the Legislature intended the 2007 amendments imposing registration upon juvenile offenders to apply retroactively to dispositions on or after July 1, 1989, the Legislature did not in fact do so. The fact that the Legislature may have made other Youth Court Act provisions regarding sexual offenses retroactive is not dispositive. ‘No law contained in any of the statutes of Montana is retroactive unless expressly so declared.”
¶25 This Court has previously considered this very issue in determining whether the district court erred when it “reflected the Montana Legislature’s intent to extend the scope of SVORA to adjudicated youths” and held:
[I]f [a statute’s language] is clear and unambiguous, no further interpretation is required.... In construing statutes, the function of the court is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or*328 substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted ... we conclude the District Court erred in construing the statutes at issue here by looking beyond their plain, unambiguous language.
Hastings, ¶¶ 14, 18.
¶26 Thus, the majority likewise cannot attempt to construe the Legislature’s intent by looking beyond their plain, unambiguous language. The clear and unambiguous language used in the retroactive provision for the 2007 amendments specifically limits its application to those “who are sentenced” after July 1, 1989.
¶27 The term “sentenced” has been specifically defined under that portion of the criminal procedure code that deals with adults charged with crimes. The definition is not ambiguous or subject to interpretation.
¶28 This Court’s prior and continued willingness to equate an adult “sentence” with a youth court “disposition” disregards the inherently clear and unambiguous statutory and public policy differences between youth and adult court.
¶29 ‘Unless Montana statutes permit the imposition of a SVORA registration requirement, the court may not impose one.” Hastings, ¶ 18. There is no question that Juvenile Male was not in the custody or under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, thus the only method for the amendments to apply retroactively to him is if he was “sentenced”on or after July 1,1989. Juvenile Male was not “sentenced” either in accordance with the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act or Montana law and therefore is not subject to retroactive application of the 2007 registration requirements for adjudicated youths. Thus, I would hold that Juvenile Male has no independent obligation to register as a sexual offender under Montana law.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
¶30 I join Judge Macek’s well-reasoned Dissent and add the following observations regarding our approach to retroactivity analysis.
¶31 Like Judge Macek, I cannot agree that we may ignore plain and
Nonetheless, to the extent that there is an error and to the extent that the statute does not accurately reflect the Legislature’s clearly expressed intention, it is appropriate that the Legislature correct the problem, not the courts. See Ingraham v. Champion Intern. (1990),243 Mont. 42 , 49,793 P.2d 769 , 773 (citing State, Dept. of Hwys. v. Public Employees Craft Coun. (1974),165 Mont. 349 ,529 P.2d 785 ; State ex rel. Grant v. Eaton (1943),114 Mont. 199 ,133 P.2d 588 ).
Goebel, ¶ 23.
¶32 In the case before us, we should simply follow our rules of statutory construction and our precedent. As Judge Macek states, we should apply the plain language of the statute rather than inferring a presumed legislative intent that was not incorporated into the actual language the Legislature adopted.
¶34 The Court acknowledges the language of
¶35 In support of this deviation from the unambiguous directive of
For a statute to be retroactively applied, such an intent must be clearly expressed by the legislature. Section 1-2-209 [sic], MCA.*331 The legislative intent must be gathered from the act itself and no other source. Penrod v. Hoskinson (1976),170 Mont. 277 ,552 P.2d 325 . However, “If it is unmistakable that an act was intended to operate retrospectively, that intention is controlling as to the interpretation of the statute, even though it is not expressly so stated.” Davidson v. Love (1953),127 Mont. 366 at 370,264 P.2d 705 at 707.
The first and third of these statements are patently-not to mention manifestly-eontrary to
¶36 If the retroactivity of a statute depends on whether the Legislature has “expressly declared” it to be so-and that, in fact, is the requirement under
¶37 Using inference and deduction, the Court argues that it would have been “useless” and “meaningless” to make certain parts of the Youth Court Act retroactive without also making the youth registration requirement retroactive as well. Opinion, ¶ 10. My disagreement with the Court is not with this inference. It is, rather, with the fact that the Court is drawing such inferences in the first
¶38 Unlike other interpretational endeavors, where we must avoid absurdities
¶39 Hence, while the Court’s approach might be appropriate if we were faced with an ambiguity in a run-of-the-mill case of statutory construction, I conclude that it is not appropriate for resolving the retroactivity question here. We should not be foraging about in the Laws of Montana trying to divine what the Legislature may have intended but did not expressly declare. We likewise should not be inferring intent from what may seem to us “unmistakable” or “logical.”
¶40 The Court concedes that the Legislature did not “expressly declare” the youth registration requirement to be retroactive. Opinion, ¶ 10 (fflt would have been preferable, and would have avoided any question, for the retroactivity provision to state that the amendments were made retroactive to those ‘sentenced or adjudicated’ since July 1, 1989 ....”(emphasis in original)). And Judge Macek ably demonstrates this to be the case. Dissent, ¶¶ 17-29. Pursuant to
¶41 I dissent.
The 'Unmistakable’’standard originated in secondary authority, not the actual language of Montana’s retroactivity statute. See Davidson,
See Opinion, ¶ 8 (“ ‘[I]t is only logical that the Legislature intended the amendments to apply retroactively.’ ’’(quoting Hamilton, ¶ 15)).
In re Marriage of McMichael,
State v. Johnston,