Justin J. Allеe appeals his convictions for conspiracy, bank robbery, carjacking and weapons violations. The government cross appeals the district court’s decision to run Allee’s sentence for a second violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) concurrently with his sentence for his first violation of that section. We affirm Allee’s convictions but reverse his sentencе and remand to the district court for resentencing.
I.
On March 14, 2000, Allee, his brother James Allee, and Sue Bryant robbed the West Gate Bank in Lincoln, Nebraska. While the Allees were carrying out the robbery, Sue Bryant waited with the switch car in an apartment complex a short distance from the bank. After fleeing the bank in the white Jeep Cherokee that they, along with Bryant, had earliеr stolen, the Allees drove to the apartment complex where they joined Bryant in the switch car, a blue Mazda Navajo that belonged to the Allees’ sister. Police observed and followed the Mazda on Interstate 80. When the officers pulled the Mazda over and approached the vehicle, Bryant sped off, left the highway, and drove across a field.
Shortly thereafter, the Allees entered a home in Greenwood, Nebraska, and demanded the keys to a pickup truck that was parked in the driveway. After taking the keys, James Allee shot the residents, Leslie and Retha Debrie. Bryant and the Allees fled the scene in the Debries’ pickup truck. They subsequently abandoned and burned the truck in Iowa.
*999 On March 16, 2000, all three defеndants were arrested, Bryant in the morning, James Allee in the afternoon, and Allee in the evening. Police read Allee his Miranda rights and placed him in a Chevrolet Suburban for transport to the Omaha police station. After being placed in an interview room, Allee consented to answer questions from the police. In a short interview, he asserted that he was not involved in the robbery or the shooting. He stated that he hoped the Debries would recover, but denied having shot them. 1
During his pretrial incarceration in the Douglas County, Nebraska, Correctional Facility, Allee made a number of phone calls to various people wherein he made statements that the prosecution argued were attempts to create аn alibi, instructions to individuals 'to keep silent, and attempts to implicate others in the crimes.
Both Bryant and James Allee pleaded guilty. James Allee entered his guilty plea on March 6, 2001. On March 12, 2001, James Allee escaped from jail, but was recaptured some four hours later. There was substantial news coverage of the crimes, the search for the perpеtrators, the arrests, James Allee’s escape and recapture, the DeBries’ recovery from the extensive injuries they had suffered in the shooting, and the related court proceedings. Additionally, on March 6 and 7, 2001, the Omaha World-Herald, reported that the Assistant United States Attorney announced that initially both Allees accepted plea agreements, but that Justin Allee had withdrаwn from the plea deal.
Allee was convicted of conspiracy to commit bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d); bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a), (d), and 2; car jacking in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(2) and 2; displaying and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(ii) and 2; using and discharging a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(l)(A)(iii), (C)(ii), and 2; and being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Allee was sentenced to concurrent 235 month sentences on each count except the two § 924(c)(1) offenses. He was sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment on the first § 924(c)(1) charge and 300 months’ imprisonment on the second. At sentencing, the district court found that § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii) required that it impose the § 924 sentences consecutively to thе sentences for the underlying offenses but that it had the discretion to run the § 924 sentences concurrently with each other. Hence, Allee was sentenced to a total of 535 months’ imprisonment.
II.
Allee appeals his conviction on three grounds. First, he asserts that the district court wrongfully denied his motion for a change of venue based on excessive pretrial publiсity. Second, he contends that the court impermissibly allowed testimony about his post-Miranda silence. Last, he argues that the court erred in admitting tapes of telephone calls made while he was awaiting trial because their prejudice outweighed their probative value and because they were inadmissible character evidence. The government cross appeals Allee’s sentence, asserting that the district court had no discretion to run the sentences for the § 924 violations concurrently with each other.
A.
We review a denial of a motion for a change of venue for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Blom,
Allee contends that his is а tier-one case. He points to over two hundred local news items that pertained to the crimes, the search for and arrests of the perpetrators, the recovery of the victims, the guilty pleas of James Allee and Sue Bryant, James Allee’s escape from jail, and the announcement of Allee’s withdrawn guilty plea.
The mere existence of рress coverage, however, is not sufficient to create a presumption of inherent prejudice and thus warrant a change of venue. To create a presumption, the coverage must be inflammatory or accusatory.
See Id.
Alee documents incidents in which less-than-objective language was used in the news media. Some examples include statements that the perpetrators “should pay forever,” engaged in a “series of ‘Bonnie and Clyde’ getaways,” were “very dangerous individuals who do not have regard for life,” and were “linked to [a] long list of crimes.” Isolated incidents of intemperate commentary about the crimes and perpetrators, however, do not rise to the level of inflammatory or аccusatory where for the most part, the reporting appears to have been objective and unemotional.
See McNally,
Athough the press coverage of the events in question was extensive, the time frames in which the bulk of the coverage occurred were limited to the period of the crimes and arrests and the period that encompassed James Alee’s guilty plea and jailbreak. The first events occurred in March 2000, more than one year before trial, and the second incidents occurred in March 2001, approximately two months before trial. Moreover, because Alee’s trial originally was scheduled for the end of March 2001, the district court granted A-lee’s request for a continuance in order to guard against any prejudice that might have arisen from the coverage of James Alee’s guilty plea, escape, and recapture. Thus, the year-long time span between the press accounts of the robbery, shooting, and cаpture, and the two-month time span between the accounts regarding James A-lee’s plea, escape, and recapture worked to eliminate the risk of presumed prejudice.
Alee’s claim also fails under tier-two analysis. Alee directs our attention to four venire members who were dismissed from the panel because they asserted that they could not set aside what they had heard in the press and decide the case only on the evidence presented in court. In determining whether Alee’s jury was fair and impartial, we must focus on the jury that was actually seated.
Blom,
B.
Allee also argues that the district court erred in permitting the government to inquire into his
post-Miranda
silence in violation of
Doyle v. Ohio,
Allee points to the following inquiry by the prosecutor:
Q. You were brought down to the police statipn and you were brought to an interview room, weren’t you?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. You were given your Miranda rights at that time? In other words, they advised you of what the charges are and they tell you about your rights, your right to remain silent and everything else, correct?
Mr. Courtney: Your Honor, I’ll object to this and renew the motion filed, pretrial motion that was filed, with respect to any statements as these are the subject matter statements that — I mean pretrial motions that were filed earlier.
The Court: Overruled.
The Witness: Took place in the Suburban.
Q. You were read your rights in the Suburban?
A. The whole interview took place in the Suburban.
Q. No matter where it took place, whether at the pоlice station, or whether it took place en route in the Suburban, you were given an opportunity, were you not, to tell them who you were with and what you had been doing that day, and you didn’t [do] so, did you?
A. They didn’t ask me—
A. They didn’t ask me who I was with.
Q. They didn’t have to ask you; you could have told them, right?
A. I just told them what I was asked—
Q. You didn’t tell them, did you?
A. No.
Q. You didn’t tell them anything about what you have just told this jury?
A. No.
*1002 Q. You didn’t tell them anything about an alibi at that time, did you?
Mr. Pfeffer: Objection, Your Honor. This is irrelеvant and he has a constitutional right not to say anything outside the presence of an attorney.
The Court: Overruled.
Q. You didn’t tell the officers during the time period, the relevant time period in which they were asking you, either in the Suburban or at central police station after you were given your rights anything about an alibi, did you?
A. Had nothing to say without an attorney present.
The Supreme Court has held that
Doyle
is not implicated where “questions were not designed to draw meaning from silence, but to elicit an explanation for a prior inconsistent statement.”
Anderson,
At oral argument, Allee attempted to distinguish between the interview that he now concedes took place in an interview room at the Omaha policе station and what he alleges was the prosecution’s at-trial commentary on his silence in the Suburban. As we stated, our focus must be on what occurred during trial. The fact that Allee asserted at trial that the events occurred in the Suburban rather than in the interview room does not lead to a conclusion that there was a period of silence upon which the gоvernment impermissibly commented. The government’s questioning was not designed to elicit testimony about silence, nor was that the result. Thus, there was no Doyle violation.
C.
Allee also contends that the district court erred in permitting the introduction of portions of telephone calls made by Allee from jail while'he was awaiting trial. He objects on the grounds that the tapes were unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 and that they were impermissible character evidence under Rule 404. We review decisions regarding the admissibility of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Fuller,
Allee advanced an alibi defense at trial. From each of the tape excerpts, the jury could have inferred that Allee’s statements were attempts to create an alibi, to implicate others in the crimes, or to persuade witnesses to remain quiet about his role in the crimes. Thus, the excerpts were not only relevant but were particularly probative on the issue of the veracity of his alibi defense. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the tapes over Allee’s Rule 403 objection.
Allee also contends that the district court erred in admitting the taped conversations because they were inadmissible character evidence. Rule 404(a) pro- *1003 Mbits the introduction of a person’s character “for the purpose of proving аction in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Allee argues that because the telephone calls were placed from jail, they would tend to indicate to the jury that he has a criminal character and that he acted in conformity with that criminal character in regard to the crimes with which he was charged.
There is no indication in the record that the tapes were introduced for the purpose of establishing criminal character. Rather, they were introduced as evidence from which the jury could evaluate the truthfulness of Allee’s alibi. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the tapes over Allee’s Rule 404 objection.
D.
The government contends that the district court еrred in concluding that it had the discretion to run Allee’s two sentences under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) concurrently with each other. We agree. The language of the statute and the cases explaining its application clearly indicate that the sentences must run consecutively.
Section 924(c)(1) sets out the penalties for a violator who “during and in relation to any crime оf violence ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.... ” For a first conviction under the subsection, minimum terms are imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(A)(i) — (iii). “In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this subsection, the person shall ... be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(C)(i). The statute further prоvides that “no term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person....” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii).
Allee was convicted of two violations of § 924(c)(1)(A). For the first violation, brandishing a firearm during the bank robbery, he was sentenced to the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years, or 84 months, under § 924(c)(l)(A)(ii). Because the second violation, discharge of a firearm during the carjacking, was a second conviction, Allee was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment under the § 924(c)(l)(C)(i) enhancement.
Allee argues that because the underlying offenses were part of a single criminal transaction, the district court was not constrained by the mandatory language of § 924(e)(l)(D)(ii) to run the sentences consecutively. Allee analogizes his situation to that of the defendant in
United States v. Freisinger,
Allee’s situation is more similar to that of the defendant in
United States v. Davis,
Accordingly, we affirm Allee’s conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand to the district court for resentencing consistent with the views set forth in this opinion.