United States v. Joshua AldridgeUnited States v. Joshua Aldridge
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Steven D. Jaeger, HEMMER WESSELS MCMURTRY, Fort Mitchell, Kentucky, for Appellant. Kimberly Robinson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.
OPINION
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Joshua Aldridge was found guilty of conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion, among other charges. Thereafter, the district court sentenced him to 324 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Aldridge challenges the district court‘s denial of his Rule 29 motion and the district court‘s application of two sentencing enhancements. For the reasons explained below, we AFFIRM the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2009, Aldridge lived in rural southeast Ohio with his girlfriend Kathy,1 Kathy‘s two young daughters, and Aldridge‘s parents. R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 501–02, 505–06) (Kathy) (Page ID #5136–37, 5140–41). Aldridge and Kathy were introduced to Larry Dean Porter, Kathy began to buy marijuana from Porter, and Aldridge purchased painkillers. Id. at 510–11, 515–17 (Kathy) (Page ID #5145–46, 5150–52). Although Aldridge had cautioned Kathy not to use painkillers, Kathy eventually began taking Lortab and Vicodin. Id. at 516–17 (Kathy) (Page ID #5151–52). Soon Kathy and Aldridge were both addicted to painkillers, and they sought out higher-dosage pills—specifically Oxycodone 30-milligram pills—from Porter. Id. at 519–20 (Kathy) (Page ID #5154–55). Initially, they were taking only one pill per day at a cost of about $30 or $40 per pill. Id. at 521, 524 (Kathy) (Page ID #5156, 5159). Over time, as their addiction worsened, Kathy needed three to four pills per day to maintain her high, and Aldridge needed four or five pills per day. Id. at 522–23 (Kathy) (Page ID #5157–58). If Aldridge and Kathy were unable to take a certain dose of Oxycodone on a given day, they would become “dope sick,” which caused body and stomach aches and “felt like . . . dying.” Id. at 527–28 (Kathy) (Page ID #5162–63).
For a while, Aldridge and Kathy were able to pay for the pills with money from Aldridge‘s job, but, as their needs increased, it became difficult to fund their addiction. Id. at 529 (Kathy) (Page ID #5164). When they could not afford to purchase pills with money, Porter would “front them” by allowing Kathy and Aldridge to have the pills so long as they agreed to pay Porter later. Id. at 529–30 (Kathy) (Page ID #5164–65). This arrangement worked for a period, but eventually Aldridge and Kathy were unable to repay Porter. Id. at 530 (Kathy) (Page ID #5165). Tasha,2 who also bought pills from Porter, informed Kathy that she could “work off” the debt that she and Aldridge had accrued by “cleaning and do[ing] sexual favors.” Id. at 534–36 (Kathy) (Page ID
As time went on, Porter increased the “price” of the pills. Initially, one sexual favor would “buy” two pills; however, over time this decreased to one sexual favor for one pill. Id. at 553–54 (Kathy) (Page ID #5188–89). Then Porter asked Kathy to bring her young daughters, who were eight and ten years old at that time, to his home to help her repay the debt under the guise that any sexual acts performed with Kathy‘s daughters would be fake. Id. at 566–70 (Kathy) (Page ID #5201–05). At the height of Aldridge‘s and Kathy‘s addictions, Kathy and her two daughters went to Porter‘s home to engage in sexual acts three or four times each week for an hour at a time, often driven by Aldridge. Id. at 575–76, 579–81 (Kathy) (Page ID #5210–11, 5214–16). Each time that Kathy and her daughters went to Porter‘s house to engage in sexual acts, Kathy and Aldridge would receive one or two pills and each of the daughters would receive roughly $20. Id. at 580–81 (Kathy) (Page ID #5215–16).
If Kathy declined to participate in sexual acts, Porter became agitated and threatened to hurt Kathy, her kids, and her family. Id. at 561 (Kathy) (Page ID #5196). For example, Porter taped Kathy‘s and Tasha‘s hands together and “put clothespins on [their] nipples,” which left marks on Kathy‘s body. Id. at 561–63, 565 (Kathy) (Page ID #5196–98, 5200). Porter left “shotguns and guns” “[a]ll over the house,” where anyone could see them. Id. at 562 (Kathy) (Page ID #5197). And “a couple of times” Porter shot a pistol next to Kathy‘s ear and told her that “[t]his is what could happen.” Id. at 563 (Kathy) (Page ID #5198). Kathy suffered permanent hearing damage as a result. Id.
On one occasion, Kathy told Aldridge that she did not want to go to Porter‘s house, and they had an argument. Id. at 558 (Kathy) (Page ID #5193). At the time, Aldridge was “dope sick,” became agitated, and was “yelling and screaming” at the two daughters and “throwing stuff at” Kathy. Id. at 624 (Kathy) (Page ID #5259). He locked Kathy in her room and demanded that she reach out to Porter. Id. at 625–26 (Kathy) (Page ID #5260–61). Kathy then reached out to Porter to buy some pills in order to deescalate the situation. Id. at 623–27 (Kathy) (Page ID #5258–62). On cross-examination, Kathy testified that Aldridge did not threaten her, that he never said that he would hurt her or the girls, and that she would have gone to Porter‘s even if Aldridge had not asked because she also was “dope sick.” Id. at 715–18 (Kathy) (Page ID #5350–53).
Aldridge was charged with conspiracy to sex traffic a child (“Count One“), conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force (“Count Two“), and child sex trafficking (“Count Five“). R. 121 (Second Superseding Indictment ¶¶ 44–47, 52–53) (Page ID #746–48, 750). After a multi-day trial, Aldridge moved for judgment of acquittal at the close of the government‘s case-in-chief, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he was guilty of Count Two, the adult-sex-trafficking-by-force conspiracy. R. 666 (Trial Tr. at 967–70) (Page ID #5602–05). The district court orally denied the motion, reasoning that a jury could
At sentencing, the district judge applied two enhancements over Aldridge‘s objections: the enhancement for use of a computer to entice or offer and the vulnerable-victim enhancement. R. 667 (Sent‘g Hr‘g Tr. at 6–8) (Page ID #5622–24). The district judge sustained Aldridge‘s objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement. Id. at 7 (Page ID #5623). Aldridge‘s total offense level was 51—eight levels above the maximum total offense level of 43—and his criminal history category was III, which resulted in a sentencing guideline range of life imprisonment. See id. at 4, 7–9 (Page ID #5620, 5623–25) (declining to adopt two additional levels, as recommended by the PSR, for obstruction of justice and noting the total offense level as 43 because that is the maximum offense level under the guidelines); see also R. 586 (PSR ¶¶ 83–149) (Page ID #3646–57) (calculating the total offense level as 53, including the two additional levels for the obstruction-of-justice enhancement). The district court sentenced Aldridge to 324 months’ imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently, and a supervised-release term of life on each count, to be served concurrently. R. 614 (Judgment at 3–4) (Page ID #3877–78).3 Aldridge filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 622 (Notice of Appeal at 1) (Page ID #3900).
II. ANALYSIS
Aldridge argues that the district court improperly denied his Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two and that the district court incorrectly applied two sentencing enhancements. We will address each argument in turn.
A. Rule 29
We “review[] de novo a district court‘s denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence.” United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689, 693 (6th Cir. 2012). “In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sliwo, 620 F.3d 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wallace, 597 F.3d 794, 800 (6th Cir. 2010)). In so doing, we “must consider all of the evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless of whether that evidence was admitted erroneously.” McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 131 (2010) (per curiam) (quotation omitted).4
Aldridge challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his conviction on Count Two, the conspiracy to sex traffic an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion. D. 25 (Appellant Br. at 21–28).5 Under
Thus, in the
The object of the conspiracy here was sex trafficking of an adult by force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion in violation of
As used in the statute, “coercion” means “any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person.”
Aldridge was convicted of conspiring with Porter to sex traffic Kathy using force, threats of force, fraud, or coercion in violation of
Although the defendant in Mack is plainly analogous to Porter, id., it is not clear that the same logic applies to Aldridge. Here, the drug debt was shared by Kathy and Aldridge, and it was referred to as such. D. 33 (Appellee Br. at 21); see also, e.g., R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 534, 544, 569) (Kathy) (Page ID #5169, 5179, 5204). Thus, the object of the conspiracy was to coerce Kathy to exchange sex for drugs by exploiting Kathy‘s and Aldridge‘s opioid addictions until they were in severe debt to Porter. See D. 33 (Appellee Br. at 21). Aldridge could not have voluntarily joined a conspiracy intending to advance the conspiracy‘s goal of coercing Kathy, if it was the conspiracy‘s coercion—making both Kathy and Aldridge dope sick and then demanding payment—that caused Aldridge to further the conspiracy‘s goal. Mack, therefore, does not provide an apt analogy to Aldridge.
Moreover, it is not sufficient, as the government suggests, that Aldridge knew that Kathy was exchanging sex for drugs and Aldridge facilitated those transactions because
Nonetheless, in this case there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that Aldridge voluntarily joined the conspiracy with the intent to further its goal of coercing Kathy. Kathy had marks on her body and suffered permanent hearing loss as a result of Porter‘s physical abuse and threats of violence. R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 561–63, 565–66) (Kathy) (Page ID #5196–98, 5200–01). During this period, she was living with Aldridge, and they were in a romantic relationship and shared a bed. Id. at 566 (Kathy) (Page ID #5201). Additionally, Porter left his guns in the open where Aldridge could see them whenever Aldridge was in Porter‘s home. Id. at 562 (Kathy) (Page ID #5197). From this evidence, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Aldridge knew that Porter was threatening or harming Kathy.
With this knowledge, Aldridge asked Porter to front him pills and then directed Porter to collect payment from Kathy. See, e.g., R. 679 (Gov. Exh. 1B at 21732) (Page ID #5972); id. at 8301 (Page ID #5957). Although these transactions were sometimes facilitated by Kathy, occasionally Aldridge arranged for a transaction without Kathy‘s knowledge, and she found out after the fact when payment was due. See R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 603–05) (Kathy) (Page ID #5238–40). From this, the jury could reasonably conclude that Aldridge knew that Porter was threatening or physically harming Kathy if she did not obey, and Aldridge asked Porter to “front” him drugs in exchange for Kathy providing sexual favors. This, in turn, put Kathy in the position of having to comply with Porter‘s requests or risk harm to herself. Thus, there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Aldridge knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy with intent to further its objective. See
The same facts that were sufficient for a jury to conclude that Aldridge knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy with intent to further its objective are also sufficient for a jury to conclude that the conspiracy used coercion. As explained above, the jury could have reasonably concluded that when Aldridge asked Porter to “front” him pills without Kathy‘s knowledge, he put Kathy in the position of having to comply with Porter‘s sexual requests or risk harm to herself. See Mack, 808 F.3d at 1081;
B. Sentencing
Next, Aldridge challenges the reasonableness of his sentence, arguing that the district court incorrectly applied the vulnerable-victim and use-of-a-computer enhancements. There are two aspects of reasonableness in the sentencing context: procedural and substantive reasonableness. United States v. Gates, 48 F.4th 463, 468–69 (6th Cir. 2022). Here, Aldridge challenges only procedural reasonableness. “Procedural reasonableness requires that a district court must properly calculate the
1. Vulnerable Victim
First, the district court correctly applied the vulnerable-victim enhancement. Two levels are added to a defendant‘s total offense level “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1). A vulnerable victim is any individual “who is a victim of the offense of conviction and any conduct for which the defendant is accountable” and “who is unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1, cmt.2. “[D]rug addiction, standing alone, cannot serve as the basis for applying the [vulnerable-victim] enhancement.” United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377, 398 (6th Cir. 2015). If, however, the victim is vulnerable due to drug addiction and additional traits or circumstances, then application of the enhancement is appropriate. See id. at 398–99 (finding the enhancement applicable because the victims suffered from drug addiction and various mental-health conditions). Although the defendant is not required to “target” the victims because of their vulnerability, United States v. Brawner, 173 F.3d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1999), there must be some reason the vulnerability makes the victim “particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct,” U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1 cmt.2; see also United States v. Wilson, 561 F. App‘x 451, 452–53 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding the “incarcerated victims were particularly susceptible to [the defendant‘s]” fraudulent offer of legal services because the victims had “limited education, cognitive abilities, and ability to understand the legal technicalities of their case, and” maintained “limited communication with . . . the outside world“).
Here, Kathy‘s physical and mental conditions, as well as her financial dependence on Aldridge, place her squarely within the vulnerable-victim category. Kathy became highly addicted to opioids such that she needed three or four pills per day or else she would get “dope sick,” which “felt like . . . dying.” R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 522, 527–28) (Kathy) (Page ID #5157, 5162–63). She was prescribed medication for mental-health issues, but she stopped taking her medication when she was using opioids. Id. at 713–14 (Kathy) (Page ID #5348–49). Additionally, Kathy was diagnosed with fetal alcohol syndrome when she was young and, as a result, has difficulty understanding and retaining information. Id. at 497–98 (Kathy) (Page ID #5132–33). And, while in a relationship with Aldridge, Kathy had brain surgery to remove a tumor from her pituitary gland. Id. at 713, 721 (Kathy) (Page ID #5348, 5356).
If this were not enough, Kathy was a single mother to two young daughters who lived with Aldridge and his family. Id. at 499–502, 506–09 (Kathy) (Page ID #5134–37,
2. Use of a Computer
Likewise, the district court correctly determined that the enhancement for use of a computer is applicable. Under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), two levels are added to a defendant‘s total offense level if the offense involved the use of a computer to “entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor.” This enhancement “requires the inducement of a third party” to engage in sexual acts with a minor, “rather than the inducement of the minor.” United States v. Murphy, 530 F. App‘x 522, 524 (6th Cir. 2013) (emphasis omitted). Thus, the enhancement “does not apply without three people—the defendant, the minor, and the third person who is being enticed.” United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 448 (6th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court applied this enhancement, as recommended by probation, to the sentencing-calculation groups for Count 1A and Count 1B, which pertain to Kathy‘s daughters. See R. 586 (PSR ¶¶ 92–93, 109–110) (Page ID #3647–48, 3650). Thus, there must be evidence that Aldridge used a computer to “entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with” each of Kathy‘s daughters. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B).
Here, the plain text of the enhancement supports its application. There were several online conversations between Aldridge and Porter during which Aldridge facilitated a transaction by directing Porter to contact Kathy. And, throughout the charged time period, Aldridge regularly drove Kathy and her daughters to Porter‘s house, received a pill, left Kathy and her daughters at Porter‘s home, and returned later to pick up Kathy and her daughters. R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 580–82) (Kathy) (Page ID #5215–17). For example, on July 13, 2019, Aldridge messaged Porter asking if Porter “ever g[o]t anything.” R. 679 (Gov. Exh. 1C at 21732) (Page ID #5972). Porter said that he did and asked, “where‘s kathy.” Id. Aldridge responded that she was “[r]ight here” and that he would “have her message” Porter. Id. Minutes later, Kathy messaged Porter and arranged for her daughters and herself to go to Porter‘s home. R. 679 (Gov. Exh. 1B at 8301–03) (Page ID #5957–59). Porter offered to pick up Kathy and her daughters, agreed to bring Aldridge‘s pill, and instructed Kathy, her daughters, and Aldridge to meet him at the end of Aldridge‘s driveway. Id. at 8303 (Page ID #5959); R. 665 (Trial Tr. at 621–23) (Kathy) (Page ID #5256–58).
Put simply, Aldridge and Kathy regularly messaged Porter to “offer” Kathy‘s daughters in exchange for the opioids Aldridge and Kathy sought. “Based on the text of the Guidelines alone, [this] enhancement clearly applies to [Aldridge‘s] conduct.” United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming application of the enhancement because the defendant posted advertisements containing pictures of minors and offering their sexual services to third parties at a cost); see also Murphy, 530 F. App‘x at 528 (finding the district court properly applied this enhancement to a defendant who used pictures of a minor in online advertisements for an escort business).
Aldridge also argues that U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A) is inapplicable because he did not communicate directly with a minor or someone who exercises “supervisory control” over the minor to facilitate the travel of a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. D. 25 (Appellant Br. at 29–30). He may be correct under § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A); however, the district court applied § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B). See R. 586 (PSR ¶¶ 92–93, 109–110) (Page ID #3647–48, 3650); R. 667 (Sent‘g Hr‘g Tr. at 7) (Page ID #5622–23) (“I just think . . . that [defense counsel is] reading the—it‘s 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) too narrowly.“). Under 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), Aldridge was required to “entice” a third person other than the minor, see Lay, 583 F.3d at 448, and therefore, this argument lacks merit. Accordingly, the district court properly applied the § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) enhancement.
3. Harmless Error
Even if the district court erred in applying the challenged enhancements, any error was harmless. “[A] remand for an error at sentencing is required unless we are certain that any such error was harmless—i.e. any such error ‘did not affect the district court‘s selection of the sentence imposed.‘” United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. United States, 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992)). If the guidelines range “from which the district court must begin its sentencing analysis is incorrect, then” it is unlikely that the error is harmless. United States v. Anderson, 526 F.3d 319, 330 (6th Cir. 2008). The government bears a heavy burden to “persuade [us] that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor.” Id. (quoting Williams, 503 U.S. at 203). This is the rare case in which the government has met this heavy burden, in part because Aldridge concedes that any sentencing error would be harmless if we affirm the district court‘s ruling on his motion for judgment of acquittal. See D. 25 (Appellant Br. at 17 n.1).
Despite the guidelines range being life, the district court sentenced Aldridge to 27 years’ imprisonment. R. 667 (Sent‘g Hr‘g Tr. at 23) (Page ID #5639). And the district court explained that its sentencing decision was related primarily to the child-sex-trafficking counts and Aldridge‘s personal characteristics; the court did not mention either challenged sentencing enhancement as particularly relevant to its decision making. Id. at 18–23 (Page ID #5634–39). Thus, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the vulnerable-victim enhancement or the use-of-a-computer enhancement impacted the district court‘s sentencing decision in any meaningful way, the district court‘s original sentence was below the guidelines range, and Aldridge concedes that even if the district court erred, he would be subject to the same guidelines range of life. “[W]e are[, therefore,]
III. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.