After a jury trial, Jose Jesus Madrigal was convicted of conspiracy to possess and distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (1994), promoting and facilitating an unlawful business activity involving controlled substances, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2 (1994), and using a communication device to cause and facilitate possession with intеnt to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b)
I.
The following is a summary of the facts essential to an understanding of Madrigal’s arguments on appeal. The indictment against Madrigal and six others resulted from an investigation, jointly сonducted by state, federal, and local law enforcement officers, into illegal narcotics transactions between individuals in Los Angeles, California and Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The investigation began after the arrest of codefendant Jason Nordman in 1994 for possession of methamphetamine. Authorities in South Dаkota determined that Nordman was involved in the distribution of controlled substances and that he possibly had a California source. The source was determined to be codefend-ant Daniel Navarette, who had moved from Sioux Falls to Los Angeles in the summer of 1994. Before leaving, Navarette and Nord-man had devised a рlan whereby Navarette would purchase drugs in Los Angeles and send them to Nordman for distribution in Sioux Falls.
Navarette testified that in September 1994 he was introduced to appellant Madrigal and codefendant Osvaldo Olivares (also referred to as “Valo”) in Los Angeles, and that the two sold him cocaine and methamphetamine. Trial Transcript 166-73. Navarette then mailed the drugs to Jason Nordman in South Dakota. Nordman distributed the drugs and then, through Western Union, wired Navar-ette his part of the profits and money for more drug purchases. Documentation from Western Union and United Parcel Service introduced at trial corroborated Navarette’s testimony that he and the codefendants conducted drug transactions using this system. In December 1994, Madrigal and Olivares began making trips to South Dakota to deliver the drugs directly to Jason Nordman.
In early January 1995, Navarette moved back to Sioux Falls and a few weeks later he, Jason Nordman, and several others were arrested in a hotel room. Madrigal and Oli-vares were in Sioux Falls at the time, but were not present in the hotel room when the arrests were made. Navarette did not post bond after the January arrest, although Nordman did and resumed buying drugs from Madrigal. Navarette testified that while in jail he continued communicating with Nordman by phone, in person, and through letters, and that he learned Nordman was still involved in drug trafficking and distribution with Madrigal. From February until Nordman’s arrest in October, Madrigal and Nordman continued transacting drug deals, with Madrigal regularly traveling to South Dakota to make deliveries.
At trial, Nordman testified about numerous drug transactions with Madrigal and Olivares, and described some that involved the remaining codefendants, including Nordman’s wife, Kim Nordman, his sister, Charlotte Nordman, and his sister-in-law, Deborah Krier. Nordman was arrested in October when he was caught with a package of drugs Krier had obtained in Los An-geles. Madrigal testified at trial that he knew all of the codefendants, although he denied delivering drugs to any оf them. He said he had made the visit to South Dakota with Olivares in December at Oli-vares’s invitation, and that, over time, he began making the trips himself, picking up envelopes of money from Jason Nordman in return for $500 paid to him by Olivares.
In December 1995, a 54-count superseding indictment was filed in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakоta charging Madrigal and seven codefendants with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (1994); possession with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994); interstate travel in aid of racketeering, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1952 and 2 (1994); and use of a communication device to commit felonies under the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1994). Madrigal was arrested in Los Angeles and transferred to the District of South Dakota. Six of Madrigal’s codefendants pleaded guilty before his trial, and one, Olivares, was a fugitive at the time of trial. After a jury trial, Madrigal was convicted of the conspiracy count, seven counts of interstate travel in
II.
On appeal, Madrigal asserts the District Court erred in admitting Kim Nordman’s statements that Madrigal had threatened to “have [Jason Nordman] and his whole family taken out” if Jason did not “make up for the drugs and profit that was [sic] lost” because of Nordman and Navarette’s arrest and the resulting seizure of drugs supplied to them by Madrigal. Trial Transcript 331. Madrigal characterizes the statements as inadmissible evidence of other acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). He argues that when examined for its probative value and its prejudicial effect as required by Rule 403, evidence of the alleged threat was unfairly prejudicial.
Madrigal contends that this Court’s decision in
United States v. Weir,
[i]n agreeing with the district court’s original assessment that the prejudicial impact of the “other crimes” evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, we note the obvious tendency of the testimony of [the witness] to suggest to the jury that a decision be rendered on an improper basis. The testimony suggested that appellants be convicted of bank robbery because they were bad men who had threatened to kill law enforcement agents or informers.
Id. at 671 (footnote omitted).
“Acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy are admissible as circumstantial evidence that the agreement existed....”
United States v. Dierling,
III.
Madrigal argues that the District Court erred in allowing Navarette to testify
The government argues that under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) Navarette’s testimony was admissible nonhearsay because it amounts to “a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” To avail itself of 801(d)(2)(E) in introducing Navarette’s testimony, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy.
United States v. Lewis,
We may reverse the District Court on this issue only if its findings were clearly erroneous. See
United States v. Alonzo,
Navarette’s contention that the only reason he continued discussing Nordman’s illegal activities with him was out of “curiosity,” is not conclusive of the question of whether Nordman arid Madrigal were acting in furtherance of the conspiracy at the time Nord-man made the statement to Navarette. Appellant’s Brief 28. We have long hеld that “[statements of a coconspirator identifying a fellow eoconspirator as his source of controlled substances is [sic] in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore admissible.”
United States v. Womochil,
IV.
Madrigal states that “[t]he government refused to disclose any witness statements taken by the [Assistant United States Attorney]” and that “[the government’s] insistence not to furnish his notes even for
in camera
review were [sic] suspicious and troubling.” Appellant’s Brief 4(Ml. Madrigal also asserts “[t]he Court was repeatedly requested to make аn
in camera
review of the [Assistant United States Attorney’s] notes and memos of interview to assess the
Brady, ...
and Jencks in them” but did not grant those requests.
Id.
at 41. Madrigal does not identify in his brief the witnesses whose statements he contends were not divulged. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial, however, Madrigal argued that the Assistant United States Attorney failed to provide complete notes from his pre-trial interview with Kim Nordman. Hearing on Post-Trial Motions 4-13. We assume these are the notes to which Madrigal is referring. Madrigal also contends that because the gov-
Madrigal relies on the Seventh Circuit’s holding in
United States v. Marshall
that “[u]pon reasonable argument from counsel, thеre is a presumption that the court should conduct an
in camera
inspection of documents to determine whether the documents are producible under the Jencks Act.”
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted by or approved by him [or] (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement.....
18 U.S.C. § 3500(e)(l)-(2) (1994).
In
United States v. Willis,
this Court held that a defendant “failed to raise a colorable claim” that FBI routine investigation reports concerning conversations that agents held with a government witness were ‘“statements’ within the meaning of Jencks.”
In light of Willis and Malone, Madrigal has failed to demonstrate why an in camera review of the notes in question was necessary. He provides no basis for his belief that thе notes contain “statements” as defined in the Jencks Act.
Madrigal also asserts that the notes should have been reviewed
in camera
for possible
Brady
material. Under
Brady,
the government’s suppression of material, exculpatory evidence violates due process.
Brady v. Maryland,
Madrigal asserted at the hearing on the motion for a new trial that the notes from Nordman’s interview may have contained information with impeachment value. Madrigal contends that because Kim Nordman’s testimony at trial differed from her pre-trial interview regarding the circumstances under which Madrigal threatened to “take out” Jason Nordman, the District Court should have reviewed the interview notes for additional
Brady
material. We disagree. First, after Kim Nordman testified at trial, she wrote the prosecuting Assistant United States Attorney, explaining why she had changed some of her testimony since the interview. Understanding its potential impeachment value, the government provided the defense with that document, and with the relevant portion of Kim Nordman’s pre-trial interview. Responding to this argument in its ordеr denying the motion for a new trial, the District
We have addressed the more substantial of Madrigal’s claims that the government failed to provide the defendant with full discovery, and reject the others without further discussion. 2
V.
The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Hon. Lawrence L. Piersol, United States District Judge for the District of South Dakota.
. Similarly, we have carefully reviewed Madrigal's other arguments that the District Court erred in evidentiary rulings with regard to: the government’s rebuttal closing argument; the government’s examination of witnesses at trial; the exclusion from evidence of documents con-ceming forfeiture of currency seized from Madrigal; and the denial of a request that the government advise Madrigal of the order in which its witnesses would testify at trial. We consider these arguments to be without merit.