We hold today that a defendant’s term of supervised release is tolled from the time that he absconds from supervision until the time he is found by federal authorities. Accordingly, the district court in this case had jurisdiction to conduct revocation proceedings because a sworn petition to revoke was filed before the term of supervised release, as tolled, had expired.
I. Facts and Procedural Background
In April 1987, Jose Delamora was convicted on all counts of a nine-count indictment relating to his participation in a cocaine trafficking ring. Delamora’s conviction occurred during the “window period” between the effective date of two federal statutes that govern post-confinement monitoring of drug offenders. Before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, some drug offenders, like Delamora, were eligible for parole, but would have to serve an additional term of “special parole” following their incarceration.
See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States,
The district court sentenced Delamora to 10 years’ imprisonment, and ordered that Delamora was parole-eligible upon serving one-third of his 10-year sentence. In accordance with the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, it also ordered that Delamora was to serve eight years of supervised release.
Delamora was released on parole on November 14, 1990. He was discharged from parole on May 17, 1996. On February 20, 1998, his probation officer filed an unsworn petition in the district court, alleging that Delamora had violated the conditions of his supervised release by not reporting to him since December 1997 and by not submitting monthly reports since November 1997. The probation officer also alleged that the INS, which possessed a Warrant of Deportation for Delamora, could not locate Delamora at his residence or workplace, and that Delamora told him that he was planning to return to Mexico permanently. On February 23, 1998, the district court issued a warrant for Delamora’s arrest.
Delamora, however, did not permanently return to Mexico. On April 20, 2000, he applied for a California driver’s license under the name “Joe Macias.” Five years later, on February 8, 2005, police in Garde-na, California arrested him on suspicion of drug possession. Delamora was released, but on March 8, 2005, the Gardena police discovered Delamora’s true identity. On March 28, 2005, the Gardena police also charged Delamora with making false statements to the California Motor Vehicles Division.
That same day, a United States Probation Officer filed a petition for revocation of Delamora’s supervised release, this time based on a sworn declaration. Specifically, the Probation Officer averred that he had “reviewed the Court file [and] the attached Petition dated February 20, 1998,” and that “the statements contained in the petition [we]re true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge.” The district court issued another warrant for Delamo-ra’s arrest, and on April 21, 2005, one day after his arrest, Delamora appeared before the district court.
The district court dismissed the petition. It relied on our decision in
United States v. Vargas-Amaya,
The Government timely appealed.
II. Analysis
The district court correctly concluded that, under Vargas-Amaya, the February 23, 1998 bench warrant — which was based on unsworn allegations — did not preserve its jurisdiction. The March 28, 2005 warrant was based on sworn allegations, but it was issued well after Delamora’s supervised release term would have expired in the absence of tolling. Thus, the district court had jurisdiction to revoke Delamora’s supervision release only if tolling prevented his supervised release term from expiring.
After the district court dismissed the Government’s petition, we decided
United
*980
States v. Murguia-Oliveros,
We affirmed. We concluded that Murg-uia-Oliveros was a “fugitive” because he “effectively absconded from serving the terms of his supervised release” by reentering the United States and not contacting his probation officer.
Id.
at 954 (relying on
United States v. Crane,
Delamora argues that
Murguiar-Olive-ros
permits tolling of his supervised release term only from the date the arrest warrant was issued until the date his term would have expired absent a violation, regardless of the fact that he absconded from supervision. We reject that argument. Tolling of a supervised release term extends the date the term is set to expire so long as the defendant remains a fugitive. “To hold otherwise here would reward those who flee from bench warrants and maintain their fugitive status until the expiration of their original term of supervised release.”
Crane,
Delamora became a fugitive when he stopped reporting to his probation officer and absconded from supervision. Under Murguia-Oliveros, the start of Delamora’s flight, which corresponds with the February 23, 1998 bench warrant, commenced the tolling of his supervised release term. On that date, he had 265 days of supervision remaining before his term would have otherwise expired on November 14, 1998, because his supervised release term began when he was released from prison on November 14, 1990. 3 Delamora was brought *981 into federal custody on April 20, 2005, at which point the clock began running again. Delamora’s supervised release term, then, did not actually expire until December 10, 2005, or 265 days from April 20, 2005. Because the Probation Department filed its petition to revoke supervised release on March 28, 2005, the district court had jurisdiction.
Delamora argues that by tolling his supervised release term for more than seven years, we are affording invalid warrants (i.e., those based on unsworn allegations) more force than valid warrants. Not so. What tolls the time is Delamora’s fugitive status, not the invalid warrant. In this case, Delamora’s status as an absconder happens to coincide with the date of the unsworn petition as it did in Murguictr-Oliveros, and often might.
Finally, we disagree with Delamora that the district court lacked authority under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act to revoke his supervised release. Although the Anti-Drug Abuse Act does not expressly provide for revocation, such authority is necessarily implied in the district court’s authority to impose supervised release in the first place. See Pub.L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)). We do not believe that Congress would have authorized a system of post-confinement monitoring in an exercise of futility.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has said that the term “supervised release” in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act should be interpreted with reference to the Sentencing Reform Act.
See Gozlon-Peretz,
For the same reason, we reject Delamo-ra’s argument that applying the revocation provision would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The revocation provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), was part of the “full definition” of supervised release that the Anti-Drug Abuse Act incorporated by reference.
Id.
Since supervised release may be imposed against those convicted during the “window period” without triggering constitutional concerns,
see id.
at 407-09,
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the district court’s order dismissing the petition for revocation, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.
REVERSED.
Notes
. The Sentencing Reform Act was passed before the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, but it did not become effective until one year after the Anti-Drug Abuse Act took effect.
. In
Crane,
the defendant's term of supervision was set to expire on May 2, 1991, but he was a fugitive from September 1990 to December 1990, and was incarcerated on unrelated state charges from December 1990 to May 9, 1991.
. We join the Third, Fifth and Tenth Circuits in deciding that, for defendants sentenced during the "window period” between passage of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act, the term of supervised release begins on the day they
*981
are released from imprisonment, not the day their parole period ends.
See United States v. Cook,