*2 BERZON, Circuit Judges.
Opinion TROTT; by Judge Partial partial Concurrence and Dissent by Judge THOMAS.
TROTT, Circuit Judge: Appellant John Lakatos challenges the United States District Court of the Central District of California’s requirement that he past-due child obligations in full as a condition of his release. Lakatos arguments advances two supporting position: a condition of supervised release directing a defendant to pay off a child debt constitutes a se per violation of the United States Sen- (“the tencing USSG”); Guidelines even if a district court can require a defen- liquidate dant to a child aas may contravene the preex- terms of a isting state court judgment so doing. jurisdiction We have and REVERSE and REMAND for resentencing.
DISCUSSION Background I.
Lakatos was married to Deborah Peters (“Peters”) from 1972 until at which marriage time their ended divorce. During marriage, this Peters had two children. a result of the As di- vorce, Lakatos was ordered an Idaho state court to pay per child month, in addition to the children’s medical insurance. Lakatos satisfy did not Novak, Richard Office of the Federal obligation successfully evaded Peters’ Defender, California, Angeles, Los attempts to collect child for over a defendant-appellant. for the private decade. With the help investi- Raphael, Michael J. United States At- gator, Peters was able to locate Lakatos Office, torney’s California, and, Angeles, 20, 1995, Los obtain a judg- plaintiff-appellee. ment from an Idaho state court release, and, pursuant to the past him for due $85,873.10 against imposed a term parties, subsequently- wishes case support. day and an additional of one imprisonment reciprocal enforcement transferred months of thirty-five due to from Idaho that, however, Lakatos, objection of state. Over residency *3 an additional imposed court 18,1995, pleaded Lakatos September On supervised requiring release of condition conspiring to of Idaho in the District guilty outstanding child his pay to Lakatos a employee of to an provide to kickbacks prior months in full at least six port in viola- Contractor States Prime release. supervised his expiration of § 41 U.S.C. 371 and U.S.C. tion of 18 above condi- imposed the Judge Williams in the 53, Lakatos was sentenced §§ 54. just eigh- a court issued despite tion imprison- to temmonths’ of Idaho Court earlier from days teen supervised release. three-years’ ment and to Lakatos his of California Lakatos’ condition of One payments outstanding child dependents “support was that he lease increments, lump with two monthly responsibilities.” family other and meet appeal fol- of payments sum $5000. 1999, the United States In August, lowed. District of for Central jurisdiction over transfer of approved a of Review II. Standard release from defendant’s im decision to A district court’s District of Idaho. supervised release is pose a December, 1999, acting at the behest discre an abuse of reviewed for typically Probation United States supervising Bee, States tion. United a officer, Audrey B. Collins issued Judge Cir.1998). (9th a court is Whether 1234 of in the Central bench warrant payment of a child to order empowered violating for Lakatos California for super of a support obligation as condition release im- conditions of however, question a of law vised The warrant case. posed in the Idaho v. Mil de novo. United reviewed (1) had alleged two Lakatos violations: Cir.2000). ler, F.3d 205 a by driving committed misdemeanor suspended; was his license vehicle while Support Payment Obli- of a Child III. (2) had numerous submitted and Lakatos of Condition Su- gation is a Permissible Monthly Supervision Reports false pervised Release that he representations which he made authorized A he was em- district when fact unemployed was 3583(d) § to conditions impose and living was U.S.C. ployed, and he with This statute enumer- his mother when being supported by of su- mandatory conditions at certain a home he later ates fact he lived in valued Furthermore, offenders and for federal $650,000. pervised release approximately any dis- to a district court permits payments to make Lakatos had failed Peters, cretionary conditions owing support debt to the child in- appropriate,” December, 1999, that “it considers be had grown in 18 U.S.C. conditions listed $100,000. those cluding over (b)(12)-(20). 3563(b)(l)-(10) § and hearing be- preliminary In a revocation 3583(d) (2000). discretionary A U.S.C. Collins, pleaded guilty Judge fore condition, however, imposed only can be then The case to the above violations. it: extent in the same district to Senior transferred (1) to the factors reasonably related Judge David W. Williams (a)(2)(B), 3553(a)(1), in section At set forth 2000. hearing on (a)(2)(D); (a)(2)(C), term hearing, the court revoked greater deprivation responsibilities,” 3563(b)(1) involves no reasonably (emphasis added), than is liberty necessary for “comply purposes any set forth in section the terms court order or order of an (a)(2)(C), 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(D); process pursuant administrative to the law State, Columbia, the District of or possession other territory of the United any pertinent poli- is consistent with States, requiring payments by the cy Sentencing statements issued defen- dant and maintenance Commission to 28 U.S.C. child or of a parent child and the 994(a).... whom is living.” 18 U.S.C. Id. 3563(b)(20) added). (emphasis The above-referenced factors set forth USSG describes these conditions as “stan- *4 (1) § in 18 U.S.C. 3553 include: nature dard conditions [that] are recommended and circumstances offense and the release.” USSG history and characteristics of the defen- 5D1.3(c)(4). § Thus, Lakatos’ argument is dant; adequate the need for deterrence fatally by undermined the clear and unam- conduct; (3) to criminal pro- to need biguous statutory language of 18 U.S.C. public tect the from further crimes 3563(b) § 5D1.3(c)(4). § and USSG defendant; provide the need to Second, fact that attorney Lakatos’ defendant with needed educational or voca- previously conceded that the district court care, tional training, medical or other cor- could compliance order with the child rectional treatment in the most effective port order against militates acceptance our 3553(a) (2000); § manner. U.S.C. see argument contrary now. At the Janu- Jackson, also United States v. 31, 2000, ary sentencing hearing before (9th Cir.1999). par- These factors Williams, Judge Lakatos’ attorney stated: allel by those advanced the USSG. USSG Mr. is willing agree Lakatos to that this 601.3(b) (1997). § Manual jurisdiction court has the there’s —and Lakatos argues statutory that this no doubt about that —to Mr. order Laka- prohibited framework the district court comply tos to California Supe- [the requiring pay from that he child rior Court’s order pay that Lakatos as a super-vised condition of his release. Peters], child support to And if he argument Lakatos’ fails for reasons. two comply order, doesn’t with the court First, a necessitating compliance condition then the Probation Officer can allege awith that requires payment court order a petition, proba- fact the and maintenance of a child tion [sic] could have alleged Officer it in reasonably related to the factors enunci petition. Certainly instant there’s 3553(a). §in instance, ated For requiring dispute no about that. liquidate Lakatos his child support obli representa- This statement is a correct gations clearly related to Lakatos’ histo tion of accurately the law and reflects ry characteristics, promotes Lakatos’ position of this court. We reject therefore respect for legal obligation his to pay Pe Lakatos’ that a district argument ters, criminal deters conduct precluding require cannot comply defendant to Lakatos continuing from delinquent be child preexisting as a con- on his payments, protects Peters’ and dition of children from Lakatos’ further crimes IV. The District Court Abused its Dis- Lakatos. This conclusion is bolstered Imposing cretion in a Condition of Su- 3563(b) and USSG pervised Release that Conflicted with a 5D1.3(c)(4), expressly authorize a Preexisting State Order defendant, district court to require a as a “sup argument crux at The port dependents and meet family other hearing, and his enforcing wholly products persuasive argument appeal, orders that are
most of state law. Both claims lack merit. fashioning that the district court erred in support payment government's schedule that con- The first contention-that flicted with an order issued the federal condition of release just eighteen and the state court enforcement order are days prior sentencing hearing. clearly wrong. to the The not inconsistent-is We government accept government's suggestion counters that the condition cannot imposed by requirement the district court that the district court's pay liquidate $100,000 Lakatos to his entire child the entire thirty proper thirty debt in less than months was in less than months is consistent notwithstanding preexisting allowing California with the state court order him to government per state court order. The is mis- the debt at a rate of month. taken. government's argument- second imposition The district court's actions were principles conditions cannot violate of fed contrary limitations im equally unavailing. eralism-is plicit 3563(b)(20). in 18 U.S.C. This sec position of its that no viable federalism tion authorizes the district court to by Lakatos, gov claim can be raised *5 a condition of ernment relies on the Second Circuit "comply the defendant to with the terms of Appeals' holding Court of in United States any court order ... to the law of Inc., (2d v. A-Abras 185 F.3d Cir. requiring payments by a State ... 1999). government's The reliance is not defendant and mainte only misplaced, but ironic. nance child. . . ." generally While the facts in A-Abras 3563(b)(20) (emphasis added). This lan parallel bar, those in the case at the devil guage compliance indicates that where is in the details. The defendant in A- with a state child order is made a pleaded guilty Abras in federal court to the court illegally removing asbestos, in violation of require compliance must with the "terms sentencing, the Clean Air Act. At the de- order," impose [the] and not its leniency, noting fendant asked for that the own terms. While the conditions listed in city already of New York had fined him for 3563(b) exclusive, logic are not it defies his conduct. The district court sentenced properly to conclude that the district court imprison- the defendant to three months imposed a condition of release ment, by years super- followed three concerning precisely subject the same vised with the condition that he contemplated by 3563(b)(20) matter city specified monthly fine at a following without limitations argued, alia, rate. The defendant inter articulated in that section. The above con that this condition should be vacated be- rings especially clusion true in this case "principles cause of federalism bar a feder- given that the limitation reflects requiring payment al court from of a state ensuring a federalism concern with that specified or local fine at a rate." Id. at 32. respect federal courts state court orders finding In that the district court could generally preeminent and the states' role specify the rate at which the defendant support particularly. in matters of child required repay city fine, was the A- government attempts downplay reasoning. Abras court offered two lines of by First, well-accept- federalism concerns in this case the court reiterated the arguing: principle enjoys that the federal and state ed that "a district court inconsistent; setting orders are not that broad discretion when the condi- release conditions do not vio- tions of release." Id. at 35. opined principles The Second Circuit that because late of federalism even when the district court’s decision not to alter na of child given our commitment appeared amount of total the fine to reflect principle “[flamily relations are city’s the district court’s deference to the concern, a traditional area of state ... decision, it was “well within federal [the] which the state courts a special have ex- court’s discretion to pertise experience,” and our recogni- conditions would ensure that de- [the tion of the fact that possess states “a vital actually pa[id] City fendant] fine.” Id. interest in protecting the authority of the judicial system, so that its orders and The second reason advanced the Sec- judgments are nugatory.” not rendered why ond Circuit as to the district court Koppel, H.C. v. justified in formulating specified Cir.2000) (internal omitted). quotations repayment rate the reason that —and betrays government’s reliance Enforcement of the district court’s con- case—was that no such rate had previously dition that Lakatos pay his entire child fact, city. been established twenty-nine months would specified court noted that had city its clearly nullify the effect of the preexisting repayment, rate of own district court’s issued the Califor- be, “would in light actions of what we have Thus, nia Court. the district here, most troubling.” said Id. Further- court’s formulation of a repayment sched- more, the court noted holding that its was ule at odds with the order of the California premised on if city the fact elected Superior qualifies as federal inter- impose particular the future to rate of vention into a “traditional area of state repayment that with the rate conflicted set concern.” Id. court, the defendant could Therefore, the limitations inherent return district court and seek a modifi- § 3563(b)(20), coupled legal with the guid- of his cation release condition. *6 ance offered in A- Second Circuit Id. Abras our long-standing reluctance to analysis in suggests A-Abras nullify state court judgments involving tra- the condition im- functions, ditional compel state us to con- posed by the district in court the case at clude that the district court erred improper. bar was Specifically, the dis- quiring Lakatos to pay his child imposition trict court’s of a rate of repay- obligations at a rate different than that ment prescribed inconsistent established the state of pre- California constitutes the Court. cise course conduct the Second Circuit labeled troubling.” as “most Id. CONCLUSION Moreover, the discrepancy between the federal and state While district court can require court orders in this de- case comply fendant to exemplifies a state child type of conflict that port judgment or suggested Second Circuit enforcement order as a would entitle La- may to have conflicting katos federal condi- negate express of such a pursu- judg- tion terms release modified (1994). ment or order in doing. ant to 18 so For the rea- U.S.C. 228 Id. above, sons stated we REVERSE and discrediting Further the district court’s REMAND to the district court for resen- in this actions case is the Second Circuit’s tencing. statement in A-Abras that “where a state in place a comprehensive procedure has THOMAS, Judge, concurring Circuit probation for resolution of the condition part dissenting part: imposes, it good makes sense to defer to procedure.” that established Id. I majority opinion concur in the in all rings especially statement true in respect. the are- one but The record in this case is County 1; Lewis Hospital No. District the Califor- either record of devoid of 1; Hospital No. Mason District Public judg- orders or nia or Idaho 1; Hospital No. County District Public for me Thus, impossible it is ments. Douglas Pub Okanogan Counties controlling has the state ascertain Okanogan 1; Hospital District No. lic Interstate to the Uniform 3; Hospital No. County District Public Family Code Act. See Cal. Support Family Hospital County Okanogan Public Thus, it §§ 7-1010. 4911; Code §§ Idaho County 4; Public Pacific No. District whether to determine impossible also 2; Pacific Coun Hospital No. District negat- released the condition 3; No. Hospital ty District Public operative state terms of ed the Hospital County Public Pend Oreille for further Thus, remand I would order. Hospi 1; Prosser Public No. District and reconsider- of the record development County District; Skagit Public tal light of our ation 1; Skagit Coun Hospital No. District holding that the Califor- decision, without 2; No. Hospital District ty Public conclusive. nia court order Public Skagit Counties and Whatcom 304; Hospital District No. Snohomish 1;No. County Hospital District Public Hospital County Public Snohomish County 2; No. Snohomish District 3; Hospital District No. Whit Public Hospital County Public man County 1-A; Public No. Whitman OF WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION Plaintiffs-Ap Hospital District No. DISTRICTS, a HOSPITAL PUBLIC pellants, unincorporated Washington associa Hospital County tion; Public Adams County Public 2; INCORPORATED; Adams No. PHILIP MORRIS 3; Company; Affiliated
Hospital Reynolds No. Tobacco RJ Corpo Services, general partnership Tobacco Health Brown & Williamson Hospital ration; Dis Tobacco County British American Skagit Public PLC; British Plc; Skagit B.A.T. Industries & 1 and Whatcom trict No. Limit Tobacco Investments American Hospital District No. Counties *7 formerly ed, as British-Ameri known Hospital County 304; Public Chelan Limited; Company Loril can Tobacco County 2; Public Clallam District No. Liggett Company; lard Tobacco 1; Clallam Hospital No. District Inc.; Myers, Inc.; Liggett Group, & 2; Hospital No. County District Public Company; The Tobacco Okanogan Lincoln, Grant, Douglas, Institute, Inc.; The Council Tobacco Hospital District No. Public Counties USA, Inc.; for Tobacco Research - Hospital Ferry County Dis 6; Public Inc.; Council, Hill Tobacco Smokeless County 1; Public Garfield trict No. Corpora Knowlton, Inc.; Unknown & County District; Pub Hospital Grant A-Z, Defendants-Appellees. tions 1; Hospital Grant District No. lic No. 00-35117. 2; County Hospital No. District Public Hospital County Public Grant Appeals, Court of United States County 3; Grays Public Harbor No. Ninth Circuit. 1; Hospital No. Jefferson Dec. Argued and Submitted 2; County Hospital No. Public Feb. Filed Hospital District; Public Kennewick County Hospital District King Public County Hospital King 1;
No. Public County 2; Kittitas
District No.