*1 therefore, agree, the decision of I
Secretary be affirmed. of Labor should America,
UNITED STATES
Plaintiff-Appellee, ELLERBEE,
John L. Defendant-
Appellant.
No. 94-2278. Appeals,
United States Court
Sixth Circuit. 13, 1995.
Submitted Oct.
Decided Jan. *2 to a of 24 Ellerbee term
court sentenced months incarceration. appeal, oral was waived
On Appellant the briefs. this case was heard on (1) presented at argues: the evidence a of law to trial insufficient as matter (2) guilt; that the evi- support a support presented was insufficient dence finding, at made the District Court’s engaged in sentencing phase that planning” in order “more enhancement; support a two-level sentence (3) court committed error that the trial depart failing to downward argued “minor guidelines to Ellerbee’s due (4) fraud; that the trial role” the mail adopting a error court committed question in order to valuation of the required market value” determine the “fair appellant’s sentence. For to determine reasons, following affirm the conviction we and sentence. trial, presented at
From the evidence
light
favorable to the
viewed
most
summary
following is a brief
prosecution, the
essentially
facts. Ellerbee
of the relevant
would,
whereby
nu-
ran a scheme
he
under
names, sign up with the Colum-
merous false
part of
House Record Club. As
Colum-
bia
Attorney
Hiyama, Asst. U.S.
Stephen L.
“introductory
typically
offer” the club
bia’s
(briefed), Detroit, MI, for U.S.
join,
allowing
incentives to
such
offered
(briefed), Detroit, MI,
Morgan
E.
Joan
purchase eight tapes, al-
the subscriber to
John L. Ellerbee.
cent. The member
bums or CDS for one
minimum
obligated
purchase
was then
MOORE,
KENNEDY and
Circuit
Before:
8)
regular
(usually 6 or
items
number
*,
Judge.
Judges;
District
POTTER
the next two to
price from the Club over
years.
receiving the free
three
After
POTTER, D.J.,
opinion
delivered
street),
(which
Eller-
he later resold on the
court,
MOORE, J., joined.
in which
later invoices that
bee would then refuse the
109-110),
KENNEDY,
(pp.
J.
delivered
name at the addresses
sent to the false
were
concurring opinion.
separate
he utilized.
POTTER,
Judge.
District
JOHN W.
address,
his own
used
Canfield;
step-daughter,
that of his
appeals
criminal East
Defendant/appellant
address,
Defendant,
Coplin;
a third
4325 East-
sentencing.
after
or
conviction
lawn,
fraud,
The addresses were
trial,
for the deliveries.
of mail
a bench
was convicted
apartments,
1341;
into nonexistent
using
to fur-
all subdivided
fictitious names
U.S.C.
defraud,
1342;
picked at random from
and the names were
18 U.S.C.
ther a scheme to
telephone
Appellant submitted
transportation
book.
the interstate
membership applications,
fraud,
total of 221 false
2314. The district
taken
18 U.S.C.
Potter,
sitting by designation.
John W.
*The Honorable
Ohio,
Judge
for the Northern District
District
applications
Supreme
were from Ellerbee’s
208 of the
Court held that in
address,
address,
Coplin
determining
five
bore
of evidence to
Eastlawn address. As a re
a criminal
“the
bore the
conviction
relevant
whether,
applications,
question
viewing
sult
sent
House
after
the evi-
*3
Coplin
light
1811
cassettes to
dence in the
CDS and 506
most favorable to the
prosecution,
and Canfield addresses.1
rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the
of
to the
The total value
the items sent
beyond
a
crime
reasonable doubt.”
at
Coplin
placed
Canfield and
addresses was
mail
had
to establish
proof
that no
specific
as
his
following
elements:
arguments
intent to defraud. Both of these
defraud;
of a
1.
the existence
scheme to
pertain to the
of the evi-
2.
mail in
use
furtherance
and,
diseussed,
dence
as
are
above
without
scheme; and
merit.
culpable participation
3.
the accused.
that,
argues
next
§
present-
See 18 U.S.C.
1341. The evidence
trial,
phase
sentencing
of his
the district
light
ed is
in the
most
reviewed
favorable
erroneously
appellant
court
found that
en
findings
prosecution,
and the trial court’s
gaged in “more than
planning.”
minimal
findings
only
reversed
if the trial court’s
finding supported
This
a two-level sentence
“clearly
were
United
v.
erroneous.”
States
enhancement. The trial
Bashaw,
court
982
168
F.2d
may
appellant’s
increase
convicted
offense
theory
only
Appellant’s
is that he was
points if
level
two
the offense involved
scheme,
dupe
mind
whose master
planning.”
“more than minimal
U.S.S.G.
“Derrick”;
only
was an individual known
as
2Bl.l(b)(5).
appropriate
The
standard of
supposedly
operation
Derrick
ran
review the trial
court’s
“more
paid
only
appellant
per tape. Ap
one dollar
planning”
instance is
one
pellant argues
only equivo
that since there is
Eve,
of clear
v.
error. United States
984
guilt
cal
and no
circumstantial evidence
F.2d 701
evidence,
direct
evi
insufficient
support
Appellant argues
dence to
his conviction.
than
To
that “more
minimal
appellant
proposition
planning”
planning
than
relies on the case
means more
is nec-
(6th
Leon,
essary
simplest
of United
commit
the offense in
Cir.1976).
holding
Commentary.
The
in this
is no
form.
See U.S.S.G.
Stone,
longer good
than typical
law.
United States v.
Ellerbee maintains that “more
(6th Cir.1984);2
creating dummy
planning”
F.2d 361
see also Jack
would include
cor-
307, 318-19,
accounts,
Virginia,
multiple
son v.
porations,
U.S.
bank
etc. The
(1979).
2781, 2788-89,
argument
S.Ct.
61 L.Ed.2d 560
follows
since all
did
every
hypothesis except
1. The
sent to
ad-
CDS and
the Eastlawn
remove
reasonable
Stone,
apparently
dress were
not
the de-
guilt.”
attributed to
The court
F.2d at 362.
fendant.
previous
indicating
further held
decisions
rejected
approval
contrary
of a
rule "are
Stone,
2.
held
the court
that "circumstantial
Id. at
overruled.”
guilty
evidence alone can sustain a
verdict
so,
to do
circumstantial evidence need
Nagi,
212-13
applications,
upward enhance-
States v.
fill
out
Cir.1991).
(6th
Court,
best,
improper.
At
ment is
pre-
plain
The evidence
review
error.
merit.
lacks
Ellerbee’s
sented,
light
reviewed in
most favorable
require
planning
minimal
does not
than
More
prosecution,
appellant was
shows that
in its most
be committed
the offense
sole,
major, if
participant
fraud
form,
appellant impliedly
ar
complicated
The
failure to de-
scheme.
district court’s
something
just
more
it
must be
gues; rather
part
plain
downward was not
error.
simplest
in its
form. “More
crime
than the
planning”
minimal
can be deduced
than
interesting
appellant’s
most
acts,
repeated
is typical,
than
planning
more
*4
assigned errors is
that
the
his contention
In
in
crime.
this
steps to conceal the
calculating
district court erred in
the amount
stance,
the
crime
appellant
committed
by adopting
of the
of loss
a retail valuation
applica
filling
over
hundred
through
out
two
goods
question
in
in
the
order to determine
acts),
false names and
(repeated
tions
used
required
“fair market value”
to determine
(concealment),
picked
two
over
addresses
Ellerbee’s sentence. The court’s standard of
telephone
of the
false names out
hundred
review in this
is also one of clear
instance
(more
planning).
than minimal
book
Kohlbach, 38
error. United States v.
F.3d
the enhancement was
evidence indicates that
warranted.
Further,
pointed
govern-
the
as
out
require
Sentencing
As the
Guidelines
ment,
in
of
comments
the
one
the
of
that the amount
loss attributable to Eller-
guidelines
particularly germane: “[m]ore
is
fraud be taken
account in deter
bee’s
into
planning
pres-
deemed
[also]
is
pertinent
sentencing range,
mining the
repeated acts
involving
in
over
ent
2Fl.l(b)(l),
Court must look
U.S.S.G.
the
time,
period
unless it is clear that each
of
meaning of
“loss.” Section
purely
opportune...”
instance was
Sentencing
n. 2 of the
comment
Guidelines
1(f) (emphasis
n.
1B1.1 comment
U.S.S.G.
property
defines “loss” as
value of the
“the
added).
Ivery, 999
also United States v.
See
taken, damaged
Ordinarily,
destroyed.”
or
stated,
As
this
F.2d 1043
property
destroyed
is
the
when
taken or
loss
acts over 12
repeated
scheme involved
particular
is the fair market
of the
value
months,
and each
was as a result
instance
property
Appellant argues
at issue.
that in
fraud-inducing
appellant,
the
the
efforts
case,
this
the
be valued at the
should
being
“opportune.” The
merely
rather than
per tape for
appellant
which
claims he
$1.00
Ellerbee’s offense
district court’s
that
alternative,
goods.
sold the
the
planning
more than minimal
was
involved
that,
argues
membership pro
since the club
proper.
eight
that the
had for
vided
albums could be
sentencing, appel
respect
to
With
long
eventually
penny
as
as the member
argues that
court com
lant also
the district
loss,
albums,
bought six
as
additional
the
by failing
depart downward
mitted error
to
by using
per tape
calculated
unit value
or
the
sentencing guidelines
in
due to Ellerbee’s
CD,
be averaged
should
out over fourteen
El-
argued “minor role”
the mail fraud.
in
instead of
albums
“free” albums
only
argues
player
that he
a small
lerbee
was
per membership.
received
mysterious
larger
in a
scheme
that the
actually
Derrick was
the criminal master
cites
United States Warshaw
(6th Cir.1994),
plot
sky,
supporting
mind behind the
to defraud Columbia
totally
proposition
House. This
without
the retail market
where
merit,
appears
repeat
question,
Eller-
to
in
application
be a
has no
the crime
argument concerning
improper
it is
bee’s
then
use a retail valuation
Furthermore,
goods.
appellant did
of the
the evidence.
establish
market value
Warshawsky, however,
court.
not raise this issue
the district
dealt with fraud
before
wholesalers,
Ordinarily,
amongst
to address
victim was a
this Court declines
and the
market;
player
not raised
court below. See
thus
that
issues
wholesale
case,
KENNEDY,
inappropriate
Judge,
it was
to use the
Circuit
concurring.
goods.
Id. at 213-14.
panel’s
I
opinion
concur
except for
fraudulently
valuation
obtained
distinction,
place
Because of the market
goods. The District Court decided the fair
Warshawsky
apply
does
the scenario
the stolen
based on
bar,
In the case at
Co-
before
Court.
testimony
of an
employee
Columbia
place
acting
in the retail
lumbia
market
(“Columbia”)
House Record Club
Moreover,
by selling
Ellerbee
to consumers.
“generic
values” of a
disc and cas-
selling
acting
market
this same
tape
sette
were'
respectively.
$15
$10
albums
these same consumers.
It
However,
only
did Columbia
sell
say
be a
also
mistake to
the valuation
products
less,
specific
for
involved
but
price;
of a
arrived was
use
“retail”
showing
anyone
also there was no
sold
actuality,
presented
evidence
showed
products prices.
these
those
products
tended to market
price,
case,
somewhat below retail
and it was Co-
we are
with the
prices
question
lumbia’s
that were used to establish
of whether value
be
should
deter
goods’
price
mined
Simply
fair market value.
be-
reference to the
for which
*5
tapes
and cassettes are
cause Columbia
to offer the
sold in
chose
introducto
stores,
retail
or whether value should
ry goods
be
at a substantial discount as an
the
charged
determined
amount
join
incentive to
not
the record club does
particular
Columbia for these
labels. The
goods
mean that the
value of
was
market
the
easily
latter
is
appro
market
and
ascertained
lessened.
United
v. Col
somehow
States
priate in this case. See United States v.
(3rd
letti,
Cir.1992) (rejecting
Warshawsky,
victim similarly theft of a Warshawsky involved
But “suggested retail hypothetical
product with a its court based upon which the district
price” Warshawsky, 212. As valuation. Id. at America, UNITED STATES found market value this case the Plaintiff-Appellee, connection to the has little District Court Warshawsky, at 213. both case. cases, showing that the mer- no (95-5648) Johnny Arnold HALLIBURTON sold ever have been chandise would (95-5649), Nancy Jane Welborn prices suggested at the retail outlet Defendants-Appellants. government. Nos. 95-5649. value, being mea- rather than Fair market market, easily hypothetical an sured Appeals, United States Court for the amount in this measured Circuit. Sixth merchandise. sells which Columbia 15, Argued Sept. 1995. readily available there is such Where fair market value to determine the means Decided Jan. merchandise, clearly erroneous I believe it is “If employ it. some readily-ascertainable, property is the stolen proceed to the sentencing court must
