*1 1158 court on remand. by tion for the district attorney’s fees is barred for claim Therefore, Hacker’s to address we decline merger.
the doctrine in this area. contentions Ellis is entitled to We conclude attorney’s fee for his services a reasonable failure spite of his appeals in IV. CONCLUSION the contract between terms of
establish the reasons, judgment foregoing For the the na Whatever himself and Lowrance. part, Affirmed of the district court is right Ellis has the agreement, ture of part Remanded part Reversed meruit for quantum compensated in to be not inconsistent with proceedings further he rendered: the services opinion. professional ser- attorney renders If an right compensated vices, has the services_ express an Where for such attorney
contract [between into, gener- there is not entered client] pay a reason- implied promise ally an the services ren- compensation for able attorney pursuant by the dered In Illinois meruit. theory quantum America, UNITED STATES quantum may under recover plaintiff Plaintiff-Appellee, pursuant made to an a claim meruit on v. amendment of without express contract plaintiff fails to es- pleadings, where FOUTRIS, Defendant-Appellant. John G. express contract but does tablish No. 91-2124. rendered. were in fact that services show Appeals, United States Court Braun, Browne, Ltd. & Greenbaum Circuit. Seventh 303, 309, 210, Ill.Dec. Ill.App.3d case, (1980). In this Ellis’ N.E.2d Argued April 1992. allege not even an for fees did petition July Decided and Low- himself express contract between Rehearing Aug. Denied of fees for Nor was the award rance. obtaining judg- the initial Ellis’ services the terms of based on
ment for Lowrance Ellis and Low- express contract between an Rather, the district awarded rance. it determined be a fees based on what hourly rate. We do not see reasonable plead attorney does not even why an who should be worse off express contract an fails plead one but than one who does its existence. prove even if
Finally, argues that Hacker right otherwise have Ellis would Hacker, postjudgment fees from recover denying peti Ellis’ order district court’s the fees affirmed because tion should be “unreasonable, unwarranted claimed are then offers sever Hacker and excessive.” allegedly of Ellis’ pages “examples” al unreasonable, and excessive unwarranted of a reasonable The determination
claims. fee, however, ques- is a factual attorney’s *2 Atkinson, (ar-
Brenda Atty. Asst. U.S. gued), Atty., Office the U.S. Crim. Div. Elden, Barry R. Asst. Atty., U.S. Of- fice Atty., of the U.S. Receiving, Crim. D'iv., Ill., Appellate Chicago, plaintiff- for appellee. (argued)
Robert A. Novelle Philip M. Angelini, Serpico, Navigato, Novelle & Chi- Ill., cago, defendant-appellant. BAUER, Before Judge, Chief EASTERBROOK, Judge, Circuit NOLAND, Judge.1 Senior District
BAUER, Judge. Chief pleaded guilty offering John Foutris Alcohol, Tobacco, an undercover and Fire- Agent arms to burn $600.00 down his tav- ern, violation 18 U.S.C. 373. At sentencing, the district court determined recklessly endangered that Foutris others, pursuant lives of 2K1.4(b)(2), Guideline increased his base of- fense level appeals levels. Foutris increase; affirm.
I. Facts operated
Foutris
the Six Pence
Tavern
Broadway
a rented storefront at 5947 N.
Street,
Chicago,
Illinois. The tavern was
profitable,
partner
and Foutris’
ab-
$100,000
sconded with
from another ven-
ture,
leaving
financial straits.
lease,
escape
To
his
Foutris offered one of
$1,000
regular
customers
to torch
Apparently
tavern.
the customer did not
offer,
instead,
leap at the
introduced
Foutris to Rich Marianos. Foutris believed
arsonist,
professional
Marianos was a
when
fact,
agent with the Bu-
Marianos is an
Tobacco,
Alcohol,
reau of
and Firearms.
meetings,
told
During
taped
their
de-
Marianos that he wanted
tavern
Foutris,
stroyed. Marianos asked
“You
ground[,]
completely
it burned
want
“Well[,] not the
huh?” Foutris answered:
only, I
thing,
inside the bar
don’t
whole
Noland,
sitting by designation.
1. The Honorable James E.
Senior Dis-
Indiana,
Judge
trict
for the Southern District
Analysis
II.
my
it’s not
building,
for the
a shit
give
to bother
I don’t want
building....
government
The
bears the burden
Con-
Monitored
Transcript of
building.”
justifying an enhance
proof
on factors
(“4/18/90
4/18/90,
made
versation
of a defendant’s sentence. United
ment
*3
alarm,
his
disabled
Transcript”). Foutris
721,
(7th
Spillman, 924 F.2d
723
v.
States
to
accelerants
with
Marianos
provided
and
ap
Cir.1991).
an enhancement
Whether
agreed to
initially
Foutris
the fire.
start
for the sentenc
question of fact
plies is a
gas-
three bottles of
two or
bring Marianos
for clear error.
we review
judge, which
ing
ultimately
going, but
the fire
get
oline to
Boyer, 931
v.
Id. See also
lighter
use
should
Marianos
that
decided
Cir.1991);
(7th
United
1201, 1203-04
F.2d
thinner,
from the
liquor
fluid,
and
paint
(7th
Hubbard, 929 F.2d
310
v.
States
details were worked
final
After the
bar.
sentencing determi
Cir.1991).
review
We
out,
arrested.
Foutris was
affirm the
deferentially, and will
nations
con-
a storefront
located in
tavern is
The
are left
imposed unless we
with
sentence
A hard-
masonry
brick.
and
of
structed
that mistake
and firm conviction
“definite
liquids,
flammable
stocks
store that
ware
Boyer, 931 F.2d
committed.”
has been
thinner, turpentine, and
paint
paint,
as
such
McGuire,
v.
States
also United
See
adjoin-
located
accelerants, is
other
(7th Cir.1992);
315
F.2d
957
next
beauty shop
is a
building. There
(7th
Lewis,
1396
v.
F.2d
States
store,
five residential
and
to the hardware
Cir.1992).
apartments
The
shop.
over the
apartments
the tavern.
37.5 feet
are
applied by
2K1.4
The version.of §
in-
found that
court
The district
.Foutris
adjustments to
district
sets forth
court
destroy the
fire that would
a limited
tended
upon specific
level based
offense
the base
tavern,
but
fixtures
his
merchandise
characteristics,
de
which must be
offense
Nevertheless,
building.
not the
certainty. See
reasonable
termined
ensure, or
precautions
took no
Foutris
con
As the
Sentencing
2X1.1.
Guideline §
influence,
of
containment
significantly
out,
no
section was
points
this
currence
concluded
the district court
sen
when Foutris was
longer
effect
of
endangered the lives
others.
recklessly
the Guidelines
apply
are to
Courts
tenced.
intent,
the court
Foutris’
Regardless of
sentencing
time of
unless
in effect at the
steps
ensure that
found,
no
he took
Unit
clause is violated.
post
the ex
facto
endangered
be struck before
fire could
(7th
Bader,
956 F.2d
v.
ed States
firemen,
and residents of
passersby,
did
Cir.1992).
2K1.4
The amendment
found that
The court
nearby apartments.
case,
in this
Foutris’ sentence
affect
was
whom he
know with
“did not
Foutris
error. See
however,
ignore the
we shall
so
offense,
of this
planning
dealing in the
n. 2.
demonstrating
recklessness
infra
his
further
of his admonition
spite
to outcome
2K1.4(b)(2)
“If the
provided:
Section
damage
property
do
coconspirator
safety
endangered
recklessly
defendant
inside
property
fire to the
to limit the
Foutris
another,
by
levels.”
of
increase
building.” Transcript
is unwar
14-levelincrease
that the
argues
The
also stated
Hearing
court
at 38.
(1)
reasons:
for three
in this case
ranted
that an
reasonably assume
uncon-
it could
anyone
not find that
did
district court
expand
tavern “will
fire in a
trolled
no
endangered because
actually
was
regard to the intentions
spread without
set; (2)
specifically intended
Foutris
upon
at 39. Based
Id.
planner.”
its
fire; and
by the
endangered
no one be
Foutris
held that
findings, the district
contemplated
small fire
(3)
others,
endangered the lives
recklessly
tavern.
destroy only the inside
to would
pursuant
level
his offense
increased
the court
contends
government
21- The
received
2K1.4.
Guidelines §
potential seriousness
“the
properly noted
super-
sentence,
months
with 36
month
into
entered
that was
plot
of the criminal
release.
vised
defendant,”
Foutris we refined
reviewing
and sentenced
the standards for
de-
appropriately. Sentencing
2K1.4(b)(2).
Tr. at 33.
terminations under
We held
contemplated arson,
that the nature of the
court, Foutris, and the
The district
might aggravate
and factors that
its seri-
rely
upon the First Cir-
government
heavily
proper
are
ousness
considerations under
analysis
cuit’s
of 2K1.4 United States
2K1.4.
Cir.1990).
(1st
Medeiros,
In
was of similar construction. Radiative low, making heat transfer would have been Appeals, States Court likely it less than the norm that the Seventh Circuit. spread way would a fire indeed set —if April Argued 1992. wanted, whiskey with the alcohol in July Decided 1992. accelerant, and vodka principal as the had significant damage much of doing chance Rehearing En Banc Rehearing even the bar. closest to The residence Aug. Denied the bar was on of the hard- the other side Rehearing Sept. Denied store, ware could the time engulf leap hardware store
apartments, persons would been have
alerted. So the risk in Foutris’s plans We also note that the Notes or a injury dwelling; risk of death or vide that substantial structure other than a per- (3) firefighters emergency plus includes risk to 2 the offense level from 2F1.1 (Fraud Deceit) respond Id. if sonnel who to the fire. the offense was commit- 1164 unlikely to are about arson vate views guideline asserts “[t]he United States Aiken, 935 Brewer v. another’s. Cf. match of the defendant’s the time in effect at (7th Cir.1991)(concurring 850, F.2d 861-62 offense level a base sentencing contained opinion). guidelines read the no one 6”. Did changes in the Although some carefully? dangerous is arson How may crime date of the after the guidelines unoccupied? The record con- known be post facto ex under the problems create evidence, lawyers have tains no not, see 2K1.4 does clause, change in diametrically opposed, but presented their (7th Bader, F.2d 708 956 subject. ignorant, United States views on equally current ver- Cir.1992), only because if Fire Protection According to the National comes level of sion, Association, arsons of build- with base the facts for awith former version thing ings same are: recklessness, given plus 14 of 6 base age, this day our conclusion “[i]n structure —whether an urban arson of virtually a or commercial—is residential others.” endangerment of per .se reckless F.2d States v. in the figures those Uni- These exceed Cir.1992). (7th 46,- lists Reports, which Crime form § n of 2K1.4 version Under the former arsons in Crime 216 structural case, if easy Golden anything but an (1991), the FBI It obstacles put aside. illustrates arson, to be only blazes known counts uniform, sentences under predictable suspi- fires of the NFPA includes while guide- provisions guidelines. Many the difference does not origin. cious But tractable issues. knotty but present lines purposes. About for current matter “knowingly”? “In- act Did the defendant job annually. perish firefighters on possess tentionally”? Did 1990, only 44 of died in two One hundred How kilogram of cocaine? more than E. of a fire. Arthur at the scene in crime? Former partners about Washburn, Rita F. Paul R. LeBlanc & terms such as 2K1.4(b)(2) familiar uses Fahy, Fighter Fatalities Fire kind different presents a “recklessly” but “Sixteen (July/Aug.1991). NFPA Journal
