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United States v. John Doe
655 F.2d 920
9th Cir.
1981
Check Treatment

*1 case, California present applying In the govern involving

law to cause of action upon

fire land as to which California main jurisdiction further

tains concurrent would as well as proprietary

the state’s interests having claim fil

its varied interests in State,

ing applied. statutes Roberts v. See 844, (1974). Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. totally

This accomplished would be without

frustrating any policy program. federal

Furthermore, no uniform federal need for a

rule is indicated this case as in Clearfield States,

Trust Co. v. U.S. appro 87 L.Ed. 838

priate state law is neither “aberrational”

nor “hostile” to Unit federal interests. See Co.,

ed States v. Little Lake Misere Land

supra, U.S. at 2398.

Adding these considerations to a balance

which, above, already as discussed

weighted borrowing law favor of state

leads us to the conclusion that both the

suppression filing costs statute and claim adopted appropri

statutes should be as the

ate rules of decision in this case. As the government comply

federal failed filing requirements,

the claim dismissal was

proper.

AFFIRMED. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, DOE, Defendant-Appellant.

John

No. 79-1379. Appeals,

United States Court of

Ninth Circuit.

Argued Sept. and Submitted 1980.

Decided Nov. 1980.

As Jan. Corrected 1981.

As April Corrected *2 Bendich, Seattle, Wash., for

Judith E. defendant-appellant. conviction, Diskin, Seattle, ceeding. We affirm the but re- Atty.,

Jerry Asst. U. S. Wash., resentencing. plaintiff-appellee. mand for Background

I. Factual December Doe was On aboard *3 Seoul, Korea, flight an airline from to Seat- tle, Washington. accompanied by He was FLETCHER, Before Circuit SNEED drinking Richard Both had been dur- Roe.2 JAMESON,* Judges, Judge. District ing flight. flight Roe the While in offered bag a carry serviceman to a duffel $500 JAMESON, Judge: District through customs. This offer was overheard Doe,1 defendant-appellant, John passenger. another The serviceman ac- possession convicted of of heroin with in cepted upon landing in the offer and Seat- tent importation to distribute and of heroin. passed through tle a United States Customs primarily appeal The issues on this relate to checkpoint bag. Customs officers pretrial alleged respect errors with to the inflight had of the conversa- been informed suppression hearing sentencing pro- tion, however, and the the serviceman was * Jameson, The Honorable William Senior J. about which been set conviction [a] [had] Judge Act; pursuant United States District Montana, sitting by designation. for the District of aside” to the Youth Corrections X, Boy United States v. Indian 565 F.2d 585 major where the issue before this Pseudonyms 1. have been substituted for the juvenile appellant’s court was whether a mur- defendant-appellant names of and three other suppressed, der confession should have been persons opinion. named in the used, and fictitious names were ing not- Following filing original opinion, of the attempted throughout opin- that it had appellant opinion pseudonyms published moved the court that in the identity protect appellant ion to of the in appel- be substituted for Act; spirit Delinquency of the Juvenile Doe persons lant and the other therein named. This (D.Mont.1974) Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652 opinion motion was but the was with- and cases there cited. drawn and refiled as a memorandum and not to Supreme given implicit recog The Court has published. Government, be Counsel for the pseudonyms nition in to the use of the abortion pursuant 21(f), to Rule Rules of the United cases, Wade, 113,93 Roe v. 410 U.S. S.Ct. Circuit, Appeals States Court of then lished as an for the Ninth Bolton, (1973), 35 L.Ed.2d 147 and Doe v. requested pub- that the court’s decision be U.S. In S.Ct. opinion because of the issue re- Ullman, Poe v. garding allocution Government counsel at (1961), challenging the L.Ed.2d 989 two cases hearing, pseudonyms the time of and that the constitutionality pro statutes of Connecticut suggested by appellant for be made for hibiting contraceptive devices ’and protection appellant, the use serving of the who is a use, giving prison appellant in their joined of medical advice sentence. Counsel request. Supreme in the Court noted that the Court Errors requested approved Counsel were to inform the court of Connecticut had suit under ficti any precedent regard request of publish special to the “in the tious names the cases.” circumstances of opinion using pseudonyms. an Coun- 498 n. 1753 n.l. Id. sel have called attention to a number of cases factually While these cases are all distin- pseudonyms where have been used. While guishable, we conclude that an “unusual case” precisely point, they, these cases are not do presented. appellant serving long support pseudonyms the use of in this case. prison Both the and the sentence. Government recognize identity parties We that the appellant urge protection. the need for his In a action, criminal, civil or should not be corpus proceeding related habeas sealed, the file was case, except concealed in an unusual where parties agreeing and the court anonymity. there is a need for the cloak of appellant’s testimony government due as a however, necessary, protect Where it is witness, bodily he faced a risk of serious harm harassment, person injury, per- from ridicule or if his role on behalf of the Government embarrassment, permitted sonal courts have pseudo- other inmates. The use of disclosed See, pseudonyms. g., the use of e. nyms may prevent the dissemination of infor- Doe, (6th States v. prison respect appel- mation within the court, appellant’s where the in accordance with cooperation with the Government. lant’s motion, “changed style of the case to show appellant prevent ‘John Doe’ as in order to Pseudonym. unnecessary dissemination of information examination room stopped agents’ questions and taken to an answered the concerning bag inspector. inspection An participation importation in the heroin packages powder revealed ten of white agents scheme. The informed Doe that proved approximately which later to be they authority had no plea enter into a eight pounds of 92% heroin. When the bargain. serviceman observed the contents of the were transported Doe and Roe bag immediately implicated duffel Attorney’s United States office in Seattle. Roe, custody, who were taken into re- During inquired possible the ride Doe about room, secondary moved to a examination cooperated. Upon sentences for those who 3 rights. and advised of Miranda No their arrival Doe met with Assistant United

questioning place. took agreed Attorney coop- Sim. Doe Drug Enforcement Administration investigation erate the DEA’s *4 (DEA) primary was notified and took re- importation drugs scheme and to take the subsequent sponsibility investiga- for the up delivery. to San Francisco to set their Special Agent Boggs tion. When of the sup- Government witnesses testified at the DEA was custody took of Doe he informed pression hearing attempted that Doe ne- to by the Customs officers that Doe had been release, gotiate Roe’simmediate but did not interjected rights. advised of his Doe that ask for consideration of his own case. he attorney. Boggs wanted an told Doe he This was denied Doe who now contends then, question did not want to him to “sit part alleged agreement that as a of his tight get things straightened until we some Government would recommend a reduced out,” ques- and left the room. Doe was not sentence for him. request tioned. The for counsel was re- brought Doe was before a United States peated. Magistrate where he right waived his to an thereafter, Shortly Special Agent Snyder attorney, cooper- and indicated a desire to DEA, again advising after Doe of his ate with the authorities. He was released rights, constitutional asked Doe whether he custody agents to the of DEA and taken to willing cooperate was to in the DEA’s in- a motel room questioned where he was and vestigation smuggling drug scheme. plans delivery for of the heroin to the in- Doe did not demand to see an or recipients tended in California were dis- Rather, right exercise his to remain silent. story apparently changed cussed. While his before, prison stated that he had been in retelling, some in the it is admitted that he cooperation nothing, that meant and that cooperated respects. with the DEA in all nothing agent there was could do for plans to carry delivery out a controlled questioning him. No was carried out at agents aborted when became con- time, transported and Doe was to the cerned about the safety operation. Port of Seattle Police Office. Proceedings II. in District Court Approximately one-half hour later Doe In an indictment January returned on asked to talk to brought Roe. Roe was to charged Doe and Roe were with con- Doe and the two were allowed to confer spiring 841(a) to violate 21 U.S.C. § agents’ hearing. within the agents tes- possessing heroin with intent distribute suppression hearing tified at the that after (Count I), possession of heroin with intent Roe, talking agents Doe turned to the (Count II), importing to distribute and her- and stated that the heroin was his. Doe (Count III). oin making agents denied this statement. The (1) pretrial motions to dismiss advised Doe Doe filed requested that since he had an attorney, questioning no comply could occur until the indictment for failure to with a present. or, alternative, one was expressed plea bargain, Doe then in the an enforce cooperating (2) interest in in the DEA’s plea bargain; suppress investi- state- gation, waived his attorney, to an and agents airport; ments made to DEA at the Arizona, 3. Miranda v. (3) Alleged Agreement defendants’ Plea to sever the trials. Fol- iy. lowing evidentiary hearing February Doe that plea contends there was a motions were the three denied. e., agreement, exchange “that in i. trial, prior On March the court cooperation, charges dropped would be arguments regarding heard additional against Roe4 and the Government would alleged plea bargain and Doe’s motion to recommend sentence for Doe.”5 a reduced statements, rejected suppress offers of The Government contends that there was proof, again Doe’smotions. denied Af- plea agreement, calling no attention to case, ter the Government rested its the mo- testimony Assistant United States tion for At severance renewed. that Attorney sug- Doe “never once even that

time Doe se pro made a statement case, gested anything be done for his obligation” court that he had “moral always it was case.” Roe’s testify Roe, as a witness defense of support contention that there denying the court’s order severance plea agreement, was a attempted Doe “put[s] position forcing me in the tome testimony introduce the of his brother rela- stand, take the have a miscarriage tive to a conversation between justice the brother happening here.” The motion Agent Boggs. proof, In ah offer of again sever was denied. Doe was called stated, alia, counsel testify by for Roe. inter that the brother fully in- testify “Agent Boggs criminated himself and testified that would Roe had indi- *5 nothing knew of the heroin. Doe was ac- cooperation they cated that with John Doe’s quitted on I and found guilty Count on working agreement were an out with re- acquitted Counts II and III. Roe was on all gard disposition against of the case counts. Roe, they Mr. a recommending and regard reduced sentence John Doe.” 11, At sentencing hearing the on March rejected The court the proof offer of on the 1979, the request court refused a of the grounds hearsay that it was inadmissible prosecuting attorney to address the court. and that Federal Rule of Criminal Proce- imposed The court consecutive sentences of 11(e)(1) contemplates dure only that eight years II years on Count and seven government attorneys plea could enter into Count III. bargains.6 Appeal III. Contentions on bemay appellant’s there merit in appeal (1) Doe contends on that a While new testimony contention that of Doe’s evidentiary required hearing (a) because brother exception was admissible as an “improperly trial court excluded testi- the hearsay rule under Federal Rule mony plea relevant to the substance of the 801(d)(2XD)7 Evidence agreement”, and that the trial (b) he and was denied counsel during plea negotiations; (2) 11(e)(1) the trial court read Fed.R.Crim.P. too nar- abused refusing rowly, agree its discretion in appellant a sever- we cannot his ance; (3) proc- Doe was denied his the exclusion prejudiced due he was right ess sentencing hearing. to a fair testimony. brother’s recognizes 4. acting pro may engage that since Roe was found not when se in discus- guilty counts, aspect alleged on all reaching agree- sions with a view toward agreement is moot. ment. ... apparently 5. There no contention that the 801(d)(2)(D)provides: 7. Fed.R.Evid. agreement Government and Doe reached an hearsay A statement if is not .. . state- [t]he particular that a sentence would be recom- against party isment a a offered and is ... plead mended or that Doe ever offered to agent concerning statement his or servant guilty. scope agency a matter within the of his employment, during the made existence 11(e)(1) pertinent part: 6. Rule in reads relationship.... government and attorney for the defendant or the defendant Right that his brother’s to Counsel Appellant Y. The testimony would have shown that he was Appellant contends that was de plea engaged negotiations prived right of his Sixth Amendment accordingly were statements inadmissible when the Government elicited ad 11(e)(6), pro under which Fed.R.Crim.P. missions from him his repeated after re vides that evidence of “statements made quests for again counsel and when he with, plea connection and relevant to” a right upon waived to counsel in reliance guilty guilty plead or an offer to are “not promises unfulfilled made the Govern proceed civil or criminal admissible ment. Neither is supported by contention ing person against plea who made the 'the record. or offer.” See also Fed.R. of Evid. court, following This United States v. Rob Rodriguez- This court in United States v. ertson, 1356, 1366 (5 (en 1978) Gastelum, 1978) (en 569 F.2d 482 banc), adopted has a bifurcated test es banc), recognized Supreme Court admissibility tablish the of statements made has mandated se per not rule that would during assertedly plea negotia what are any possibility eliminate of a waiver tions: right suspect request to counsel after a has apply trial court must a two-tiered [t]he attorney. ed an The determination determine, first, analysis whether there an intelligent whether has been waiv subjective accused exhibited an actual ex- er of the depend upon counsel must pectation negotiate plea time at the particular facts circumstances of discussion, and, second, whether Zerbst, 458, each case. Johnson v. 304 U.S. expectation accused’s was reasonable 1019, 1023, 58 S.Ct. 82 L.Ed. 1461 given objective the totality of the circum- (1938); Williams, reiterated in Brewer v. stances. Pantohan, L.Ed.2d reh. U.S. 1979); Castillo, 857 Cir. United States v. per L.Ed.2d A se *6 878, 615 (9 F.2d 885 Cir. only rule “would serve to our handcuff law replete

While the is ref performance record enforcement in the officers of “plea bargaining”, erences to we find noth imprison suspect their duties and to ing to Doe pled show ever or offered to alleged his privileges.” constitutional Ro plead guilty. plea He engaged was not driguez-Gastelum, supra, at 488. negotiations, but was attempting rather to Doe was advised of Miran- repeatedly his exculpate himself, by inculpating Roe mak rights da questioned prior and he was not to ing the best of a by cooperat bad situation meeting Following his with Roe. that ing in investigation.8 the DEA At most he meeting cooperate he a indicated desire to claimed exchange coopera that that investigation in the DEA and waived his tion the agreed Government to recommend right to counsel. From our review a reduced Assuming sentence. that we record are satisfied that the district agreement made, was there is no evidence properly held that his waiver was of the Government’s failure to comply “knowingly intelligently” and made. promise its to recommend sen reduced infra, Appellant ap- he argues tence. As discussed next that when court at peared his sentencing magistrate time of before the he waived right denied the of right that Government counsel to allocute im to counsel in reliance his belief and in posing apparently disregarded bargain sentence evi he plea had reached a dence of Doe’s cooperation. Attorney, United States and was induced to assuming, arguendo, closing argument complete that 8. Even all of the state- contained a con- contemplated bargain plea guilt. Any ments and were of fession admission made to he 11(e)(6), agents excludable under Rule Doe was not DEA in advance of did not affect trial prejudiced by finding guilt. their admission. his trial tes- fully timony he incriminated himself. Likewise 926 discretion to sever.” United attorney court’s States representations that an

do so Brashier, 1315, (9 548 1323 investigation. The v. F.2d down the would slow 1111, denied, Attorney testified cert. 97 S.Ct. Assistant United States reached, (1977). Appellant’s he ever that had 51 L.Ed.2d 565 that no deal was demonstrating prejudice Govern- rejected burden a dif Doe’s demand one, Roe, judge’s ruling made will that he no ficult a trial ment release rarely on review. United be disturbed to Doe that representation Campanale, F.2d at 359. investigation. DEA v. 518 down the would slow did tell Doe agent Boggs testified that he denial of his Appellant contends that the not counsel his election to have would posi- him in the placed motion for severance investigation, that he did speed up the but exercising his Fifth Amend- of either tion appeared had before the so Doe only after taking or right silent ment remain right to counsel. magistrate and waived his necessary provide to ex- stand to evidence Thus, possible existence extent words, culpate Roe. In other factors on the impact of either these forcing obliga- him his “moral to honor of Doe’s waiver voluntariness testify tion” to of his co-defend- on behalf credibility. question is a compelled him tes- unconstitutionally ant judge opportunity trial had observe tify against himself. credibility assess the of the witnesses. Clearly compelled not Doe was hearing testimony After he concluded testify. It is settled that a defendant well voluntary, that Doe’s waiver was and that may not call a witness co-defendant agreement. Those con- plea there was no stand, Gay, 567 F.2d at United States supported by clusions are the record.9 918; Roberts, United States v. Trials VI. Severance denied, 600 Cir. cert. U.S. are, charged jointly Co-defendants (1975). Roe L.Ed.2d 811 facie, prima jointly to be tried. Fed.R. provide compel Doe to powerless 8; Gay, United States v. Crim.P. his behalf. Doe’s exculpatory evidence on Cir.) cert. U.S. so to do was his own decision. election grant- had been If the severance motion un granting or denial of a severance trial ed, effectively could of course exercise within der Fed.R.Crim.P. is a matter right to at his remain silent own trial the trial court’s discretion and reversal give testimony in exculpatory the trial if appropriate only an abuse of discretion own only of Roe in the event his trial was Campa has been shown. United States *7 first, If held first. Roe’s trial held 352, nale, (9 518 F.2d 359 cert. exculpatory testimony Doe’s could be used 777, denied, 1050, 423 U.S. 96 S.Ct. 46 against him at own trial. In his other 950, denied, L.Ed.2d 638 reh. 424 U.S. 96 words, any prejudice joint from claim of a 1422, (1976), citing 47 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 356 upon was in effect conditioned his own trial 511, States, Schaffer v. United 362 U.S. 80 being held first. trial 945, (1960). The de 4 L.Ed.2d 921 S.Ct. Gay, joint supra, a must that a trial In United fendant demonstrate States give testimony it out at a manifestly prejudicial “so co-defendant offered to judicial defendants which weighs separate the dominant trial of concern defendants, compels exculpate but economy and the exercise the would event, appears any prejudice If it that a defendant or the from In no flowed Doe’s joinder during appearance government prejudiced a of of- waiver of counsel his before magistrate. in an or None fenses or of defendants indictment of the statements he joinder subsequently cooperating made or such for trial to- while information gether, attempt may DEA’s to send heroin to its intend- order an election or court counts, recipients grant against separate him at a ed offered trial. trials of severance provide or relief defendants whatever other justice requires... provides: . 14 10. Fed.R.Crim.P.

927 offer expressly opportunity of the co-defendant was speak to on behalf of the based on the condition that he be tried defendant and shall address the defend- before the defendants. The court affirmed personally ant and ask him if he wishes to motion, noting the denial of the severance make a statement in his own behalf and simply the trial court refused to allow present any mitigation information in games” the defendants “play grant punishment. for the any any rights they of the defendants equivalent Government shall have an op- “would enjoyed joint not have but for the portunity speak to the court. indictment.” 567 F.2d at 920-21. The ef The Government concedes that “the trial though fect here is the same even no condi strictly court did not comply provi- expressed. tional offer was may While it 32, sions of Rule ... in that he denied proper be in some circumstances to allow a counsel for the Government an opportunity separate prior trial of a defendant so that prior to allocute pronouncing sen- might provide exculpatory testimony for 11 tence,” but that Doe cannot now co-defendant, it was not an abuse of dis complain object because he did not cretion for the deny court to the motion in procedure joint case. The and in preju preju- trial was event was not not “so dicial require ... as to diced. the exercise of [the judge’s]

trial only way, discretion in one Initially recognize we that a trial 919; ordering separate trial.... Id. at judge has a determining wide discretion in States, 1193, 1194 Parker v. United 404 F.2d (9 denied, imposed the sentence to 1004, may cert. be 394 con U.S. 89 1602, 782, S.Ct. 22 sider relevant per L.Ed.2d reh. facts in the defendant’s 395 York, U.S. history. S.Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d 460 sonal Williams v. New (1969). 241, 246-47, 1079, 1082-83, U.S. (1949); L.Ed. 1337 United States v. Beec Sentencing Hearing

VII. roft, 1979). 608 F.2d 762 Cir. Never theless, justice Appellant if is to contends that he be done the sentenc was denied process right ing judge due sentencing to a fair should know all of the facts. hearing because States, counsel for the Harris Govern- v. United 166- allocute, ment was denied con- trary 32(a)(1), to Fed.R.Crim.P. and that To that judge required end the “is to listen the trial court acted on misinformation and give and to serious consideration to any

conjecture. information mitigation pun material Malcolm, ishment.” United States v. 32(a)(1) Fed.R.Crim.P. initially promul- as appellate 819 Cir. While gated was designed to allow the defendant little, power courts have if any, to review to address the prior sentencing. sentences, appropriateness legal they the rule was amended and now ex- pressly provides prosecution duty do have a “to rudimentary insure that right to address the court before proc sentence is notions of fairness are observed in the imposed. It reads: ess which the sentence is determined.” Espinoza,

Sentence shall imposed be without un- *8 delay. reasonable imposing Before sen- This includes concern for “the tence the court shall afford probable counsel an accuracy of the informational in- beginning sentencing proceed- 11. At the the information that can be made available to ings Attorney Assistant United States Diskin it. requested permission to make a statement. In THE COURT: Well I think I have as much denying request, following colloquy the the oc- do, you information as Counsel. curred: respectfully MR. DISKIN: I submit there is thing you THE COURT: I don’t one think I have to don’t know. hear you, any says do I? Is there rule that I THE do? COURT: Well I don’t want to hear you MR. I any DISKIN: think Rule 32 indicates from that case. the Court should take into all consideration 928 accused ment and favorable the sentencing process.” the United

puts in Weston, the sen- presented F.2d 634 Cir. to the court and that 448 92 or cert. 404 U.S. S.Ct. of fact tence is not based mistakes 818; cit- faulty 432 information.” ing Brady Maryland, notes, true, It is as the Government 1194, 1196-97, (1963).17 L.Ed.2d Doe extend that both and his made Bar Stan- Association See also American sentencing, admit prior ed statements dards, Proce- Sentencing Alternatives convictions, prior recogniz ting felony six dures, 32(a)(1) con- 5.3(d)(ii) (1968). Rule § prison proper,12 but ing that a sentence attor- templates that the statement coop leniency by reason of Doe’s requesting infor- ney include for the Government shall clear, with eration the Government. It is well as to the accused as mation however, favorable accept did not the that the court to the Government. statements Doe or his counsel relative cooperation During the Doe’s DEA. not apparently does The Government Doe, colloquy the between the court and the question obligation part on the this repeatedly he did believe court said that not not Doe was prosecutor, but that particular, In the Doe.13 record indicates the “unlikely it is that prejudiced because questioned that the statements made court have been allocution would Government’s by both and his counsel relative to the course, true, helpful It is to Doe.” Mrs. and a Mr. involvement of a Smith what the does not disclose record principal drug as the Jones dealers and attorney said in his Government would have Any questions distributors.16 which the might have or what answers he statement might respect court have entertained with regarding coopera- questions made to Doe’s DEA, cooperation to Doe’s tion, including information he furnished Jones, involvement of Mrs. Smith Mr. respect to the involvement Smith and information Doe furnished the DEA possible and Jones. It is that his statement regarding Smith and Jones could have been would have contradicted the statements by prosecuting attorney. clarified In attorney. made and his The reverse by Doe fact, prosecuting the statement of the at might have true. The statement also torney might well have been in view critical coopera- Doe’s claim extensive verified of the court’s distrust of the state obvious continuing includ- investigation, tion in the ments made Doe and counsel. ing that he had informa- the fact furnished Malcolm, supra, United States v. leading tion to the identification of Smith that, recognized impor- “One of drug principal dealers. and Jones as prosecutor upon tant functions of the con- circumstances we are sentence is make sure that informa- Under all possession per- have punish- tion in his material the trial court should vinced that Pseudonym. support 15. 12. The record does not the Govern- attorney ment’s contention that “Doe’s even suggested very sentences which were re- 16. Counsel stated to the court that information suggest ceived.” did Doe’s a sentence of Mrs. furnished Doe led to the indictment eight years, of seven or posed but the im- sentences Appellant’s brief states that subse- Smith. years. for the counts totaled two quent to Doe’s trial indictments were returned recognized Doe and against his counsel not both Smith and Jones. This is impose court could years a maximum sentence of 30 questioned in the Government’s brief. argued on the two counts and that Doe portion would have to serve a substantial corollary in Malcolm is a The rationale imposed. sentence court, long recognized by principle, a defendant has to a sentence point 13. At one the court said: information. untainted false unreliable your cooperation “... I what don’t care was. See, Weston, supra, g., States v. e. It makes I no difference me. believe don’t States, 628-633; *9 F.2d Farrow v. United you.” (9 1358-59 Cir. Pseudonym. rejecting coop- questioning and all claims of attorney to make mitted Government given might mitigate punishment. and requested statement eration which his verify either opportunity appearance an of fair- Government We conclude presented by Doe dispute the statements by remand to ness would best be served obviously reject- which were and his counsel judge. Though may there be another some that a re- ed the court. We conclude effort, sentencing duplication of a new sentencing hearing new and mand for a resen- hearing required will be whether the express no resentencing required. are We assigned original judge or tencing is to the propriety of sentence opinion on the judge. We do not believe resentenc- a new might imposed. which be judge entail waste ing by another would proportion to the duplication out of the case Appellant fair- gain preserving appearance in judge. be remanded to a different should ness. in two recently recognized This court has Arnett, cases, v. appellant conviction of is affirmed. The and United States vacated, sentence is and the case Ferguson, 624 F.2d 81 for to the district court resen- remanded bias, remand to a proof personal absent tencing by judge. a new judge for “unusual circum new is reserved must be considered stances.” Three criteria SNEED, Judge, dissenting: Circuit determining whether those circumstances motion, with the original judge appellant’s On present: (1) are whether the concurrence, majority has expected put government’s out of reasonably could be appel- pseudonym views or find previously expressed agreed his mind to substitute opinion. found to be ings subsequently throughout that were our lant’s true name erroneous; (2) reassignment is ad necessary whether claims this is appellant appearance jus preserve visable to prison for him from retaliation in protect tice; (3) reassignment whether would which government, cooperation his of effort out of duplication entail waste or opinion. It is from this in our described preserving proportion gain realized in I dissent. pseudonym that substitution of a appearance of fairness. United States should be proceedings Generally court Ferguson, 624 F.2d at 83-84. public when so conducted conducted in concluded that the Ferguson In the court for not normally justification no there is when district court had abused its discretion opinion par- reflecting any appellate sentencing probation a defendant in a revo- proceeding they as were known in ties hearing. respect to the first cation With regarded be To do otherwise must below. above, tripartite factor in the test set out strong tradition departure from the as the court said: limited and should be publicity in the courts judge Because the district created the Des- Doe v. to the “unusual case.” See error in this case and because was so he (D.Mont.1974) champs, 64 F.R.D. in his refusal to take account of adamant court). this is not my view (three-judge circumstances, mitigating we cannot rea- appellant made his a case. Here the such now be sonably conclude that he would government and now arrangement with the previous errors out of his put able to conse- predictable seeks to avoid one resentencing Or mind in this defendant. cooperation. Whatever its quences of his overreach in favor of the may tend to not include arrangement did structure that past defendant in an effort to correct nor would it bind anonymity, assurances mistakes. if had. We should decline this court it of tools judge government’s storehouse 624 F.2d at 83. Here too the created add to the cooperation of procure the refusing permit Government with which to the error in when to do so and informants requested counsel to make the allocution witnesses of the courts. compromises openness statement. The court was adamant *10 930 in a greater all the hesitancy should be

Our America, anonymity Appellee, one in which case such as this of STATES UNITED is of dubious effectiveness. this late date v. reason, LINTON,

Beyond arguments Appellant. the based Lee the authorizes no statute or federal rule America, Appellee, of STATES UNITED majority. No re- practice approved by the v. approves I am aware ported case of which WEBBE, Appellant. similar to these practice of such a on facts Sorkis J. in which the procedural posture or in the America, Appellee, STATES of UNITED to us.1 We should appellant’s motion came v. lay not the foundation here. KENNEDY, Appellant. Fred L. America, Appellee, of STATES

UNITED v. TINDELL, Appellant.

Robert C. America, Appellee, UNITED STATES v. CORP., Appellant.

ALADDIN HOTEL America, Appellee, UNITED STATES PIOTROWSKI, Appellant. Dennis by parties, government, by pseudonym 1. Of the cases cited to us ated with the for majority vast security.” concerned in instances which an “reasons of Id. at 90. The court did onymity rights closely very was connected to the elaborate, plaintiff not but the marital tie to the by party requesting asserted it. may under the circumstances of the case have plaintiffs required these cases the to re more, been sufficient reason. Without Civiletti personal veal information of an intimate and provide appellant. should no aid to nature in order to vindicate constitutional or X, Boy In United States v. Indian statutory rights grounded protection in the (9th 1977), 585 Cir. cert. See, privacy. g., Deschamps, supra, e. Doe v. (1978), this court logic and cases cited therein. There is some appellant pseudonym. did allow the to use a cooperating ity provide anonymity public when However, appellant challenging was very injury litigant would inflict the juvenile delinquency conviction for and the seeks to avoid resort to the courts. The grounded protect court tity its decision to the iden practice providing pseudonyms should be juvenile “spirit in the of the Juvenile only rarely. extended to other situations See Delinquency Act.” Id. at 587 n.4. No similar University Southern Methodist Association of statutory policy appellant’s favors the case Jaffe, Wynne Women Law Students v. & 599 Bar, Finally, F.Supp. here. Doe v. State (5th 1979); Lindsey F.2d Dayton-Hudson 712-13 Cir. aff’d, (9th (N.D.Cal.1976), Cir. Corp., 592 F.2d enjoin disciplinary proceed was a suit to (10th ings against attorney. plaintiff parties The other cases cited are dis- anonymity allowed to maintain his in state tinguishable Civiletti, from this one. In Doe v. proceedings commencing court before his fed (2d plaintiff sought 635 F.2d 88 Although eral action. pseudonym the district used a government’s reinstatement in the Witness Program, plaintiff opinion, Protection in its it ex authorized V Title Organized pressed “great Crime Control Act of Pub. disfavor” with which it L.No.91-452, 933, reprint- practice expressly §§ 84 Stat. viewed the declined to is, p. ed in 18 U.S.C. at There question light disposition. address the of its again, logic providing anonymity once some Id. at n. 1. anonymity closely when connected to the persuades None of these cases me that we statutory sought claim to be While vindicated. appellant should extend to the the shroud of government might appellant have enrolled anonymity deny ordinary that we would to the here, Program in the Witness Protection it did litigant in federal court. not do so. The court in Civiletti also referred husband, plaintiffs cooper- who had also

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. John Doe
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Apr 2, 1981
Citation: 655 F.2d 920
Docket Number: 79-1379
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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