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United States v. John Charles Flaherty
76 F.3d 967
8th Cir.
1996
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*1 enjoyed eighty-year history in the To tution has of a instead Governor. Board member System.5 agency con- of the this new the statute conform to the Governor prior references figuration, principles statutory construc- If normal deleted, that had including one needed to be applied, it is obvious to me that the tion are of the PCAs’ the last sentence added to change intended the 1985 technical § 2.17 of the 1971 exemption provision, tax not be construed as hav- amendments should However, simply than delete rather Act. extraordinary substantive effect ing the Governor, Congress de- this reference urged by appellee PCAs PCAs. Because §of 2.17. See two sentences leted the last exemption and local taxa- had no from state 205(e)(16), 99-205, § 99 Stat. Pub.L. No. (other than tion before the 1985 amendment remained, (1985). mi- What obligations), they exemption for their statutory changes,4 subsequent nor exemption should have no under the statute in obligations quoted exemption for tax PCA amended, § But this as U.S.C. 2077. opinion, now codified court’s footnote of the otherwise, adhering my concludes —in § 2077. at 12 U.S.C. blindly express “no waiver” dicta view —to express implied con- amendment deleted earlier cases that discussed the This 1985 granted immunity. illogi- to a PCA This is stitutional decision exemption that cal, rule, long contrary overriding the PCA was for so and it is and its income statutory Commit- grounded The relevant constitutional and Government-owned. merely defining a techni- principles, this as the extent of federal Report tee described 28-29, H.R.Rep. instrumentality quintessen- 425 at change. immunity No. tax is a cal See Although Accordingly, more I tially legislative at 2615. task. dissent. 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. was de- reference to the Governor than the

leted, explanation since there logical that is a eligible in 1985 publicly-owned no PCAs But this enjoy exemption. the deleted seemingly innocu- construed a

court has now STATES, Appellant, UNITED as instead confer- ous technical amendment immunity grant ring implied of blanket In other and local taxation. from state FLAHERTY, Appellee. John Charles

words, repeal of a the court construes No. 95-1874. express exemption, for which no PCA limited Appeals, grant of a far eligible, as the United States Court remained Indeed, depend- implied exemption. Eighth Circuit. broader applies opaque dictum ing upon how one Nov. Submitted Mary- paragraph of the last McCulloch 27, 1996. Decided Feb. (4 Wheat.) land, effect of exempt from be to PCAs this decision taxes, property an ex-

state and local real insti-

emption than Farm Credit broader 4. This section was reenacted 5. The court creates this been Chairman of culture in 1985: Credit Act of 101 Stat. taxes on standing Representatives Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska. colloquy prevented given property specific authority between although the House Committee on and the Member who Pub.L. owned doing a Member of the House local uncertainty despite a No. so? Is governments [PCAs], 100-233, levy property Agricultural your they under- Agri- are Although postenactment needed taxation. So islators ing islative support ment. Credit inform that is the certainly Mr. De La Garza. Cong.Rec. [1985] System intent, are not clarify consistent with my interpretation conference. gentlewoman from Nebraska that banks, advice of our this farther the House H 462 usually colloquy are technical amendment PCAs, (daily reliable indicators views of Mr. subject in 1988 was consider- my understanding like ed. Feb. of the 1985 legal Speaker, quite persuasive all other Farm individual real counsel 23, 1988). property I would amend- leg- leg- *2 support the was insufficient affirm. jury’s We verdict. Long Shop in Hamburger and

Eddy’s Malt Lake, operated owned and which was deliberately destroyed by two Flaherty, was *3 two approximately that occurred set fires 31, 1988, fire apart. On December weeks at the responded put out a fire department multiple found investigation An restaurant. liquid of a acceler- origin, evidence points of consisting ant, of the remains “trailers” and that restroom roller towels commercial carefully draped one fire loca had been was no evidence of other. There tion to been locked. entry, and all doors had forced investigator concluded The fire marshal intentionally. On Janu been set the fire had out at the fire ary 1989 second broke investigation uncovered ev That restaurant. liquids flammable idence that There throughout restaurant. poured entry. The fire mar forced no sign was had also been that this fire shal determined deliberately set. investigation,

After extensive by a Melina were indicted Gregory Lee and charged two counts and each with grand jury arson, in abetting violation aiding and 844(i) count of §§ and and one 18 U.S.C. arson, in violation to commit conspiracy Minnesota, ar- Minneapolis, Engh, Paul C. 844(i). pleaded Both § 18 U.S.C. gued, appellant. for jury. Flah- to trial before guilty went and Attorney, U.S. Margaret Magill, Assistant fires, but Melina erty for both was convicted Minnesota, argued, appellee. for Minneapolis, only of involvement convicted sepa- second, appeal proceeding his and GIBSON, HANSEN, R. JOHN Before rately. MURPHY, Judges. Circuit Flah- suggested trial The evidence and set financial trouble erty in severe MURPHY, Judge. Circuit DIANA E. which proceeds, insurance fires collect Flaherty appeals his convic- Charles John with Melina. promised to share he abetting aiding counts on two person- tion significant business had incurred concurrent restaurant, he received for which his arson which al debts. years supervised three income, a cash generating month sentences and was not source dis- appeal he expenses. On release. to cover flow sufficient nontestify- employ- admitting a his court1 erred taxes withheld from paid trict significant state violation owed the ing wages, and he codefendant’s ees’ States, compensation. unemployment Bruton v. United amounts venture, (1968), denying addition, his second business L.Ed.2d nightclub across severance, excluding development of a teen evi- motion for weeks In the Eddy’s, had failed. party third street from that a tending to show dence fire, Flaherty learned first prior to He also claims the fires. might have set Minnesota. Judge District of for the District Kyle, H. The Honorable Richard significant expenses restaurant, paid would have to be police but suspicious became building open before the could because sign entry there was no of forced city permit applica- council had denied his damage and no reported done. He also re- tions. ceiving threatening phone call about his club, night involvement in police the teen suggested The evidence also scripts later found several for the call on the had an opportunity to set or aid in setting nightclub premises diary entry by and a early fires. He closed the restaurant Flaherty identifying “phony the call as a day of the first fire. He entertained harassment call.” guests evening, at his home in the but there guests was evidence to show that he left his linking There was also nearly shortly two hours before the parties stipulated Melina. The *4 night was discovered. The other, of the second fire two knew each having met in the late alibi; Flaherty had an he was in early Sorenson, bed recover- 1970’sor Liz 1980’s. Flaher- ing repair surgery ty’s hernia that he employee had friend and an Eddy’s, at testi- undergone that afternoon. timing The of Flaherty fied that had used telephone her surgery suspicious, was shown be howev- several times to contact someone named Flaherty er. had others Greg told that his doctor and that telephone had she received told him operation day. to have the on that Flaherty calls for from someone who identi- The doctor testified at trial that he had told fied himself as Greg. She also testified that Flaherty surgery could be scheduled during the time between the fires she had will and that Flaherty had called on January accompanied Flaherty looking when he was later, 10 to surgery days schedule the for two matching someone description. Melina’s day of addition, the fire. a chalkboard found Melina’s basement had of drawing an traces accurate physical There was evidence to link Flah- Eddy’s. of erty Analysis to the fire scene. of the towel- ing material used as trailer in a the first appeal Flaherty On argues that his Sixth revealed that it had been soaked with right a Amendment to confrontation was violat petroleum medium distillate similar to miner- ed the admission of certain out-of-court spirits. al spirits Mineral and scraps burned by Melina, statements made who did not of similar toweling were found testify inside a and thus was not available for cross locked building area of the that had been examination. claims that the state leased Only for the teen nightclub. Flaherty ments him incriminated in violation of Bru Gestach, and Tom partner his States, business in the ton v. nightclub, keys. had police The also recov- 20 L.Ed.2d 476 ered a half-roll of toweling similar from separate Three statements were involved. nightclub. fire, After the second First, statements made Melina at depo- a give up nightclub decided to on the venture. sition in a related civil case were admitted When he and removing Gestach were con- into evidence. They concerned his contacts tents from building, they uncovered a Flaherty. Shillingstad, Hal the attor- pile toweling of that had ripped into ney deposition, who took the testified that strips similar to the trailers. at- Melina had told “I Johnny him ain’t seen tempted to conceal the of existence these since and I’ve seen him one time back toweling strips. He placed bag them a maybe in ’84. That was the last time I seen carry convinced Gestach it to a dump- him,” him, and “when I knew he drove a ster nearby Burger at a King. He told white, I Cadillac, think it was a white Cad- Gestach being that he was framed. (T. 918-20). illac something_” or Flah- jury also heard suggest- evidence that erty argues that is incriminating this if com- Flaherty may ed attempted have to divert bined testimony with the of wife suspicion away by falsely from himself they re- had owned a white Cadillac be- porting burglaries mysterious threats September tween 1988 and March April period over a of time before the fires 1989. He pieces the two set. reported string burglaries a evidence show that he and Melina had seen in, 20). brought was Second, When fire. the time near other each testimony ... that “the instructed jury threats was about Westergaard testified Heather testimony is Melina’s respect to Mr. telephone conversa- with during a by Melina made against him and him or as to inquired about admissible After she April tion in any charges respect to John, used with Melina is not to be named man to a his connection did Flaherty.”2 Mr. against business butt out if I didn’t “told me objection the statements Bruton going to any he raise asking stop questions, ass, testimony Westergaard he called fucking my kick described come and object going He was he agent, cunt. ATF but did and a and the stupid bitch ame (T. boyfriend’s hearsay. ass.” my my ass and kick the Bureau agent from Finally, an evidence, the (ATF) of all the testi- At the close Alcohol, Firearms Tobacco and conspiracy he had drawn court dismissed him that Melina told fied chalkboard, de- insufficient evidence. charge but on basis diagram found on Instead, opportu time, Flaherty given Melina Eddy’s. At was of nied that concerns, chose Bruton drawing any the board nity raise “said did Mound, which “he counsel stated he do so. His Minnesota” not to bank (T. rob.” planned to individual admitted another believe *5 974). an instruction and that he believed mistrial state jury Melina’s directing to consider the Bruton objec- a Flaherty raised Although sufficient.3 himself would be only as to ments trial, he did at the statements to one of tion admitted Although some evidence issue the through to ensure follow not conspiracy, that evidence proof of a pending objected to the admis- he When preserved. Flaherty. The by made statements involved statement, deposition Melina’s sion of objected to on Bruton now statements three testimony con- argued that that government conclusion made after the were grounds exculpatory statements only false tained and admitted charged conspiracy were party. The implicate either directly did not instructions, they cautionary trial with the Bru- agreed and overruled conditionally. not received were to parties but then asked ton objection, Bruton any problem, mention did not Flaher- proffered evidence. about the confer He requested. relief he gave him the now statements agreed to the use ty jury of the object the content to did not (Tr. 900-01), object did not challenged, of the trial.4 (Tr. given at close instructions 918- introduced. they time at the so, analyze what you you do should When requested the instruction lawyer 2. Melina's respect to case shows with by evidence deposition given. statement A be defendant, leaving time, out of consider- and Melina’s individual the same was admitted against solely any admitted objection it. related to ation lawyer raised a Bruton given limiting be defendant. other requested that a instruction He Flaherty and Meli- depositions both about na. been has certain circumstances In particular concerning only defen- a admitted inquiry about response district court's In purpose and not only particular a or for dant conspiracy count would dismissal all or against for generally both defendants mistrial, lawyer Flaherty’s request a for lead to purposes. replied: evi- purpose which this for the limited For of the relative case because in this I think may give you it such received has been dence appro- is not quanta that mistrial of evidence not, may you You weight feel it deserves. problem can be remedied priate, and any pur- however, other use this instructions, I cautionary which by sufficient specifically party not against any pose other I've said time ever is the first believe mentioned. seeking I've a mistrial. years. And we not are addition, by a defendant made mistrial, seeking a if he Mr. asked defendant presence of the other out either. want a mistrial he does not regard by you only with to be considered to (Tr. at to and are making the statement defendant regard to the other by you with deliberating, jury was instructed: considered be to 4. Prior personal separate defendant. duty give your It is 102, 104-05). (Jury Tr. Instruction each individual. case of consideration appears It thus from the record that Jones, Flaher- States v. 965 F.2d ty right pursue objec- waived the a Bruton Cir.), denied, cert. 506 U.S. appeal. tion on 121 L.Ed.2d 261 If Meli- considered, na’s statements are not gov assuming Even prop issue was evidence, ernment’s including evidence of erly preserved however, appeal, we are motive, opportunity, connection to persuaded Bruton violation oc Melina, suspicious behavior, and false state curred. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment ments, is sufficient support Flaherty’s ar right of confrontation is violated when non- son convictions. testifying codefendant’s confession incrimi nates the defendant is introduced at also that his case trial, joint jury their if the even is instructed should not have joined with Melina’s only against consider the confession and that the district court’s denial of his Bruton, 136-136, codefendant. 391 U.S. at motion to sever was an abuse of discretion. not, S.Ct. at 1627-1628. Bruton does prejudiced claims he was joinder however, require the exclusion of all state jury because it allowed the to hear Melina’s ments made a codefendant. If a eode out-of-court statements. This is essentially fendant’s does not confession incriminate the the same as argument, his Bruton and we face, defendant on its but does so when reject it for similar explained reasons. As evidence, linked to additional be ad above, the statements complains that he mitted if a limiting given instruction is actually were not incriminating against him jury and the name is defendant’s redacted and were prejudicial therefore not to his Marsh, the confession. Richardson v. case. Rimell, See United 200, 211, 1702, 1709, Cir.), denied, cert. *6 (1987). L.Ed.2d 176 Bruton apply does not -, 453, (1994) 115 S.Ct. 130 L.Ed.2d 362 all if the eodefendant’s statement does not (defendant joinder must show resulted in Escobar, incriminate the defendant. U.S. v. “severe or compelling prejudice”). More Cir.1995). 50 F.3d over, Flaherty does not demonstrate that the jury was unable compartmentalize Here, the evi the made Me dence as it related to the lina codefendants. Flaherty do not incriminate on See their face, Agofsky, 866, United States v. 20 or even F.3d when linked to other 871 — (8th Cir.), denied, cert. -, They received at the trial. do U.S. 115 not refer to 280, (1994). charged 130 crimes at all. L.Ed.2d deposi 196 Melina’s The fact statements, jury tion that if did even linked to Mrs. not convict Flah both defendants erty’s testimony about when both couple counts is ability evidence of its Cadillac, analyze owned the show distinguish Melina the evidence as to had seen sometime near the time of each. In this case limiting instructions the fire. threatening Melina’s statements to were any sufficient to cure prejudice. risk of Westergaard may suggest that he did States, not 534, United 537- Zafiro questions want to answer about his 538, involve 933, 937, 113 S.Ct. 122 L.Ed.2d 317 “John,” ment with someone named (1993). but did The district court did not abuse its implicate Flaherty in arson. Similarly, discretion. Melina’s false statement to the agent ATF also deprived he was that the diagram blackboard was a bank he rights present his a defense and to due rob, planned to shows that Melina will was process because the district court excluded ing to lie diagram, about the but does not concerning the possible culpability implicate Flaherty. Melina’s statements are of a party. third evasive, false, claimed that threatening, but not in T.E.H., high school student who was criminating. Eddy’s

former employee and a friend of Moreover, any son, error in Flaherty’s Brady, admission had set a fire in Bra- of Melina’s statements was dy’s harmless. See school locker on October of arson. offense court, of the merce element in state charged with arson was T.E.H. 844(i) subject requires During her U.S.C. charge dismissed. but the in used interstate being property was trial, mentioned Mrs. testimony at agreed at parties The Brady’s foreign in commerce. a fire started that someone jury be instructed not at- should trial that she did but in October locker its burden meet government culprit. “[t]he identify tempt to by dem- of the offense element proving this trial, lawyer his Flaherty’s the end Near to heat gas used onstrating the dis- copy of attempted to introduce the State supplied outside building was prove complaint to state court missed Minnesota,” they stipulated hoped to He fire. locker set T.E.H. ... natu- Eddy’s heated with “was facts responsi- that T.E.H. an inference create from sources outside purchased gas ... ral Eddy’s, and he indicated the fires ble for Flaherty did ... of Minnesota.” of the State eyewit- to produce able might that he be or raise jury instruction object fire, sure. he was not but to the locker ness proof of an government’s regarding issue objected to the offer government The judgment in motions nexus interstate would be inadmissible ground gov- that the asserts acquittal. now 404(b) and of Evidence Federal Rules under a substantial show ernment was the ob- sustained the district building and inter- between the connection jection.5 v. Lo- States commerce, United citing state to sub is not our task appeal On — -, 115 S.Ct. pez, district that of judgment our stitute L.Ed.2d 626 its court, to determine instead but in raise Flaherty’s failure discre of its ruling was an abuse evidentiary issue commerce (8th terstate Ahrens, King v. tion. issue, jury a waiver resulted in the rec Cir.1994). review a careful After the one trial mirrors given at instruction did district court ord, we conclude Ryan, upheld in this case. its discretion not abuse denied, cert. Cir.1994) (en banc), proffered value of the probative 131 L.Ed.2d U.S.-, ruling time of its At the slight. to facts sufficient (1995). Flaherty stipulated proof; offer only a weak lawyer had made Ryan *7 described the burden to meet charge and arson only a dismissed he had on our Based by stipulation. bound eyewitness an uncertain find no clear error. we the record no review He had located. fire could be school Jennings, 12 F.3d v. States at United fires linking T.E.H. evidence other Montanye, v. (8th Cir.1994); start Moreover, were not the fires Eddy’s. banc). Cir.1993) (en (8th 190, 192 F.2d fire was The locker manner. in a similar ed at while the a match simply lit with waived, we had not been issue Even if the origin. We sophisticated of more Eddy’s was Lopez would apply. persuaded are not error occurred that no reversible conclude held that Supreme Court In that case government’s the court sustained when authority under its had exceeded Congress objection.6 Rule 403 it enacted when Clause Commerce Act, 18 U.S.C. School Gun-Free Flaherty next of- it a federal made which 922(q)(l)(A), com- interstate prove the to was insufficient relevant, commented the court it make the extent this, "[t]o stated 5. The district set locker fire prove I am in which the manner to been an offer there has A fires. objection to it other entirely from the government’s different going sustain the to it_” 1088-89). (Tr. explicit As the required to make allow is not out, King balancing. on to elaborate points court went regarding findings dissent its Rule Rule admissibility Cir.1994). under Ahrens, 16 F.3d 404(b), the context apparent from but it is pertinent factors ruling considered that the court determination, it is not neces- of this Because colloquy counsel court’s rules. to both 404(b). sary Rule to discuss proof what over its concern showed to incident actually the locker offer about could knowingly possess fense aration, plan, firearm cetera, knowledge, et be- statute, by terms, school zone. That its cause I think fires entirely differ- “nothing to do with commerce or sort of ent. ... enterprise,” economic nor did it contain a (T. requirement possession that the be connect In excluding the evidence under Rule any way ed in to interstate commerce. Lo 404(b), 404(b) applied district court Rule pez, at -, 115 S.Ct. at broadly. too The court recognize faded to here, 1630-31. The arson statute issue any difference admitting between similar acts however, damage criminalizes the or destruc evidence for offensive pur- and defensive tion of property jur business and contains a poses. Specifically, ignored the court isdictional requiring proof element fact that the defendant offered evidence of property affected is “used in interstate or party. similar acts a third “[T]he foreign Lopez commerce.” The decision did admissibility standard of when a criminal not address the amount of defendant offers similar acts evidence as a prove explicit jurisdictional an element of shield need not be as restrictive as when a and does offense not control this case. prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword.” Finally, Flaherty asserts that the ev Aboumoussallem, United States v. 726 F.2d idence is insufficient to support jury’s (2d Cir.1984); accord United States verdict because does not show that Flaher Cohen, Cir.1989). 888 F.2d ty started the fires or aided and abetted Several recognized courts have this distinc- Melina. haveWe reviewed the evidence sub tion, concluding that evidence of per a third mitted at trial and conclude that it is suffi son’s similar acts is not excluded under Rule cient support the verdict. 404(b) when the defendant seeking to ad For the stated reasons judgment of mit prove the evidence to some fact relevant affirmed, conviction is and the motion See, e.g., his defense. United States v. pending appeal release is dismissed as moot. Blum, (2d (court Cir.1995) 67-68 abused its in excluding discretion evidence of GIBSON, JOHN R. Judge, Circuit personal witness’ motive to evi fabricate dissenting. dence); Cohen, (court at 775-77 I respectfully dissent. I think the district erred in excluding evidence that witness had court abused its discretion in excluding evi- been scheme); involved in similar Aboum dence of the fire set T.E.H. The court oussallem, (evidence 726 F.2d at 912 today concludes that the district court ex- defendant’s duped person cousins another cluded the evidence of the fire set T.E.H. into transporting hashish not inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because 404(b)). under Rule justified This result is probative value of the 404(b) because Rule typically applies to ex slight. Although government objected clude evidence that prosecution *8 seeks to the evidence based on Federal Rules of Evi- introduce to show the accused committed a 404(b) 403, dence the district court’s crime on another occasion. Fed.R.Evid. ruling could not straightforward. be more 404(b), advisory committee’s note. The rea The district court excluded the un- evidence son excluding prior crimes evidence is the 404(b), der Rule under The district danger that the jury will use the evidence of court stated: prior a crime as a inferring basis for I going am to sustain the Government’s defendant committed charged crime. objection it, to it and not allow concluding United DeAngelo, States v. 1228, that it is evidence of (8th other crimes Cir.), denied, and its 1232 U.S. -, cert. only purpose in put being forward, 2717, 129 not- 114 (1994). L.Ed.2d 842 This withstanding representations justification of coun- when, is not implicated here, as sel, is prove to the character of the individ- the defendant prove offers evidence to ual in involved order to show action and some fact defense, relevant to his namely, conformity therewith. I don’t think it fits someone else have committed the any of the other exceptions intent, of prep- Flaherty attempted crime. to use evidence

975 (motive of Blum, crime); F.3d 68 62 support his defense to prior crime T.E.H.’s of recognized crime to commit party third danger that Thus, was no there theory. the lock- 404(b)). Besides to Rule exception con- inference improper make the jury would supporting fire, evidence was other there er 404(b). See Huddleston by Rule templated evidence theory. There was Flaherty’s 681, 108 S.Ct. States, 485 U.S. v. United job at the restau- fired from T.E.H. was (1988) (discussing ad- 771 1496, L.Ed.2d 99 dispute with long-standing a and had evidence). rant act similar of mission to went son, Brady. T.E.H. Flaherty’s evade de chat to pas ado must The court physical had Brady, and several with school Rule of misapplication court’s the district Brady. confrontations and verbal is of evidence the T.E.H. 404(b), saying that . addition in evidence There was Flaherty made because probative value little Brady kicked Brady, T.E.H. had threatening court states The proof. offer a weak in the ribs. locker school of the evidence and a charge arson dismissed a fire was ruling its base did not district court As the court fire. eyewitness possible saying it did 403, without goes Rule lacking because evidence also finds required balancing test perform not similar. fires were today rules the court Although rule. value, the “slight” probative copy however, evidence offered, a certified evi- the value balance arson fails to charging T.E.W. with complaint of the as prejudice danger of unfair school arising dence with out degree the first 403, appellate an if indeed County by Rule Hennepin as fire well locker fact-finding func- this perform file could This the incident. attorney’s file about “un- no articulation has including witness’ been tion. There report, police contains how the T.E.H. I not see evaluation, case do prejudice.” fair statements, pretrial jury to decide ‘"wouldinfluence documents evidence summary. These disposition King v. basis.” improper dis on an charge the case arson T.E.H.’s show that (in- Cir.1994) (8th 265, Ahrens, 269 guilty F.3d plea T.E.H.’s exchange missed omitted). view, my Flaher- burglary citation ternal offense included the lesser this introduce able charge been ty have the arson should That degree.7 the second that someone his defense support factual has no ultimately dismissed Dowling the fire. started See else in this ease. significance legal 668, 342, 110 S.Ct. States, 493 U.S. v. United T.E.H. of the The exclusion testimony (1990) (admitting 107 L.Ed.2d Lucas, Michigan v. See error. prejudicial the defendant alleged crime that about 150-152, 111 S.Ct. committing); United acquitted (1991); States 114 L.Ed.2d Cir.1982), F.2d Riley, Cir. 454-57 Stops, 997 Bear denied, rt. ce for a remand would reverse I Moreover, L.Ed.2d trial. new sophisticated were more fires restaurant not bolster does locker fire school than Flaherty did not today. ruling the court’s prove locker offer the fires or that character

T.E.H.’s 404(b). Flah- *9 Fed.R.Evid. acts. See similar possi prove the

erty offered fire. See person set another

bility that Perkins, (defendant intro Cir.1991) entitled committed else that someone

duce December set the restaurant fires at pretrial T.E.H.’s the fact that interest 7. Of January 1989. disposition documents and case evaluation January December dated

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. John Charles Flaherty
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 27, 1996
Citation: 76 F.3d 967
Docket Number: 95-1874
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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